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Habeas Corpus Granted, Immigration Detainee Nidia Garcia Serrano Released

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Summary

The US District Court for the Western District of Kentucky granted Petitioner Nidia Garcia Serrano's Writ of Habeas Corpus, ordering her release from ICE detention. The Court ruled that Section 1226 of the Immigration and Nationality Act, not Section 1225(b), governs Serrano's detention, finding that she is entitled to a bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. Serrano, a 50-year-old Mexican citizen who entered without inspection in December 1996 and has pending immigration applications, had been detained since February 11, 2026. The Court incorporated prior rulings in Edahi v. Lewis and Vicen v. Lewis, which rejected ICE's interpretation of mandatory detention authority under DHS's July 8, 2025 interim guidance.

Why this matters

Immigration practitioners and ICE detention counsel should review pending bond-hearing denials for clients detained under Section 1225 who entered without inspection and are in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a. The WDKY Court's rulings in Edahi and Vicen, now followed again in Serrano, provide a framework for challenging mandatory-detention classifications where the Notice to Appear characterizes the respondent as an "alien present" rather than an "arriving alien." Sixth Circuit guidance on the Section 1225/1226 question remains forthcoming in the four pending appeals.

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What changed

The Court granted the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed by Nidia Garcia Serrano, ordering her release from ICE custody at the Grayson County Detention Center. The ruling rests on the Court's determination that Section 1226 governs Serrano's detention rather than Section 1225(b)(2)(A), following prior rulings in Edahi v. Lewis (W.D. Ky. Nov. 27, 2025) and Vicen v. Lewis (W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2026). The Court rejected ICE's reliance on DHS's July 8, 2025 interim guidance mandating detention of non-admitted noncitizens under Section 1225.

Immigration detainees held under similar circumstances—those who entered without inspection, are in removal proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229a, and have pending adjustment applications—may have grounds to challenge their detention. Legal practitioners handling removal proceedings involving non-inspection-entry aliens should monitor whether courts in their circuits follow Edahi and Vicen, particularly given that the Sixth Circuit has pending appeals (Lopez-Campos, Alvarez, Contreras-Cervantes, Pizarro Reyes) addressing the same Section 1225 versus Section 1226 question.

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Apr 25, 2026

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Nidia Garcia Serrano v. Samuel Olson, et al.

District Court, W.D. Kentucky

Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
OWENSBORO DIVISION

NIDIA GARCIA SERRANO, Petitioner,

v. Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-279-RGJ

SAMUEL OLSON, et al.,
Respondents.


MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Nidia Garcia Serrano’s Writ of Habeas
Corpus. [DE 1]. Respondents responded on April 22, 2026. [DE 6]. Petitioner replied on April 23,
2026. [DE 8]. The parties agree no evidentiary hearing is necessary. [DE 7; DE 9]. This matter is
ripe for adjudication. For the reasons below, GRANTS the Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus.
[DE 1].
I. Background
Petitioner Nidia Garcia Serrano (“Serrano”) is a 50-year-old native and citizen of Mexico.
[DE 1 at 6]. Serrano has been present in the United States since December 1996. [Id.]. Serrano
entered the United States without inspection. [Id; DE 6 at 84].1 Serrano resided in Logansport,
Indiana prior to her detention. [DE 1 at 6]. She has worked continuously since entering the United
States. [Id.]. On May 9, 2025, Serrano submitted a Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian,
Widow(er), or Special Immigrant, as a VAWA self-petitioning parent with the United States
Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”). [Id.]. On November 21, 2025, Serrano
submitted a Form I-485, Application to Adjust Status. [Id.]. On February 16, 2026, Serrano’s
daughter, a U.S. citizen, submitted a Form I-130, Petition for Alien Relative with USCIS on behalf
of her mother. [Id.]. All applications are pending. [Id.].
Serrano has been in detention since February 11, 2026. [DE 1 at 6-7]. On February 10,
2026, Serrano was pulled over by local police in connecting with a traffic-related incident. [Id.].
Serrano was charged, and arrested, for driving without a license. [Id.]. The next day, Immigration
and Customs Enforcement (“ICE’) located Serrano through its Criminal Apprehension Program.
[Id; DE 6 at 84]. She was then taken into ICE custody and transported to Grayson County
Detention Center in the Western District of Kentucky. [Id.]. On February 27, 2026, Serrano

