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March 25, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In the Int. of: A.I.Y., a Minor

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 500 MDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: King

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (25.2K)

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Lead Opinion

                        by King

J-A04020-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.I.Y., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: B.J.Y., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 500 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 10-AD-2025

IN INTEREST OF: O.R.Y., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: B.J.Y., FATHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 501 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 11-ad-2025

IN THE INTERST OF: E.L.Y., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: B.J.Y., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 502 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 12-AD-2025

IN THE INTEREST OF: I.U.Y., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
J-A04020-26

:
:
APPEAL OF: B.J.Y., FATHER :
:
:
:
: No. 503 MDA 2025

Appeal from the Decree Entered March 13, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Orphans' Court at
No(s): 13-AD-2025

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and LANE, J.

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED MARCH 25, 2026

Appellant, B.J.Y. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered in the

Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas, granting the petitions of Appellee,

Dauphin County Social Services for Children and Youth (“the Agency”), for

involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights to his minor children, A.I.Y.,

O.R.Y., E.L.Y., and I.U.Y. (“Children”). We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this appeal are as follows.

A.I.Y. and O.R.Y. are twins who were born in 2017. E.L.Y. was born in 2019,

and I.U.Y. was born in 2020. On January 27, 2022, the Agency filed

dependency petitions for all four children. The petitions stemmed from

concerns over unsanitary and unsafe housing conditions. Additionally, the

Agency questioned Mother and Father’s parenting skills because Children were

experiencing developmental delays. The court conducted a shelter care

hearing on January 31, 2022. Following the hearing, the court placed Children

under the temporary care and custody of the Agency. On February 9, 2022,

-2-
J-A04020-26

the court adjudicated Children dependent, and the Agency placed Children

into foster care. Additionally, the court ordered Father to comply with the

following objectives:

Service objectives were for him to cooperate and comply
with the Agency, will participate in a reunification service
identified, will address mental health and behavioral health
needs, will demonstrate an ongoing commitment to his
children, will maintain appropriate housing, and then
reimburse the county for any support that would be
identified through domestics.

(N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/13/25, at 5).

The trial court’s opinion described what happened next as follows:

Following placement in foster care, both parents were
granted the right to supervised visits at the Harrisburg
YWCA. Throughout July 2022, the YWCA reported ongoing
concerns for the safety of the Children during visits and the
parents failing to follow the rules or directives from the
supervision staff. Specific concerns included the parents’
failure to properly diaper the Children or provide prompt
bathroom breaks, failure to pay proper attention to the
Children including spending time on their phones and/or not
paying attention; overfeeding the Children to the point of
vomiting, and allowing the Children to climb on furniture
with no correction.

On October 25, 2023, a General Protective Services (“GPS”)
referral was received with allegations concerning one of the
twins, A.I.Y., and the third child E.L.Y., both of whom had
been diagnosed with a seizure disorder.[1] Father was
reported to have inappropriately medicated the Children
during visitations. In addition, the referral stated that the

---

1 At the termination hearing, the Agency’s case manager explained: “[A.I.Y.

and E.L.Y.] have a seizure disorder which requires maintenance medication,
you know, diet, schedule, sleeping schedule. And they all have the GRIN2
genetic mutation—all four, excuse me.” (N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/13/25,
at 7).

-3-
J-A04020-26

Children would bite each other during visits with Father,
leaving visible marks. These allegations were validated by
the Agency on November 8, 2023.

On November 27, 2023, the Agency received another GPS
referral raising a number of concerns including that Father
lacked appropriate housing, failed to properly supervise the
Children, and mishandled the Children’s medical care.
These concerns were later validated by the Agency which
noted that the Children would return from Father’s home
smelling of animal urine and smoke. Father admitted
“mixing up” A.I.Y.’s and E.L.Y.’s seizure medications and
giving the wrong dose to the wrong child. There were also
continued issues with the Children biting each other while
visiting Father.

---

In April of 2024, there was an incident where the Children
accessed and played with A.I.Y.’s and E.L.Y.’S emergency
rescue medication while Father was driving. Thereafter,
Father failed to contact the medical providers to obtain a
refill of the emergency medication.

