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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Washington, S.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 62 WDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Olson

• Opinion

• Authorities (14)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.7K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by [Judith Ference Olson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8241/judith-ference-olson/)

J-A06006-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SHARONN KEIT WASHINGTON :
:
Appellant : No. 62 WDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered December 16, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-02-CR-0002620-2024

BEFORE: OLSON, J., MURRAY, J., and BECK, J.

MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED: March 25, 2026

Appellant, Sharonn Keit Washington, appeals from the judgment of

sentenced entered on December 16, 2024, following his bench trial convictions

for persons not to possess a firearm and evading arrest or detention on foot.1

We affirm.

We briefly summarize the facts and procedural history of this case as

follows. On April 3, 2024, Deputy Thomas Cramer of the Allegheny County

Sherriff’s Department observed a white SUV commit a traffic violation when

the vehicle continued going straight instead of making a mandatory right turn

as indicated by clearly marked traffic signage.2 N.T., 11/27/2024, at 3.

Appellant was the front passenger. Deputy Cramer smelled the odor of

---

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105 and 5104.2, respectively.

2 Appellant does not challenge the validity of the traffic stop.
J-A06006-26

marijuana emanating from the vehicle. Id. at 4. He asked Appellant, the

driver, and a rear passenger to provide identification. Id. Appellant and the

driver produced identification and there were no active arrest warrants for

either of them. Id. The rear passenger, however, denied having identification

and provided a false name to Deputy Cramer. Id. As a result, Deputy Cramer

ordered all three occupants out of the vehicle. Id. Deputy Cramer frisked

Appellant for officer safety and did not find anything on Appellant’s person

initially. Id. Eventually, the rear passenger provided his real name, Deputy

Cramer determined that there was an active warrant for his arrest, and the

rear passenger was detained. Id. at 5. Deputy Cramer then asked the driver

and Appellant if there was contraband in the car. The driver replied that there

was marijuana and consented to a search of her vehicle. Id. Deputy Cramer

retrieved a black bag containing two bags of suspected marijuana and a digital

scale from the driver’s side of the vehicle. Id. Deputy Cramer asked the

driver and Appellant if they were carrying contraband. Id. The driver lifted

her shirt to show the officer that she did not have a weapon tucked in her

waistband. Id. at 6. Deputy Cramer testified that Appellant gave verbal

consent to search him. Id. When Deputy Cramer lifted Appellant’s hoodie,

there was a visible firearm in his waistband. Id. Appellant fled on foot. Id.

Deputy Cramer tasered Appellant and apprehended him. Id. The

Commonwealth charged Appellant with the aforementioned crimes.

Prior to trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress the firearm recovered

from his waistband during a second search. The trial court held a suppression

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hearing on September 23, 2024. At the suppression hearing, the

Commonwealth presented the police body camera footage as recorded by

Deputy Cramer. Id. Appellant testified that he did not consent to a second

search of his person, “maintain[ing] that he told Deputy Cramer, that you

already checked me, you already searched me.” Id. at 7.

Ultimately, the trial court entered its findings of fact into the record on

November 27, 2024, immediately prior to a bench trial. The trial court

determined that Appellant consented to the search based upon its review of

Deputy Cramer’s body camera footage, which showed that Appellant stated,

”you can check me, sir, I don’t have nothing on me.” Id. at 8. The trial court

concluded that the suppression testimony, together with the court’s

observations of Deputy Cramer’s body camera video, supported the finding

that the second search of Appellant’s person was not the product of coercion

and that Appellant freely chose to consent. Id. at 10. Accordingly, the trial

court denied suppression and proceeded directly to the bench trial. Id. The

trial court found Appellant guilty of the two charged crimes. Id. at 20. On

December 16, 2024, the trial court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term

of 5½ to 11 years of incarceration. This timely appeal resulted.3

---

3 On January 14, 2025, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal and,
thereafter, complied timely with the trial court’s direction to file a concise
statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
On May 20, 2025, the trial court filed a statement in lieu of an opinion pursuant
to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), “rel[ying] on its findings of facts and conclusions of law
as found on pages [one] through 10 of the November 27, 2024 suppression
ruling and non-jury trial transcript.” Trial Cout Statement in Lieu of Opinion,
5/20/2025, at 3 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

