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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Campanella, D. v. Mertz, P.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3256 EDA 2024
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Nichols

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (217)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Nichols

J-S31045-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

DIANNE M. CAMPANELLA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
PETER MERTZ : No. 3256 EDA 2024

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 13, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Pike County Civil Division at No(s):
758-2015-Civil

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and NICHOLS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY NICHOLS, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2026

Appellant Dianne M. Campanella appeals the dismissal of her complaint

in ejectment and trespass against Appellee Peter Mertz, after Appellee

installed improvements on property to which both parties claim title.

Appellant claims that the trial court misinterpreted evidence and, further,

made conclusions not supported by the evidence. We affirm.

The trial court summarized the filings and evidence presented at a non-

jury trial as follows:

On May 29, 2015, Appellant . . . filed [a] complaint against
Appellee . . . alleg[ing that Appellee] entered upon her real
property in or about 2009 and proceeded to make various
improvements thereon. Despite requests by [Appellant],
[Appellee] refused to remove the improvements from the disputed
property. [Appellant’s] complaint set forth separate causes of
action for ejectment and trespass.

[Appellee] filed an answer . . . with new matter on December 23,
2015. In his answer, [Appellee] denied [Appellant’s] claim of title
to the property in dispute [and] alleged that he owns the subject
J-S31045-25

disputed property, has rights thereto through adverse
possession[,] and generally asserted various other affirmative
defenses[,] including waiver, estoppel, unclean hands[,] and
statute of limitations.

[Appellant] owns real estate [(Campanella property)] located in
Westfall Township, Pike County, Pennsylvania[,] by virtue of a
deed dated October 2, 2012 from Catherine Davis a/k/a Catherine
H. Davis to [Appellant] as recorded in the office of the Pike County
Recorder of Deeds on January 16, 2013 [(2012 Campanella deed).
Appellee] owns real estate located in Westfall Township, Pike
County, Pennsylvania[,] by virtue of a deed dated October 12,
1999 from Rose M. Kloepfer, widow[,] to [Appellee] and Anne
Olshansky as recorded in the Office of the Pike County Recorder
of Deeds on October 13, 1999 [(Mertz property).]

The Campanella and Mertz properties are both located in the
village of Millrift[,] which is located along the Delaware River in
Westfall Township, Pike County. Both properties originate from a
common parcel of land previously owned by Wilber W.
Sawyer. The Sawyer deed dates back to January 24, 1910 and is
recorded in the Office of the Pike County Recorder of Deeds [(1910
Sawyer deed). V]arious transfers and conveyances of the
[Sawyer] common parcel led to the current ownership of the
Campanella and Mertz properties. See Exs. P-1 and P-2.

---

Mr. Ewald[, a licensed land surveyor,] prepared and identified
abstracts of title of the Campanella and Mertz properties. [See
Exs. P-1 and P-2.] Mr. Ewald also prepared a survey land map of
the various properties involved in this action. [See Ex. P-3.]

Mr. Ewald opined that the Campanella and Mertz properties share
a common parent parcel containing dimensions of 250 feet by 106
feet as described in the [1910 Sawyer deed]. Mr. Ewald testified
that various parcels were subsequently conveyed out of that
original parcel including lands of Geise (56 feet by 106 feet), Hart
(50 feet by 106 feet), [the] Mertz property[,] and the Campanella property. Based on his review of the deed records and his on site
survey work, [Mr.] Ewald concluded that the Mertz property
actually contained 73 feet of railroad and river frontage and that
the [Campanella] property actually includes the disputed land in

-2-
J-S31045-25

question, i.e., a 26 foot strip of land on which [Appellee] erected
his improvements.

[Appellee] offered the expert testimony of [Mr.] Williams . . . a
licensed land surveyor. . . [who] agreed that the Campanella and
Mertz properties share the common parent parcel as set forth in
the [1910 Sawyer deed]. Mr. Williams also acknowledged the
various conveyances out of the [Sawyer] parent parcel as noted
by Mr. Ewald. Mr. Williams disagreed, however, with Mr. Ewald
as to the exact location of the [Campanella] property, the
dimensions of the Mertz property[,] and thus the ownership of the
26 foot strip of land in question.