On July 14, 2024, the Agency received a GPS referral
regarding the youngest child, I.U.Y., who was hospitalized
at the time for pneumonia. It was alleged that while Father
was at the hospital, he was heard multiple times screaming
at the Children through a closed door. His voice was so loud
it could be heard down a hallway and made hospital staff
uncomfortable and concerned for the Children’s safety.

On September 12, 2024, the Agency learned that A.I.Y. had
to be taken to the emergency room because he was having
trouble breathing. Father was supposed to alternate
overnight shifts at the hospital with the foster family to
watch A.I.Y. but repeatedly failed to attend his shifts.

Eight (8) permanency review hearings were held during the
pendency of these cases: May 12, 2022; August 11, 2022;
February 28, 2023; May 4, 2023; September 27, 2023;
January 11, 2024; May 8, 2024; and September 16, 2024.
… At each permanency review hearing, the Children were
found to be dependent and their continuing placement found

-4-
J-A04020-26

“necessary and appropriate.” The [c]ourt found Father to
be in compliance with the placement plan at all hearings
including “moderate compliance” at the first two hearings,
“substantial compliance” at five hearings and “full
compliance” at one hearing.

At the January 11, 2024 review, the [c]ourt noted that the
Children had been in placement for the last 22 months and
were no longer within the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(“ASFA”) timeframe. The [c]ourt, however, granted Father
a timeframe exception from the ASFA mandate, which
requires the Agency seek termination of parental rights
where a child has been in foster care for 15 of the most
recent 22 months. Father was granted another timeframe
exception at the next permanency review hearing on May 8,
2024. At the hearing on September 16, 2024, however, a
timeframe exception was not granted. By that point, the
Children had been in placement for 29 months, well outside
of the ASFA parameters.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/29/25, at 4-6) (record citations omitted).

On January 16, 2025, the Agency filed petitions for the involuntary

termination of Father’s parental rights to Children. The court conducted

termination hearings on February 13, 2025 and March 13, 2025.2 At the

hearings, the court received testimony from the Agency’s case manager, as

well as a social worker who assisted the family. Father also testified on his

own behalf. Immediately following the March 13, 2025 hearing, the court

entered separate decrees terminating Father’s parental rights to Children,

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (8), and (b). Father timely filed

---

2 We note that Mother and Father were married, but Father filed for divorce in

1. The [c]ourt terminated Mother’s parental rights to Children on March 13, 2025, and Mother is not a party to the current appeal.

-5-
J-A04020-26

separate notices of appeal and concise statements of errors on Monday, April

14, 2025. On May 12, 2025, this Court consolidated the appeals sua sponte.3

Father now raises two issues for this Court’s review:

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in terminating
parental rights of Father where the Agency failed to meet its
burden of proof?

---

3 Initially, the court appointed James Petrascu, Esquire, to serve as Children’s

guardian ad litem (“GAL”). At the first termination hearing, Attorney Petrascu
indicated that he had not filed a motion to be appointed as Children’s legal
counsel. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/13/25, at 40). At the court’s
suggestion, Attorney Petrascu made an oral motion for appointment as
Children’s legal counsel. Father’s attorney did not object, and the court
granted the motion. Further, the court asked Attorney Petrascu about
whether he perceived any conflict of interest by serving as GAL and legal
counsel for Children. Attorney Petrascu responded, “I do not at this time.”
(Id. at 41).

On the second day of the hearing, however, Attorney Petrascu announced his
opinion that termination of Father’s parental rights was not in Children’s best
interests. (See N.T. Termination Hearing, 3/13/25, at 75). In light of this
announcement, the court determined that it needed to undertake additional
fact finding to determine whether Children’s best interests aligned with their
legal interests. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed 5/23/25, at 5). See also In
re Adoption of K.M.G., 663 Pa. 53, 240 A.3d 1218 (2020) (explaining that
court must appoint attorney to represent child’s “legal interest,” i.e., child’s
preferred outcome; child’s legal counsel may also serve as GAL, responsible
for asserting child’s “best interests,” so long as child’s legal interests do not
conflict with attorney’s view of child’s best interests).

