Peo in Interest of SH - Judgment Affirmed, Division IV

Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

April 23, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Peo in Interest of SH

Colorado Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25CA1734

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (92.2K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

25CA1734 Peo in Interest of SH 04-23-2026

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS

Court of Appeals No. 25CA1734
Mesa County District Court No. 23JV62
Honorable Matthew D. Barrett, Judge

The People of the State of Colorado,

Appellee,

In the Interest of S.H., E.H., A.H., and V.H., Children,

and Concerning S.K.,

Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED

Division IV
Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ
Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur

NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)
Announced April 23, 2026

Todd M. Starr, County Attorney, John R. Rhoads, Assistant County Attorney,
Grand Junction, Colorado, for Appellee

Josie L. Burt, Counsel for Youth, Glenwood Springs, Colorado, for S.H.

Jenna L. Mazzucca, Guardian Ad Litem for E.H., A.H., and V.H.

Andrew A. Gargano, Office of Respondent Parents’ Counsel, Denver Colorado,
for Appellant
¶1 S.K. (mother) appeals the judgment terminating her parent-

child legal relationships with S.H., E.H., A.H., and V.H. (the

children). We affirm.

I. Background

¶2 In August 2022, the Mesa County Department of Human

Services initiated a dependency or neglect action, alleging that

mother struggled with issues of mental health, substance abuse,

domestic violence, and homelessness. The Department removed the

children, but after mother agreed to stay at a family shelter and

enter into a deferred adjudication agreement, the Department

returned the children to her care. In May 2023, the juvenile court

dismissed the case at the Department’s request.

¶3 After the initial dependency or neglect case closed, the

Department continued to provide the family with services, which

they could access on a voluntary basis. Less than two months

later, mother was contacted by law enforcement and placed on a

mental health hold after an incident in which she believed the

family was in danger, ran into the street with the children, and

brandished a machete. The Department removed the children

again and filed a new petition in dependency or neglect.

1
¶4 Mother denied the allegations in the petition and asked for a

jury trial. After trial, the jury determined that the Department had

proven the allegations, and the juvenile court sustained the petition

and adjudicated the children dependent or neglected.

¶5 The juvenile court then held a dispositional hearing and

adopted a treatment plan for mother that required, among other

things, that she complete a psychological evaluation and specialized

family assessment, participate in therapeutic parenting time and a

parenting class, engage in life skills training, and maintain stable

housing and employment.

¶6 In June 2024, the Department moved to terminate mother’s

parental rights. The juvenile court held an evidentiary hearing over

six days in July 2025. After hearing the evidence, the court

determined that, although mother had participated in some of the

services provided by the Department, she continued to struggle with

the same issues that prompted the dependency or neglect cases.

The court then determined that an allocation of parental

responsibilities (APR) to either D.M. (maternal grandmother) or S.H.

(maternal aunt) was not a less drastic alternative to termination.

2
As a result, the court terminated the parent-child legal relationship

between mother and the children.

II. In Camera Interview

¶7 Mother asserts that the juvenile court violated her due process

right to confrontation and cross-examination when it conducted an

in camera interview of her child, E.H. In the alternative, she

maintains that, even if she did not have a constitutional right to

confront and cross-examine E.H., the court abused its discretion by

allowing the in camera interview. As explained below, mother failed

to preserve her contention for appellate review, so we decline to

address it for the first time on appeal.

¶8 Because dependency or neglect cases are civil in nature,

“appellate courts [generally] review only issues presented to and

ruled on by the lower court.” People in Interest of M.B., 2020 COA

13, ¶ 14. To preserve a claim for appellate review, a party must

make an objection that is specific enough to alert the court to the

asserted error. People v. Tallent, 2021 CO 68, ¶ 12. “[M]erely

calling an issue or fact to the court’s attention, without asking for

any relief, is insufficient to preserve an issue for review.” Forgette v.

People, 2023 CO 4, ¶ 23.