Mr. Williams relied on his review of the deeded conveyances of the
Campanella property[,] specifically noting that said deed
description notes that the property deeded traverses along the
lands of Knickerbocker. Mr. Williams found this information
relevant . . . since [Mr.] Ewald’s map notes that the lands of
Knickerbocker were located to the far east end of the original 250
foot tract[,] which would thus place the [Campanella] parcel to
the far east end of the 250 foot tract. In that instance, [Mr.]
Williams opined that [the] Campanella [property] does not
encompass the disputed land strip of 26 feet.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/13/25, at 1-4 (some formatting altered).

As described above, Appellant testified that she obtained title to the

Campanella property by way of the 2012 Campanella deed from her mother,

Mrs. Davis. See N.T., 8/15/22, at 7-8. The 2012 Campanella deed conveyed

two separate pieces of property: Parcel I and Parcel II, with Parcel I being

the Campanella property, conveyed by special warranty, and Parcel II being a

quit claim conveyance. See R.R. at 185a-87a (Ex. P-1, 2012 Campanella

Deed).1 In a statement of adverse possession recorded concurrently with the

2012 Campanella deed, Mrs. Davis declared that she had “acquired title in

---

1 We may cite to the reproduced record for the parties’ convenience.

-3-
J-S31045-25

fee” to Parcel II by adversely possessing the land for a period of twenty-one

years, beginning in 1971. R.R. at 182a-84a (Ex. P-1, Statement of Adverse

Possession, 1/16/13). Subsequent to execution of the 2012 Campanella deed,

in a separate action filed by Appellant, a quiet title judgment was entered on

September 19, 2013, recognizing Appellant’s claim of adverse possession to

Parcel II. See Ex. P-1 (Docket No. 762-2013, Quiet Title Judgment, 9/19/13).

At trial, Mr. Ewald, admitted as Appellant’s expert witness in land

surveying, testified that he first surveyed the disputed property at the request

of Mrs. Davis, in 2008. N.T., 8/15/22, at 68-69. For the 2008 survey, Mr.

Ewald reviewed the deeds that conveyed the Campanella and Mertz properties

to the prior title holders before Appellant and Appellee. Id. at 68-70. As part

of the 2008 survey, Mr. Ewald reviewed a survey map prepared in 1988 by

Pat Addio, depicting the Mertz and Campanella properties. Id. at 72; see

also Ex. P-19. In 2008, Mr. Ewald also performed a field survey to determine

the property line between the Campanella and Mertz properties, in which he

identified four monuments of what he at that time believed were the boundary

lines of the Mertz property. See N.T., 8/15/22, at 69-74;2 see also, Ex. P-

3.

---

2 Specifically, regarding the results of his first survey, Mr. Ewald testified that

in 2008, when he measured 118 feet from the Geise property boundary line,
he found the following evidence of a boundary line for what he believed at
that time was the Mertz property : “[a] railroad spike in [R]iver [R]oad, a
pipe down by the river[,] and a bit of iron fence that was up across the road
towards the railroad.” Id. at 74. He also found an “iron pipe which would
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-4-
J-S31045-25

In 2012, at the request of Appellant’s counsel, Mr. Ewald performed a

second survey to again determine the boundary line between the Campanella

and Mertz properties. See N.T., 8/15/22, at 77-78. For the second survey,

Mr. Ewald reviewed the abstracts of title for the Campanella and Mertz

properties to locate the original boundary lines for the parcels and identified

the 1910 Sawyer deed as a parent parcel to both the Campanella and Mertz

properties. Id. at 78-79.3 Mr. Ewald indicated the boundaries of the property

conveyed in the 1910 Sawyer deed on the Ewald survey map and described

the Sawyer parent parcel as a 250-foot by 106-foot rectangular area. Id. at

80; see also Ex. P-3. Mr. Ewald testified that three conveyances came out of

the Sawyer parent parcel; specifically, a 56-foot by 106-foot lot conveyed to

Geise (Geise property), a 50-foot by 106-foot lot conveyed to Hart (Hart

property), and a 118-foot by 106-foot lot (Celim Seymour property) conveyed

to Celim Seymour in 1911 (1911 Celim Seymour deed). See N.T., 8/15/22,

at 82-88; see also Ex. P-3. Mr. Ewald testified that the chain of title for the

Geise property described the conveyance by employing an adjoinder call to

---

mark . . . the southwesterly most corner of the Mertz parcel on the railroad
side.” Id. at 75. On the Ewald survey map, these monuments are located at
the northeasterly boundary line of the Geise property (an iron pipe) and 26
feet southwest of the southwesterly Knickerbocker boundary line (a railroad
spike, an iron pipe, and an iron fence). See Ex. P-3.