Upon remand, the court conducted a hearing on June 17, 2025. At that time,
Attorney Petrascu testified that he did not have a conflict, and his position on
Children’s best interests aligned with their legal interest, “i.e. that the
Children’s preferred outcome was for no termination of parental rights.” (See
Opinion and Order, filed 6/17/25, at 3). The court accepted this testimony
and entered an order finding that Attorney Petrascu did not have a conflict by
representing Children’s best interests and their legal interests at the
termination hearings. Thereafter, Quintina Laudermilch, Esquire, entered her
appearance in this Court as substitute GAL and legal counsel for Children.

-6-
J-A04020-26

A. Did the Agency fail to show that Father’s repeated
or continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal
caused the children to be without essential parental
care, necessary for their well-being, and those
conditions cannot or will not be remedied by Father
pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(2)?

B. Did the Agency fail to show that Father was
unsuccessful in remedying the issues before the
[termination of parental rights], and that the
termination would best serve the welfare of the
children pursuant to [Section] 2511(a)(8)?

Did the trial court abuse its discretion by failing to give
primary consideration to the developmental, physical,
emotional needs, and welfare of the children?

(Father’s Brief at 6).

Appellate review in termination of parental rights cases implicates the

following principles:

In cases concerning the involuntary termination of parental
rights, appellate review is limited to a determination of
whether the decree of the termination court is supported by
competent evidence. This standard of review corresponds
to the standard employed in dependency cases, and
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
supported by the record, but it does not require the
appellate court to accept the [trial] court’s inferences or
conclusions of law. That is, if the factual findings are
supported, we must determine whether the trial court made
an error of law or abused its discretion. An abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing
court might have reached a different conclusion; we reverse
for an abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of
manifest unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill
will. Thus, absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law,
or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court’s
decision, the decree must stand. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have
first-hand observations of the parties spanning multiple

-7-
J-A04020-26

hearings. However, we must employ a broad,
comprehensive review of the record in order to determine
whether the trial court’s decision is supported by competent
evidence.

In re Adoption of C.M., 667 Pa. 268, 294-95, 255 A.3d 343, 358-59 (2021)

(internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

The Agency filed a petition for the involuntary termination of Father’s

parental rights on the following grounds:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.―The rights of a parent in regard to
a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:

---

(8) The child has been removed from the care
of the parent by the court or under a voluntary
agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have
elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of
the child continue to exist and termination of parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.

---

(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating
the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
(a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.

-8-
J-A04020-26

23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8), (b). “Parental rights may be involuntarily

terminated where any one subsection of Section 2511(a) is satisfied, along

with consideration of the subsection 2511(b) provisions.” In re Z.P., 994

A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa.Super. 2010).4

In his first issue, Father contends that the Agency did not meet its

evidentiary burden to prove that termination was warranted under either

Section 2511(a)(2) or Section 2511(a)(8). Regarding Section 2511(a)(8),

Father emphasizes that he cooperated with the Agency, and the Agency’s

issues with Father were resolved prior to the filing of the termination petitions.

Despite his cooperation and improved parenting skills, Father asserts that the

court terminated his parental rights based upon the amount of time that

Children were in their foster care placements. Father acknowledges the

general proposition that a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while their

parent is unable to assume parental responsibilities. Nevertheless, Father

insists that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8) is unwarranted where

Father has complied with the Agency’s parenting objectives. Father also notes

that he “has participated in the medical needs of the children and developed

appropriate supports to assist with his care of the children moving forward.”

(Father’s Brief at 25). Father concludes that the court erroneously found that

---

4 The court also terminated Father’s parental rights under Section 2511(a)(2),

but we need only analyze Section 2511(a)(8) for purposes of this appeal.

-9-
J-A04020-26

the Agency presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of his

parental rights. We disagree.

“[T]o terminate parental rights under Section 2511(a)(8), the following

factors must be demonstrated: (1) [t]he child has been removed from

parental care for 12 months or more from the date of removal; (2) the

conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist;

and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare

of the child.” In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1275-76 (Pa.Super.