requested a custody determination hearing before an Immigration Judge (“IJ”). [DE 1 at 7]. The IJ
denied the request for bond, citing a lack of jurisdiction. [Id.].
Shortly after detention, ICE issued a Notice to Appear Form I-862. [DE 6-1 at 90]. The
Notice to Appear marked Serrano as an “alien present in the United States who has not been
admitted or paroled” not an “arriving alien.” [Id.]. ICE also served Serrano an I-200, Warrant of
Arrest. [DE 6-3 at 97]. Serrano is currently in removal proceedings pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229a.
[DE 1 at 7].
ICE contends that based on interim guidance from DHS, issued July 8, 2025, titled “Interim
Guidance Regarding Detention Authority for Applicants for Admission,” only those noncitizens
who have already been admitted into the United States are eligible to be released during removal

proceedings and all other noncitizens are subject to mandatory detention, under 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (“Section 1225”), not Section 1226. [DE 1 at 2-3]. This is a reversal of longstanding policy. [Id.].
Serrano asserts that the United States illegally detained her under Section 1225 instead of
Section 1226 in violation of the INA. [Id. at 18-19]. And that this prolonged detention is in
violation of her Due Process Rights under the Fifth Amendment. [Id.]. Therefore, Serrano seeks
release from her detention, or in the alternative, to hold a bond hearing before a neutral IJ to
determine whether she should remain in custody. [Id.].
In response, the United States “relies on and incorporate[s] by reference the legal
arguments from the briefs the government filed with the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in the four
§§ 1225-1226 appeals.” [DE 6 at 85-86]. Those cases are Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, Case No. 25-
1965 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025); Alvarez v. Noem, Case No. 25-1969 (6th Cir. Oct. 27, 2025);
Contreras-Cervantes v. Raycraft, Case No. 25-1978 (6th Cir. Oct. 28, 2025); Pizarro Reyes v.
Raycraft, Case No. 25-1982 (6th Cir. Oct. 29, 2025). The United States concedes that the “relevant

facts in all four matters on appeal” are “similar to the relevant facts in this matter” and the only
“relevant legal question” is whether the Petitioner is detained under Section 1225(b)(2)(A) or
Section 1226. [DE 6 at 86].
II. DISCUSSION2
A. Section 1225(b)(2) vs. Section 1226
While the relevant facts are undisputed by the parties, the United States argues Section
1225 applies to Serrano’s detention, not Section 1226. The United States acknowledges that the
Court has previously ruled on the substantive question regarding § 1225 mandatory detention, [DE
6 at 83-84], and, that the only relevant legal question is whether Serrano is “detained under 8
U.S.C. § 1225 or § 1226?” [Id.]. As both parties acknowledge that the Court has previously ruled

on this substantive issue, which is the only “relevant legal question,” the Court incorporates by
reference its reasoning in Edahi v. Lewis, 2025 WL 3466682, at 5-13 (W.D. Ky. Nov. 27, 2025)

2 Neither party asserted any jurisdiction-related arguments. However, the Court has analyzed jurisdiction
of remedies in similar circumstances, such as Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at 2-3 and incorporates its
reasoning into this opinion. Neither party asserted any exhaustion-related arguments and no applicable
statute or rule mandates exhaustion. However, because many decisions in similar cases by district courts
within the Sixth Circuit discuss this principal, the Court incorporates its analysis on exhaustion of remedies
from a previous case, Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at *3, and the Court waives the exhaustion requirement
and Vicen v. Lewis, 2026 WL 541171, *2–
9 (W.D. Ky. Feb. 26, 2026), holding that Section 1226
applies to the Petitioner based on the facts set forth above.
i. Related Case Law
The United States incorporated brief cites to several nonbinding district courts, and one
BIA decision, to support their interpretation.3 However, the Court is not persuaded by these
decisions for the reasons previously explained in Edahi, 2025 WL 3466682, at 9–13 and Vicen 2026 WL 541171, at 2–9, incorporated here by reference.


For the reasons above and incorporated, Serrano, who has been present in the United States
for more than twenty-nine years, is not “seeking admission” into the United States, a fact
acknowledged in her Notice for Appearance by not marking her as an “arriving alien,” as well as
her arrest pursuant to the I-200 Warrant which authority arises out of Section 1226. Section 1226,
not Section 1225(b)(2), applies to her detention.
B. Lawfulness of Current Detention
As stated, Serrano is detained under Section 1226. The United States contends that because
Serrano is properly detained under Section 1225(b)(2), not Section 1226, and she has not been
“deprived of any due process.” [DE 6 at 88]. Otherwise, the United States does not respond to
Serrano’s alleged violation of due process. Because the Court found that Serrano’s detention is

guided by Section 1226, the Court must determine whether the continued detention pursuant to
Section 1226 is in violation of her Due Process.

