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April 1, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

Court of Appeals of Oregon

• Citations: 348 Or. App. 22
• Docket Number: A175575
• Judges: Lagesen

• Disposition: Reversed and remanded.

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (449)

• PDF

Disposition

Reversed and remanded.

Combined Opinion

22 April 1, 2026 No. 229

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON

Sonja BOHR,
Tamara Barnes, Karen Foglesong, and Mary Wood,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
v.
TILLAMOOK COUNTY CREAMERY ASSOCIATION,
an Oregon cooperative corporation,
Defendant-Appellant.
Sonja BOHR,
Tamara Barnes, Karen Foglesong, and Mary Wood,
on behalf of themselves and all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
TILLAMOOK COUNTY CREAMERY ASSOCIATION,
an Oregon cooperative corporation,
Defendant-Respondent.
Multnomah County Circuit Court
19CV36208; A175575

On remand from the Oregon Supreme Court, Bohr v.
Tillamook County Creamery Association, 373 Or 343, 567
P3d 413 (2025).
Argued and submitted on remand February 19, 2026.
Michael Sandmire argued the cause for appellant-re-
spondent. Also on the briefs were Alexandra M. Shulman,
Daniel L. Lis, and Buchalter Ater Wynne.
Nadia H. Dahab argued the cause for respondents-appel-
lants. Also on the answering brief were David F. Sugerman
and Sugerman Law Office; Tim Quenelle and Tim Quenelle
PC; and Kelsey Eberly (California), Amanda Howell (Texas),
and Animal Legal Defense Fund (California). Also on the
supplemental brief were David Sugerman and Sugerman
Dahab; Tim Quenelle and Tim Quenelle PC; Amanda Howell
(Texas) and Animal Legal Defense Fund (California).
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 23

Before Tookey, Presiding Judge, Lagesen, Chief Judge,
and DeVore, Senior Judge.
LAGESEN, C. J.
Reversed and remanded.
24 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

LAGESEN, C. J.
We consider this putative class action under Oregon’s
Unlawful Trade Practices Act (UTPA) for the second time,
in this instance on remand from the Oregon Supreme Court.
Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Assn., 321 Or App 213,
516 P3d 284 (2022) (Bohr I); Bohr v. Tillamook County
Creamery Assn., 373 Or 343, 567 P3d 413 (2025) (Bohr II).
Together, those decisions supply a detailed background of
the course of this case to date, and we write from the prem-
ise that readers of this decision are acquainted with the pre-
vious decisions.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs allege that defendant Tillamook County
Creamery Association’s advertising about its dairy products
was misleading in ways that violated three provisions of the
UTPA: ORS 646.608(1)(b) (causing likelihood of confusion
or of misunderstanding regarding the source of goods); ORS
646.608(1)(d) (using deceptive representations or designa-
tions of geographic origin in connection with goods); and
ORS 646.608(1)(e) (representing that goods have qualities
and characteristics, including ingredients, that they do
not have). Plaintiffs further allege that the asserted viola-
tions caused them to suffer an “ascertainable loss” under
ORS 646.638. The trial court dismissed the complaint to
the extent that it purported to assert claims on behalf of a
class, concluding that plaintiffs were required to allege that
they relied on the asserted violative conduct in purchasing
defendant’s products, and, further, that plaintiffs failed to
adequately allege reliance by class members. The court con-
cluded, however, that the individual plaintiffs’ allegations
sufficiently stated claims under each of the identified UTPA
provisions.
As ORS 19.225 allows in putative class actions,
the trial court certified to us seven questions that the court
determined were “controlling question[s] of law” that would
benefit from interlocutory resolution. When this case was
first before us, we answered four of those questions in defen-
dant’s favor (1, 2, 3 and 5) and, based on those answers,
affirmed the trial court’s order of dismissal with respect to
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 25