2003). “Section 2511(a)(8) sets a 12-month time frame for a parent to

remedy the conditions that led to the children’s removal by the court.” In re

A.R., 837 A.2d 560, 564 (Pa.Super. 2003). Once the 12-month period has

been established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that

led to the child’s removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith

efforts of the Agency supplied over a realistic time. Id.

Notably, this subsection does not require the court to
evaluate a parent’s current willingness or ability to remedy
the conditions that initially caused placement or the
availability or efficacy of the agency’s services. Rather, our
inquiry is focused upon whether the at-issue conditions have
been remedied such that reunification of parent and child is
imminent at the time of the hearing. It is axiomatic that a
child’s life cannot be held in abeyance while the parent is
unable to perform the actions necessary to assume
parenting responsibilities. We cannot and will not
subordinate indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and
stability to a parent’s claims of progress and hope for the
future.

Matter of S.H.D.N., 343 A.3d 737, 747 (Pa.Super. 2025) (internal citations

• 10 - J-A04020-26

and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).

Instantly, the trial court correctly recognized that Father had exceeded

the twelve-month period for remedying the conditions that led to Children’s

removal:

The Children had been in placement for a period
considerably longer than twelve months as of the date the
TPR Petitions were filed in January 2025. The boys had
been, in fact, in placement for 34 months as of the filing of
the TPR Petitions. In addition, as discussed in great detail
above, the conditions that led to placement continue to
exist, and termination of the parental rights would serve the
needs and welfare of the Children, providing them with
permanency.

It is not disputed that Father has been very cooperative with
the process over the last year, has attended every visit and
more recently attended all of his classes and every
appointment with the Children, is very amenable to making
changes, and has otherwise “done everything he possibly
can to comply.” Additionally, there is no dispute whatsoever
that Father very much loves the Children and is devoted to
them.

---

Father was given a very lengthy period of almost three years
to meet the requirements to qualify for reunification. As
such, the Agency presented ample, clear and convincing
evidence to establish grounds for termination under Section
2511(a)(8).

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/29/25, at 26-27) (emphasis in original).

Earlier in its opinion, in its analysis of the termination provisions of

Section 2511(a)(2), the court explained how the conditions leading to

Children’s removal continued to exist:

The clear and convincing evidence was that Father has

• 11 - J-A04020-26

revealed a repeated and continued incapacity to be a single
parent to these Children and that the conditions and causes
of his incapacity cannot be remedied. The proposed and
agreed upon remedy was for Father to obtain significant and
consistent supports, which he has failed to do over the life
of this case. The testimony reflected at most a hope by
Father that an approved support system will materialize.
Father’s incapacity has not been remedied to date and this
[c]ourt believes Father will be unable to remedy it in the
near future.

(Id. at 26). Our review of the record supports the court’s determinations.

At the termination hearings, the Agency first presented testimony from

its case manager, Heather Reinhard. While Ms. Reinhard acknowledged the

progress that Father had made in achieving his service objectives, she also

noted the obstacles that continue to prevent reunification:

One is the consistency with the housing, the understanding
of the developmental needs of the children and the
extensive supports and things that are needed there.

The most concerning is being able to be a full-time caregiver
for these children. When we had … developed a plan for
extended visits over the summer of 2024, it took extensive
supports both for [Father] and individuals, as any parent
would, we need to have supports because of the needs of
these children. But it took an extreme amount of hours by
myself, other staff through the Agency and LivingWell[5] to
develop the plan.

(N.T. Termination Hearing, 2/13/25, at 14-15).

Ms. Reinhard then provided an example of how Father’s purported

---

5 LivingWell is a social services group that works “with families on behalf of

[the Agency] to help them achieve their [Agency] objectives….” (N.T.
Termination Hearing, 2/13/15, at 42).

• 12 - J-A04020-26

support system lacked stability.

