Staunton v Zahab - Interim Control Order

Original Word Document (152.6 KB) FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Staunton v Zahab [2026] FCA 308

| File number(s): | NSD 324 of 2026 |
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| Judgment of: | BURLEY J |
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| Date of judgment: | 23 March 2026 |
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| Catchwords: | CRIMINAL LAW – control orders – application for interim control orders pursuant to s 104.4 of the Criminal Code in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) – where respondent convicted of a terrorism offence – where respondent’s release into the community is imminent – whether control orders sought are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purposes in s 104.4(1)(d) of the Criminal Code – whether condition requiring wearing of electronic monitoring device is proportionate – interim control order made. |
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| Legislation: | Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) sch 1 (Criminal Code) ss 100.1, 102.1(1), 102.7(1), 104.1, 104.2, 104.3, 104.4, 104.5, 104.27, 104.28A

Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation—Islamic State) Regulation 2014 (Cth)

Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 3LA

Firearms Act 1996 (NSW) ss 73(1), 74A(1)

Weapon s Prohibition Act 19 9 8 (NSW) s 33(1) |
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| Cases cited: | Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882

McCartney v Abdirahman-Khalif (No 2) [2020] FCA 1002

McCartney v EB [2019] FCA 183; 263 FCR 170

Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 191 CLR 559

Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307 |
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| Division: | General Division |
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| Registry: | New South Wales |
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| National Practice Area: | Federal Crime and Related Proceedings |
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| Number of paragraphs: | 89 |
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| Date of hearing: | 11 March 2026 |
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| Counsel for the Applicant: | Mr T Glover SC with Ms K Curry |
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| Solicitor for the Applicant: | Australian Government Solicitor |
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| Counsel for the Respondent: | Mr R El-Choufani with Mr J Brock |
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| Solicitor for the Respondent: | Legal Aid New South Wales |

ORDERS

| | | NSD 324 of 2026 |
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| BETWEEN: | JEREMY EWEN STAUNTON

Applicant | |
| AND: | HAISEM ZAHAB

Respondent | |

| order made by: | BURLEY J |
| DATE OF ORDER: | 23 March 2026 |
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

ENDORSEMENT PURSUANT TO RULE 41.06

TO: HAISEM ZAHAB

IF YOU (BEING THE PERSON BOUND BY THIS ORDER):

A.    REFUSE OR NEGLECT TO DO ANY ACT WITHIN THE TIME SPECIFIED IN THIS ORDER FOR THE DOING OF THE ACT; OR

B.    DISOBEY THE ORDER BY DOING AN ACT WHICH THE ORDER REQUIRES YOU NOT TO DO,

YOU WILL BE LIABLE TO IMPRISONMENT, SEQUESTRATION OF PROPERTY OR OTHER PUNISHMENT.

ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS YOU TO BREACH THE TERMS OF THIS ORDER MAY BE SIMILARLY PUNISHED.

Interim control order

1.    An interim control order be made pursuant to s 104.4 of the Criminal Code (Cth), being the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth), in the terms set out in the Schedule to these orders.

Confirmation hearing

2.    The proceeding be listed for hearing at 10.15 am on 1 June 2026 (with an estimate of 1 day), for the Court to either confirm (with or without variation) the interim control order, or declare the interim control order to be void, or revoke the interim control order.

3.    Until further order, the reasons for judgment not be disclosed to or published by any person, save for the parties and their legal representatives.

4.    By 5pm on 24 March 2026, the parties confer and indicate to the chambers of Burley J whether there is any confidential information contained in the reasons for judgment and if so, provide a copy of the reasons for judgment with the parts said to contain confidential information highlighted.

5.    The parties have liberty to apply.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

SCHEDULE

1. This interim control order relates to the Respondent, Haisem Zahab.

2. The Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the Respondent has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to relating to terrorism or a terrorist organisation (s 104.4(1)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Code (Cth)).

3. Further, the Court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the conditions, and the combined effect of all the conditions to be imposed on the Respondent by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of:

3.1. protecting the public from a terrorist act (s 104.4(1)(d)(iii) of the Criminal Code (Cth));

3.2. preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act (s 104.4(1)(d)(iv) of the Criminal Code (Cth)); or

3.3. preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement of hostile activity in a foreign country (s 104.4(1)(d)(v) of the Criminal Code (Cth)).

1. The conditions to be imposed on the Respondent by this Interim Control Order are those set out in Annexure A to this Schedule.

2. A summary of the grounds on which the order is made is set out in Annexure B to this Schedule.

3. This Interim Control Order does not begin to be in force until:

6.1. it is served personally on the Respondent; and

6.2. if the order is served personally on the Respondent whilst detained in custody in a prison, it begins to be in force when the Respondent ceases to be detained in custody in a prison.

1. If this Interim Control Order is confirmed, the confirmed control order is to be in force for 12 months after the day on which this Interim Control Order is made.

2. The Respondent may attend the Federal Court of Australia which is located at the Law Courts Building, Queens Square, 184 Phillip Street, Sydney NSW on 1 June 2026 at 10:15am for the Court to:

8.1. confirm (with or without variation) this Interim Control Order;

8.2. declare this Interim Control Order to be void; or

8.3. revoke this Interim Control Order.

1. The Respondent’s lawyer may attend the AFP Sydney office at 110 Goulburn St, Sydney NSW 2000 between 9:00 am and 4:00 pm, Monday to Friday in order to obtain a copy of this Interim Control Order.

ANNEXURE A

CONDITIONS OF INTERIM CONTROL ORDER

1. Where you live

1.1. You must reside at the specified premises and nowhere else.

1.2. The specified premises is:

a. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]; or

b. any other premises nominated by you and approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent.

1.3. You must seek approval from the AFP Superintendent under paragraph 1.2(b), or an exemption from Condition 1.1, in writing at least two (2) business days prior to any:

a. change to the premises you nominate under Condition 1.2(b); or

b. planned or anticipated temporary absence of 24 hours or more from the specified premises.

1.4. The prohibition in Condition 1.1 and the requirement in Condition 1.3 do not apply during any period in which you are admitted to hospital.

1. Checking in

2.1. Within 24 hours of this order being given to you, you must call the AFP Superintendent.

2.2. You must also call or meet with the AFP Superintendent when they direct you to do so.

1. Travel

3.1. You must not leave or make arrangements to leave Australia.

3.2. You must not apply for any Australian or foreign travel document (including passports), visa, or travel authorisation.

3.3. You must not possess an Australian or foreign travel document (including passport), visa, or travel authorisation which is in another person’s name.

3.4. You must not travel or make arrangements to travel outside the state of New South Wales or the Australian Capital Territory.

Note: For the avoidance of doubt, travel between the state of New South Wales and the Australian Capital Territory is permitted.

1. Electronic monitoring

4.1. You must wear a monitoring device at all times. The monitoring device you must wear is:

a. the monitoring device the AFP Superintendent directs you to wear within 24 hours after this order comes into force; or

b. if the AFP Superintendent directs you to wear a different monitoring device at a later time, that monitoring device.

4.2. The AFP Superintendent may direct you to attend the specified premises at a specified time, including within the first 24 hours after this order comes into force, for the purpose of you being fitted with a monitoring device.

4.3. At the time specified by the AFP Superintendent under order 4.2, you must attend the specified premises, let police officers into the specified premises and permit those police officers to fit you with a monitoring device.

4.4. You must let police officers into the specified premises at any reasonable time for any purpose relating to the electronic monitoring of you, including to allow them to give you a monitoring device to wear or to give you instructions about using and maintaining the monitoring device.

4.5. You must allow a police officer to:

a. install, repair or fit the monitoring device or any related monitoring equipment (for example, a charging cable) at any reasonable time and place they direct;

b. remove a monitoring device or any related equipment at any reasonable time and place they direct;

c. take any reasonable steps to ensure that the monitoring device and any related monitoring equipment are or remain in good working order;

d. do anything else for the purpose of electronically monitoring you.

4.6. This order authorises police officers to do all the things listed above in Conditions 4.2, 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5, and to contact you to ensure the monitoring device and equipment is working properly.

4.7. You must charge the monitoring device every day so that it is always charged. If a police officer directs you to place the monitoring device on charge, you must charge it as soon as possible.

4.8. You must do anything else a police officer directs you to do to make sure the monitoring device or related equipment is working properly.

4.9. If you become aware that the monitoring device or related equipment is not working properly, you must tell the AFP Superintendent as soon as reasonably practicable.

4.10. You must not remove the monitoring device or tamper with or damage the monitoring device or any related equipment.

1. Voluntary psychological support and treatment

5.1. You must consider, in good faith, participating in counselling, or psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment, with a suitably qualified professional counsellor, psychologist or psychiatrist.

Note: The Australian Federal Police will pay the cost of your psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment, or counselling, for the duration of this order.

5.2. If you participate in counselling or psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment:

a. You must tell the AFP Superintendent the name of the suitably qualified professional counsellor, psychologist, or psychiatrist you intend to see before you see them;

b. You can request that the AFP Superintendent recommend a suitably qualified professional counsellor, psychologist, or psychiatrist for you;

c. You may withdraw your consent to attend counselling, or psychological or psychiatric treatment at any time; and

d. You may change your counsellor, psychologist or psychiatrist at any time for another suitably qualified person, as long as you tell the AFP Superintendent their name and occupation before you see them.

1. Sharing information

6.1. If the AFP Superintendent directs you under this order to give information, you must not give false or misleading information to the AFP Superintendent.

6.2. You must allow the provider of any service described in Condition 5.1 to share information with the AFP Superintendent about when and for how long you met with them and any safety concerns they may have, including regarding your risk or risk factors.

1. Who you can’t communicate with

7.1. You must not communicate with anyone who is detained in a correctional facility, unless you are detained in that facility.

7.2. You must not communicate with anyone you know or suspect to be located overseas, unless they are a close family member. However, before you communicate with a close family member who is located overseas, you must advise the AFP Superintendent in writing of the full name and contact details of the close family member.

7.3. You must not communicate or associate by any means, with anyone you know or suspect to be, or who professes to be, a member of Islamic State or any other terrorist organisation.

7.4. You must not communicate or associate by any means with any person known to you to be convicted of, or currently charged with:

a. a ‘terrorism offence’ within the meaning of section 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth);

b. an offence against Subdivision C (urging or threatening violence, offences against groups or members of groups, and advocating terrorism or genocide) or CA (publicly displaying, and trading in, prohibited symbols and giving Nazi salute) of Division 80 of the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (‘Criminal Code’); or

c. an offence against Part 5.3B (prohibited hate groups) of the Criminal Code.

7.5. You must not communicate or associate with any person known to you to be currently or previously subject to:

a. a control order made under Division 104 of the Criminal Code; or

b. an interim or extended supervision order made under the Terrorism (High Risk Offenders) Act 2017 (NSW) or Division 105A of the Criminal Code.

7.6. You must not communicate or associate with:

a. Wisam Haddad born 9 May 1980; or

b. Samata Ullah born 7 November 1982.

7.7. If the AFP Superintendent determines that you must not communicate or associate with a person, you must not communicate or associate with them.

Note: As explained in Condition 22, you must not ask or cause someone else to communicate on your behalf with a person described in Condition 7.

1. Employment and Education

8.1. You must tell the AFP Superintendent before starting any job, volunteer work, vocational training, or education.

8.2. You must give any information the AFP Superintendent directs you to give about your job, volunteer work, vocational training or education.

1. Groups

9.1. You must not join or otherwise associate with any groups, clubs or organisations (including online) which:

a. circulate or discuss violent extremist material or material created by a terrorist organisation (other than as part of professional psychological treatment, rehabilitation or intervention program);

b. claim to be part of a terrorist organisation;

c. advocate for, or support a terrorist organisation; or

d. advocate for, or support the doing of terrorist acts, either in Australia or overseas.