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J-A06006-26

On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
   matter of law by denying Appellant’s motion for suppression
   when the officer unlawfully conducted a second search of
   Appellant in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the United
   States Constitution and Article I, Section VIII of the
   Pennsylvania Constitution?

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
   matter of law by denying Appellant’s motion for suppression
   after finding that Appellant provided the officer consent to
   conduct a second search?

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as a
   matter of law by denying Appellant’s motion for suppression
   when Article I, Section VIII of the Pennsylvania Constitution
   should require that police inform individuals that they have the
   right to refuse consent prior to conducting a warrantless
   search?

Appellant’s Brief at 6 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

All three of Appellant’s issues challenge the trial court’s ruling on

suppression and we will examine them together. First, Appellant argues that

Deputy Cramer frisked him for weapons when he initially exited the vehicle in

question and when he did not find any weapons, Deputy Cramer allowed

Appellant to smoke a cigarette. Id. at 17-18. Appellant contends that

“[n]early fifteen minutes after the initial frisk which yielded no weapons,” he

asked Appellant if there was any contraband on his person. Id. at 18.

Appellant claims he stated, “you just checked me,” but that Deputy Cramer

never asked for consent to search Appellant and, instead, reached into

Appellant’s hoodie pocket, lifted the garment up to reveal Appellant’s

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J-A06006-26

waistband, while saying, “let me check your pockets real quick.” Id.

Appellant concedes that the “trial court listened to the [police camera] video

which was [presented as] Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 [at] the suppression

hearing,” but argues that “[t]he trial court incorrectly interpreted what

Appellant said moments before police officers searched him[.]” Id. at 19; see

also id. at 20 (“[T]he record reflects that the trial court interpreted Appellant’s

statements in a manner not supported by the actual video and audio evidence

presented at the [suppression] hearing [as] compounded by the officer’s

testimony, which also misstated what Appellant said during the incident. … A

fair review of the video and audio demonstrates that the statements were

misheard and did not provide consent for a search.”); see also id. at 22

(“Upon review of Deputy Cramer’s body worn camera footage, Appellant did

not give consent to be searched a second time. Appellant testified to the

same.”). Appellant argues that this Court should “listen to the video and make

its own assessment of what Appellant actually said.” Id. at 20. In the

alternative, Appellant contends that “[s]hould [this] Court find that Appellant

provided consent, the consent was not voluntarily given” because “Deputy

Cramer was going to search Appellant and [] his hoodie regardless of what

Appellant said.” Id. at 22. Finally, Appellant suggests that despite our

Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Cleckley, 738

A.2d 427 (Pa. 1999) stating otherwise, “[t]he law in Pennsylvania should be

that officers are required to inform individuals that they have the right to

refuse consent” to search. Id. at 28-29. Because the Pennsylvania

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J-A06006-26

Constitution “provides greater protection than the Fourth Amendment” to the

United States Constitution and the Cleckley decision is over 25 years old,

Appellant maintains that “Cleckley should be overturned” and “Deputy

Cramer should have informed Appellant that he could refuse consent;

therefore, the evidence should [have been] suppressed.” Id. at 29 and 33.

We adhere to the following standards of review:

When reviewing the propriety of a suppression order, an
appellate court is required to determine whether the record
supports the suppression court's factual findings and
whether the inferences and legal conclusions drawn by the
suppression court from those findings are appropriate.
Where the defendant prevailed in the suppression court, we
may consider only the evidence of the defense and so much
of the evidence for the Commonwealth as remains
uncontradicted when read in the context of the record as a
whole. Where the record supports the factual findings of the
suppression court, we are bound by those facts and may
reverse only if the legal conclusions drawn therefrom are in
error. However, where the appeal of the determination of
the suppression court turns on allegations of legal error, the
suppression court's conclusions of law are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine if the
suppression court properly applied the law to the facts.