3 Specifically, Mr. Ewald identified the deed as a conveyance from William
Sawyer to Wilbur W. Sawyer, dated January 24, 1910 and recorded in deed
book 63, page 621. Id. at 79; see also Exs. P-1 (Item 8) and P-2 (Item 10).

-5-
J-S31045-25

the “lands of Lehman,” which he explained was now the Mertz Property. Id.

at 83-84.4

Mr. Ewald testified that the Mertz property was conveyed from the Celim

Seymour property and indicated on the Ewald survey map the boundary lines

he had identified for the Celim Seymour property. See N.T., 8/15/22, at 86-

89; see also Ex. P-3. Mr. Ewald further testified that the Celim Seymour

property was the “parent parcel” of the Campanella and Mertz

properties. N.T., 8/15/22, at 88-90, see also N.T., 8/15/22, at 104 (where

Mr. Ewald again references the “118 foot piece” as “our true parent parcel”).

Next, Mr. Ewald testified that on December 11, 1923, Celim Seymour

conveyed a 45-foot by 106-foot parcel from the Celim Seymour property to

Fayette L. Seymour (1923 Fayette Seymour deed). See N.T., 8/15/22, at

90.5 Mr. Ewald explained that in 2008 he had been “under the impression

---

4 We note that the parties treat the term ‘adjoinder’ as a call to an adjoining

property and that Black’s Law Dictionary defines “adjoining” as “[t]ouching;
sharing a common boundary; contiguous[,]” and defines “adjoining owner” as
“[s]omeone who owns land abutting another’s.” See Adjoining & Adjoining
Owner, Black’s Law Dictionary (12th ed. 2024).

5 The 1923 Fayette Seymour deed’s property location description reads:

BEGINNING at a stone near the Delaware River, and running
thence north 57½ degrees west [106] feet to the line of the Erie
Railroad Company’s lands; thence north along the line of the said
Erie Railroad Company’s land [45] feet to a stone; thence south
57½ degrees east along the lands of Olive Knickerbocker [106]
feet to the Delaware River, and thence down the said Delaware
River [45] feet to the place of beginning.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

-6-
J-S31045-25

that the 45 foot was adjacent to it, but in reality we found out differently[,]”

that is, “[t]hat the 45 feet came out of the 118 foot” parcel.” Id.; see also

id. at 102. Based on the deeds in the chains of title and his field survey work,

Mr. Ewald opined that the “45 foot by 106 foot parcel of land . . . described in

the [2012 Campanella deed] . . . came out of the 118 foot piece” of the Celim

Seymour property. Id. at 102.

Mr. Ewald testified that his final conclusion regarding the location of the

boundary line between the Campanella and Mertz properties differed from his

2008 conclusion as indicated in the Ewald survey map because in the second

survey he examined the language of the relevant deeds more

thoroughly. See id. at 104-05. Mr. Ewald also testified that he realized what

had “caused the confusion here is they thought they were on Knickerbocker’s

line[,] which would be at the 250 [foot mark of the Sawyer parent parcel], but

in reality they were 26 feet down further” than the location he had indicated

on the Ewald survey map based on his 2008 survey. Id. at 104; see also Ex.

P-3.

On cross examination, Mr. Ewald testified that the lines on his 2008

survey map were accurate but that his conclusions as to what the lines

represented changed after he reviewed the complete chain of title for the

properties. See N.T., 8/15/22, at 108. Mr. Ewald conceded that the location

---

Ex. P-1 (1923 Fayette Seymour deed).