1. Prohibited items

10.1. You must not buy, make, possess or use any of the following:

a. a knife;

b. a ‘firearm’, a ‘firearm part’ or ‘ammunition’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW);

c. a ‘prohibited weapon’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW) ’;

d. laser guidance or laser detection technology;

e. a 3D printer or related 3D printer technology;

f. a drone or related drone technology;

g. a hobby rocket, a hobby rocket engine or other hobby rocket supplies; or

h. explosives, explosive devices, initiation systems, or firing devices.

10.2. Condition 10.1 does not prohibit you from possessing or using a knife if it is:

a. ordinary cutlery used for eating;

b. a kitchen knife within your household for ordinary domestic purposes; or

c. a tool reasonably necessary in the ordinary course of business as an electrician.

10.3. You must not be in the company of any person who you know has, on their person or in a vehicle in which you are travelling with them, any of the items referred to in paragraph 10.1.

Note: This condition does not prohibit you from being in the company of a person who has a knife on their person or in their vehicle that is:

a. ordinary cutlery used for eating;

b. a kitchen knife within their household for ordinary domestic purposes; or

c. a tool reasonably necessary in the ordinary course of that person’s employment or business.

10.4. You must not possess any quantity of any chemical which is not consistent with ordinary domestic purposes.

10.5. You may seek approval from the AFP Superintendent in accordance with Condition 21 to possess a quantity of chemical greater than that which is consistent with ordinary domestic purposes.

1. Places you can’t go

11.1. You must not go to any prison or correctional facility unless you are detained there.

11.2. You must not go to the following places:

a. within 1 km of any Australian airport which has an international point of departure;

b. within 1 km of any Australian port that has an international point of departure.

11.3. You must not be present at places where firearms are stored, sold or used, including firearm dealers, shooting ranges or private premises where firearms are stored.

11.4. If the AFP Superintendent directs you not go to a place, you must not go there.

1. Phone rules

12.1. The AFP Superintendent will give you a phone and SIM card. This is referred to as the ‘AFP phone’ and ‘AFP SIM card’. You may only use the AFP phone and AFP SIM card. You must not use any other mobile or landline phone or SIM card.

Note: As explained in Conditions 12.5 and 12.7, you may use another phone only in specific circumstances.

12.2. The AFP Superintendent will provide you with the following information:

a. The password for the AFP phone; and

b. The phone number for the AFP phone.

12.3. You must:

a. keep your AFP phone switched on, charged and with you at all times;

b. be available to answer calls from the AFP Superintendent;

c. if you are unable to answer a call from the AFP Superintendent, return the call as soon as reasonably practicable;

d. do anything else the AFP Superintendent directs you to do with your AFP phone in relation to Conditions 12.3(a),(b) or (c);

e. provide passwords and PIN codes for your AFP phone and any files, folders, programs and applications on your AFP phone, when directed to do so by a police officer for the purposes of searching or seizing your AFP phone or data within or accessible from it;

f. permit one or more police officers to inspect, repair, service, or replace your AFP phone or AFP SIM card, when directed to do so by a police officer;

g. if you become aware that your AFP phone, AFP SIM card or charging equipment is not working properly, notify the AFP Superintendent as soon as possible and, in any case, within 12 hours of becoming aware.

12.4. You must not:

a. enable any face ID, fingerprint, or other biometric security features on the AFP phone;

b. change the password for the AFP phone unless:

i. the AFP Superintendent has given you approval to do so; and

ii. you have provided the new password to the AFP Superintendent.

c. let anyone else use your AFP phone or AFP SIM card unless it is an emergency. You must tell the AFP Superintendent if this happens;

d. connect your AFP phone to any Wi-Fi network, including public Wi-Fi or your home Wi-Fi;

e. connect your AFP phone to any other device, or allow another device to connect to your AFP phone, over a wired connection, Wi-Fi, hotspot, Bluetooth or similar means;

f. tamper with, damage or destroy any component of your AFP phone or any equipment necessary for the operation of your AFP phone (e.g. charging cables);

g. change, remove, modify or disconnect the SIM card, telecommunication service provider or phone number connected to your AFP phone;

h. utilise any call-forwarding to your AFP phone, or from your AFP phone to another device;

i. obtain a different SIM card or eSIM; or

j. ask or allow any other person to make calls or send messages on a different device on your behalf.

12.5. There are exceptions to Conditions 12.1, 12.3 and 12.4. You may:

a. connect your AFP phone to your AFP computer (see Condition 13 below);

b. connect your AFP phone to your AFP internet service (see Condition 13 below);

c. use the Bluetooth function on your AFP phone to connect to personal Bluetooth enabled devices (such as headphones or an in-car Bluetooth connection);

d. use another phone for the sole purpose of telling the AFP Superintendent that the AFP phone or AFP SIM card is not working;

e. use another phone in an emergency to call ‘000’ or the State Emergency Services (SES).

12.6. If you obtain a job where the employer requires you to use a different phone, you must notify the AFP Superintendent of that phone prior to its first use. This is referred to as the ‘work phone’. You must also provide the following details about the work phone to the AFP Superintendent prior to its first use:

a. particulars explaining why the work phone is necessary for your job;

b. particulars explaining what functionalities of the work phone you will use including any applications or programs you will use;

c. confirmation as to whether the work phone will be used by any other person;

d. brand and model of the work phone;

e. phone number for the work phone; and

f. International Mobile Equipment Identity number for the work phone.

12.7. You may use the work phone for the purpose of your job only.

1. Computer and internet rules

13.1. The AFP Superintendent will give you a computer or tablet device. This is referred to as the ‘AFP computer’. Apart from your AFP computer and AFP phone, you must not use any other computer, tablet or internet capable device.

Note: ‘Internet capable device’ includes any phone, computer, laptop, tablet, gaming device, television, or any other electronic device capable of connecting to the internet (either directly or by connecting to a wireless network). A device can be an internet capable device even if it is not currently connected to the internet.

Note: As explained in Conditions 13.5, 13.7 and 13.9, you may use another computer, tablet or internet capable device in specific circumstances.

13.2. You will get an internet service for use with your AFP computer. This is referred to as the ‘AFP internet service’. You must not use any other internet service or wireless network with your AFP computer.

Note: You are permitted to use another internet service or wireless network in connection with Conditions 13.7 and 13.9.

13.3. You must:

a. provide passwords and PIN codes for your AFP computer and any files, folders, programs and applications on your AFP computer, when directed to do so by a police officer for the purposes of searching or seizing your AFP computer or data within or accessible from it;

b. permit one or more police officers to inspect, repair, service, or replace your AFP computer, when directed to do so by a police officer;

c. if you become aware that your AFP computer or associated equipment is not working properly, notify the AFP Superintendent as soon as possible and, in any case, within 12 hours of becoming aware.

13.4. You must not:

a. let anyone else use your AFP computer unless it is an emergency. You must tell the AFP Superintendent if this happens as soon as reasonably possible;

b. connect your AFP computer to any Wi-Fi network, including public Wi-Fi and your home Wi-Fi;

c. connect your AFP computer to any other device, or allow another device to connect to your AFP computer over a wired connection, Wi-Fi, hotspot, Bluetooth or similar means; or

d. tamper with, damage or destroy any component of your AFP computer or any equipment necessary for the operation your AFP computer (e.g. charging cables).

13.5. There are exceptions to Conditions 13.1, 13.3 and 13.4. You may:

a. connect your AFP phone to your AFP computer;

b. connect your AFP computer to a wired display, keyboard, mouse, headphones, speaker, microphone, printer, dock or other ordinary accessory or peripheral device;

c. use the Bluetooth function on your AFP computer to connect to personal Bluetooth enabled devices (such as headphones or a wireless keyboard or mouse);

d. use a computer or internet capable device and internet service to make ordinary business transactions (such as using an EFTPOS terminal, ATM or ordering food or paying for groceries or other goods via a self-serve screen);

e. use a smart TV connected to the internet to access television services and streaming services (but not a smart TV’s internet browser or any chat or social media capabilities).

13.6. If you obtain a job where the employer requires you to use a different computer or internet capable device, you must notify the AFP Superintendent before using that computer or device. This is known as the ‘work computer ’. You must also provide the following details about the work computer to the AFP Superintendent prior to its first use:

a. particulars explaining why the work computer is necessary for your job;

b. particulars explaining what functionalities of the work computer you will use including any applications or programs you will use;

c. particulars of any data storage or cloud storage you will use in connection with the work computer;

d. confirmation as to whether the work computer will be used by any other person;

e. brand and model of the work computer;

f. any usernames you will use to sign in to the work computer or to operate software on the work computer;

g. any phone number or SIM card number connected to the work computer; and

h. International Mobile Equipment Identity number or serial number for the work computer.

13.7. You may use the work computer for the purpose of your job only.

13.8. If you undertake study which requires the use of a different computer or internet capable device, you must seek approval from the AFP Superintendent before using that computer or device. This is known as the ‘study computer’. You must also provide the following details about the study computer to the AFP Superintendent when seeking approval:

a. particulars explaining why the study computer is necessary for your study;

b. particulars explaining what functionalities of the study computer you will use including any applications or programs you will use;

c. particulars of any data storage or cloud storage you will use in connection with the study computer;

d. confirmation as to whether the study computer will be used by any other person;

e. brand and model of the study computer;

f. any usernames you will use to sign in to the study computer or to operate software on the study computer;

g. any phone number or SIM card number connected to the study computer; and

h. International Mobile Equipment Identity number or serial number for the study computer.

13.9. If your request is approved, you may use the study computer specified in the approval for the purpose of your study only.

1. Email use

14.1. You must not use any email account other than one nominated by you and approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent. This is referred to as the ‘AFP email account’.

14.2. You must not:

a. sign up for any online account or engage in any transaction using any email account other than the AFP email account;

b. use any function which uses temporary or forwarding emails (such as an iPhone’s ‘Hide My Email’ function).

14.3. If you obtain a job or undertake study which requires a different email account, you must notify the AFP Superintendent before using that email account. This is known as the ‘work or study email account’. You must also provide the following details about the work or study email account to the AFP Superintendent prior to its first use:

a. particulars explaining why the work or study email account is necessary for your job, vocational training or education;

b. confirmation as to whether the work or study email account will be used by any other person;

c. the email address for the work or study email account.

14.4. You may use the work or study email account for the purpose of your job, vocational training or education only.

1. Programs, applications and data

15.1. Conditions 15.2 to 15.7 apply to your AFP phone, AFP computer, and AFP internet service.

15.2. You must only use the applications and programs that are already on your AFP phone or AFP computer at the time they are provided to you, or which are approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent.

15.3. You must not:

a. install any programs or applications onto your AFP phone or AFP computer without prior approval from the AFP Superintendent;

b. use any social media or messaging services not approved by the AFP Superintendent.

Note: A social media or messaging service includes any internet-based service that can be used to communicate with, or broadcast or disseminate information to, other users, such as WhatsApp, X, Instagram, Signal, Telegram or Facebook. For the avoidance of doubt, ‘using’ a social media or messaging service includes using that service via a web browser.

15.4. There is an exception to Conditions 15.2 and 15.3(a):

a. You may install software updates that are automatically available on your AFP phone or AFP computer.

15.5. If you want to use an application or program that is not already on your AFP phone or AFP computer, you can ask the AFP Superintendent to approve the application or program.

15.6. If you want to use a social media or messaging service, you can ask the AFP Superintendent to approve the social media or messaging service.