3
¶9 In this case, the guardian ad litem (GAL) reported to the

juvenile court that E.H. wanted to testify. But the GAL did not

believe that it would be in E.H.’s best interests to do so in open

court, so the GAL asked the court to conduct an in camera

interview of E.H. See People in Interest of H.K.W., 2017 COA 70,

¶ 17 (concluding that section 19-1-106, C.R.S. 2025, permits

juvenile courts to conduct in camera interviews of children in

dependency or neglect cases).

¶ 10 When the court asked for mother’s position, her attorney

stated the following:

Here’s the struggle. It’s — I agree that that
putting [E.H.] on the stand and having him
have to testify in front of all of us could
potentially be very detrimental. And that’s
something that, you know, we are weighing in
balancing with [mother’s] constitutional rights,
due process rights, all those things in a
termination hearing.

The juvenile court then interjected with the following:

[B]efore we get much further, the question I’m
going to pose to you is: this is about the best
interest of the child. This is not a criminal
case. So I don’t want there to be some
confusion between what the rights look like
across these different types of cases. And
you’re going to have to at least explain to me
why it’s — the best interests of [E.H.] are

4
served by requiring him to testify, and be
subject to cross examination through mother’s
counsel, about things that he doesn’t want to
share with everyone here. And how those best
interests are trumped by that ability to cross
examine[.]

Mother’s counsel said that she agreed with the court and that was

why she was requesting the opportunity to “give the [c]ourt any

questions that the parties may feel [are] appropriate to ask him.”

See People in Interest of S.L., 2017 COA 160, ¶¶ 48-49 (“[I]n the

interests of fairness and to allow for the development of a full

record, the trial court should allow the parents or trial counsel to

submit questions to the child, which the court may ask in its

discretion.”).

¶ 11 Based on this exchange, we conclude that mother failed to

preserve her argument for purposes of appeal. Mother contends

that she objected to the in camera interview and only agreed to it

after the court denied her request. But mother’s counsel never

made any specific objection to the in camera interview. See Tallent,

¶ 12. Nor did she assert that mother had a constitutional right to

confront witnesses through cross-examination that would be

violated by the in camera interview. Rather, she only noted her

5
concern about the balancing of the child’s best interests with

mother’s constitutional rights. See Forgette, ¶ 23. And she

ultimately agreed with the court that an in camera interview was

appropriate in this case.

¶ 12 Because mother failed to object to an in camera interview on

either ground that she raises on appeal, we decline to address the

merits of her argument. See M.B., ¶ 14.

III. Termination of Parental Rights

¶ 13 Mother next contends that the juvenile court erred by

terminating her parental rights. We are not persuaded.

A. Termination Criteria and Standard of Review

¶ 14 Under section 19-3-604(1)(c), C.R.S. 2025, the juvenile court

may terminate parental rights if it finds, by clear and convincing

evidence, that (1) the child has been adjudicated dependent or

neglected; (2) the parent has not reasonably complied with an

appropriate treatment plan or the plan has not been successful; (3)

the parent is unfit; and (4) the parent’s conduct or condition is

unlikely to change within a reasonable time.

¶ 15 Whether a juvenile court properly terminated parental rights

presents a mixed question of law and fact because it involves

6
application of the termination statute to evidentiary facts. People in

Interest of A.M. v. T.M., 2021 CO 14, ¶ 15. We review the court’s

factual findings for clear error, but we review de novo its legal

conclusions based on those facts. People in Interest of S.R.N.J-S.,

2020 COA 12, ¶ 10.

¶ 16 The credibility of the witnesses; sufficiency, probative value,

and weight of the evidence; and the inferences and conclusions

drawn therefrom are within the juvenile court’s discretion. People

in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244, 249-50 (Colo. 2010). We

therefore cannot reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment

for that of the juvenile court. People in Interest of S.Z.S., 2022 COA

133, ¶ 29.

B. Appropriate Treatment Plan

¶ 17 Mother argues that the juvenile court erred by determining

that her treatment plan was appropriate. We disagree.