Commonwealth v. Tillery, 249 A.3d 278, 280-281 (Pa. Super.
2021) (citation and brackets omitted)

“We are highly deferential to the suppression court's factual
findings and credibility determinations.” Commonwealth v.
Carmenates, 266 A.3d 1117, 1123 (Pa. Super. 2021) (en banc);
see also Commonwealth v. Byrd, 185 A.3d 1015, 1019 (Pa.
Super. 2018) (“The suppression court is free to believe all, some
or none of the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.”
(citation omitted)). “If the record supports the suppression
court's findings, we may not substitute our own findings.” Id.

Where a defendant files a motion to suppress evidence, “the
Commonwealth shall have the burden of going forward with the
evidence and of establishing that the challenged evidence was not

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J-A06006-26

obtained in violation of the defendant's rights.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
581(H); see also id., Comment (stating that the standard of
proof is a preponderance of the evidence). [“A preponderance of
the evidence is tantamount to a more likely than not inquiry.”
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 340 A.3d 297, 308-309 (Pa.
2025) (citation, brackets, ellipses and quotation marks omitted).]
The Commonwealth “satisfies its preponderance of the evidence
burden if it proves to the satisfaction of the suppression court that
the evidence was properly seized.” Commonwealth v. Smith,
304 A.3d 35, 39 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citation omitted); see also
Anderson, 340 A.3d at 309 (“The Commonwealth may sustain its
threshold preponderance burden by means of circumstantial
evidence.”).

Commonwealth v. Fulton, 345 A.3d 352, 360–361 (Pa. Super. 2025)

(original brackets omitted; footnote incorporated).

Furthermore,

“Under both the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania
Constitution, searches conducted in the absence of a search
warrant are per se unreasonable, unless they satisfy one of the
recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement.”
Commonwealth v. Hunte, 337 A.3d 483, 498 (Pa. 2025)
(citations omitted); see also Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326
A.3d 888, 896 (Pa. 2024) (“Protection of reasonable expectations
of privacy is the primary purpose of the prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures.” (citation omitted)). “One
such exception exists when a person consents to the search.”
Hunte, 337 A.3d at 498; see also Commonwealth v. Strickler,
757 A.2d 884, 888 (Pa. 2000).

Our Supreme Court explained the consent exception in
Commonwealth v. Valdivia, 195 A.3d 855 (Pa. 2018):

[W]e have long approved consensual searches because it is
no doubt reasonable for the police to conduct a search once
they have been permitted to do so. Although a warrantless,
but consensual, search is constitutionally permissible,
obtaining consent is an investigative tool utilized by law
enforcement. It allows police to do what otherwise would
be impermissible without a warrant.

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J-A06006-26

As a consent search is in derogation of the Fourth
Amendment, there are carefully demarked limitations as to
what constitutes a valid consent search.

First, consent must be voluntarily given during a lawful
police interaction. For a finding of voluntariness, the
Commonwealth must establish that the consent given by the
defendant is the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice — not the result of duress or coercion,
express or implied, or a will overborne — under the totality
of the circumstances.

If consent is given voluntarily, the ensuing search must be
conducted within the scope of that consent. The standard
for measuring the scope of an individual's consent is one of
objective reasonableness. We do not ascertain the scope of
consent from the individual's subjective belief or the officer's
understanding based on his or her training and experience,
but based on what the typical reasonable person would have
understood by the exchange between the officer and the
suspect.

Valdivia, 195 A.3d at 868 (paragraph formatting modified).

Id. at 362–363 (original emphasis omitted).