The second visit in August was delayed in starting by several
days because the day prior to the visit we were asking what
the plan was and the support team that [Father] had put in
place for his June visitation, all those individuals had backed
off so we had to kind of start at square one to get individuals
approved for that plan.

(Id. at 15). The court responded by asking Ms. Reinhard about two people

who were identified as supports at the last hearing. Ms. Reinhard indicated

that she had not heard from them since that hearing.6

At that point, the questioning shifted towards whether Paternal

Grandmother could provide support. Ms. Reinhard testified that Paternal

Grandmother, who lives in Florida, was unwilling to participate in an

assessment under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children

(“ICPC”)7, 62 P.S. § 761:

---

6 Father’s own testimony established why a support system is vital to his
ability to parent. Father testified that he currently works two jobs. Father
works for “Flagger Force, which is a company that keeps motorists safe in a
work zone, stop the traffic, you know, guys out there turning the stop/slow
paddles.” (N.T. Termination Hearing, 3/13/25, at 8). Father also works at a
local supermarket when he does not have shifts with Flagger Force. Due to
his work schedule, Father relies on members of his community to provide
childcare “before and after school especially.” (Id. at 24).

7 Among other things, the ICPC states:

It is the purpose and policy of the party states to cooperate
with each other in the interstate placement of children to
the end that … [t]he appropriate authorities in a state where
a child is to be placed may have full opportunity to ascertain
the circumstances of the proposed placement, thereby
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 13 - J-A04020-26

When the state of Florida had reached out to them for the
home study, her understanding was that it was just for
somebody to do a walkthrough of the home to approve the
home for [Father] and the children to move into her home.

And I explained to her, you know, I thought we had made
that very clear not only in this hearing but meetings outside
that she was presenting as that formal placement. So she
was not at that time willing to have her home, like, to go
through the assessment process.

(Id. at 16).8

Regarding additional services that the Agency could provide, Ms.

Reinhard claimed that there was “[n]othing that the Agency is aware of that

---

promoting full compliance with applicable requirements for
the protection of the child.

62 P.S. § 761, Article I.

8 Father’s testimony provided additional context about the complications
surrounding Paternal Grandmother’s participation as a support. Specifically,
Father admitted that he had explored the option of making Paternal
Grandmother the primary caregiver for Children. Nevertheless, Paternal
Grandmother no longer wished to participate in the ICPC process because
“[t]here are some health concerns with my stepfather at the moment.” (N.T.
Termination Hearing, 3/13/25, at 26). Father added that Paternal
Grandmother “would still be willing to act as a support for me … if we—the
five of us were down there, with my help she would be able to handle both
[her sick husband] and the children with my help.” (Id. at 27). At the
conclusion of Father’s testimony, the court expressed skepticism about the
feasibility of Paternal Grandmother providing any support for Father moving
forward. First, the court observed that a move to Florida would be “putting
more on [Father’s] plate” because he would have some obligation to assist
with the care of his stepfather. (See id. at 37). The court also reiterated that
Children “would still have to go through the ICPC process because the children
are under the jurisdiction of this [c]ourt.” (Id. at 38). Thus, the court was
unwilling to base its termination decision on the mere “hope that something
will happen” with Paternal Grandmother’s ability to provide support. (Id. at
39).

• 14 - J-A04020-26

we could offer.” (Id. at 20). Under these circumstances, Ms. Reinhard opined

that Father would not be able to demonstrate an ability to care for Children

independently, and Children deserved some sense of permanency. (See id.

at 16-17). Conversely, Ms. Reinhard testified that Children “are doing very

well” in their current placements. (Id. at 18). Children’s foster parents attend

to their medical, educational, and social needs, and Children “are very bonded

to their foster parents.” (Id. at 19).

The Agency also presented testimony from LivingWell’s social worker,

Mark Potts. Mr. Potts echoed Ms. Reinhard’s opinion that Father was incapable

of caring for Children. Initially, Mr. Potts described Children as “four high-

energy young boys, and [Father’s] a single parent. So there are occasional

moments when things get a little bit crazy.” (Id. at 43). Mr. Potts also

testified that Children’s unique temperaments and needs created a situation

where reunification was unadvisable:

My position all along with this case is that, you know,
“Superdad” wouldn’t be able to take four boys these ages
with the learning disabilities they have as a working parent,
couldn’t do that on their own.