15.7. You must not:

a. hide any of your online activity (including by using private browsing, incognito/hidden mode, or using a virtual private network, also known as a VPN);

b. use any data storage or cloud storage other than the cloud storage account provided to you with your AFP phone or AFP computer; or

c. deliberately delete or alter any of the following on or from your AFP phone or AFP computer: applications; programs; emails; text messages; electronic messages; call history; data; internet or application search history; application chat or communication history.

15.8. Condition 15.9 applies to the work phone, work computer and study computer.

15.9. You must not:

a. hide any of your online activity (including by using private browsing, incognito/hidden mode, or using a virtual private network, also known as a VPN);

b. deliberately delete or alter any of the following on or from your work computer or study computer: applications; programs; emails; text messages; electronic messages; call history; data; internet or application search history; application chat or communication history.

1. Possessing documents and other media

16.1. You must not possess or access documents or other media that:

a. relate to any of the following

i. propaganda or promotional material for a terrorist organisation; or

ii. activities of, or otherwise associated with, any terrorist organisation;

b. depict or describe:

i. laser guidance or laser detection technology;

ii. 3D printer technology or related 3D printer technology;

iii. drones or related drone technology;

iv. hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines, or related hobby rocket material;

v. explosives, explosive devices, initiation systems or firing devices;

vi. military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers;

vii. manuals or instructions on carrying out terrorist attacks, counter-surveillance or making explosives, weapons, firearms, or military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers; or

viii. a prohibited symbol;

c. provide instruction in, advocate for, encourage or praise:

i. the use of a ‘prohibited weapon’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW);

ii. arson;

iii. the use of a ‘firearm’, a ‘firearm part’ or ‘ammunition’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW);

iv. genocide or the persecution of an ethnic or religious group;

v. terrorism; or

vi. violence, including but not limited to shooting, immolation, stabbing, bombing, beheading, torture and execution.

16.2. Condition 16.1 does not apply to a document or other media if the document or other media is:

a. published by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), Australian Community Media (ACM), News Corp Australia, Nine Entertainment Co, Schwartz Media, Seven West Media, the Special Broadcasting Service (SBS), the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), CNN, CBS, PBS, NBC, the Guardian and any other publisher or broadcaster approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent;

b. broadcast on Australian free to air or pay television;

c. broadcast on one of the following streaming services available in Australia: Netflix; STAN; Amazon Prime; Binge; ABC iView; 10play, 9Now, 7plus, SBS on Demand, Kayo Sports, Apple TV+, Paramount Plus, Disney+ and any other streaming service approved in writing by the AFP Superintendent;

d. broadcast in Australia by a licenced AM or FM radio station;

e. shown in a commercial movie cinema;

f. contained in material that is received by you or your legal representatives, or created by your legal representatives, for the purpose of any legal proceeding you are involved in (referred to as ‘Court Material’).

1. Creating or sharing documents and other media

17.1. You must not create, publish or share documents and other media that:

a. relate to a terrorist organisation;

b. depict or describe:

i. laser guidance or laser detection technology;

ii. 3D printer technology or related 3D printer technology;

iii. drones or related drone technology;

iv. hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines, or related hobby rocket material;

v. a ‘prohibited weapon’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Weapons Prohibition Act 1998 (NSW);

vi. arson;

vii. explosives, explosive devices, initiation systems or firing devices;

viii. a ‘firearm’, a ‘firearm part’ or ‘ammunition’ within the meaning of s 4(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW);

ix. genocide or the persecution of an ethnic or religious group;

x. a prohibited symbol;

xi. military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers;

xii. manuals or instructions on carrying out terrorist attacks, counter-surveillance or making explosives, weapons, firearms, or military arms or equipment such as missiles or rocket launchers;

xiii. terrorism; and

xiv. violence, including but not limited to shooting, immolation, stabbing, bombing, beheading, torture and execution.

17.2. Condition 17.1 does not prohibit you from distributing, or directing a person to distribute, Court Material for the purpose of the conduct of any legal proceeding you are involved in.

1. Access to accounts and devices

18.1. You must give the AFP Superintendent access to your AFP phone, AFP computer and study computer, and any password protected applications or files held on your AFP phone, AFP computer or study computer, and any of your email or other online accounts, when directed to do so for the purposes of the AFP Superintendent searching or seizing the device or accessing data held within or accessible from it.

18.2. You must give the AFP Superintendent access to any device in your possession when directed to do so for the purposes of the AFP Superintendent searching or seizing the device or accessing data held within or accessible from it.

1. Reasonable direction

19.1. You must comply with any reasonable direction given to you by the AFP Superintendent in connection with Conditions 1-18 in this order.

Exemptions and approvals

1. Getting exemptions

20.1. You can request a temporary exemption from any of the conditions in this order, by writing to the AFP Superintendent.

a. You must provide the reason why you are requesting an exemption and any other information that AFP Superintendent directs you to provide in relation to the request. If you do not provide the information you are directed to provide, your request will not be considered.

b. The AFP Superintendent can grant or deny a request for an exemption.

20.2. The AFP Superintendent can also grant an exemption to any condition in this order without you requesting an exemption. The AFP Superintendent will provide you with reasonable notice in writing of any exemption granted under this Condition, and any associated conditions.

20.3. If an exemption is granted under either Condition 20.1.b or 20.2, the AFP Superintendent can make it subject to reasonable directions that will be given to you writing. If you do not comply with those directions, the exemption is to be treated as having no effect.

20.4. The AFP Superintendent may cancel any exemption that has been granted by providing reasonable notice to you in writing. After you are notified that an exemption to a condition has been cancelled, you must comply with the condition as it is written in this order.

1. Getting approvals

21.1. This order applies to any conditions which allow you to seek approval from the AFP Superintendent to do something (for example, to install and use a new program or application on the AFP phone or AFP computer).

21.2. You can request an approval by submitting a written request to the AFP Superintendent. You must provide any information the AFP Superintendent directs you to provide in relation to the request. If you do not provide the information you are directed to provide, your request may not be considered.

21.3. The AFP Superintendent can approve or deny these requests. If a request is approved, the AFP Superintendent can make it subject to reasonable directions that will be given to you in writing. If you do not comply with those directions, the approval is to be treated as having no effect.

21.4. The AFP Superintendent can also grant an approval without you requesting an approval. The AFP Superintendent will provide you with reasonable notice in writing of any approval granted under this Condition.

21.5. The AFP Superintendent may cancel any approval that has been granted by providing reasonable notice to you in writing. After you are notified that an approval has been cancelled, that approval no longer has any effect.

1. Attempting to contravene this order or causing a third party to do something on your behalf

22.1. Where this order prohibits you from doing something:

a. You must not attempt to do that thing. For example, you must not attempt to leave Australia.

b. You must not ask or cause someone else to do that thing on your behalf. For example, where you are prohibited from communicating with a person, you must not ask someone else to communicate with that person on your behalf.

Definitions

In this order:

AFP Superintendent means a member of the Australian Federal Police performing the duties of a Superintendent with responsibility for National Security Investigation functions and includes any AFP member or special member authorised to perform duties or functions or otherwise act on behalf of a Superintendent with responsibility for National Security Investigation functions in connection with this control order.

close family member has the same meaning as in s 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

documents and other media means any hardcopy or electronic record of information and includes, but is not limited to, video and audio recordings, pictures, computer games, online articles and social media ‘ posts’. Sharing documents and other media includes, but is not limited to, sharing an electronic link to that material.

police officer means:

a. a ‘member’ or ‘special member’ of the Australian Federal Police, as defined by the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth); or

b. a ‘police officer’ as defined in the Police Act 1990 (NSW).

password includes but is not limited to any passcode, swipe pattern or any information or function necessary to facilitate access to a device or account.

phone means a phone of any kind, including but not limited to a mobile phone, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VoIP) phone, landline phone, satellite phone or public payphone.

prohibited symbol has the same meaning as in s 80.2E(1) of the Criminal Code.

reasonable direction means a direction that the AFP Superintendent giving the direction is satisfied is reasonable in all the circumstances to give effect to:

a. the condition; or

b. the object of Division 104 of the Criminal Code.

terrorist organisation has the same meaning as in s 102.1 of the Criminal Code.

violent extremist material has the same meaning as in s 474.45A of the Criminal Code.

ANNEXURE B

SUMMARY OF GROUNDS ON WHICH THE ORDER SHOULD BE MADE
Criminal Code (Cth), section 104.2(3)(c)

1. Having regard to the matters set out in the ‘Statement of facts relating to why the order should be made’ (SOF-For) and the ‘Statement of facts relating to why the order should not be made’ (SOF-Against), including the confidential SOF-Against, the grounds on which an interim control order should be made are summarised as follows.

Offence relating to terrorism or a terrorist organisation

1. On 27 May 2019, Mr Zahab pleaded guilty to the following charge:

Between about 1 December 2014 and about 28 February 2017, at Young in the State of New South Wales, did, contrary to section 102.7(1) of the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) intentionally provide support or resources to a terrorist organisation, namely Islamic State, that would help the organisation engage, directly or indirectly, in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, knowing that the organisation was a terrorist organisation.

1. This offence is “an offence relating to terrorism” for the purposes of s 104.4(1)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Code because an offence against section 102.7(1) of the Criminal Code, which is within Part 5.3 of the Criminal Code (“Terrorism”), is properly characterised as one “relating to” terrorism.

2. Additionally, or in the alternative, this offence is “an offence relating to…a terrorist organisation (within the meaning of subsection 102.1(1))” for the purposes of s 104.4(1)(c)(iv) of the Criminal Code. Subsection 102.1(1) defines a “terrorist organisation” to include “an organisation that is specified by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph”. Islamic State has been listed as a terrorist organisation in the regulations since 11 July 2014. 2

3. Mr Zahab was sentenced to imprisonment for a period of nine years with a non-parole period of six years and nine months.

4. Mr Zahab’s head sentence expires on 27 March 2026. Mr Zahab’s non-parole period expired on 27 December 2023. Mr Zahab has not been granted parole and remains in custody.

The proposed conditions are reasonably necessary, appropriate and adapted to the risk posed by Mr Zahab

1. Having regard to all of the matters outlined in the SOF-For and the SOF-Against, including the confidential SOF-Against, the proposed interim control order conditions are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public from a terrorist attack, preventing Mr Zahab from providing support for or facilitating a terrorist act in either Australia or overseas, or providing support for or facilitating the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

2. The risk posed by Mr Zahab is demonstrated by and/or arises out of the following matters. These matters and the consequent risk will be expanded upon in an affidavit of the applicant if an application for an interim control order is made.