-7-
J-S31045-25

of the boundary line between the Campanella and Mertz properties was

dependent on which end of the parcel to locate a 26 foot portion of land. See

id. at 111, 119. Mr. Ewald opined that while there was conflicting evidence

regarding at which end of the Campanella property the 26 foot portion was

located there was “much more certainty” to locating the 26 foot portion on the

southwest end, and that the evidence in favor of locating the 26 foot portion

at the northeast end of the property was “very vague.” Id. at 111.6

Mr. Williams, admitted as Appellee’s expert witness in land surveying,

agreed with Mr. Ewald that the dimensions of the Campanella property were

45 feet wide by 106 feet long. See N.T., 10/3/22, at 7. To determine the

boundaries of the Campanella property, Mr. Williams first located the

---

6 Mr. Ewald testified on cross as follows:

Q: Could the 26 feet have been a mistake as far as where it’s located
whether it’s on one end of the [Campanella] parcel or the other?

A: I don’t believe so because of the evidence we have on the
southwesterly end of the Mertz parcel which is in harmony with the east
parcel and in harmony with the Hart parcel, so we definitely have a much
more certainty that you start from the southwest and move to the
northeast, . . . but very vague as to Knickerbocker’s location I guess is
what I want to say.

N.T., 8/15/22, at at 111.

In addition, the trial court understood Appellee’s position to be that the
location of the Campanella property was 26 feet to the right of where Appellant
placed the boundary line. Specifically, the trial court stated that Appellee was
“trying to establish . . . sliding that 45 foot [Campanella property] to the right
which would be . . . the northeast portion of the property of the original 250.”
Id. at 122.

-8-
J-S31045-25

Knickerbocker property and indicated on the Ewald survey map the

southwesterly boundary line of the Knickerbocker property. See id. at 12;

see also Ex. P-3. Mr. Williams then indicated his opinion of the location of

the Campanella property, identifying the southwesterly Knickerbocker

boundary line as the northeasterly boundary line of the Campanella property.

See N.T., 10/3/22, 13-15; see also Ex. P-3. Mr. Williams located the

Campanella property 26 feet further northeast of where Mr. Ewald had located

the property. See Ex. P-3.

On cross examination, Mr. Williams agreed with Mr. Ewald that three

conveyances came from the Sawyer parent parcel in the parties’ chains of

title. Specifically, he agreed that the 50-foot by 106-foot Hart property was

located at the south end of the Sawyer parent parcel and had the same point

of beginning as the Sawyer parent parcel, that the 56-foot by 106-foot Geise

property adjoined the Hart property, and that Sawyer had conveyed a 118-

foot by 106-foot property to Celim Seymour in 1911. See N.T, 10/3/22, at

23-27. Mr. Williams also agreed that the 1923 Fayette Seymour deed

conveyed out 45 feet from the 118 foot line of the Celim Seymour property.

Id. at 30, 31-33.7 Mr. Williams acknowledged that the description of the Geise

---

7 Q: [T]he [Sawyers] acquired the 250 foot piece, they sold off 50 feet,
they sold off 56 feet and they conveyed 118 feet and according to the deeds
out of the 118 feet came the 45 feet; is that correct?
A: Okay.

Id. at 33.

-9-
J-S31045-25

property indicated that it had “a common boundary line” with the Mertz

property and that the Geise property was “adjacent to the Mertz property.”

Id. at 37-38. Mr. Williams agreed that the 118-foot by 106-foot property

description in Appellee’s deed to the Mertz property was accurately

represented as drawn by Mr. Ewald on the Ewald survey map. Id. at 39; see

also Ex. P-3.

Mr. Williams testified that the adjoinder call to the lands of

Knickerbocker in the Mertz property’s chain of title first appeared in the 1911

Celim Seymour deed, but that he did not know the exact location of the

Knickerbocker property. See N.T, 10/3/22, at 40-41. Mr. Williams agreed

with Mr. Ewald that the three conveyances out of the Sawyer parent parcel

added up to 224 feet, leaving a 26-foot portion of land from the original 250-

foot Sawyer parent parcel unaccounted for in those three conveyances. Id.

at 41. Mr. Williams agreed that both the Ewald and Addio survey maps

depicted the 118-foot Celim Seymour property, as established in the chain of

title for the Mertz property, as directly adjoining the Geise property. Id. at

45-47; see also Exs. P-3, P-19.