¶ 18 A treatment plan is appropriate if it is (1) reasonably

calculated to render the parent fit to provide adequate parenting to

the child within a reasonable time and (2) relates to the child’s

needs. § 19-1-103(12), C.R.S. 2025. An appropriate treatment plan

must “address the safety concerns identified during the assessment

7
of the family.” People in Interest of K.B., 2016 COA 21, ¶ 14. We

measure the appropriateness of a treatment plan by its likelihood of

success in reuniting the family, “which must be assessed in light of

the facts existing at the time of the plan’s approval.” People in

Interest of B.C., 122 P.3d 1067, 1071 (Colo. App. 2005).

¶ 19 The primary purpose of a treatment plan is “to reunite a

parent and child in the kind of relationship [that] will be beneficial

to both, under conditions [that] are designed to eliminate those

factors [that] necessitated society’s intrusion into the family in the

first instance.” People in Interest of B.J.D., 626 P.2d 727, 730 (Colo.

App. 1981). A plan must be designed to achieve this objective but

do so in a way that is consistent with ensuring the health and

welfare of the children. § 19-3-208(2)(a) C.R.S. 2025 (‘“Services’

shall be designed to . . . promote the immediate health, safety, and

well-being of children eligible for these services based upon the case

assessment and individual case plan[.]”).

¶ 20 The juvenile court found that mother’s treatment plan was

appropriate and that it addressed the main concerns that brought

the family to the Department’s attention. The record supports the

8
court’s finding. The first caseworker1 testified that she developed

the treatment plan based on what worked and did not work for the

family during the first dependency or neglect case and the

subsequent voluntary services. The caseworker said that mother’s

mental health presented differently in this case, and she therefore

believed that the treatment plan needed to “delve[] deeper” into

mother’s underlying issues by including a psychological evaluation

and therapeutic family time. Overall, the caseworker opined that

the treatment plan was appropriate because it “was mindfully

created in implementing services that would mitigate the concerns”

and the reasons “why the Department got involved with this family

again.”

¶ 21 Mother contends that her treatment plan was inappropriate

because she could not complete it, given her inability to access

E.H.’s therapeutic information. We disagree for the following two

reasons.

¶ 22 First, mother’s challenge to the treatment plan is based on her

contention that the juvenile court erred by allowing E.H. to hold his

1 There were three different caseworkers assigned to this family. We
refer to them in the chronological order that they served in the case.

9
own therapeutic privilege. See L.A.N. v. L.M.B., 2013 CO 6, ¶ 27

(concluding that, “when neither the child nor the child’s parent(s)

have [the] authority” to hold the child’s psychotherapist-patient

privilege, then “the GAL should hold the child’s privilege”). But

mother never objected to E.H. holding his own therapeutic privilege.

See Tallent, ¶ 12. Because mother failed to object in the juvenile

court, we will not address for the first time on appeal her challenge

to the court’s decision to allow E.H. to hold his own privilege. See

M.B., ¶ 14.

¶ 23 Second, mother maintains that her treatment plan was

inappropriate because she was prevented from “understanding

[E.H.’s] needs and refusal to attend parenting time.” But the record

shows that mother received information about E.H.’s needs and his

refusal to attend parenting time through multiple sources, such as

family engagement meetings, meetings with the caseworkers,

feedback from therapeutic family time supervisors, and professional

reports. And even if mother had been allowed to access information

from E.H.’s therapist, she does not explain with any specificity how

she could have used that information to complete her treatment

plan.

10
¶ 24 Mother next asserts that her treatment plan was inappropriate

because it did not include a domestic violence component. The

record indicates that mother had a history of domestic violence

issues, but domestic violence was not one of the core concerns that

necessitated the Department’s intervention in this case. See B.C.,

122 P.3d at 1071. And although the treatment plan did not include

a domestic violence component, it still provided for services —

namely, individual therapy — that were intended to address

mother’s trauma history, including domestic violence. See K.B.,

¶ 23 (noting that, even though domestic violence was not explicitly

addressed in the treatment plan, the department could have offered

services to adequately address it). Therefore, we are not convinced

that mother’s treatment plan was inappropriate because it did not

specifically address domestic violence.