Mr Zahab’s offending conduct was sophisticated and calculated, as were his efforts to conceal it

1. As the sentencing judge found, Mr Zahab “earnestly engag [ed] in intricate and planned scientific research” with “unwavering focus, at all times intent upon assisting Islamic State in its involvement in armed and violent hostilities overseas”. 3 His offending conduct took place over slightly more than two years. 4

2. Mr Zahab demonstrated a high level of technical proficiency in his offending conduct, including in:

10.1. creating a functional design for a laser warning receiver, to provide advance warning of laser guided munitions; 5

10.2. creating a report detailing his research and development into a laser warning receiver (the LWR report), which provided enough information for a person with a reasonable technical background to be able to repeat the work with some effort; 6

10.3. sharing the LWR report securely with another Islamic State supporter online; 7

10.4. conducting research and development towards designs for guided missiles using computer software, including software that simulated rocket flights; 8

10.5. authoring a report on making custom rocket engines using Potassium Nitrate/sugar propellants; 9 and

10.6. using sophisticated technical methods to conceal his conduct including encrypted messaging applications, secure web browsing applications, encrypted USBs and multiple operating systems. 10

Mr Zahab engaged in ‘real world’ research and development to facilitate his offending

1. Mr Zahab’s design and testing was not limited to online efforts, but he also engaged in ‘real world’ research and development, including by:

11.1. 3D printing some component parts of a laser warning receiver; 11 and

11.2. using hobby rocketry as a means of flight testing rocket designs. 12

1. In the course of executing two search warrants at Mr Zahab’s premises, one in April 2016 and one in February 2017, the AFP seized material connected with Mr Zahab’s research and development work including two laser modules and a laser diode, a 3D printer, hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines and a 2.5kg bag of potassium nitrate. 13

Mr Zahab had access to an unlicensed firearm

1. During the period of his offending conduct, Mr Zahab was found to have access to a weapon in his home. In April 2016, the AFP seized a .177 caliber air rifle and .117 caliber air rifle pellets from Mr Zahab’s residence. 14 Mr Zahab was subsequently convicted of unsafely storing a firearm, possessing an unregistered firearm and the unauthorised possession of ammunition without a permit. 15

2. Although Mr Zahab has been subject to a Firearms Prohibition Order (FPO) and Weapons Prohibition Order (WPO) since 28 February 2017, 16 there is limited overlap between those orders and the conditions to be imposed on Mr Zahab by the interim control order. The risks arising from Mr Zahab’s ability to access weapons, by making them or by being in company with a person with a weapon remain present, notwithstanding the FPO and WPO. Terrorist attacks in Australia have involved the use of illegal firearms. Islamic State-inspired attacks also frequently involve more easily obtained or non-traditional weapons.

3. The conditions to be imposed on Mr Zahab are directed towards these risks. Unlike the FPO and WPO, the conditions expressly prohibit making a knife, firearm or prohibited weapon, or being in company with a person who has on their person or in their vehicle a knife, firearm or prohibited weapon.

Mr Zahab was motivated by his support for Islamic State ideology

1. Mr Zahab asserted at his sentencing hearing that at the time of his offending he believed that Islamic State was a force for good against the oppressive regime of Bashar al-Assad. 17 However, as the sentencing judge found, his level of dedication to that organisation saw him choose to ignore the atrocities they committed, 18 and is inconsistent with the type of support Mr Zahab was espousing. For example, his Tweets referred to paying back Israel for Gaza, and to Australia being engaged in a war against Muslims, 19 which are inconsistent with his support for Islamic State being directed only to the conflict in Syria. He was also directly confronted with accounts and images of the violence committed by Islamic State in the course of his online activities. 20

2. Over the period he was engaged in the offending conduct, Mr Zahab repeatedly accessed material supportive of Islamic State, including in the form of nasheeds, 21 and espoused and expressed his own support for Islamic State ideology, by downloading extremist literature, and in telephone conversations with his friends. 22

3. Mr Zahab established a network of online Islamic State supporters. 23 He repeatedly shared his support for Islamic State ideology on his Twitter account 24 and incorporated references to Islamic State in his research and design work. For example, he added the term ‘ Baaqiyah ’ (a term of special significance to Islamic State) to his designs for the laser warning receiver and incorporated the Islamic State flag into his rocket designs. 25

Mr Zahab continued to support Islamic State and to conceal the full extent of his offending after he became aware of the AFP’s investigation

1. After the AFP executed the first search warrant on his residence in April 2016, Mr Zahab continued to access media and information relating to Islamic State. 26 He also chatted privately via an encrypted messaging application with Samata Ullah, a UK national subsequently convicted of offences relating to his own support for Islamic State. 27 In those private chats, Mr Zahab described an item that the AFP had missed, and his hopes that the AFP would not be able to decrypt an encrypted USB device they had seized. 28 Mr Zahab also referred to wiping and burying things and burning “the device (detector)”. 29 Several burnt items, including an Apple iPhone, a USB stick and other burnt objects were located by the AFP at the execution of a second search warrant on Mr Zahab’s residence in February 2017. 30

2. Between the execution of the first and second search warrants, Mr Zahab continued to discuss his aim to assist Islamic State in his communications with Mr Ullah. 31

3. At and after the execution of the second search warrant on his residence in February 2017, Mr Zahab refused to comply with an order under s 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) to provide his passwords despite knowing them, out of “anger”, 32 which, as the sentencing judge found, was consistent with a desire to ensure as far as possible that the full extent of his offending would not be known. 33

Mr Zahab has continued to minimise the severity of his offending, and the evidence that Mr Zahab rejected extremist thinking following his arrest should be approached with caution

1. When he was first arrested, Mr Zahab included derogatory comments in letters to his family about Australia and Australians and espoused the belief that Australia is a satellite of the United States and engaged in a war on Islam and Muslims. 34

2. In February 2018, Mr Zahab discovered that his custodial letters were included in the brief of evidence against him and wrote to his family, “they will use anything they can against me” and “every word is scrutinized”. 35 Since that time, Mr Zahab has displayed caution in what he is willing to write in his letters or say over the phone to his family members while in custody. 36

3. In April 2019, shortly before he was sentenced, Mr Zahab made a full denunciation of his previous views regarding Islamic State. The sentencing judge regarded that timing with some scepticism, as he did Mr Zahab’s expressions of contrition in his evidence. 37

4. Other records demonstrate that even after he was sentenced, Mr Zahab continued to show limited insight into extremist thinking and his offending. 38 As recently as May 2022, Mr Zahab expressed that he is in a system which punishes Muslims for what they believe. 39 In November 2024, Mr Zahab maintained that he perceived his actions to be righteous at the time of his own offending, and that he was motivated by humanitarian concerns. 40

5. Mr Zahab has participated in rehabilitation and counter-extremism programs in custody, and received positive reports for that participation. 41 However, that fact should be considered in context. During his time in custody, Mr Zahab also demonstrated awareness that reports from custodial programs may impact on the length of his time in custody, and expressed an intention to participate only where it would benefit him positively in that respect. 42 For example, Mr Zahab initially refused to participate in the Proactive Integrated Support Model (PRISM) in part because of his concern that information he disclosed in the program would be misinterpreted and impact negatively on his release. 43 He started participating in May 2024, 44 only after parole was first refused in December 2023, and he was notified that in making that decision the Attorney-General had regard to his decision not to participate in PRISM. 45

6. Mr Zahab’s conversations with family members also reveal that he has accumulated grievances about being arrested, charged and imprisoned. For example, he has expressed the view that:

27.1. labelling him as a terrorist offender wrongly associates him with violence; 46

27.2. the time he has to serve as a terrorist offender is disproportionate to other offenders; 47

27.3. media reporting of his offences was inaccurate, misleading and “fake news”; 48

27.4. the system is designed to keep him in prison, 49 including with specific reference to the fact that the Attorney-General must not make a parole order in relation to a person serving a sentence for a terrorism offence unless satisfied that exceptional circumstances exist; 50 and

27.5. Muslim extremists are sentenced more harshly than right wing extremists. 51

1. There remains a risk that Mr Zahab could carry these beliefs and grievances after his release from custody, notwithstanding what he has said to authorities involved with his potential release on parole. For example, in March 2025, Corrective Services NSW (CS NSW) recorded that Mr Zahab said that he had come to realise much of what he previously believed was propaganda. 52 CS NSW recorded in June 2025 that Mr Zahab said he is aware of the wider impacts of his offending behaviour and incarceration is an appropriate punishment. 53 However, CS NSW also recorded in July 2025 that Mr Zahab had “minimised his responsibility by claiming he was merely testing a publicly available document and sharing it with a contact on a social media platform with common interests”. 54 Mr Zahab’s statements to CS NSW were made in the context of Mr Zahab seeking a parole decision in his favour in December 2025. He is aware from previous adverse parole decisions that his comments about his offending and extremism have received close scrutiny, and his statements in this context should be treated with caution. 55

Returning to the community will expose Mr Zahab to the risk factors which contributed to the offending conduct

1. Mr Zahab worked on his designs almost every day late at night or in the early morning at his home. He has expressed that his offending was in part a result of the isolation he experienced after moving to rural NSW. 56 He also identified other factors leading to his offending, including: 57

29.1. financial difficulties and a reluctance to leave the house due to concerns about spending money;

29.2. having tunnel vision and being influenced by the (then) Twitter algorithm;

29.3. watching war-related content online;

29.4. his interest in technological projects as a personal challenge; and

29.5. being stuck in a “bubble” of like-minded supporters.

1. Mr Zahab has an ongoing interest in technology, including computer programming, website design and 3D printing, which he shares with his son. 58

2. Assessments in custody indicate that Mr Zahab may meet some of the criteria for autism, a factor which Mr Zahab considers contributed to his offending. 59

3. Mr Zahab’s immediate family, who have consistently provided him with practical, social and emotional support during his time in custody, and who want him to return to the family home, 60 are a protective factor. There is no indication that Mr Zahab’s wife or children hold extremist ideologies. 61 However, Mr Zahab’s home is in the same rural location that he indicated was isolating and contributed to his offending.

4. Similarly, Mr Zahab’s desire to return to his family and provide them with economic and emotional support are protective factors. 62 However, should Mr Zahab return to an environment where technology and social media is again easily accessible, and some, if not all, of the risk factors identified at [29 ] may be present, there would be a real risk of Mr Zahab committing a further offence in the absence of the proposed ICO conditions. The proposed ICO conditions are designed both to assist Mr Zahab engage positively with the community on his return, and to allow the AFP to monitor his activities, and especially his online activities, during that period of re-engagement.

The current security environment

1. The risk posed by Mr Zahab is heightened in the current security environment. In 2014 to 2017, when Mr Zahab engaged in his offending conduct, Islamic State presented a significant global security threat. While the security landscape has become more diverse since that time, and there was a period where Islamic State was less active, Islamic State is now reviving its capabilities overseas.

2. The online landscape has also changed significantly since Mr Zahab last engaged with it. As the Director-General of Security stated in his 2025 Annual Threat Assessment, “the grievance narratives, conspiracies and online echo chambers that proved so potent during COVID have festered and evolved into a diverse threat environment susceptible to sudden shifts in response to events”. Mr Zahab’s offending conduct demonstrates that he is particularly vulnerable to being influenced by online echo chambers, particularly if he carries his own grievances about his treatment by Australian authorities.

Appropriateness of conditions

1. The nature of the risk posed by Mr Zahab is complex and multifaceted. There is a real risk that upon Mr Zahab’s release, without appropriate conditions in place, Mr Zahab will:

36.1. start to reengage with extremist views and propaganda online;

36.2. start to reengage with other patterns of behaviour which led to his offending conduct;

36.3. engage in conduct supportive of or facilitative of a terrorist attack or hostile activity in a foreign country.

1. The proposed ICO conditions will ensure Mr Zahab:

37.1. is provided with the opportunity to engage positively with the community (through employment, religious observation, counselling and education);

37.2. is capable of being monitored by police during his re-engagement with the community;

37.3. is prohibited from engaging in behaviours, and being exposed to influences, which may lead him to commit, provide support for or facilitate a terrorist act in Australia or abroad or the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country; and

37.4. does not have access to items which might be used to commit, provide support for or facilitate a terrorist act;

and thereby reduce the risks outlined above.

1. The conditions that would be imposed by the proposed interim control order are reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purpose of preventing Mr Zahab from committing, supporting or facilitating a terrorist act domestically or abroad, or otherwise providing support for or facilitating the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

2. The interim control order should be made notwithstanding the matters set out in the SOF-Against and the confidential SOF-Against, for the following reasons:

39.1. The statements made by Mr Zahab regarding his reasons for supporting Islamic State, and the impact of his offending ,should be seen as self-serving statements made to obtain a more favourable outcome at sentencing and therefore would be treated with caution.

