Carvajal Bautista v. ICE - Colombian Detainee Granted Individualized Bond Hearing

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April 6, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Luis Enrique Carvajal Bautista v. U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), et al.

District Court, S.D. Florida

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:26-cv-22191

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (34.1K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

Case No.: 1:26-cv-22191-GAYLES

LUIS ENRIQUE CARVAJAL
BAUTISTA,

Petitioner,

v.

U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (“ICE”), et al.,

Respondents.
/

ORDER

THIS CAUSE comes before the Court on Petitioner Luis Enrique Carvajal Bautista’s
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (the “Petition”) against Respondents U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), Attorney General of the United States, and the Warden of Krome
North Service Processing Center (together, “Respondents”). [ECF No. 1]. Petitioner challenges
his detention at the Krome North Service Processing Center in Miami, Florida (“Krome”) without
being afforded an individualized bond determination. See generally id. Respondents filed a
Response in Opposition to the Petition, [ECF No. 4]. The Court has considered the record, the
parties’ written submissions, and applicable law. For the following reasons, the Petition is
GRANTED IN PART.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Petitioner’s Immigration History in the United States
Petitioner is a Columbian national. [ECF No. 1]. On November 27, 2022, Petitioner entered
the United States without inspection. Id. Upon entry, U.S. Border Patrol agents determined
Petitioner was inadmissible, placed him under arrest, and transferred him to the custody of ICE,
Enforcement and Removal Operations (“ICE ERO”). [ECF No. 4-1]. On December 6, 2022, ICE
ERO released Petitioner under an Order of Recognizance. [ECF No. 4-3].
On May 6, 2024, Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear (“NTA”) and placed in removal

proceedings. [ECF No. 4-4].
On March 26, 2026, ICE agents detained Petitioner in Key Largo, Florida during a raid at
Petitioner’s place of employment. [ECF No. 1, 4-1]. He was then transferred to Krome.
To date, Petitioner remains in ICE custody at Krome. [ECF No. 1]. Petitioner has no
criminal history and has family in Miami, Florida. [ECF No. 1]. Petitioner has an immigration
hearing scheduled for April 8, 2026.
B. Petitioner’s Habeas Petition
On March 31, 2026, Petitioner filed the Petition alleging three counts against Respondents:
Violation of INA (Count I); Violation of Bond Regulations (Count II); and Violation of Due
Process (Count III). Id. Petitioner asks this Court to order that he be provided an individualized

bond hearing pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a). Id. On April 3, 2026, Respondents filed a Response
in Opposition to the Petition, arguing that Petitioner is not entitled to an individualized bond
hearing because Petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (b)(2), not § 1226(a). [ECF No.
4].
II. LEGAL STANDARD
“Writs of habeas corpus may be granted by . . . the district courts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. §
2241 (a). “Habeas is at its core a remedy for unlawful executive detention.” Munaf v. Geren, 553
U.S. 674, 693 (2008). This Court has jurisdiction over challenges involving immigration detention
as to whether Petitioner is detained subject to § 1225(b)(2) or § 1226(a). See, e.g., Puga v. Assistant
Field Off. Dir., Krome N. Serv. Processing Ctr., No. 25-24535-CIV, 2025 WL 2938369, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 15, 2025) (holding the Court has jurisdiction to decide whether petitioner is subject
to § 1226(a) or § 1225(b)(2)); Nguyen v. Parra, No. 25-CV-25325-JB, 2025 WL 3451649, at *2
(S.D. Fla. Dec. 1, 2025) (same).

III. ANALYSIS
The core disagreement remaining between Petitioner and Respondents is whether
Petitioner is detained under § 1225(b)(2), and is thus ineligible for bond, or § 1226(a), which
allows for release on bond. Section 1225(b) governs the inspection of applicants for admission,
which is defined in § 1225(a)(1) as “[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or who arrives in the United States . . . .” 8 U.S.C. § 1225. Detention for applicants for
admission under § 1225(b)(2) is mandatory and, as such, an applicant for admission is ineligible
for bond. See, e.g., Nguyen, 2025 WL 3451649, at *3 (citing Gomes v. Hyde, No. 25-cv-11571, 2025 WL 1869299, at *8 (D. Mass. July 7, 2025)).
In contrast to applicants seeking admission into the United States, “[§ 1226(a)] also