the class claims, and remanded to the trial court to proceed
with the case with respect to the individual plaintiffs. Bohr I,
321 Or App at 224-25, 237-49. In so doing, we concluded that
one of plaintiffs’ theories of relief (the price inflation theory)
was not tenable and that the other two theories (inducement
and prohibited transaction) required plaintiffs to plead—
and ultimately prove—reliance. Id. at 249. As a result of
those determinations, we did not reach the other questions
certified to us (4, 6 and 7). We reasoned that, under the cir-
cumstances, they no longer presented controlling questions
of law with respect to the class action. Id. at 226-28.
The Supreme Court allowed review of our decision
and reversed our decision insofar as we had held that plain-
tiffs were required to plead reliance for purposes of their
“price inflation” and “prohibited transaction” theories of
recovery:
“We conclude that, for their claim alleging violations of
ORS 646.608(1)(b), (d), and (e), where plaintiffs allege
that they suffered ascertainable loss in the form of pay-
ing a ‘premium’ price for Tillamook’s dairy products due
to Tillamook’s conduct that inflated the market value of
those products, plaintiffs and the class members need not
plead that they relied upon Tillamook’s representations.
Plaintiffs’ allegations that they purchased ‘misbranded’
and ‘illegally advertised’ goods in violation of federal and
state law also do not require plaintiffs and the class mem-
bers to plead reliance.”
Bohr II, 373 Or at 371. The Court remanded to us for fur-
ther proceedings. Id. Upon plaintiffs’ request, we received
supplemental briefing and heard oral argument from the
parties regarding the effect of the Supreme Court’s decision
on questions 4, 6 and 7—the questions we previously left
unanswered. Those questions are as follows:
“4a. To establish ascertainable loss under ORS 646.638(1)
based upon their theory that Plaintiffs and the members of
the putative class overpaid for the Tillamook products com-
pared to competing brands, must Plaintiffs and the mem-
bers of the putative class plead and prove which Tillamook
product(s) Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class
purchased and at what cost, as well as the cost of the proper
26 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

comparator product(s) available at the time of their respec-
tive purchases?
“4b. If the answer to the foregoing question is ‘no,’ must
Plaintiffs and the members of the putative class nonethe-
less plead and prove which Tillamook product(s) Plaintiffs
and the members of the putative class purchased and at
what cost in order to provide the basis for any ‘inference’ of
ascertainable loss?”

“6. Whether Plaintiffs’ claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b)
fails on the basis that the term ‘source’ in that subsection
refers to the company that sells the goods at issue, not the
geographic origin of an ingredient used to make the goods,
and not the supplier of an ingredient used to make the
goods.”
“7. Whether Plaintiffs’ claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b)
fails on the basis that the meaning of ‘goods’ in that sub-
section does not include an ingredient used to make the
goods, in this case, milk.”
For the reasons that follow, we answer both parts
of question 4 in the negative. In view of that conclusion,
and accounting for the Supreme Court’s determination that
plaintiffs are not required to allege reliance for two of their
theories, we reverse the trial court’s order dismissing the
class claims for failure to state a claim.
That determination, which resurrects the poten-
tial class claims, means that questions 6 and 7 are poten-
tially controlling questions for purposes of ORS 19.225, so
we answer them. We answer each in the affirmative and
conclude that, as pleaded, the allegations in the complaint
do not state a claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b). We remand
for further proceedings consistent with that conclusion, and
our conclusion that plaintiffs have sufficiently alleged an
ascertainable loss.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Ascertainable Loss
We start with question 4 which, as noted, asks
about the standard for pleading and proving an “ascertain-
able loss” within the meaning of ORS 646.638(1).
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 27