So—and I’ve been very clear in my position that I don’t think
[Father] is capable of that. That’s why we first focused on
[Paternal Grandmother] with the ICPC and subsequently
focused on support teams to help him.

And I think generally speaking, that’s gone well. Although
I have to say recently I’m not sure he’s making as strong
use of them as he could and should.

(Id. at 44-45).

• 15 - J-A04020-26

Later, when questioned by the court, Mr. Potts conceded that Father

was not in a position for imminent reunification with Children:

THE COURT: Okay. So how confident are you that
returning the children to him right now … would be in their
best interest or not be in their best interest?

THE WITNESS: If we’re speaking of today, I would say
he has some work to do to prepare for that.

(Id. at 60).

Based upon the foregoing, we disagree with Father’s assertion that the

court terminated his parental rights simply based upon the amount of time

that Children have been in placement.9 In addition to considering the twelve-

month timeframe for a parent to remedy conditions under Section 2511(a)(8),

the court properly determined that the conditions that led to Children’s

removal continued to exist. See In re A.R., supra. Here, the record confirms

that the at-issue conditions were not remedied such that the reunification of

---

9 As mentioned earlier, Attorney Petrascu opined that Father’s parental rights

should not be terminated. Similar to Father’s argument on appeal, Attorney
Petrascu suggested that the court should not focus on the amount of time that
Children had been in placement:

I don’t think maybe we should terminate his rights just
because of a couple of months or a number of months that
it’s gone by to this point without the opportunity for a little
more time to see if he can get to the point of reunification
with the children….

(N.T. Termination Hearing, 3/13/25, at 75). Despite this recommendation,
we reiterate that “a GAL is not a judicial or quasi-judicial officer, and the
orphans’ court is not bound by a GAL’s recommendation.” In re Adoption of
B.A.S., 345 A.3d 787, 795 n.2 (Pa.Super. 2025).

• 16 - J-A04020-26

Father and Children was imminent at the time of the hearing. See Matter of

S.H.D.N., supra. Accordingly, the court properly concluded that adequate

evidence supported the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights,

pursuant to Section 2511(a)(8). See In re Adoption of C.M., supra.

In his second issue, Father emphasizes the trial court’s finding that a

bond exists between Father and Children. Father cites the testimony from the

Agency’s witnesses that: 1) Children call Father “Dad” during their visits; 2)

Children were willing to attend visits; 3) Children cry when the visits end; and

4) termination of Father’s parental rights will be difficult for Children to accept.

Father insists that he satisfies Children’s emotional needs because he “plays

with the children, knows their likes and dislikes, and they show affection

toward him.” (Father’s Brief at 29). Father maintains that he satisfies

Children’s developmental needs because he “is extremely attentive to their

learning disabilities,” and he “attends [school] meetings and takes notes on

what needs improvement.” (Id.) Regarding Children’s medical conditions,

Father “attends appointments, properly administers medication and ensures

healthy diets … by monitoring the nutritional value of the food they eat.” (Id.)

For these reasons, Father argues that the Agency did not prove that the

termination of Father’s parental rights will serve Children’s best interests.

Father concludes that the court abused its discretion by granting the Agency’s

termination petition. We disagree.

If the court determines that there are grounds to terminate parental

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rights under Section 2511(a), the court must “engage in the second part of

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and

welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child.” In re

L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007). “Intangibles such as love,

comfort, security, and stability are involved when inquiring about the needs

and welfare of the child.” In re C.P., 901 A.2d 516, 520 (Pa.Super. 2006).

“The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond,

paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the

bond.” Id.

“In this context, the court must take into account whether a bond exists

between child and parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,

necessary and beneficial relationship.” In re Z.P., supra at 1121.