authorizes the Government to detain certain aliens already in the country pending the outcome of
removal proceedings. . . .” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 289 (2018). Section 1226(a) states
that a noncitizen already present in the United States “may be arrested and detained pending a
decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and may be released on
bond. 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a)(2). Thus, this statute “establishes a discretionary detention framework,”
Gomes, 2025 WL 1869299, at *2, unlike the mandatory detention framework of § 1225(b)(2).
Importantly, “[f]ederal regulations provide that aliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond
hearings at the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306.
On July 8, 2025, the DHS issued a notice to all ICE employees, indicating that any
noncitizen in the United States who has not been formally admitted or paroled shall be considered
an applicant for admission and shall be subject to § 1225(b)(2). See, e.g., Merino v. Ripa, 2025 WL
2941609, at *3 (citing ICE Memo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for

Applications for Admission, AILA Doc. No. 25071607 (July 8, 2025)). Following this
interpretation, the BIA held in Matter of Yajure Hurtado that an immigration judge had no
authority to provide a bond hearing to a noncitizen, who had been living in the United States for
years without admission or parole, because he is an applicant for admission under § 1225(b)(2),
subject to mandatory detention. 29 I&N Dec. 216 (BIA 2025).
District Courts have overwhelmingly rejected the BIA’s interpretation. “DHS’s
interpretation of the applicability of § 1225(b)(2), rather than § 1226, to noncitizens who have
resided in the country for years and were already in the United States when apprehended, runs
afoul of the statutes’ legislative history, plain meaning, and interpretation by courts in the First,
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.”1 Merino, 2025 WL 2941609, at *3 (citing cases);

see also Puga, 2025 WL 2938369, at *2 (“As explained, the statutory text, context, and scheme
of section 1225 do not support a finding that a noncitizen is ‘seeking admission’ when he never
sought to do so. Additionally, numerous courts that have examined the interpretation of section
1225 articulated by Respondents — particularly following the BIA’s decision in Matter of Yajure
Hurtado — have rejected their construction and adopted Petitioner’s.”); Nguyen, 2025 WL
3451649, at *3; Ardon-Quiroz, 2025 WL 3451645, at *7.

1 The Court acknowledges the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494 (5th Cir.
2026), which agreed with the government’s position here. But that decision “distort[s] the statutory text, abstract[s] it
from its context and history, ignore[s] the Supreme Court’s clearly stated understanding of the statutory scheme, and
wave[s] away the [government’s] previous failure to detain millions of noncitizens as if it were a rounding error.” Id.
at 509 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit’s decision “is not binding here, and it contradicts the vast
majority of district court opinions addressing the issue.” Lobovillalobos v. Hardin, No. 2:26-cv-00446, 2026 WL
621380, at *2 n.1 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 5, 2026).
The Court agrees that the plain reading of the statute supports a finding that Petitioner, who
has been living in the United States since 2022, is governed by § 1226(a) and not § 1252(b)(2).
Petitioner is therefore entitled to a bond hearing under § 1226(a), and Counts I and II are granted
in part. The Court declines to reach the merits of Petitioner’s other claims in Count III as the Court

is granting in part the relief requested for Counts I and II. See, e.g., Nguyen, 2025 WL 3451649,
at *4 (declining to reach the merits of the petitioner’s due process claim because it granted the
requested relief in other counts but allowing the petitioner to reassert its due process claim if the
respondents do not provide a bond hearing); Puga, 2025 WL 2938369, at *6 (same). If
Respondents do not comply with this Order by providing Petitioner a bond hearing under §
1226(a), Petitioner may renew his other claims. Since Counts III is an “unripe claim contingent on
Petitioner not receiving a custody determination hearing under section 1226(a), ‘the Court must
dismiss [them] without prejudice[.]’” Nguyen, 2025 WL 3451649, at *4 (citing Babilla v. Allstate
Ins. Co., No. 20-cv-1434, 2020 WL 6870610, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2020)).
IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, it is hereby ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows:
(1) Petitioner Luis Enrique Carvajal Bautista’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
[ECF No. 1], is GRANTED IN PART. The Court finds that Petitioner falls under 8
U.S.C. § 1226 (a).
(2) Respondents shall afford Petitioner an individualized bond hearing consistent
with 8 U.S.C. § 1226 (a) on or before April 20, 2026, or otherwise release
Petitioner.
(3) Count III of the Petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.
(4) This case is CLOSED for administrative purposes.
DONE AND ORDERED in Chambers at Miami, Florida, this 6th day of April, 2026.

DARRIN P. GAYLES
UNITED STATES DIST JUDGE