3 None of the cases cited by the United States are controlling authority within the Sixth Circuit. Further, the
BIA is neither binding, nor should be viewed as persuasive authority, on any district court. See Loper Bright
Enter., 603 U.S. at 413 (“courts. . . may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a
The Due Process Clause extends to all persons regardless of status. A.A.R.P. v. Trump, 605
U.S. 91, 94
(2025). This includes non-citizens. Id. To determine whether a civil detention violates
a detainee’s due process rights, courts apply the three-part balancing test set forth in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). The Court must weigh: (1) the private interest that will be affected
by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and (3) the United States’ interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative
burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Id. at 335. The

United States does not address the merits of her Due Process claim, but instead focuses solely on
the legal argument of Section 1225(b)(2) versus Section 1226 as referenced above.
1. Private Interest
It is undisputed Serrano has a significant private interest in not being detained. One of the
“most elemental of liberty interests” is to be free from detention. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S.
507, 529
(2004). “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other
forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the very liberty that [the Due Process Clause]
protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001). Courts can also consider the detainee’s
condition of confinement. Martinez v. Noem, 2025 WL 2598379, at *2 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 8, 2025).
This is to determine if the conditions are indistinguishable from criminal incarceration. Id. Serrano

is being detained at Grayson County Jail. [DE 1 at 4].
Since her arrival into the United States, Serrano has resided in Logansport, Indiana. [DE 1
at 6-7]. But because of her detention in a separate state, she is separated from her community and
family, including her U.S. citizen daughter. [Id.]. The detention is thus making it difficult for
Serrano to participate in her community, work, and care for her daughter. [Id.]. She also has three
pending petitions with USCIS. [Id.]. As a result, the first Matthews factor favors Serrano’s
position.
2. Risk of Error
The second factor concerns the risk of the erroneous deprivation of Serrano’s liberty. A re-
detention, without any individualized assessment, leads to a high risk of erroneous deprivation of
an individual’s liberty interest. Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *15 (holding that “re-
detention without any individualized assessment” establishes a “high risk of erroneous
deprivation” of a protected liberty interest). As of today, Serrano has not had a merits bond hearing,

with counsel and evidence. Munoz Materano, 2025 WL 2630826, at *15 (holding that Due process
requires at a minimum the opportunity for the petitioner to submit evidence and be heard).
Respondents have not demonstrated that Serrano is a flight risk or a danger to the community, nor
is it likely they can. [DE 1 at 19]. She has no criminal or civil record, outside of the pending charge
related to driving without a license. [Id.]. Therefore, it would appear to the Court the only material
change within the past year, with respect to Serrano, is the United States’ interpretation of Section
1225 and Section 1226. Thus, because of a high, if not already evident, risk of erroneous
deprivation of Serrano’s liberty interest, the second Matthews factor favors Serrano.
3. United States’ Interest
The final Matthews factor concerns the Unites States’ interest in the procedure, as well as

any financial or administrative burdens associated with permissible alternatives. Matthews, 424
U.S. at 335
. The Court recognizes that the United States does have a strong interest in ensuring
noncitizens do not harm their community and that they appear for future immigration proceedings.
Sampiao, 2025 WL 2607924, at *12. However, a “routine bond hearing” before an IJ presently
“minimal” burdens to the United States.” Hyppolite v. Noem, 2025 WL 2829511, at *15 (E.D.
N.Y. Oct. 6, 2025). These procedures are also already in place. Id. Therefore, “existing statutory
and regulatory safeguards adequately serve the governmental interest in promoting public safety.”
Günaydin v. Trump, 2025 WL 1459154, at *10 (D. Minn. May 21, 2025). Because of that, the
Court finds that the third Matthews factor also favors Serrano.
Therefore, the Court finds that all three Matthews factors favor Serrano. The current
detention of Serrano is in violation of the Due Process Clause and the INA.
III. Remedy
Numerous courts across the country have ordered the release of individuals stemming from
ICE’s illegal detention. Patel, 2025 WL 2823607, at *6; Beltran Barrera, 2025 WL 2690565, at