¶ 25 Finally, mother asserts that, because her treatment plan was

inappropriate, the Department had an obligation to request

modification of it. See People in Interest of Z.P.S., 2016 COA 20,

¶ 26 (“[C]hanged circumstances may render a treatment plan,

previously approved at a dispositional hearing, no longer

11
appropriate.”). But because we have concluded that the treatment

plan was appropriate, mother’s argument necessarily fails.

C. Reasonable Efforts

¶ 26 Mother asserts that the Department did not make reasonable

efforts to rehabilitate her and reunify her with the children. We are

not persuaded.

¶ 27 In determining fitness under section 19-3-604(1)(c), the

juvenile court must consider whether the county department of

human services made reasonable efforts to rehabilitate the parent

and reunite the family. §§ 19-1-103(114), 19-3-208, 19-3-604(2)(h),

C.R.S. 2025. “Reasonable efforts” is defined as the “exercise of

diligence and care” to reunify parents with their children, and the

department’s reasonable efforts obligation is satisfied if it provides

appropriate services in accordance with section 19-3-208. § 19-1-

103(114).

¶ 28 When determined “necessary and appropriate,” the

department must provide (1) screening, assessments, and

individual case plans; (2) home-based family and crisis counseling;

(3) information and referral services; (4) family time; and

(5) placement services. § 19-3-208(2)(b). The juvenile court should

12
consider whether the services provided were appropriate to support

the parent’s treatment plan, People in Interest of S.N-V., 300 P.3d

911, 915 (Colo. App. 2011), by “considering the totality of the

circumstances and accounting for all services and resources

provided to a parent to ensure the completion of the entire

treatment plan,” People in Interest of My.K.M. v. V.K.L., 2022 CO 35,

¶ 33.

¶ 29 The juvenile court found that the Department made

reasonable efforts to rehabilitate mother and reunify her with the

children. The record supports the court’s findings. The

caseworkers testified that the Department authorized services for

mother to complete her treatment plan, including referrals for

family time, a psychological evaluation, a specialized family

assessment, and life skills. The caseworkers also testified that the

Department provided the children with mentors, coaches, and

individual therapy.

¶ 30 Nevertheless, mother presents arguments articulating why she

believes that the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. We

address these arguments in turn.

13
1. Housing

¶ 31 Mother asserts that the Department did not provide her with

adequate housing resources because it only (1) gave her a vehicle

and expected her to use it for shelter and (2) recommended that she

apply for a voucher program with a long waitlist. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 32 Recall that a department can meet its reasonable efforts

obligation by providing appropriate services under section 19-3-

1. See § 19-1-103(114). However, section 19-3-208 does not

explicitly require the Department to provide housing resources. See

People in Interest of A.R., 2012 COA 195M, ¶ 28 (noting that, as

compared to the active efforts standard, a department may be able

to satisfy the reasonable efforts standard by passively “requiring a

parent to . . . acquire new housing”). At most, section 19-3-

208(2)(b)(III) requires the Department to provide “[i]nformation and

referral services to available public and private assistance

resources.”

¶ 33 Because the record shows that the Department provided

mother with information and referrals to housing resources, we

reject her argument. The first caseworker testified that, in the first

14
dependency or neglect case, the Department arranged for the family

to stay at a shelter and then assisted mother with applying for

housing through the local authorities. The caseworker said that,

during the second case, mother’s application had expired, so she

helped mother submit a new application. The record also shows

that mother had a life skills worker, who helped her access

information on employment and housing.

¶ 34 Contrary to mother’s assertion, nothing in the record suggests

that the Department expected mother to live in her car. Rather, the

first caseworker’s testimony indicated that, when mother asked for

a car, she said that she wanted to use it “as a form of shelter and to

keep warm.” We see no evidence, and mother has not directed us

to any, showing that the Department believed that providing mother

with a car was enough to satisfy its reasonable efforts requirement

to help with housing.

¶ 35 As for mother’s assertion that the housing voucher program

had a three-year waitlist, she has not directed us to any competent

evidence in the record to support that contention. Rather, she

points to unsworn statements from her own attorney, as well as

secondhand statements within a report that was not admitted at

15
the termination hearing. These statements are not evidence, and

the juvenile court could not properly consider them at the

termination hearing. Therefore, we cannot consider them on appeal

either.