Mr. Williams opined that the Campanella property was located 26 feet

further in a northerly direction than where Mr. Ewald had located it and

explained that his conclusion was based on the call to the lands of

Knickerbocker in the chain of title. See N.T., 10/3/22, at 43, 47-48. Mr.

Williams agreed that if the Campanella property was located where he

proposed that this location would shift the boundary line for the Mertz property

• 10 - J-S31045-25

northerly by 26 feet, which might result in the new boundary line for the Mertz

property running though Appellee’s house. Id. at 47-48. Mr. Williams

admitted that he had not conducted a field survey of nor visited the disputed

properties and that his opinion was based on his review of the deeds in the

chain of title and survey maps prepared by other land surveyors. Id. at 45,

1. Mr. Williams did not undermine or discredit any of the monuments or

landmarks depicted in any of these survey maps, including the Ewald survey

map. Id. at 55-57.

On re-direct, Mr. Williams testified that he was not aware of any other

deeds conveying out any further property from the Sawyer parent parcel and

speculated that the 118-foot distance referenced in the chain of title for the

Mertz property “could be” in error due to the unaccounted-for 26 feet from

the Sawyer parent parcel. Id. at 61.

On July 1, 2024, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of Appellee

and dismissed Appellant’s ejectment and trespass actions. See Trial Ct.

Order, 7/1/24. Appellant filed a motion for post-trial relief which, after oral

argument, the trial court denied on November 8, 2024. Appellant then filed a

timely notice of appeal.8

---

8 On January 2, 2025, this Court issued a rule to show cause directing
Appellant to praecipe the trial court prothonotary to “enter judgment on the
decision of the trial court” and file with this Court “a certified copy of the trial
court docket reflecting the entry of the judgment.” See, Order, 1/2/25. On
January 13, 2025, Appellant filed a praecipe for final judgment with the trial
court. See Appellant’s Praecipe, 1/13/25. In the certified record, attached to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 11 - J-S31045-25

On appeal, Appellant raises the following claims:

1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law by applying the
   incorrect standard of proof, leading to a wrongful determination
   that the 45-foot parcel conveyed by Celim H. Seymour to
   Fayette L. Seymour in 1923 was a separate and distinct
   conveyance from the original 250-foot parcel conveyed to
   Wilbur W. Sawyer in 1910?

2. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that the 45-foot
   parcel was conveyed out of the original 250-foot parcel, as the
   record evidence, including testimony and exhibits, clearly
   shows it was conveyed out of the 118-foot parcel, not the 250-
   foot parcel?

3. Whether the trial court erred in finding that the common source
   of title for the parties' respective properties was the 1910
   conveyance from Sawyer to Sawyer, when the correct common
   source is the 118-foot parcel conveyed from Wilbur W. Sawyer
   to Celim H. Seymour, as agreed by all relevant witnesses?

4. Whether the trial court erred by misinterpreting the testimony
   of Robert Ewald, which clearly established that [Appellant’s]
   property abuts [Appellee’s] property, as it emanates from the

   ---

Appellant’s timestamped praecipe, is a document styled “Final Judgment” that
states in its entirety: “AND NOW, this 13th day of January, 2025, Final
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Defendant, Peter Mertz, and against
Plaintiff, Dianne M. Campanella.” See id. The document bears the signature
stamp of the trial court prothonotary but does not bear a file stamp. See id.
On January 15, 2025, Appellant filed an updated certified trial court docket
with this Court; therein, the last docket entry reads: “1/13/25 PRAECIPE FOR
ENTRY OF FINAL JUDGMENT FILED.” See Appellant’s Resp. to Rule, 1/15/25.
On January 22, 2025, this Court discharged the rule to show cause. See,
Order, 1/22/25.

While no entry for ‘final judgment’ appears in the docket, because Appellant
timely filed a praecipe for the trial court prothonotary to enter final judgment
and the certified record includes the “Final Judgment” document described
above, we conclude that final judgment was entered by the trial court
prothonotary despite the lack of a docket entry. Accordingly, Appellant has
established a final, appealable order in this matter and we may proceed to
review it. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a).

• 12 - J-S31045-25

same 118-foot parent parcel, contrary to the court’s
conclusion?