*7; Roble v. Bondi, 2025 WL 2443453, at *5 (D. Minn. Aug. 25, 2025) (ordering petitioner’s
“release from custody as a remedy for ICE’s illegal re-detention”). The Supreme Court has also
recognized that “Habeas has traditionally been a means to secure release from unlawful detention.”
Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 107 (emphasis in original). This Court is releasing Serrano because of
the “unlawful detention” by ICE and the United States for the reasons stated above. Serrano is not
being released because she is detained pursuant to Section 1226. But instead, the Court is ordering
her release because of the United States’ illegal actions it undertook in Serrano’s detention.
Hyppolite, 2025 WL 2829511 *16 (holding that the United States cannot “detain [Petitioner]
without first conducting a hearing before an IJ” because of the unlawful detention of Petitioner).
As a result of her release stemming from the “unlawful detention” in violation of her due

process rights, and further pursuant to Section 1226 and its supporting regulations, Petitioner must
be provided with a bond hearing on the merits before a neutral IJ prior to any re-detention. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1 (c)(8), (d)(1). The IJ may consider the non-exhaustive list of factors set out in
Matter of Guerra 24 I. & N. 37, 40 (BIA 2006). Courts across the country have routinely held this
procedure proper. Alonso, 2025 WL 3083920, at *9; Lopez-Campos, F.Supp. 3d at 785-86; Mboup
v. Field Office Director of N.J., 2025 WL 3062791, at *2 (D.N.J. Nov. 3, 2025); Espinoza, 2025
WL 2675785, at *11; Ramirez Clavijo, 2025 WL 2419263, at *6; Munoz Materano, 2025 WL
2630826, at *20.
Serrano’s procedural due process rights are not violated by the fact she is detained. “Rather,
[Petitioner’s rights] are violated because she has been detained without a hearing that accords with
due process.” Lopez-Arevelo v. Ripa, 2025 WL 2691828, *12 (W.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2025) (citing
to Black v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149-150 (2d Cir. 2024)). Therefore, “the proper remedy” is the
“full process due under [Section 1226] which includes a bond hearing before an [IJ].” Maldanado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *9-10; Morales-Martinez v. Raycraft, 2025 WL 3124695, at *7 (E.D. Mich.
Nov. 7, 2025) (holding that because Petitioner had been detained “without a. . . hearing, he is in
federal custody in violation of federal law.”)
Because Serrano is being detained pursuant to Section 1226, relevant regulations entitle
her to a neutral bond hearing. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1236.1 (c)(8), (d)(1). Therefore, to afford Serrano
with the “full [due] process” under Section 1226, the United States must provide Serrano with a
neutral bond hearing before an IJ. Maldanado, 2025 WL 2968042, at *9-10.
VI. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the United States has violated Serrano’s due process rights.
The Court GRANTS Serrano’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus [DE 1] and orders the
following:
I. The United States is directed to release Petitioner Serrano immediately because of
the unlawful detention in violation of her due process rights.
II. | The United States must provide her with a bond hearing before a neutral IJ pursuant
to Section 1226.
IH. The United States must certify compliance with the Court’s order by a filing on the
docket by April 25, 2026.

April 24, 2026 8 “Henne

Named provisions

Section 1225(b)(2)(A) Section 1226 8 U.S.C. § 1229a Form I-360 Form I-485 Form I-130 Form I-862 I-200 Warrant of Arrest

Citations

8 U.S.C. § 1225 governs mandatory detention of arriving aliens
8 U.S.C. § 1226 governs detention with bond hearing rights
8 U.S.C. § 1229a removal proceedings provision
8 U.S.C. § 1101 INA definitions cited

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Classification

Agency
USDC WDKY
Filed
April 24th, 2026
Instrument
Enforcement
Branch
Judicial
Legal weight
Binding
Stage
Final
Change scope
Substantive
Document ID
Civil Action No. 4:26-cv-279-RGJ
Docket
4:26-cv-00279 25-1965 25-1969 25-1978 25-1982

Who this affects

Applies to
Immigration detainees Government agencies Legal professionals
Industry sector
9211 Government & Public Administration
Activity scope
Immigration detention Bond hearings Habeas corpus proceedings
Geographic scope
US-KY US-KY

Taxonomy

Primary area
Immigration
Operational domain
Legal
Topics
Criminal Justice Healthcare Civil Rights

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