Additionally:

The Section 2511(b) inquiry must also include consideration
of other important factors such as: the child’s need for
permanency and length of time in foster care…; whether the
child is in a preadoptive home and bonded with foster
parents; and whether the foster home meets the child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs, including
intangible needs of love, comfort, security, safety, and
stability. These factors and others properly guide the
court’s analysis of the child’s welfare and all [their]
developmental, physical, and emotional needs. Trial courts
have the discretion to place appropriate weight on each
factor present in the record before making a decision
regarding termination that best serves the child’s specific
needs.

Interest of K.T., ___ Pa. __, __, 296 A.3d 1085, 1113 (2023) (internal

citations and footnotes omitted).

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Instantly, the court conceded that “there is bonding and/or attachment

between Father and each child.” (Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/29/25, at 29).

Despite these bonds, the court found that “the record does not support that

Father’s bond with the children is necessary and beneficial….” (Id. at 30). In

support of this conclusion, the court analyzed Children’s psychological

evaluations. (See Hearing Exhibits B3-B6). The evaluations, which were

conducted by Dr. Jessica Port, Psy.D., detailed the regression in Children’s

behavior after their visits with Father:

O.R.Y.: While Dr. Port described a positive relationship
between O.R.Y. and Father during the observation period,
his visits outside the clinical setting revealed “anxiety,”
“regression” and “distress” to O.R.Y. Specifically, prior to
visits, O.R.Y. would become physically ill and be unable to
eat. In addition, he had soiling accidents and his frustration
tolerance became worse. In addition, O.R.Y. preferred
being with his foster parent inasmuch as he did not like
being separated from her, except during school.

A.I.Y.: Dr. Port described a fairly close relationship, in the
clinical setting, between Father and A.I.Y.; however, despite
positive interactions, she pointed to A.I.Y.’s behaviors
outside of the session, which displayed regression following
A.I.Y.’s visits with Father. A.I.Y. was described as often
worrying and struggling with adjusting to transitions and
that his anxiety is likely expressed through acting out as
well as withdrawing from himself. Dr. Port reported that
A.I.Y. was reluctant to visit Father and that his frustration
level and anxiety increased following visits. A.I.Y.
expressed a specific dislike for the 10-day overnight with
Father. Dr. Port described his post-visit regressive
behaviors as becoming increasingly more challenging.
A.I.Y. also expressed worry about having enough food with
Father and has come home hungry at times. As with O.R.Y.,
A.I.Y. does not like being separated from his foster mother.
He also tends to worry that his father will be mad at him.

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E.L.Y.: While E.L.Y. exhibited a secure attachment with
Father, he had secondary features of avoidant attachment
and his contact with Father was somewhat muted. He was
described as reactive to changes resulting in tantrum-like
behaviors that have increased since the initiation of visits
with his Father. His struggles with practical communication
skills, self-advocacy and modeling influences (including
swearing) increased in relation to the frequency of visits
with Father.

I.U.Y: Dr. Port reported that I.U.Y. displayed intermittent
anxiety that was notable between visits. His foster parent
reported that his behaviors became more challenging after
visits and that he communicated a lack of desire to visit
Father. Foster mother also communicated to Dr. Port that
I.U.Y. exhibits generally good behavior in her home but will
act out when he returns from Father’s home, including
throwing tantrums. I.U.Y. does not call Father “dad” but by
his first and last name.

(Trial Court Opinion, filed 8/29/25, at 30-31).

Our review of Dr. Port’s evaluations confirms the court’s summaries.

Moreover, the entire record supports the court’s finding that “Children’s stable

foster homes fully provide for the Children’s needs and welfare.” (Trial Court

Opinion, filed 8/29/25, at 31). On this record, the court correctly concluded

that terminating Father’s parental rights would not destroy an existing,

necessary, and beneficial relationship for Children. See In re Z.P., supra.

To reach this conclusion, the court placed greater weight upon factors such as

Children’s bond with the foster parents and the foster parents’ ability to

provide for Children’s best interests. We cannot say that the court abused its

discretion in how it weighed these factors. See Interest of K.T., supra;

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Adoption of C.M., supra. Accordingly, we affirm the decrees for involuntary

termination of Father’s parental rights.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq.
Prothonotary

Date: 03/25/2026

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