As an initial matter, to the extent question 4 asks
us to determine what proof—in addition to pleading—is
required, it is beyond the scope of this appeal. Under ORS
19.225, the only questions before us are the ones that are
involved in the order on appeal.
“When a circuit court judge, in making in a class action
under ORCP 32 an order not otherwise appealable, is of the
opinion that such order involves a controlling question of
law as to which there is substantial ground for difference
of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order
may materially advance the ultimate termination of the
litigation, the judge shall so state in writing in such order.
The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, per-
mit an appeal to be taken from such order to the Court of
Appeals * * *.”
ORS 19.225. Here, the order on appeal comes from a motion
to dismiss for failure to state a claim pursuant to former
ORCP 21 A(1)(8) (2019), renumbered as ORCP 21 A(1)(h)
(2022). Because the order is limited to the pleadings, so, too,
is our inquiry. See Bohr II, 373 Or at 370 (“In this ORCP 21
A posture, * * * a court is required to assume that plaintiffs
will be able to adduce evidence in support of their allega-
tion that Tillamook’s false representations had the effect
of systematically inflating the prices of its goods across the
market.”).
Having determined that questions of proof are not
properly before us, we turn to the question whether plaintiffs
are required to plead facts beyond what they have already
pleaded to withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state
a claim under ORCP 21 A(1)(h) challenging the adequacy
of their allegations supporting their claim of “ascertainable
loss” under ORS 646.638(1).
The Supreme Court has “interpreted the term
‘ascertainable loss’ to mean, generally, any determinable
loss, even a loss that cannot be measured directly.” Clark
v. Eddie Bauer LLC, 371 Or 177, 185, 532 P3d 880 (2023)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “Whenever a consumer
has received something other than what he bargained for,
he has suffered a loss of money or property. That loss is
ascertainable if it is measurable even though the precise
28 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

amount of the loss is not known.” Id. at 193 (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). In view of Clark’s construction of the
phrase “ascertainable loss,” then, we understand the ques-
tion to be whether plaintiffs have alleged a “determinable
loss.”
They have. The allegations in the complaint, in
plain and simple terms, are that plaintiffs overpaid for
defendant’s dairy products because of defendant’s deceptive
advertising. Plaintiffs allege that “[c]onsumers increasingly
seek out and are willing to pay more for products that they
perceive as being ecofriendly” and “through its marketing,
Tillamook is capitalizing on a sea change in consumer pur-
chasing preference.” They further allege that “[c]onsumers
also seek out products made by small-scale farmers in order
to support non-industrialized farming, to eschew products
that contribute to corporate control of the food system, and
support products that are environmentally sustainable.” The
named plaintiffs each state that they “regularly seek[ ] out,
and [are] willing to pay more for, dairy products that [they]
perceive[ ] as being more humane and coming from small,
pasture-based dairies.” Plaintiffs allege that they paid an
“inflated price based upon the represented increased eco-
nomic market value of [defendant’s] products” and as such,
plaintiffs “paid more than they otherwise would have paid
for Tillamook dairy products.” Plaintiffs further allege that
they “overpaid for the Tillamook dairy products because
the dairy products were not as represented.” To support
their allegation that “[d]efendant’s illegal marketing and
sales prices have led plaintiffs and members of the class to
routinely pay more for Tillamook dairy products, as com-
pared to national and generic brands,” plaintiffs identi-
fied several Tillamook products from various retailers and
compared them to other brands those retailers sell, which
shows Tillamook products sold at a higher price. In our view,
those alleged overpayments easily and adequately allege an
“ascertainable loss” under Clark in a manner sufficient to
withstand a motion to dismiss under ORCP 21.
Defendant’s arguments otherwise appear to rest
largely on concerns that the pleadings do not divulge suffi-
cient information to permit preparation of a defense. Those
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 29

concerns are not unreasonable, but they are concerns more
appropriately addressed by a motion to make more definite
and certain than a motion to dismiss. In that regard, we
note that defendant filed such a motion. In view of its prior
disposition, the trial court has not addressed that motion;
whether to grant it is a matter of discretion for the trial
court in the first instance. See Weihl v. Asbestos Corporation,
Ltd, 204 Or App 255, 266, 129 P3d 748 (2006) (“it would
have been within the trial court’s discretion, in ruling on a
motion under ORCP 21 D, to require plaintiff to plead” with
reasonable particularity any alleged exposures to asbestos-
containing products)
In addition, it is difficult to see how plaintiffs will be
able to demonstrate that this case satisfies the standards for
proceeding as a class action without, at a minimum, iden-
tifying the products that they purchased. As the Supreme
Court explained in this case, at the class-certification stage,
the trial court will have to go “behind the pleadings to the
extent necessary to resolve the class claims.” Bohr II, 373
Or at 370 (internal quotation marks omitted). For example,
plaintiffs will have to meet the requirements for class cer-
tification under ORCP 32 A and “the court, as set out in
ORCP 32 B, must also find that a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudica-
tion of the controversy.”1 Migis v. AutoZone, Inc., 282 Or App
774, 781-82, 387 P3d 381 (2016), adh’d to in part on recons,
286 Or App 357, 396 P3d 309 (2017) (emphasis in original;
internal quotation marks omitted). Specifically, the predom-
inance inquiry under ORCP 32 B(3) asks, “how central are
the common questions, and will common proof resolve” the