Finally, this Court has stated:

“Where the underlying encounter [between the citizen and the
police] is found to be lawful, voluntariness becomes the exclusive
focus.” [Strickler, 757 A.2d at 888 ].

As to the voluntariness of an individual's consent, we have
declared:

[during the suppression hearing,] the Commonwealth bears
the burden of establishing that a consent is the product of
an essentially free and unconstrained choice – not the result
of duress or coercion, express or implied, or a will overborne
– under the totality of the circumstances. While knowledge
of the right to refuse to consent to the search is a factor to
be taken into account, the Commonwealth is not required to
demonstrate such knowledge as a prerequisite to
establishing a voluntary consent. Additionally, although the
inquiry is an objective one, the maturity, sophistication and

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J-A06006-26

mental or emotional state of the defendant (including age,
intelligence and capacity to exercise free will), are to be
taken into account.

Since both the tests for voluntariness and for a seizure
centrally entail an examination of the objective
circumstances surrounding the police/citizen encounter to
determine whether there was a show of authority that would
impact upon a reasonable citizen-subject's perspective,
there is a substantial, necessary overlap in the analyses.

... [T]he following factors outlined [in Strickler] are
pertinent to a determination of whether consent to search is
voluntarily given: 1) the presence or absence of police
excesses; 2) whether there was physical contact; 3)
whether police directed the citizen's movements; 4) police
demeanor and manner of expression; 5) the location of the
interdiction; 6) the content of the questions and
statements; 7) the existence and character of the initial
investigative detention, including its degree of
coerciveness; 8) whether the person has been told that he
is free to leave; and 9) whether the citizen has been
informed that he is not required to consent to the search.

Commonwealth v. Kemp, 961 A.2d 1247, 1261 (Pa. Super.
2008) (en banc) (quotations, citations, and corrections omitted),
quoting Strickler, 757 A.2d at 901-902. “With regard to consent,
‘voluntariness’ is a question of fact to be determined from the
totality of the circumstances.” Commonwealth v. Fredrick, 230
A.3d 1263, 1267 (Pa. Super. 2020); Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“the question whether
a consent to a search was in fact ‘voluntary’ or was the product of
duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the circumstances”).

Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 257 A.3d 1, 9–10 (Pa. Super. 2020) (original

footnote omitted; brackets in original). Our Supreme Court “further held in

Cleckley that Article I, Section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution does not

require that the Commonwealth establish a knowing and intelligent waiver of

the right to refuse consent in order for the consent to be valid.”

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J-A06006-26

Commonwealth v. Mack, 796 A.2d 967, 970 (Pa. 2002); see also

Commonwealth v. Kurtz, 172 A.3d 1153, 1161 n.6 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“In

Cleckley, our Supreme Court held that an officer does not need to inform an

arrestee of the right to refuse a warrantless search for consent to be voluntary

under Pa. Const. Art. I, Section 8.”), citing Cleckley, 738 A.2d at 432

(declining to reverse suppression ruling on sole basis that there was no

showing that defendant was aware of right to refuse consent test). “This Court

is bound by existing precedent under the doctrine of stare decisis and

continues to follow controlling precedent as long as the decision has not been

overturned by our Supreme Court.” Commonwealth v. Slocum, 86 A.3d

272, 278 n. 9 (Pa. Super. 2014).

Here, the suppression court initially noted that “[p]ortions of Deputy

Cramer’s body-worn camera footage, as [] indicated, were played at the

[suppression] hearing and marked and identified as Commonwealth’s Exhibit

1.” N.T., 11/27/2024, at 6. The suppression court “reviewed

Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 and listened to it on a number of occasions since

[suppression] turn[ed] on a very dispositive point here … [as] the

Commonwealth ha[d] the burden to establish that consent was the product of

an essentially free and unconstrained choice, not the result of duress,

coercion, or of will that was overborne in considering the totality of

circumstances.” Id. at 7-8. Ultimately, the suppression court determined

that

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[it was] constrained after looking at [the video footage] multiple
times and in multiple ways to conclude that the Commonwealth’s
claim [that the search was consensual was] depicted [in]
Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1, in that [Appellant] said to the Deputy,
“you can check me, sir, I don’t have nothing on me.”