39.2. Although Mr Zahab has participated in rehabilitation programs in custody, his ability to reintegrate into a community, where many of the same factors that contributed to his offending will be present, has not been tested.

39.3. Mr Zahab’s statements about his rejection of extremist thinking in custody and his insight into offending should be treated with caution where they are made in the context of seeking a favourable parole decision.

39.4. Even though Mr Zahab has not previously engaged in violent conduct in Australia, there remains a real risk that he could re-engage with online communities supportive of Islamic State and again contribute his intellect and effort, to that cause either in Australia or overseas. Mr Zahab’s ability to conceal his conduct is a further factor that contributes to the risk

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

| 1 INTRODUCTION | [1] |
| 2 THE LAW | [14] |
| 3 THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE | [22] |
| 4 THE OFFENDING | [25] |
| 5 THE SUBMISSIONS | [39] |
| 5.1 The applicant’s case | [39] |
| 5.2 Mr Zahab’s response | [44] |
| 6 CONSIDERATION | [46] |
BURLEY J:

1.    INTRODUCTION

1 The applicant, Detective Superintendent Jeremy Staunton, applies in his capacity as a senior member of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) for an interim control order to be made under s 104.4 of the Criminal Code in the Schedule to the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) (Criminal Code) against Haisem Zahab. The effect of that order will be to impose conditions on Mr Zahab following his release from detention for terrorism-related offences. The broad basis for the application is that the applicant considers that there is a real risk that in the absence of the control order, Mr Zahab may engage in conduct that constitutes a terrorist act or conduct that supports or facilitates a terrorist act, or conduct supportive or facilitative of engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

2 The making of an interim control order is, in effect, the first step in the making of a control order. If the Court makes an interim control order, it must specify a date on which the person the subject of the order may attend for the Court to confirm the order, declare the order to be void or revoke the order: s 104.5(1)(e) Criminal Code. The applicant has proposed terms of the interim control order in the form of A nnexure A to the orders above. He contends that the application satisfies the requirements of s 104.4 of the Criminal Code.

3 Mr Zahab opposes the making of the order on the basis that the Court ought not to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the requirements of s 104.4(1)(d) of the Criminal Code are met. In the alternative, if it is considered that an order is appropriate, he contends that proposed condition 4, which requires that he wear an electronic monitoring device in the form of an anklet, is neither reasonably necessary, appropriate or adapted for the purposes specified in the legislation to warrant being made.

4 The applicant has for 19 years been a member of the AFP and in his current role is Superintendent, National Security Investigations, NSW. He has extensive knowledge and experience in the investigation of terrorist offending. He relies on three affidavits in support of his application, two sworn by him on 27 February 2026 and one sworn by him on 9 March 2026. In his longer affidavit of 27 February 2026 (first affidavit) the applicant provides a detailed explanation as to why he considers that the proposed control order is necessary and appropriate. His other affidavit of 27 February 2026 (supplementary affidavit) is the subject of a suppression order I made on 12 March 2026. In his affidavit of 9 March 2026, the applicant provides additional information about the electronic monitoring device.

5 The key documents upon which the applicant relied were included in Exhibit JES-1 to the first affidavit, in particular including:

(a)    a statement of facts relating to why the order should be made pursuant to s 104.2(3)(aa)(i) of the Criminal Code (document 4);

(b)    a statement of facts relating to why the order should not be made or proposed conditions should not be imposed pursuant to ss 104.2(3)(aa)(ii) and 104.3(d)(ii) of the Criminal Code (document 5); and

(c)    a summary of the grounds on which the order should be made pursuant to s 104.2(3)(c) of the Criminal Code (document 7).

6 Documents 4 and 5 were heavily footnoted to annexures contained within Exhibit JES-1, which include primary sources for the information contained in the documents.

7 The proceedings were first notified to the chambers of the duty judge on 2 March 2026. The material supporting the application was served on Mr Zahab, who is detained in custody at the Wellington Correctional Centre in New South Wales, on 3 March 2026.

8 The matter was listed for hearing before me as duty judge on the basis that it needed to be heard and determined expeditiously because of Mr Zahab’s impending release from custody at the completion of his term on 27 March 2026. To some extent the need for expedition was artificial. The applicant, the AFP and the solicitors representing them, have plainly known for some time (arguably, almost seven years) that Mr Zahab would be released from custody on 27 March 2026. Although senior counsel for the applicant explained the detailed processes that needed to be completed in order to bring the application, including ensuring that conduct as close to the time of release as possible is taken into account, I find it difficult to accept that the end point of the preparation can be no earlier than a few weeks before the date of Mr Zahab’s release. This leads necessarily to some inefficiencies. One is that Mr Zahab received the papers in the application only shortly before it was heard. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. A third matter is that additional notice would ensure that the hearing can be docketed to a judge of the Court who is able to attend to the interim application and any confirmation hearing. I exhort those responsible to do better in this regard.

9 Although the structure of Div 104 of Pt 5.3 of the Criminal Code contemplates that the request for an interim control order will be an ex parte procedure, subject to later confirmation in accordance with the procedures stipulated in Subdiv D (ss 104.12 to 104.17), the respondent has appeared, represented by counsel, on the present application. The respondent has not filed any substantive evidence. He has, however, provided written submissions and made oral submissions at the hearing of this application.

10 The parties have agreed that the matter will be listed for further hearing not before 1 June 2026 to enable the Court to consider whether, and if so on what terms, a control order should be confirmed.

11 The present proceedings are taken to be interlocutory proceedings for all purposes, including for the purpose of s 75 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth): s 104.28A of the Criminal Code.

12 The application was listed before me for hearing on 11 March 2026. Mr T Glover SC and Ms K Curry of counsel appeared for the applicant. Mr R El-Choufani and Mr J Brock of counsel appeared for the respondent. Both parties provided helpful written submissions in advance of the hearing.

13 For the reasons set out in this judgment I consider that the interim control order as proposed by the applicant should be made.

2.    THE LAW

14 Chapter 5 of the Criminal Code deals with offences related to the security of the Commonwealth. Part 5.3 deals with offences concerning terrorism. Division 104 (within Pt 5.3) deals with the making of control orders.

15 The objects of the Division are set out in s 104.1:

The objects of this Division are to allow conditions to be imposed on a person by a control order for one or more of the following purposes:

(a)    protecting the public from a terrorist act;

(b)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act;

(c)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

16 An interim control order is made on the request of a “senior AFP member”. However, a senior AFP member must not request an interim control order in relation to a person without the written consent of the “AFP Minister”: s 104.2(1) Criminal Code. Pursuant to s 100.1, the AFP Minister is the Minister administering the Australian Federal Police Act 1979 (Cth), presently being the Minister for Home Affairs. On 23 February 2026, the AFP Minister, the Honourable Tony Burke MP, consented to the making of the request.

17 Section 104.3 of the Criminal Code sets out the information and material that must be provided to an issuing court in respect of an application for an interim control order.

18 Section 104.4 of the Criminal Code sets out the requirements for making an interim control order:

(1)    The issuing court may make an order under this section in relation to the person, but only if:

(a)    the senior AFP member has requested it in accordance with section 104.3; and

(b)    the court has received and considered such further information (if any) as the court requires; and

(c)    the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities:

(i)    that making the order would substantially assist in preventing a terrorist act; or

(ii)    that the person has provided training to, received training from or participated in training with a listed terrorist organisation; or

(iii)    that the person has engaged in a hostile activity in a foreign country; or

(iv)    that the person has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation (within the meaning of subsection 102.1(1)) or a terrorist act (within the meaning of section 100.1); or

(v)    that the person has been convicted in a foreign country of an offence that is constituted by conduct that, if engaged in in Australia, would constitute a terrorism offence (within the meaning of subsection 3(1) of the Crimes Act 1914); or

(vi)    that making the order would substantially assist in preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or

(vii)    that the person has provided support for or otherwise facilitated the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country; and

(d)    the court is satisfied on the balance of probabilities that:

(i)    each of the obligations; and

(ii)    the combined effect of all of the conditions;

to be imposed on the person by the order in accordance with section 104.5A is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of:

(iii)    protecting the public from a terrorist act; or

(iv)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or

(v)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

(2)    For the purposes of paragraph (1)(d), in determining whether:

(a)    each of the conditions; and

(b)    the combined effect of all of the conditions;

to be imposed on the person by the order is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, the court must take into account:

(c)    as a paramount consideration in all cases—the objects of this Division (see section 104.1); and

(d)    as a primary consideration in the case where the person is 14 to 17 years of age—the best interests of the person; and

(e)    as an additional consideration in all cases—the impact of:

(i)    each of those conditions; and

(ii)    the combined effect of all of those conditions;

on the person’s circumstances (including the person's financial and personal circumstances).

(2A)    In determining what is in the best interests of a person for the purposes of paragraph (2)(d), the court must take into account the following:

(a)    the age, maturity, sex and background (including lifestyle, culture and traditions) of the person;

(b)    the physical and mental health of the person;

(c)    the benefit to the person of having a meaningful relationship with his or her family and friends;

(d)    the right of the person to receive an education;

(e)    the right of the person to practise his or her religion;

(f)    any other matter the court considers relevant.

(4)    In paragraphs (1)(c) and (d), a reference to a terrorist act includes:

(a)    a reference to a terrorist act that does not occur; and

(b)    a reference to a specific terrorist act; and

(c)    a reference to more than one terrorist act.

19 Section 104.5 sets out the terms in which an interim control order is to be made.

20 The applicant’s submissions emphasise the protective purpose for which an interim control order is made, citing McCartney v Abdirahman-Khalif (No 2) [2020] FCA 1002 at [209], and McCartney v EB [2019] FCA 183; 263 FCR 170 at [18]. They also address the requirement of proportionality inherent in s 104.4(1)(d), and ss 104.4(2) and 104.4(2A), with respect to the imposition of conditions, citing Thomas v Mowbray [2007] HCA 33; 233 CLR 307 at 19 and 99. Further, the submissions direct attention to ss 104.4(1)(c) and 104.4(1)(d) which make clear that the Court’s fact-finding, for the purpose of making an interim control order, is based on the civil standard of proof.

21 Mr Zahab’s submissions emphasise that the making of control orders turns on a predictive exercise as to the future behaviour of an individual. Both parties draw attention to Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo [1997] HCA 22; 191 CLR 559 at 574–575, with Mr Zahab drawing particular attention to the following paragraph:

The extent to which past events are a guide to the future depends on the degree of probability that they have occurred, the regularity with which and the conditions under which they have or probably have occurred and the likelihood that the introduction of new or other events may distort the cycle of regularity. In many cases, when the past has been evaluated, the probability that an event will occur may border on certainty. In other cases, the probability that an event will occur may be so low that, for practical purposes, it can be safely disregarded. In between these extremes, there are varying degrees of probability as to whether an event will or will not occur.

3.    THE ISSUES IN DISPUTE

22 For the purposes of the interim hearing, Mr Zahab does not dispute that the procedural requirements as set out in ss 104.2 (Minister’s consent), 104.3 and 104.4(1)(a) (documents to be supplied accompanying a request for an interim order) have been met or that Mr Zahab meets the qualifying criteria of being convicted of a terrorism offence in accordance with s 104.4(1)(c)(iv). In respect of s 104.4(1)(c)(iv), the applicant relies on the fact that Mr Zahab has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, being his conviction of providing support to a terrorist organisation pursuant to s 102.7(1) of the Criminal Code. Section 102.1(1) of the Criminal Code defines “terrorist organisation” to include “an organisation that is specified by the regulations for the purposes of this paragraph”. Islamic State has since 11 July 2014 been specified as a terrorist organisation: Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation — Islam i c State) Regulation 2014 (Cth). Accordingly, this requirement has been met.