1. Family Time

¶ 36 Mother contends that the Department failed to make

reasonable efforts because it did not (1) provide her with “sufficient”

parenting time; (2) ensure that E.H. attended family time; and

(3) refer her to family therapy. We disagree.

¶ 37 To satisfy the reasonable efforts requirement, a department

must make available and provide “[f]amily time services for parents

with children or youth in out-of-home placement.” § 19-3-

208(2)(b)(IV). Family time services must be provided “as determined

necessary and appropriate by individual case plans.” § 19-3-

208(2)(a)-(b). A court may not restrict family time services unless it

determines that family time would be detrimental to the child’s

health and safety. § 19-3-217(3), C.R.S. 2025; see also People in

Interest of E.S., 2021 COA 79, ¶ 23. Because the court must make

decisions about family time, it cannot delegate its authority to do so

to other parties. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71.

16
¶ 38 Mother first asserts that the Department did not provide her

with “sufficient” parenting time because she had only one hour per

week of therapeutic family time with each child, and even though

she was making progress, her therapeutic supervisors never

recommended any changes to her family time. In other words, she

maintains that, because the family time services were insufficient to

reunify her with the children, the Department failed to provide

“adequate” family time services as required by section 19-3-

208(2)(a)-(b). We are not persuaded.

¶ 39 Mother’s treatment plan stated that she would have

therapeutic family time with all four children, along with an

additional hour and a half long supervised community visit every

other week. Around February 2024, the Department agreed to

transition all of mother’s visits to regular supervised family time.

However, the family time supervisor soon reported that the

community visits had become chaotic and expressed concerns

about the lack of therapeutic interventions.

¶ 40 In July 2024, the Department moved to restrict mother’s

family time to “one therapeutic visit per week with each child.” The

Department alleged, among other things, that mother could not

17
“maintain control of all four children during the visits” and that the

children were becoming “dysregulated before, during, and after

visits.” Therefore, the Department maintained that individual visits

with each child would “better support the building of the

relationship between” mother and each child.

¶ 41 A magistrate held an evidentiary hearing over two days in July

and August 2024. See § 19-3-217(3) (stating that “a parent granted

family time is entitled to a hearing prior to an ongoing reduction in,

suspension of, or increase in the level of supervision” of family time,

unless there is agreement by the parties). After hearing the

evidence, the magistrate determined that mother did not exhibit an

awareness of the children’s emotional well-being and therefore

community visits were no longer safe for the children. The

magistrate held a review hearing about a month later to determine

whether the community visits should be reinstated, but after

hearing from the therapeutic family time supervisors, the

magistrate maintained its previous order.

¶ 42 Mother never challenged the magistrate’s order restricting her

parenting time. Nor did she file a motion before the termination

hearing requesting that the juvenile court reinstate the previous

18
family time order or otherwise expand her family time. Instead,

mother asserted at the termination hearing that the Department

failed to make reasonable efforts because it did not exercise its

discretion to expand her family time. See § 19-3-217(2) (allowing

juvenile courts to grant discretion to the department “to increase

opportunities for additional parent-child contacts or sibling

contacts without further court order”).

¶ 43 At the termination hearing, the evidence established that,

although mother had made some recent progress during

therapeutic visits, the family time supervisors did not recommend

expanding visits or modifying the supervision level. For example,

one supervisor testified that the children still do not emotionally

trust mother and that the children were having trouble progressing

during visits because the case had been opened for so long without

any changes. The other therapeutic supervisor testified that mother

could, at best, inconsistently provide for the children’s emotional

needs because of “her own emotional state.”

¶ 44 Based on this evidence, the juvenile court found that the

Department provided adequate family time services, noting that

mother initially had family time with all the children but that those

19
visits were “too chaotic.” The court also found that the Department

attempted to “tailor the visits to facilitate maximum success,” but

family time had not “expanded” because of a lack of progress. The

court was not persuaded by mother’s assertion that the Department

was to blame for the lack of progress, concluding instead that the

“stagnation [was] due to the incredible harm [mother] ha[d] caused

the children,” including her inability to “meet the children’s

emotional needs.”