1. Whether the trial court erred in acknowledging that Robert
   Ewald testified there was a mistake in the Campanella chain of
   title, failing to properly address the 45-foot portion of land?

2. Whether the trial court erred by misapprehending the
   significance of the reference to Knickerbocker in [Appellant’s]
   chain of title, failing to recognize it as an adjoinder?

Appellant’s Brief at 3-4.

Appellant claims that she established title to the disputed property in

her ejectment action by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 29-34.

Appellant contends that, “[w]here there is a common source of title from the

same Grantor, the title of the . . . Grantee in conveyance first executed is

superior.” Id. at 38 (citing Wynsinki v. Mazzotta, 472 A.2d 680 (Pa. Super.

1984)). Appellant argues that the common source of title for the Campanella

and Mertz properties was the 1911 Celim Seymour deed, as this deed marked

“the inception of a division of land with clear dimensional markers.” Id. at

40-41.

Appellant further claims that the trial court based its conclusions on “an

erroneous interpretation” of the 1911 Celim Seymour deed, and “a

mischaracterization of the evidence and a legal failure to reconcile minor

record defects with the equitable and factual realities of property ownership.”

Id. at 37, 44. Appellant characterizes the reference to the Knickerbocker

property in Appellant’s chain of title as “a clerical or interpretative error” and

that the trial court erred in relying on the Knickerbocker adjoinder call to

• 13 - J-S31045-25

determine the boundaries of the Campanella property. Id. at 46. Specifically,

Appellant contends that, because “the Knickerbocker parcel is not contiguous”

to the Campanella property, the trial court erred in treating it as an ‘adjoinder’

property; rather, Appellant argues, the boundary line between the Campanella

and Mertz properties “is marked by an established iron pin.” Id. at 27, 46.

Appellee responds that the issue here is the location of, rather than title

to, the Campanella property. See Appellee’s Brief at 17. Appellee notes that

the trial court was presented with “conflicting information as to the location of

the Campanella [property]” and argues that Mr. Ewald’s testimony

contradicted the conclusions in the Ewald survey map. Id. at 8-9, 11 (some

formatting altered). Appellee contends that the trial court was free to give

effect to the Knickerbocker adjoinder reference in the chain of title. Id. at 9-

1. Once the trial court concluded that the Knickerbocker adjoinder reference

should be given effect, Appellee argues that the trial court was then free to

conclude that the 45-foot width of the Campanella property “start[ed] from

the Sawyer/Knickerbocker boundary.” Id. at 10. Consequently, Appellee

argues that the trial court correctly concluded that Appellant failed to prove

by a preponderance of the evidence that the Campanella property contained

the 26 feet of land disputed by the parties. Id. at 17.

Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s verdict in a non-jury trial:

to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial

• 14 - J-S31045-25

judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope
of review is plenary.

The trial court's conclusions of law are not binding on an appellate
court[, however,] because it is the appellate court’s duty to
determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of
the case.

Wyatt Inc. v. Citizens Bank of Pennsylvania, 976 A.2d 557, 564 (Pa.

Super. 2009) (citation omitted and some formatting altered); see also

Doman v. Brogan, 592 A.2d 104, 110 (Pa. Super. 1991).

Applicable Law

“The crux of an ejectment action . . . rests with the plaintiff[’s] ability

to identify, by a preponderance of the evidence, the boundaries of a parcel of

land to which they are out of possession but for which they maintain

paramount title.” Billig v. Skvarla, 853 A.2d 1042, 1050-51 (Pa. Super.

2004) (citations omitted). Further,

to prevail in an ejectment action, the plaintiff must show title at
the commencement of the action and can recover . . . only on the
strength of his [or her] own title, not because of weakness or
deficiency of title in the defendant. If a plaintiff in ejectment has
presented at trial prima facie evidence that it has title to the
property at issue, the burden then shifts to the defendant . . . .
Conversely, if the plaintiff’s claimed chain of title is faulty, the
plaintiff has not shown a prima facie case, and the plaintiff’s
ejectment case fails.

Becker v. Wishard, 202 A.3d 718, 722 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citations omitted

and some formatting altered).

• 15 - J-S31045-25

Further, in a cause of action related to real property, “[q]uestions

regarding the location of boundaries are a question of fact for the fact-finder.”