1
ORCP 32 A provides:
“One or more members of a class may sue or be sued as representative parties
on behalf of all only if:
“A(1) The class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable;
“A(2) There are questions of law or fact common to the class;
“A(3) The claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class;
“A(4) The representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class; and
“A(5) In an action for damages, the representative parties have complied
with the prelitigation notice provisions of section H of this rule.”
30 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

issues.2 Pearson v. Philip Morris, Inc., 358 Or 88, 110, 361
P3d 3 (2015) (internal citation omitted). “In practical terms,
the inquiry is designed to determine if proof as to one class
member will be proof as to all, or whether dissimilarities
among the class members will require individualized inqui-
ries.” Id. Thus, to permit the trial court to meaningfully
evaluate whether this case properly may proceed as a class
action, plaintiffs may well be required to show what prod-
ucts the plaintiffs and members of the class purchased, at
what price, and, depending on theory, to identify competitor
products and the prices for those products, something that
will better enable defendant to prepare a defense both to the
request for class certification and to the claims. In the words
of the Supreme Court, though, it is “premature” at this stage
to resolve these types of questions related to class certifica-
tion. Bohr II, 373 Or at 369.
B. “Source” and “Goods.”
We turn to questions 6 and 7. In the order on appeal,
the trial court also denied defendant’s motion to dismiss
plaintiffs’ claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b), which makes it
an unlawful trade practice to “cause[ ] a likelihood of confu-
sion or of misunderstanding as to the source, sponsorship,
approval, or certification of real estate, goods, and services.”
Plaintiffs allege that defendant violated this provision (and
the other UTPA provisions) by causing confusion about the
origins of the ingredients in defendant’s products in view
of the fact that defendant’s products are made from milk
produced in “massive factory farms” located in Boardman,
Oregon, and not exclusively from milk produced in small
family farms in Tillamook County.
Defendant moved to dismiss that claim on the ground
that confusion about geographic location and processing
2
ORCP 32 B(3) provides:
“An action may be maintained as a class action if the prerequisites of
section A of this rule are satisfied, and in addition, the court finds that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to this finding include:
“* * * * *;
“B(3) The extent to which questions of law or fact common to the mem-
bers of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members[.]”
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 31

methods does not constitute confusion about a “source” of
“goods” within the meaning of ORS 646.608(1)(b). Defendant
contended that “source” within that provision refers to the
maker or producer of the goods, not to where or how they
were made. In addition, defendant contended that “goods”
within that provision does not encompass the ingredients or
component parts of a product, such that plaintiffs’ allega-
tions that defendant created confusion regarding the produc-
tion of the milk used to make defendant’s products does not
state a claim that defendant created confusion about “goods.”
In other words, in defendant’s view, the term “goods” in ORS
646.608(1)(b) refers to defendant’s dairy products, not to the
milk that defendant uses to make those products. The trial
court denied defendant’s motion, concluding that plaintiffs’
allegations stated a claim. At defendant’s request, however,
it certified two questions to us—questions 6 and 7 set forth
above—in connection with that ruling.
For the following reasons, we conclude that, to
state a claim that a defendant caused a “likelihood of confu-
sion * * * as to the source of * * * goods” under ORS 646.608
(1)(b), plaintiffs must allege facts showing that the defendant
caused a likelihood of confusion as to the supplier of a prod-
uct that the defendant is alleged to have made available for
personal, family or household purposes. Although allegations
that a defendant engaged in misleading conduct regarding
the origins of a product’s ingredients, the geographic origin
of a product or its ingredients, or the nature of the operations
used to produce a product or its ingredient, may give rise to
claims under other provisions of ORS 646.608(1), including,
as here, ORS 646.608(1)(d) and (e), such allegations do not
state a claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b), which targets con-
duct that creates a likelihood of confusion as to who placed a
particular product into commerce.
We start with “goods” (question 7). We conclude
that the word “goods” refers to the products that a defen-
dant is alleged to have made available for personal, family,
or household purposes, not to the ingredients or component
parts of any such products. The UTPA does not provide a
standalone definition of the word “goods.” In the commer-
cial setting, however, the word ordinarily refers to whole
32 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