¶ 45 The record therefore supports the juvenile court’s finding that

the Department provided mother with adequate family time in view

of the existing circumstances, and we cannot reweigh the evidence

or substitute our judgment to reach a different result. See S.Z.S.,

¶ 29. We therefore discern no basis to disturb the court’s

reasonable efforts finding with respect to the adequacy of family

time. See E.D., ¶ 46 (rejecting the parent’s assertion that the

Department failed to make reasonable efforts to expand family time

because “[t]he record supports that limiting [the parent’s] family

time to a therapeutic setting was necessary for the youth’s safety

and mental, emotional, and physical health”).

20
¶ 46 Next, mother contends that the Department failed to provide

her with family time with E.H. because it allowed E.H, the foster

parents, or the professionals to effectively veto family time. We

agree with mother that the juvenile court alone has the authority to

control decisions about family time and that other parties (e.g.,

therapists, caseworkers, foster parents, or children) do not have

veto power over family time. See B.C., 122 P.3d at 1070-71. We

also disavow any notion that children should be saddled with the

burden of deciding whether family time is appropriate or that they

should be emboldened to reject family time.

¶ 47 That said, because the record in this case indicates that the

Department and its providers made efforts to encourage E.H. to

attend family time, we discern no error. For example, E.H.’s

therapeutic family time supervisor testified that visits were

scheduled and available each week, and she would speak with E.H.

each time about attending the visit. She also said that she

encouraged E.H. and mother to write letters to facilitate a

conversation in hopes of restarting visits. And the caseworker

made similar efforts by speaking with E.H. about attending family

time and arranging for mother to write letters to encourage E.H.’s

21
attendance. Accordingly, based on this record, we cannot say that

the Department failed to make reasonable efforts. See E.D., ¶ 3

(holding that a department can make reasonable efforts by

“providing appropriate therapeutic family time services . . . even if

those services don’t successfully result in face-to-face contact”).

¶ 48 We also reject mother’s contention that the Department did

not make reasonable efforts because it declined to refer her to

family therapy with her children. Notably, mother’s treatment plan

did not include any requirement that she engage in family therapy,

and although mother’s specialized family assessment recommended

family therapy, it did so with respect to therapy between mother

and maternal grandmother. Mother asserts that the Department

still should have made a referral to family therapy because the

therapeutic family time supervisor and providers in the first

dependency or neglect case recommended it. But the first

caseworker and the caseworker supervisor testified that they did

not authorize family therapy for mother and the children because

neither mother’s therapist nor the children’s therapists

recommended it. See My.K.M., ¶ 33 (allowing departments to

22
“prioritize certain services or resources to address a family’s most

pressing needs”).

1. Other Miscellaneous Contentions

¶ 49 Mother raises five additional contentions, some with various

subparts. We address them in turn.

¶ 50 First, mother argues that the “Department’s errors inhibited

[her] progress.” Specifically, she takes issues with (1) the first

caseworker’s admitted bias against maternal grandmother; (2) the

second caseworker’s inappropriate communications to her; and

(3) the Department’s “mixed messages” about success. The juvenile

court specifically addressed and rejected the first two points

because the caseworkers’ behavior had “no bearing” on mother’s

ability to successfully complete the treatment plan. Mother does

not directly challenge this finding, and because it’s supported by

the record, we cannot second-guess it. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 51 As to the Department’s “mixed messages,” mother provides

two minor examples, and we are not convinced, given that mother’s

treatment plan provided concrete measurements of success, that

any minimal confusion could result in a lack of reasonable efforts.

23
See My.K.M., ¶ 35 (noting that the department’s efforts “must be

measured holistically rather than in isolation”).