23 The dispute between the parties concerns the application of the requirements of s 104.4(1)(d) regarding proportionality.

24 The dispute between the parties concerns whether the Court can be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the proposed conditions (considered individually and in their combined effect) are “reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted” for any of the purposes listed under s 104.4(1)(d)(iii), (iv) or (v).

4.    THE OFFENDING

25 On 27 May 2019, Mr Zahab pleaded guilty to the following charges:

Between about 1 December 2014 and about 28 February 2017, at Young in the State of New South Wales, did, contrary to section 102.7(1) of the [Criminal Code ], intentionally provide support or resources to a terrorist organisation, namely Islamic State, that would help the organisation engage, directly or indirectly, in preparing, planning, assisting in or fostering the doing of a terrorist act, knowing that the organisation was a terrorist organisation (count 1).

…

Between about 28 February 2017 and 1 March 2017, at Young in the State of New South Wales, did, contrary to section 3LA(5) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), fail to comply with an order under section 3LA(2) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) (count 2).

26 The sentencing remarks of the trial judge are included within the materials provided to the Court by the applicant. The following is a summary of matters relevant for the purposes of this application.

27 From around July 2014 until December 2014, Mr Zahab used his home desktop computer to access Twitter and share ideological support for Islamic State. In this time period, he used his Twitter accounts to exchange thousands of tweets discussing Islamic State, sharing images associated with Islamic State and expressing his frustration over the use of airstrikes and drones in Syria and Iraq against Islamic State. He generated and posted numerous pro-Islamic State and anti-Western GIFS on those accounts. The profile picture used by Mr Zahab for one of his Twitter accounts was an image of a soldier with his face obscured by a scarf, leaning against a wall in a war zone and the text “Victory or Martyrdom”. He established a network of online Islamic State supporters and members, including a United Kingdom national named Samata Ullah. He exchanged public tweets and private messages and sent emails containing pro-Islamic State content, including a GIF from Islamic State showing persons being beheaded.

28 Between July and December 2014, Mr Zahab engaged in activities to enhance his online security, including by downloading an encrypted messaging application.

29 In November 2014 Mr Zahab began online research relating to electronic defence systems and from December 2014 until June 2015, on an almost daily basis, he engaged in research into laser guided weapons, research into laser target designation, and research into the use of computer-aided drawing (CAD) packages to develop a CAD design to house a laser warning receiver (LWR), which is an electronic device that provides advanced warning of laser guided munitions. He also researched developing the mechanical design and fabrication of an LWR using 3D printer technology. During these activities, Mr Zahab included references to Islamic State in his work, including by placing an image of the Islamic State flag on a design for a printed circuit board component. He also created a 288-page PDF document containing a detailed account of his research into and development of an LWR which began with the statement “in the name of Allah the most merciful and the most compassionate”. It provided enough information for a person with a reasonable technical background to be able to repeat the work with some effort. The document was encrypted and password protected with the word “Baaqiyah” which is shorthand for a term of special significance to Islamic State.

30 The document was sent securely to Mr Ullah. Later, the AFP seized from Mr Zahab’s premises a 3D printer and 3D printed casings for his LWR designs.

31 Mr Ullah was subsequently charged in the United Kingdom, and in May 2017 pleaded guilty to offences of membership of a proscribed organisation (Islamic State), terrorist training, preparation of terrorist acts and two counts of possessing an article for terrorist purposes.

32 From about mid-2015, Islamic State commenced industrialised, large scale and relatively sophisticated development and manufacture of unguided rockets of various types. In the agreed facts tendered by the Crown before the sentencing judge, Mr Zahan’s work was said to have significant commonality with the work of Islamic State at that time. Between June 2015 and February 2016, again on an almost daily basis (usually in the late evening or early morning at his home), Mr Zahab engaged in activities including research into the performance and manufacture of rocket propellant; conducting flights of hobby rockets for proof of concept of computer software used to design and simulate rockets; designing unguided rockets including a six metre long rocket; and researching and developing guidance for rockets using GPS. He generated a number of written reports and a video regarding this research which included references to Islamic State, extremist ideology and anti-Western sentiment.

33 On 13 November 2015, Mr Zahab received a telephone call from his sister informing him that a search warrant had been executed on her premises. He immediately began searching his electronic device for “isis” and deleted several related emails and images. Between June 2015 and April 2016, Mr Zahab went to considerable efforts to conceal his activities by using multiple operating systems and encrypted devices to save, access and communicate information securely.

34 On 16 April 2016, the AFP executed a search warrant at Mr Zahab’s home address at which a number of items including two laser modules and a laser diode, all later identified as connected with the LWR, several electronic devices, and an air rifle and pellets were seized. Mr Zahab was subsequently convicted of possessing an unregistered firearm, failing to store firearm safely and possessing ammunition without a valid licence (firearm conviction). No penalty was imposed.

35 After the execution of the search warrant, from August 2016 to December 2016, Mr Zahab obtained a mobile phone on which he continued to access media and information relating to Islamic State while also exhibiting behaviour that showed he anticipated further searches of his home computer.

36 On 28 February 2017, the AFP executed a search warrant at Mr Zahab’s home address and Mr Zahab was arrested. Included within the items seized were 3D printed components for laser warning devices, a 2.5kg bag of potassium nitrate, two containers of material used for making electronic circuitry, and several drones, hobby rockets, hobby rocket engines and other hobby rocket material. Mr Zahab was served with an order under s 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) requiring that he provide assistance by providing passwords for various encrypted USB sticks and files. He said that he could not remember the passwords and was charged with an offence under s 3LA(5) of the Crimes Act (being count 2).

37 As summarised in document 4 at [75], the sentencing judge found that:

a.    The offending in count 1 was very serious, as it involved a high degree of planning, sophistication and analysis over a long period of time. Mr Zahab earnestly engaged in intricate and planned scientific research, with an unwavering focus, and at all times intent upon assisting Islamic state in its involvement in armed and violent hostilities overseas. The results of Mr Zahab’s research were substantial and tangible. It was significant that Mr Zahab engaged in subterfuge in an attempt to ensure that this offending was not discovered; and

b.    The offending in count 2 was also serious, as Mr Zahab admitted that he knew the passwords, and his failure to comply with the demand frustrated the police investigation for a significant period of time. Mr Zahab’s conduct in refusing to comply with the demand was consistent with a desire to ensure, as far as possible, that the full extent of his offending would not be discovered.

38 The sentencing judge did not accept that at the time of the offending in count 1, Mr Zahab held a genuine belief that Islamic State was a force of good rather than a force of evil. He found that Mr Zahab had become aware of atrocities committed by Islamic State and his level of dedication to that organisation saw him choose to ignore what had come to his attention. He found that the evidence was “reflective of a person who holds radical and extremist views”. The sentencing judge noted evidence given by Mr Ahmed Kilani, a Muslim Prison Chaplin, that in April 2019 Mr Zahab denounced his views of Islamic State. However, the sentencing judge expressed scepticism as to the genuineness of Mr Zahab’s expressions of contrition and was guarded about his prospects of rehabilitation based on a renunciation of his views.

5.    THE SUBMISSIONS

5.1    The applicant’s case

39 The applicant submits that Mr Zahab presents an ongoing risk of engaging in, supporting or facilitating a terrorist act or hostile activity in a foreign country. He relies on the past conduct of Mr Zahab’s and an assessment that he has made of what the past conduct indicates in terms of Mr Zahab’s likely future conduct and vulnerabilities, relying on the statement of the High Court in Guo at 575 that “what has occurred in the past is likely to be the most reliable guide as to what will happen in the future”. He emphasises that what Mr Zahab did in the past was not an isolated incident, but instead a course of conduct over a period of some time.

40 The applicant submits that of particular relevance to the present application are the following matters:

(a)    That Mr Zahab has previously demonstrated extremist ideology and support for Islamic State;

(b)    That he was radicalised via online platforms on which he accessed and distributed extremist material;

(c)    That he had taken steps to provide support to a terrorist organisation over an extended period of time;

(d)    That he had specialised skills and capabilities, including the ability and demonstrated willingness to conceal his online conduct; and

(e)    That he intends to return to the same environment in which he had committed his offending.

41 The applicant submits that despite his time in and release from custody and also his renunciation of Islamic State and engagement with rehabilitative programs while in custody, there remains a risk that Mr Zahab may engage in conduct that constitutes a terrorist act, or conduct supportive or facilitative of a terrorist act or engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country. These matters are supported by the content of the applicant’s first affidavit.

42 The applicant refers in his first affidavit to each of the proposed conditions under the interim control order. I do not here repeat the content of those proposed conditions in full. In broad summary, the conditions include requirements that Mr Zahab:

(1)    must live at a specified address in Young, NSW (condition 1);

(2)    must not leave Australia or travel beyond NSW and the ACT (condition 3);

(3)    must wear a monitoring device at all times and allow police officers at any reasonable time to enter his home for any purpose relating to the electronic monitoring (condition 4);

(4)    consider, in good faith, participating in counselling (condition 5);

(5)    must refrain from communicating with certain people and categories of people (condition 7) and refrain from joining or associating with certain groups of people and organisations (condition 9);

(6)    must not buy, make, possess or use certain identified weapons and devices (condition 10);

(7)    must not go to certain places, including any prison or within 1 km of an Australian international airport or port (condition 11);

(8)    must receive from the AFP a phone with a SIM card which he must keep on his person and ensure is switched on and charged at all times, and respond to any call from the AFP Superintendent (condition 12);

(9)    must only use a computer provided to him by the AFP (condition 13) and use only one email account, details of which he has provided to the AFP, and an approved work or study email account if necessary (condition 14);

(10)    must only use AFP approved applications and programs on his phone and computer (condition 15);

(11)    must not possess or access certain proscribed documents or other media (condition 16);

(12)    must not create, publish or share documents and other media relating to a terrorist organisation or other proscribed materials (condition 17);

(13)    must not ask someone else to do something that is prohibited on his behalf (condition 22)

43 The draft interim control orders contain means by which Mr Zahab can obtain temporary exemption from any of the conditions (condition 20).

5.2    Mr Zahab’s response

44 Mr Zahab advances a number of reasons why no control order should be made. First, he submits that he engaged in no criminal conduct prior to 2014 and prior to that conduct was assessed by the sentencing judge as being a person of generally good character. He had a positive work history and a wife and six children. No member of his immediate family is said to hold extremist ideologies. Secondly, Mr Zahab submits that his offending arose in the context of the acute political conflict in Syria where he developed an obsessive interest in the criminality of the al-Assad regime. That regime has now collapsed and the conflict resolved. Further, the offending conduct correlated with a period of sustained social isolation. Mr Zahab submits that these two conditions that actuated his criminal behaviour have materially changed, citing Guo at 574–5. Thirdly, Mr Zahab submits that his views have changed significantly in the last nine years. He says that he has demonstrated insight into his views on ISIS and disavowed any legitimacy regarding the use of unsanctioned violence for political or religious agendas. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]. Fourthly, Mr Zahab has the support of his immediate family and the evidence demonstrates that he will enter an environment that is not supportive of extremism. Fifthly, his experience in custody is a significant deterrent. Finally, if an interim control order is not made, Mr Zahab will nonetheless be subject to a Weapons Prohibition Order under s 33(1) of the Weapon s Prohibition Act 19 9 8 (NSW) and a Firearms Prohibition Order under s 73(1) of the Firearms Act 1996 (NSW). The latter legislation permits a police officer to exercise powers under s 74A(1) as reasonably required for the purpose of determining whether Mr Zahab has committed discrete firearm offences, which include the power to detain him, enter his premises or stop any vehicle of which he is an occupant and search him.