Id. at 8 (“This is what the [c]ourt has heard[,] what [was] reviewed [and, i]n

fact, both the words and body language speak to [those] fact[s.]”). The

suppression court further noted that “[a]t no point during the interaction did

the Deputy identify that [Appellant] must consent to the second search, that

it was compulsory, or that it in any way affected his ability to ultimately leave

the scene.” Id. at 9. Moreover, the suppression court credited Deputy

Cramer’s testimony that Appellant “gave verbal consent to search his person.”

Id. at 6. Finally, the suppression court determined:

Under the circumstances here, and considering the facts and
circumstances that were available to the Deputy at the time,
clearly [police] were still investigating issues surrounding … the
active Family Court warrant [issued for the rear passenger and]
had seized a certain amount of suspected marijuana from the
vehicle and were trying to ascertain the ownership of the vehicle.
The Deputy was conducting an investigation.

[The suppression court did not] believe there [was] anything in
the record, both from the testimony and/or the [c]ourt’s
observations o[f] Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 that indicate[d]
under Pennsylvania law this was the product of a coerced action
or was not a free and unrestrained choice [for Appellant] to utter
those words. The Deputy took those words and attempted to
check [Appellant], as [the Deputy] indicated that [] he would[.]
Therefore, as [Appellant] is contesting the nature of the search as
not being consensual and therefore in violation of both Article I,
Section 4 of the United States Constitution, and Article I, Section
VIII of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the motion to suppress is
denied.

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Id. at 10.

Based upon our standard of review and applicable law, we discern no

abuse of discretion or error of law in denying suppression in light of Appellant’s

voluntary consent to search his person. Here, the trial court reviewed the

transcript of the suppression hearing, as well as a review of the police body

camera video footage as presented by the Commonwealth and admitted into

evidence at the hearing. The trial court determined that Appellant said that

Deputy Cramer could search, or “check,” him because he did not have

“anything” illegal on his person. This Court has carefully reviewed the entire

certified record, including Deputy Cramer’s body camera footage and his

testimony regarding the encounter, and we agree with the suppression court

that Appellant verbally manifested his consent to the second search.

Regardless, if the video or audio footage on the recording was somehow

ambiguous, we defer to the suppression court's factual findings and credibility

determinations. Here, the suppression court credited Deputy Carmer’s

version of events and we will not usurp that finding. Additionally, when

looking at the totality of the circumstances surrounding Appellant’s consent,

there was no excess police presence or physical police contact, aside from the

initial, permissible frisk, before Appellant gave consent for the second search.

Deputy Cramer did not direct Appellant’s movements. The initial investigation

was not coercive. In fact, Appellant concedes that he was permitted to smoke

a cigarette on the side of the road, for approximately 15 minutes, while the

police examined and checked occupant identification and also searched the

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vehicle with the driver’s permission. See Appellant’s Brief at 17-18

(“Appellant leaned against the deputies’ car while smoking a cigarette and

looking at his phone as the interaction continued [for n]early fifteen (15)

minutes after the initial frisk which yielded no weapons[.]”). As such,

Appellant’s consent was voluntarily given and suppression was unwarranted.

Accordingly, Appellant’s first two issues lack merit.

Finally, we reject Appellant’s suggestion that police should be required

to warn citizens that they have the right to refuse consent to a search. Our

Supreme Court has definitively held that an officer does not need to inform an

arrestee of the right to refuse a warrantless search for consent to be voluntary.

See Cleckley supra. We are bound by Cleckley under the doctrine of stare

decisis. Hence, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his final appellate claim.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

3/25/2026

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