products, not the component parts of a product. Webster’s
relevantly defines “goods” to be products:
“tangible movable personal property having intrinsic value
usu. excluding money and other choses in action but some-
times including all personal property and occas. including
vessels and even industrial crops or emblements, buildings,
or other things affixed to real estate but agreed to be sev-
ered: chattels, wares, merchandise, food products, chemical
compounds, and agricultural products.”
Webster’s Third New Int’l Dictionary 978 (unabridged ed
2002). That definition undercuts plaintiffs’ contention that
the word “goods” should also mean the component parts
or ingredients of a particular product because it speaks in
terms of things commonly viewed as wholes, not parts.
Context reinforces the conclusion that the legisla-
ture used the word “goods” in the ordinary way to refer to a
product not parts. It does so in two ways.
First, although the UTPA does not supply a stand-
alone definition of “goods,” it does define the phrase “[r]eal
estate, goods or services.” ORS 646.605(6) provides in rele-
vant part:
“ ‘Real estate, goods or services’ means those that are or
may be obtained for personal, family or household pur-
poses, or that are or may be obtained for any purposes as
a result of a telephone solicitation, and includes loans and
extensions of credit, and franchises, distributorships, and
other similar business opportunities, but does not include
insurance.”
ORS 646.605(6)(a). The structure of that definition suggests
that the legislature intended the word “good” in the UTPA
to refer to a product in the form marketed to consumers—
something that is or may be obtained for personal, family
or household purposes (or for other purposes by way of tele-
phone solicitation).
Second, the UTPA contains at least one provision
that differentiates between “goods” and their ingredients.
Saliently, ORS 646.608(1)(e) makes it an unlawful practice to
represent that “goods” have “characteristics,” “ingredients,”
or “qualities” that the goods do not have. The legislature’s
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 33

differentiation between “goods” and their “characteristics,”
“ingredients,” and “qualities” further demonstrates that,
for purposes of the UTPA, the legislature viewed the word
“goods” as referring to a whole product, separate and dis-
tinct from the product’s component parts.
The parties have not drawn our attention to any
legislative history pointing in a different direction and we
are aware of none. Accordingly, we conclude that the word
“goods” in ORS 646.608(1)(b) refers to the whole products
that defendant is alleged to have made available “for per-
sonal, family, or household purposes.” ORS 646.605(6)(a). It
does not refer to the ingredients or component parts of those
products.
We turn to “source.” Plaintiffs argue that the word
“source” in ORS 646.608(1)(b) should be construed broadly to
encompass anything related to the origin of a good, includ-
ing both the geographic origin of the good and the manufac-
turing processes that produce the good. Defendant argues
that the word should be construed narrowly to refer to the
company selling the product. We conclude that the text, con-
text, and legislative history of the provision demonstrate
that the word “source” refers to the supplier of a good, and,
therefore, does not refer to either the geographic origins of a
good or the manufacturing processes that produced it.
The ordinary meaning of the word “source” favors
neither side. As relevant to this context, Webster defines
“source” as a “generative force or stimulus: cause, instiga-
tor,” as a “a point of origin or procurement: fountain, sup-
plier,” and as “a point of emanation.” Wesbter’s at 2177. The
concept of a “generative force” could capture manufacturing
processes and the concept of a “point of origin” or “point of
emanation” could capture the geographic origin, as plain-
tiffs argue. On the other hand, a “point of procurement
* * * supplier” captures the concept of the company (or other
entity) that supplies a good.
Although the ordinary meaning of the word does
not help resolve the parties’ interpretive dispute, context
goes a long way toward doing so.
34 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