45 In the alternative, Mr Zahab submits that whilst none of the conditions of the interim control order are reasonably necessary, he is committed to complying with them if ordered to do so. However, he submits that they should not include condition 4 (electronic monitoring). He submits that the physical requirements of electronic monitoring may cause prejudice or embarrassment and impede positive opportunities (such as employment) in the community, that the offending conduct was based almost exclusively on his online activity which will not be addressed by electronic monitoring of his physical movements, and that in any event, his whereabouts can be tracked via his AFP phone (condition 12).

6.    CONSIDERATION

46 I am satisfied that the uncontested prerequisites for the grant of an interim control order are met. In particular, I note that in relation to s 104.4(1)(a), the applicant is a senior AFP member who has requested the order in accordance with s 104.3 of the Criminal Code. The Court has received and considered the information provided to it in accordance with s 104.4.(1)
(b) and does not require any further information. As noted above, I am also satisfied on the balance of probabilities that Mr Zahab has been convicted in Australia of an offence relating to terrorism, a terrorist organisation or a terrorist act within s 104.4(1)(c)(iv).

47 The only contested aspect of the present application is under s 104.4(1)(d) where the Court must be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that each of the conditions and the combined effect of all of the conditions to be imposed is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purposes of the three objects of Division 104, as repeated in s104.4(1)(d), being:

(a)    protecting the public from a terrorist act; or

(b)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of a terrorist act; or

(c)    preventing the provision of support for or the facilitation of the engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign county.

48 The considerations that I must take into account in determining this within s 104.4(2) are set out in section 2 above. They include, as a paramount consideration, the objects of Division 104 (s 104.4(2)(c)), and as an additional consideration the impact of the conditions (considered individually and in combined effect) on Mr Zahab’s circumstances (including his financial and personal circumstances) (s 104.4(2)(e)).

49 In Thomas at [19], Gleeson CJ said of the task of the Court required under s 104.4:

… The court is required to make findings that may relate to whether one or more persons are contemplating a terrorist act, whether or not a person has skills, information or other resources that could be employed by the persons who are contemplating a terrorist act to achieve their purpose, and whether the subject of the proposed order has received terrorist training. The court must make inferences and predictions as to whether the skills, information or other resources of the subject of the proposed order are capable of facilitating the commission of the contemplated terrorist act, whether the persons planning a terrorist act are likely to be able to make use of those skills or other resources, and whether the making of a control order would substantially assist in preventing the terrorist act. The requirement that a court consider whether each of the obligations imposed by a control order is both reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purpose of protecting the public was the subject of debate. A requirement of that kind would sometimes be described as a requirement of proportionality. Judgments about proportionality often require courts to evaluate considerations that are at least as imprecise as those involved in formulating a control order.

(Footnote omitted)

50 In determining what is “reasonably necessary” for the purposes of s 104.4(1)(d), Gleeson CJ said at [22]:

… the court has to consider whether the relevant obligation, prohibition or restriction imposes a greater degree of restraint than the reasonable protection of the public requires.

51 In Abdirahman-Khalif (No 2), Charlesworth J noted, after quoting Gleeson CJ at [22] of Thomas, that the phrase “reasonably necessary” reflects an underlying policy consideration that the degree of curtailment of the subject’s civil liberties properly reflect the nature and degree of the identified risk: at [20].

52 It may be noted that it is a criminal offence to contravene a control order: s 104.27 of the Criminal Code.

53 The applicant’s first affidavit sets out his considerable experience in policing and in particular his experience in counter-terrorism activities, including community supervision orders. For the purposes of the present application, I accept that he is well qualified to give the opinions that he has given. He provides a summary of the current terrorism threat level in Australia which includes the observation that since 5 August 2024 the national terrorism threat level has been “probable” and that the Director-General of Security in February 2025 described Australia’s security environment as “dynamic, diverse and degraded” and indicated that “[t]he grievance narratives, conspiracies and online echo chambers that proved so potent during COVID have festered and evolved into a diverse threat environment susceptible to sudden shifts in response to events”. He also noted that traditional transnational terrorist groups such as Islamic State and its affiliates are exploiting “permissive spaces” to revive and renew their capabilities, and noted that extremists are now self-radicalising. The applicant provides a survey of acts of terrorism in Australia since 2014 which serve to emphasise the “home grown” nature of many of the recent attacks including the 14 December 2025 Bondi Beach massacre where the perpetrators were allegedly inspired by Islamic extremism.

54 In terms of Mr Zahab’s own circumstances, the applicant gives evidence that in his opinion there is a “real risk” that in the absence of the proposed conditions, Mr Zahab may engage in conduct that constitutes a terrorist act, or conduct supportive or facilitative of a terrorist act, or conduct supportive or facilitative of engagement in a hostile activity in a foreign country.

55 There is a sound basis for the concern expressed by the applicant. He refers to five reasons for it. First, the religiously motivated extremist ideology previously demonstrated by Mr Zahab. Secondly, his radicalisation via online platforms on which he accessed and distributed religiously motivated extremist material. Thirdly, the steps that were taken by Mr Zahab to provide support to Islamic State. Fourthly, the specialised skills and capabilities possessed by Mr Zahab and finally, Mr Zahab’s intention to return to the same environment in which he committed his offences. The materials upon which the applicant relies provide support for each of these propositions.

56 As summarised above, Mr Zahab raises a number of matters that should be taken into account and which should cause the Court to refuse the grant of the interim control order.

57 It is not in dispute that Mr Zahab had a positive personal history prior to his offences. He is a qualified electrician who is married and has six children aged between 11 and 29. None of his immediate family with whom he will reside are said by the applicant to hold any extremist views, and have said that they were not aware of Mr Zahab’s offending behaviour at the time. Mr Zahab will be living with his family in the family home. It would appear that prior to his offending he was a person of generally good character.

58 It is submitted by Mr Zahab that the offences arose in the unusual circumstances of the al-Assad regime engaging in brutality in Syria and that with the regime removed, the cause of the event that triggered his offending is removed. However, it is apparent that Mr Zahab was swiftly radicalised by online content that he located by himself in his own home. He worked stealthily at home to produce materials intended to provide support to Islamic State. There is a legitimate concern, expressed by the applicant, that Mr Zahab may be radicalised again if his conduct is not moderated by the influence of control orders restricting his access to computers and particular content. Whilst it was put by his counsel that Mr Zahab fell into a “Pandora’s box” of social media which exposed him to Islamic State’s propaganda, there is a danger that upon release he may well re-open that box, or perhaps a different, equally insidious one. Many of the conditions proposed in the interim control order are directed to helping Mr Zahab avoid that situation.

59 Mr Zahab submits that he has renounced his support of the Islamic State and that this also indicates a reduced likelihood of risk. There is some material that supports that proposition and that demonstrates disengagement from his former views. As the applicant accepts, in March 2018 Mr Zahab was recorded by corrections officials to have strongly rejected the thinking of groups like Islamic State and said that “he has always lived peacefully with everyone regardless of their religion and abhorred the killing of innocent people”. As noted above, in April 2019 he made a “full denunciation” of his previous views regarding Islamic State to a Muslim Prison Chaplin. At that time he had been in prison for about two years. A 2021 assessment report noted that there was no indication that Mr Zahab continued to express a commitment to an ideology that justifies violence, and the AFP set out in document 5 its understanding that in September 2023, the Correctives Intelligence Group within Corrective Services NSW (CSNSW) believed that Mr Zahab did not currently subscribe to a Sunni violent extremist ideology.

60 In 2019, the Commonwealth parole laws were amended so that persons convicted of terrorism offences could not be released on parole unless the Attorney-General was satisfied that “exceptional circumstances” exist. Mr Zahab was eligible for parole from December 2023, which the applicant states was refused by the Attorney-General on three occasions, being 13 December 2023, 13 December 2024 and 8 December 2025. He expressed some anger at these refusals, saying in October 2023, “you can clearly see that the system is just designed to keep me in prison, they don’t really want to let me out”. This was perhaps an intemperate but fairly human reaction of frustration at being refused parole. NSW Community Corrections has recommended that a parole order be made for Mr Zahab on a number of occasions, having regard to his behaviour, institutional progress and engagement with intervention services.

61 In 2024 the Commonwealth Parole Office submitted to the Attorney-General that contemporary records indicate that Mr Zahab has disengaged from violent extremism. [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED].

62 However, there are signs that Mr Zahab does not have a good insight into his offending. CSNSW records from 14 February 2023 document an interview with Mr Zahab where he asserted that the LWR project he had been documenting in the commission of his offence, and sent to his online associate Mr Ullah, “was in no way illegal and was simply him undertaking a project within the realms of his existing interests and hobbies”. That observation is of concern because Mr Zahab appears not to have been able and prepared to acknowledge that his “project” was directed towards assisting Islamic State in its terrorist activities.

63 To similar effect, in a pre-release report prepared by CSNSW dated 23 August 2023 the following is said:

Mr Zahab attributed his offending to his isolation and eventual reliance upon interactions and news updates via social media platforms. He described becoming “hyped up” and “addicted” to social media at the time, particularly in relation to the war in Syria, and his opposition to the Assad regime. He recounted feeling at the time that IS were the only organisation opposing Assad and offering a realistic alternative.

Mr Zahab denied having knowingly provided support or resources for IS, and instead claimed to have been undertaking personal hobbies due to his interest in electrical projects, which he had then shared online. He claimed he was not aware those he was sharing with were members of IS, although acknowledged “ignorance is not an excuse”. He minimised the seriousness of his offending on the basis he did not make any threats of harm.

64 More recently, CSNSW reported on 6 July 2025 that Mr Zahab “continues to demonstrate minimisation of his responsibility for the index offending”.

65 These, and similar statements recorded in the materials, provide some support for the concern expressed by the applicant that even after his incarceration Mr Zahab does not accept that he was engaging in criminal activity of a type which was directed towards the intentional provision of support for Islamic State.

66 Furthermore, document 4 notes at [112] that in 2023 and 2025, CSNSW recorded Mr Zahab attributing his offending in part to the social isolation he experienced after moving to rural NSW, including the distance created between himself and his family as a result of his low moods.

67 Mr Zahab proposes to return to his home and family in rural NSW and there is a risk that he will experience the same sense of isolation. This tends to reinforce the concern, expressed by the applicant, that Mr Zahab is vulnerable to returning to the conduct that led him to be drawn into the Islamic State web. While Mr Zahab has indicated that he intends to reconnect with the local community through work and becoming more socially involved, including by engaging with his local Imam and the Young Mosque community, this risk remains a relevant consideration.

68 Whilst the conditions that led to the offending by Mr Zahab have changed, it is a factor in favour of the grant of the interim control order sought that Mr Zahab was susceptible to radicalisation in a short period of time, at home, using access to the internet by his home computer. Whilst the al-Assad regime in Syria is no longer, the threat assessment to which the applicant has referred in his first affidavit indicates that there is some risk that Mr Zahab will succumb to another, different but related, ideological echo chamber.

69 A countervailing factor in this regard is certainly the support of Mr Zahab’s family. In this respect, the evidence indicates that his immediate family has taken significant steps to ensure that he returns to a close and law-abiding home environment. They have voluntarily completed an online course developed by the UK government entitled “Prevent duty: Awareness” designed to enable people to identify concerning behaviours relating to radicalisation, extremism and terrorism at an early stage and prevent them. I also accept that Mr Zahab has had the deterrent effect of nine years of imprisonment.

70 It is not possible to divorce the application for the present interim control order from the conditions proposed in it. Those conditions should be considered individually and also collectively: s 104.4(1)(d)(ii) Criminal Code. I do so briefly below.