¶ 52 Second, mother asserts the Department did not make

reasonable efforts when it did not provide her with information

about the children’s therapy or needs. In support, mother notes

that she was not allowed to attend (1) meetings between the

professionals and (2) the Department’s management team staffing

sessions. But mother met with the caseworkers on a regular basis,

attended family engagement meetings, and received reports and

feedback from the professionals. Therefore, the Department

provided mother with information about the children’s needs, even

though she was not allowed to attend every meeting.

¶ 53 Third, mother contends that the Department “failed to make

efforts focused on reunification.” We see nothing in this section

suggesting that the Department failed to provide the services

required by section 19-3-208. At best, mother asserts that the

Department did not do enough to provide sibling visits. See § 19-1-

103 (defining family time as “any form of contact or engagement

between . . . siblings . . . for the purposes of preserving and

strengthening family ties”). But we are not convinced that the

24
Department failed to make reasonable efforts by not arranging more

sibling visits, considering that the record shows — and the juvenile

court found — that the children tended to “retraumatize each other”

and therefore could not be placed together.

¶ 54 Fourth, mother maintains that the Department did not make

efforts to support a kin placement. We are not persuaded because

(1) the record shows that the Department did provide resources for

the maternal grandparents while the children were in their care and

(2) mother does not point us to any authority requiring the

Department to provide additional resources to kin — especially

when the children are not placed with kin — to satisfy its

reasonable efforts obligation.

¶ 55 Finally, mother asserts that the juvenile court erred by

delaying consideration of reasonable efforts until the termination

hearing. We do not condone the practice of delaying consideration

of reasonable efforts until the termination hearing because doing so

could prevent the parent from addressing actual or perceived

ongoing problems with the services provided. And although we

acknowledge that the court’s decision to delay resolution of the

reasonable efforts issue in this case is problematic, we are not

25
persuaded that the result would have been different if the court

held an earlier hearing. We therefore discern no harm associated

with the delay in resolving mother’s reasonable efforts motion.

D. Fit Within a Reasonable Time

¶ 56 Mother contends that the juvenile court erred by finding that

she could not become fit within a reasonable time. We are not

persuaded.

¶ 57 An unfit parent is one whose conduct or condition renders the

parent unable or unwilling to give a child reasonable parental care.

People in Interest of D.P., 160 P.3d 351, 353 (Colo. App. 2007).

Reasonable parental care requires, at a minimum, that the parent

provide nurturing and safe parenting sufficiently adequate to meet

the child’s physical, emotional, and mental needs and conditions.

People in Interest of A.J., 143 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Colo. App. 2006).

¶ 58 In determining whether the parent can become fit within a

reasonable time, a juvenile court may consider whether any change

has occurred during the case, the parent’s social history, and the

chronic or long-term nature of the parent’s conduct or condition.

People in Interest of D.L.C., 70 P.3d 584, 588-89 (Colo. App. 2003).

The determination of a reasonable period is fact-specific and varies

26
from case to case. S.Z.S., ¶ 25. But a reasonable time is not an

indefinite time, and it must be determined by considering the

child’s physical, mental, and emotional conditions and needs. A.J.,

143 P.3d at 1152.

¶ 59 The juvenile court determined that mother could not become

fit within a reasonable time. In doing so, the court found that,

although mother “engage[d] and participate[d] in various aspects of

her treatment plan . . ., after two years of working on her plan, [she]

still ha[d] many of the same problems that led to the opening of this

case.” The court noted that mother only recently began to “show a

willingness to engage,” which was consistent “with her previous

efforts.” Thus, considering the children’s needs, the court

determined that it was not in their best interests to allow mother

more time to work on her treatment plan.

¶ 60 The record supports the juvenile court’s findings. For

example, the caseworker supervisor acknowledged that mother had

started engaging more in therapy and family time over the last few

months of the case, but she still opined that it was not in the

children’s best interests to give mother more time. In support, the

supervisor noted that the Department had provided services to

27
mother for nearly three years, and during that time, mother had

exhibited patterns of engagement followed by non-engagement. The

third caseworker concurred with this opinion, noting that, despite

mother’s progress over the last few months, because of her history

of “relapses,” she could not become fit within a reasonable time.