First, context includes surrounding words, and
“[i]t is a familiar rule that the meaning of words in a statute
may be clarified or confirmed by other words in the same
sentence or provision.” Goodwin v. Kingsmen Plastering, Inc.,
359 Or 694, 702, 375 P3d 463 (2016) (referring to the canon
of noscitur a sociis); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,
Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts, 195 (2012)
(“The Latin phrase noscitur a sociis means ‘it is known by
its associates’—a classical version, applied to textual expla-
nation, of the observed phenomenon that birds of a feather
flock together.”). ORS 646.608(1)(b) makes it unlawful to
cause a “likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as
to the source, sponsorship, approval, or certification of real
estate, goods, or services.” ORS 646.608(1)(b) (emphasis
added). What the italicized terms have in common is that
they speak to who questions: sponsorships, approvals, and
certifications are all things that must come from some per-
son or organization. This suggests that the objective of ORS
646.608(1)(b) is to target conduct that causes a likelihood
of confusion or misunderstanding about who has sponsored,
approved or certified particular real estate, goods, or ser-
vices. That, in turn, points to the conclusion that the word
“source” in ORS 646.608(1)(b) was intended to refer to a
“who”—a supplier—and not to a “what” (as in qualities or
ingredients), a “where” (geographic origin) or a “how” (man-
ufacturing processes).
Second, context includes other provisions of the
same statute. Northwest Natural Gas Co. v. City of Gresham,
359 Or 309, 322, 374 P3d 829 (2016). In this instance, three
other provisions of ORS 646.608(1) lend further support to
the conclusion that “source” means supplier: ORS 646.608(1)
(c), ORS 646.608(1)(d) and ORS 646.608(1)(e).
ORS 646.608(1)(c), like ORS 646.608(1)(b), targets
conduct generating a “likelihood of confusion or misunder-
standing”; it is the only other provision of ORS 646.608(1)
that does so. It provides that it is unlawful to “cause[ ] like-
lihood of? confusion or misunderstanding as to affiliation,
connection, or association with, or certification by, another.”
ORS 646.608(1)(c). On its face, the provision addresses con-
cerns about generating confusion or misunderstanding
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 35

about who is associated with a person’s “business, vocation
or occupation.” Id. This indicates that the legislature’s focus
in both UTPA provisions concerned with causing a “likeli-
hood of confusion or of misunderstanding” was on confusion
regarding “who” questions, not “what,” “where”, and “how”
questions. In that context, it would be anomalous to con-
clude that the word “source” alone was intended to mean
geographic origin or manufacturing process, in addition
to supplier, when all the other provisions have a narrower
focus.
ORS 646.608(1)(d) and ORS 646.608(1)(e) also pro-
vide contextual support for the conclusion that “source” in
ORS 646.608(1)(b) means supplier. ORS 646.608(1)(d) pro-
hibits the use of “deceptive representations or designations
of geographic origin in connection with real estate, goods or
services.” ORS 646.608(1)(d). If the legislature intended the
word “source” in ORS 646.608(1)(b) to include geographic
origin, ORS 646.608(1)(d) would be superfluous. Deceptive
representations or designations of geographic origin almost
certainly would give rise to a likelihood of confusion or misun-
derstanding about geographic origin, such that the conduct
of using them would be fully covered by ORS 646.608(1)(b).
Where one interpretation of a statute would render a pro-
vision meaningless surplusage and another would not, we
generally assume that “legislature did not intend any por-
tion of its enactments to be meaningless surplusage.” State
v. Clemente-Perez, 357 Or 745, 755, 359 P3d 232 (2015).
As for ORS 646.608(1)(e), it bars, in relevant part,
“represent[ing] that real estate, goods or services have spon-
sorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, ben-
efits, quantities or qualities that the real estate, goods or
services do not have * * *.” ORS 646.608(1)(e). Had the leg-
islature broadly intended the word “source” to address the
“where,” “what,” and “how” questions about how a good came
into being, it likely would have included the word “source”
in ORS 646.608(1)(e), in addition to or instead of using
the words that more specifically address “who” questions:
“characteristics,” “ingredients,” and “qualities.” That is, the
legislature likely would have drafted ORS 646.608(1)(e) to
bar representing that “real estate, goods or services have
36 Bohr v. Tillamook County Creamery Association