71 When, in dealing with these issues, I refer to a condition sought by the applicant as “proportionate”, I mean that, on the material presently before the Court (bearing in mind that the present application is interlocutory in character and that further evidence may be before the Court at a confirmation hearing), the condition is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for at least one of the purposes specified in s 104.4(1)(d) of the Criminal Code. This adopts the approach taken in Booth v Dakkak [2020] FCA 1882 (Yates J) at [22]. I do not below purport to summarise the entirety of each proposed condition.

72 Condition 1 requires Mr Zahab to reside only at specified premises, these being his family home. The applicant says that being located there will assist police in monitoring his whereabouts and provide some stability during the period of his re-integration into the community. It will also provide a deterrent effect for Mr Zahab as he will be aware that he is being monitored, which the applicant considers will assist him in resisting negative influences. I also note that after the hearing, the parties sent an email to my chambers informing me that they had reached an agreed position that proposed condition 1.3 should be amended to refer to two business days, rather than three business days. I accept that condition 1 is proportionate.

73 Condition 2 concerns “checking in” and requires Mr Zahab to call the AFP Superintendent within 24 hours of the conditions being given to him and when directed to do so. This is a practical requirement that enables communication lines to be established and maintained. I accept that this condition is proportionate.

74 Condition 3 prohibits Mr Zahab from leaving the area of NSW or the ACT (including abroad). The applicant considers that there is a real risk that Mr Zahab may wish to travel overseas and be further exposed to religiously motivated extremist views and receive further indoctrination and training, and return to Australia armed with new or more harmful or efficient ways to undertake or facilitate others to undertake a terrorist attack. In the absence of any evidence from Mr Zahab (necessarily, given the nature of the application), I am unaware of any particular inconvenience that the restriction of movement within Australia will cause. I note that in written submissions, Mr Zahab’s counsel observed that there is no opposition to restrictions on his travel in the context of opposing the electronic monitoring condition. I accept that restrictions on international travel are reasonable and proportionate having regard to Mr Zahab’s past offending behaviour and note that Mr Zahab may seek an exemption if he is required to travel within Australia for a particular reason.

75 Condit ion 4 concerns electronic monitoring. In his affidavit of 9 March 2026, the applicant explains that the electronic monitoring device is known as a “Smart Tag” and comprises a strap and tag of grey plastic for fitting to the ankle, which is relatively slim-fitting and can be worn under pants. It can be worn in a shower or bath. It combines three types of monitoring technology (radio frequency, GPS and global system for mobile), into one unit to communicate geographical location.

76 The applicant explains that where a control order imposes a condition of wearing an electronic monitoring unit, it can be programmed to meet the specific requirements of the control order including to provide: tamper alerts, static alerts (if it has not moved for a certain period of time), low battery alerts and exclusion zone alerts. In his first affidavit, the applicant explains that he has considered whether there may be alternatives to the electronic monitoring condition that would reduce the impact on Mr Zahab’s personal circumstances while still mitigating the identified risks. One is to have Mr Zahab use a permitted mobile telephone to track his location. This, the applicant says, is less effective in determining location because a mobile telephone can readily be left behind when Mr Zahab leaves a particular location or can be given to another person who is travelling to make it appear that Mr Zahab is moving, when he is not. The applicant considers that there is no effective substitute to an electronic monitoring device that would mitigate the identified risks effectively.

77 The essence of Mr Zahab’s opposition to this condition is that it is not proportionate, as there is insufficient connection with the objects of Division 104, and the condition holds genuine practical potential to inhibit Mr Zahab’s participation in the community. He is concerned that the physical requirements hold potential for prejudice and embarrassment and may impede positive opportunities to reintegrate himself into the community (such as employment). Mr Zahab submits that the offending conduct was almost exclusively based on his online activity, and that the steps he took to hide his activity were also confined to electronic steps (such as encryption or refusing to provide passwords), and that there are no persuasive risk factors associated with his physical movements.

78 For present purposes, I am satisfied on the balance of probabilities that condition 4 is reasonably necessary, and reasonably appropriate and adapted, for the purposes identified in s 104.4(1)(d). The prior offence committed by Mr Zahab is an indicator of the type of misconduct that he may be at risk of repeating. Although his criminal conduct predominantly involved online research, disseminating the results of that work and then assembling it all within the walls of his own home, he also engaged in physical activities, including procuring and testing hobby rockets and building prototypes. He showed skills in concealing his activities, including by the use of encryption methods, alternative electronic devices and, when he perceived that detection was possible, burnt or hid devices that he considered may be incriminating and refused to provide passcodes. For present purposes, I accept the concern expressed by the applicant that any alternative method of monitoring, such as using a mobile phone to track Mr Zahab’s movements, does not provide the right balance.

79 Condition 5 involves Mr Zahab considering voluntary participation in psychological or psychiatric assessment and treatment. Condition 6 involves providing the AFP Superintendent with information when requested, including allowing the provider of any counselling in condition 5 to share information. Both are, in my view, proportionate conditions to enable the AFP to assess the risk that Mr Zahab may reoffend and to assist in his reintegration into the community.

80 Condition 7 provides details of persons with whom Mr Zahab must not communicate. The applicant explains that the persons and categories of persons identified in the condition are intended to reduce the risk that Mr Zahab will engage with people who may pose a radicalisation risk to him or who may be at risk of radicalisation by Mr Zahab. It will enhance his re-integration into the community by ensuring that he meets new individuals who he did not know before and who have no connection with his criminal behaviour. Similarly, condition 9 restricts Mr Zahab from associating with particular groups or organisations which have extremist links or promote extremist ideology. I accept that these conditions are reasonable and proportionate.

81 Condition 8 does not require Mr Zahab to seek approval before starting any job, volunteer work or educational activity. It only requires him to inform the AFP before he starts and to provide any information about the activity requested by the AFP. I accept the applicant’s submission that it will have minimal impact on Mr Zahab, but will enable the AFP to understand his location and activities. I accept that this condition is proportionate.

82 Condition 10 specifies prohibited items. In his first affidavit, the applicant explains that of particular significance to him is the fact that an unregistered firearm and ammunition was seized when Mr Zahab’s home was searched. Whilst no information available to the applicant suggests that Mr Zahab was planning to use a firearm to commit a terrorist act, it demonstrated that Mr Zahab had the means to procure unlawful access to a firearm. Other items included are those which are either related to Mr Zahab’s offending (for example, a 3D printer or a hobby rocket) or which might be used in a terrorist attack. I consider that this condition is proportionate.

83 Condition 11 provides that Mr Zahab may not go to certain places, all of which have a logical and appropriate connection with limiting the risk that he will re-engage in offending behaviour. I consider that this condition is proportionate.

84 Condit ions 12 to 15 concern the use by Mr Zahab of telephone, computer, internet, email and computer programmes and apps. The applicant states that they are directed at enabling the AFP to monitor Mr Zahab’s communications and online activities, including by prohibiting him from using certain internet-based communication platforms, services and technologies that can be difficult to monitor. These conditions also prohibit Mr Zahab from using any mobile telephone other than a single permitted one, supplied by the AFP. Having regard to the nature of Mr Zahab’s offending, I accept that these conditions are proportionate. In a related point, condition 18 requires Mr Zahab to give the AFP Superintendent access to the phone, computer and study computer and any password protected applications or files on those devices, and any email or other online accounts, when directed to do so. This condition is plainly necessary to give effect to an important aspect of conditions 12 to 15, which is to ensure that the AFP has timely access to those devices to enable early detection of any misbehaviour, which will serve as a deterrent to Mr Zahab and facilitate prevention of any future act.

85 Similarly, conditions 16 and 17 concern the possession of or obtaining access to documents or other media that relate to propaganda or activities of a terrorist organisation or relate to Mr Zahab’s prior offending. They also prohibit him from creating similar content or sharing it. Significant exceptions are provided to enable Mr Zahab to access the content produced by a number of normal broadcasting organisations and streaming services. I am satisfied that these conditions are proportionate.

86 Condi tion 19 requires Mr Zahab to comply with any reasonable direction given by the AFP Superintendent in connection with the earlier conditions. The applicant in his affidavit explains that a direction could only be given if the Superintendent is satisfied that it is reasonable in all circumstances to give effect to the condition or the objects of Division 104 of the Criminal Code. I accept that it is proportionate.

87 Conditions 20 and 21 provide a mechanism whereby the AFP Superintendent may grant temporary exemptions to or approvals under any of the interim control order conditions. I accept that these conditions are proportionate.

88 Condition 22 concerns potential attempts to circumvent the interim control order and causing a third party to do something prohibited by the order on behalf of Mr Zahab. I accept that this condition is proportionate.

89 In conclusion, I accept that each of the conditions proposed by the applicant is, taken individually and in their combined effect, reasonably necessary and reasonably appropriate and adapted for the purposes specified in s 104.4(1)(d) of the Criminal Cod e. Accordingly, I will make the interim control order in accordance with the terms proposed by the applicant.

| I certify that the preceding eighty-nine (89) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Burley. |
Associate:

Dated: 23 March 2026

1. Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation – Islamic State) Regulation 2014; Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation – Islamic State) Regulations 2017; Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation – Islamic State) Regulations 2020; Criminal Code (Terrorist Organisation – Islamic State) Regulations 2023.
2. Statement of facts relating to why the order should be made (SOF-For) at 75.
3. SOF-For at [27]-[69].
4. SOF-For at [36]-[37], [42].
5. SOF-For at [39]-[40].
6. SOF-For at [29], [39].
7. SOF-For at [44]-[46].
8. SOF-For at [47].
9. SOF-For at [50]-[52].
10. SOF-For at [70].
11. SOF-For at [47]-[48].
12. SOF-For at [58], [70].
13. SOF-For at [58].
14. SOF-For at [5].
15. SOF-For at [6].
16. Statement of facts relating to why the order should not be made or proposed conditions should not be imposed (SOF-Against) at [5].
17. SOF-For at [76].
18. SOF-For at [30].
19. SOF-For at [32]; SOF-Against at [6].
20. A nasheed (chant) is a work of vocal music that is either sung or accompanied by instruments.
21. SOF-For at [27]-[32], [38], [53].
22. SOF-For at [29].
23. SOF-For at [27]-[28].
24. SOF-For at [38], [46(e)].
25. SOF-For at [60]-[63].
26. SOF-For at [65]; [68].
27. SOF-For at [65(a)].
28. SOF-For at [65(c) and (i)]
29. SOF-For at [70].
30. SOF-For at [65(e)-(h)]
31. SOF-For at [17]-[18]; [69].
32. SOF-For at [75].
33. SOF-For at [80].
34. SOF-For at [119]-[120].
35. SOF-For at [121]-[122].
36. SOF-For at [78]-[79].
37. SOF-For at [90]-[91]; [110]-[115]
38. SOF-For at [89].
39. SOF-For at [110].
40. SOF-Against at [70]-[79].
41. SOF-For at [128]-[130].
42. SOF-For at [130]; SOF-Against at [77]
43. SOF-Against at [76].
44. SOF-For at Annexure NN (Refusal of parole signed by the Attorney-General (Cth) dated 13 December 2023)
45. SOF-For at [107].
46. SOF-For at [108].
47. SOF-For at [108].
48. SOF-For at [98].
49. SOF-For at [106], referencing Section 19ALB of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).
50. SOF-For at [105].
51. SOF-Against at [53].
52. SOF-Against at [56].
53. SOF-For at [115].
54. SOF-Against at Annexure UU (Letter from the Commonwealth Parole Office dated 23 October 2023, ZHA.0003.0001.0056 to .0061).
55. SOF-For at [112].
56. SOF-Against at [10].
57. SOF-For at [140].
58. SOF-For at [146]-[148].
59. SOF-Against at [85]-[92].
60. SOF-Against at [93].
61. SOF-Against at [100], [102], [104] Top