¶ 61 Mother asserts that she could become fit within a reasonable

time because she “demonstrated a substantial change” over the last

few months of the case. As discussed above, the witnesses agreed

that mother’s engagement in the treatment plan improved in the

months before the termination hearing. But even “increased

compliance” over the course of a case may not justify additional

time. People in Interest of V.W., 958 P.2d 1132, 1134-35 (Colo. App.

1998). And in this case, the juvenile court explicitly considered

mother’s improved compliance and weighed it against the contrary

evidence to reach its decision. See In re Marriage of Kann, 2017

COA 94, ¶ 36 (“[O]ur supreme court has . . . expressed unbridled

confidence in trial courts to weigh conflicting evidence.”). Under

these circumstances, we must therefore reject mother’s assertion

because it would require us to reweigh the evidence, which we

cannot do. See S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

28
E. Less Drastic Alternatives

¶ 62 Mother maintains that the juvenile court erred by finding that

there was no less drastic alternative to termination. We disagree.

¶ 63 Before terminating parental rights under section 19-3-

604(1)(c), the juvenile court must consider and eliminate less

drastic alternatives. People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108, 1122

(Colo. 1986). In considering less drastic alternatives, a court must

give primary consideration to the child’s physical, mental, and

emotional conditions and needs. § 19-3-604(3).

¶ 64 A viable less drastic alternative must do more than adequately

meet a child’s needs; rather, it must be in the child’s best interests.

A.M., ¶ 27. Therefore, if the court considers a less drastic

alternative but finds instead that termination is in the child’s best

interests, it must reject the less drastic alternative and order

termination. Id. at ¶ 32. Under those circumstances, we must

affirm the court’s decision if its findings are supported by the

record. People in Interest of B.H., 2021 CO 39, ¶ 81.

¶ 65 The juvenile court determined that there was no less drastic

alternative to termination. In doing so, the court considered

whether an APR to maternal grandmother or maternal aunt would

29
be in the children’s best interests: The court rejected an APR for the

following reasons:

• In general, the evidence established that termination and

adoption better served the needs of the children in

contrast to a placement with maternal grandmother or

aunt.

• Specifically, as to maternal grandmother, the court

considered the history of domestic violence and police

calls at maternal grandmother’s home.

• As to maternal aunt, her limited knowledge of the

children’s significant needs counseled against placement

with her. See People in Interest of D.B-J., 89 P.3d 530,

531 (Colo. App. 2004) (an APR to a relative “is not a

viable alternative to termination if the [relative] lacks

appreciation . . . of the child’s conditions or needs”).

¶ 66 On appeal, mother does not directly challenge the juvenile

court’s findings, but she nevertheless asserts that the court erred

by rejecting an APR to maternal grandmother or maternal aunt

based on (1) the mental and emotional impact of termination on

children generally; (2) the children’s bond with the maternal

30
relatives and mother; and (3) the relatives’ availability to accept an

APR. Mother is correct that a juvenile court can consider these

factors when deciding if there is a viable less drastic alternative to

termination. See, e.g., People in Interest of N.D.V., 224 P.3d 410,

421 (Colo. App. 2009). But they are just some of the relevant

factors a court may consider. See A.R., ¶ 38. And in this case, the

court considered and rejected an APR based on the above stated

findings, notwithstanding the competing considerations. Because

the record supports the juvenile court’s findings, we cannot disturb

its resulting decision. See B.H., ¶ 80; S.Z.S., ¶ 29.

¶ 67 In the alternative, mother maintains that we should reverse

the termination judgment because the Department failed to make

intensive, ongoing efforts to identify relative placement options. To

aid the juvenile court in determining whether there is a less drastic

alternative to termination, a department must evaluate a

reasonable number of people as potential placement options. D.B-

J., 89 P.3d at 532. The record shows that the Department

evaluated maternal grandmother and maternal aunt for placement.

And mother has not identified any other relatives that were

31
available for placement (and willing to accept an APR) but not

investigated by the Department. We therefore discern no error.

IV. Disposition

¶ 68 The judgment is affirmed.

JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.

32