sources that the real estate, goods, or services do not have”
if it intended “source” to have the broad meaning plaintiffs
urge us to give it. That the legislature did not do so also
counsels in favor of reading “source” in ORS 646.608(1)(b)
narrowly to mean “supplier.”
Our review of the text and context of the word
“source” in ORS 646.608(1)(b) persuades us that the legis-
lature intended it to mean “supplier.” To the extent we had
any remaining doubt, we note that the legislative history
points in the same direction. Although not particularly
helpful, that history tends to show that, in adopting ORS
646.608(1)(b) and (1)(c), the legislature understood that it
was targeting conduct creating a likelihood of confusion
about who was associated with a product, not addressing
misleading conduct about other properties of the product.
Notably, that history reflects that the legislature heard tes-
timony that the point of the “likelihood of confusion” provi-
sions was to address “the confusion between whose article it
is,” as distinct from confusion about “the quality of the arti-
cle.” Tape Recording, Senate Consumer Affairs Committee,
SB 50, Feb 17, 1971, Tape 1, Sides A & B, Part I & II, (tes-
timony of David Shannon, Director of the Metropolitan
Consumer Protection Agency, testifying as an expert on
consumer protection laws in Oregon; 49:36-50:25 in the digi-
tized recording maintained at https://records.sos.state.or.us/
ORSOSARCWebdrawer/Record/6001).
In arguing for a different conclusion, plaintiffs rely
heavily on the fact that the primary objective of the UTPA
is to protect consumers, urging us to conclude that “[t]hat
purpose is best served by construing ORS 646.608(1)(b) to
protect consumers and the market more generally—by pre-
venting confusion in the market about the source, production
practices, or origins of a product * * *.” Doing so, however,
would require us to disregard the text and context of ORS
646.608(1)(b), as well as standard rules of statutory interpre-
tation. Perhaps more essentially, we do not perceive placing
a narrower construction on ORS 646.608(1)(b) as contrary
to the interests of consumers. As construed, the provision is
consumer-protective: It protects consumers from purchasing
products based on confusion about whose product it is. And
Cite as 348 Or App 22 (2026) 37

a narrow construction does not leave consumers vulnerable,
given the fact that other provisions of the UTPA, namely
ORS 646.608(1)(d) and (1)(e), address deceptive practices
related to a product’s geographic origins, method of produc-
tion, or ingredients.
Accordingly, for the reasons stated above, the word
“good” in ORS 646.608(1)(b) refers to a whole product that
a defendant is alleged to have made available for personal,
family or household purposes, not the component parts or
ingredients of such a product. The word “source” in the same
provision refers to a supplier and does not refer to the geo-
graphic origin of a product or the processes used to make it.
Because plaintiffs’ complaint does not allege facts showing
that defendant engaged in conduct that created a likelihood
of confusion as to who was supplying the products at issue,
plaintiffs have not stated a claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b).
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, plaintiffs’ allegations
state claims for relief under ORS 646.608(1)(d) and (1)(e), and
adequately allege that plaintiffs have suffered an “ascer-
tainable loss” under ORS 646.638(1). Plaintiffs’ allegations
do not state a claim under ORS 646.608(1)(b). We reverse the
order on review to the extent that the trial court’s decision
runs counter to these conclusions and those of the Supreme
Court and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion and with the Supreme Court’s opinion.
Reversed and remanded.