Long Run Timber Co. v. Dept. of Conservation and Natural Resources,

145 A.3d 1217, 1228 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (citation omitted). 9 The

interpretation of deeds, however, is a question of law subject to a de novo

standard of review and a plenary scope of review. See Kripp v. Kripp, 849

A.2d 1159, 1164 n.5 (Pa. 2004). Our Supreme Court set forth the following

standard for a trial court’s interpretation of a deed:

The same principles that apply to the interpretation of a contract
apply to the interpretation of a deed. The nature and quantity of
the interest conveyed by a deed must be ascertained from the
instrument itself. . . . We seek to ascertain not what the parties
may have intended by the language but what is the meaning of
the words. . . . Thus, the language of the deed shall be interpreted
in the light of the subject matter, the apparent object or purpose
of the parties and the conditions existing when it was executed.
If the deed is ambiguous, then all of the attending circumstances
existing at the time of the execution of the instrument should
be considered to aid in determining the apparent object of the
parties. When parol evidence is admissible, it must generally have
a foundation in pre-existing evidence of fraud, accident or
mistake, except when it is introduced not to contradict or vary,
but to explain the contract, as when something is omitted . . . so
as to qualify [such evidence] to interpret it truly according to the
intent of the parties.

Starling v. Lake Meade Property Owners Ass’n, Inc., 162 A.3d 327, 341

(Pa. 2017) (citations omitted, emphasis original, some formatting altered).

---

9 We may cite to decisions of the Commonwealth Court for persuasive value.

See In re Brown, 30 A.3d 1200, 1204 n.2 (Pa. Super. 2011).

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This Court in Doman reviewed a matter where “the precise location of

boundaries” was not clear from “a plain reading of a written deed” or, in other

words, “[w]here there exists an uncertainty due to the use of vague or

ambiguous language.” Doman, 592 A.2d at 108-09. In resolving such a

dispute, Doman held that the trial court may resort to:

extrinsic or parol evidence to explain – but not vary – the written
word . . . . Resort might also be had to the subsequent acts of
the parties as bearing on the interpretation they placed on the
instrument.

---

. . . Thus, in an ejectment action parol evidence is competent to
explain ambiguities, but not to vary or contradict a boundary
description contained within a deed[.]

---

. . . [T]o ascertain and effectuate the intent of the parties’ at the
time of the original [conveyance] . . . our courts have employed
certain rules of construction[.]

---

Where the calls for the location of the boundaries to land are
inconsistent, other things being equal, resort is to be had first to
natural objects or landmarks, next to artificial monuments, then
to adjacent boundaries (which are considered a sort of
monument), and thereafter to courses and distances.

---

[I]t is generally believed that erroneous descriptions are more
probably found in calls for measurements and distances than in
calls for fixed landmarks either natural or artificial.

Id. at 109-10 (citations omitted). The Doman Court cautioned against a

mechanical application of these rules of construction, however, and held that

the purpose of interpretation of an ambiguous deed is to ascertain the parties’

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intentions based on the “totality of [the] combined effect” of the calls in the

property description. Id. at 110 (citation omitted).

Analysis

Here, the trial court stated:

The Campanella [property’s] title chain consistently described that
land as running along the lands of Knickerbocker. Mr. Ewald
plotted out the lands of Knickerbocker to the eastern side of the
Campanella [property]. Although [Appellant’s predecessor] filed
a statement of adverse possession . . . and [Appellant filed an]
action to quiet title with regard to some land comprising part of
the Knickerbocker land and the [Campanella property], that
adverse possession claim did not appear to quiet title to the extra
[26] feet of land still unaccounted for or resolve the title
discrepancy of that parcel. Since [Appellant] was unable to prove
immediate possession to the [26] feet of disputed land which is
the subject of this action, this court dismissed her claim of
ejectment [and, on the same basis, her trespass claim].

---

. . . The parties’ survey experts both testified that the common
parcel of the parties’ current properties originates from the 1910
Sawyer deed. . . . [W]hether the [45] foot parcel was
subsequently conveyed out of the original parcel is not germane
to the court’s ultimate findings[.]

In its June 28, 2024 order, this court concluded that Mr. Ewald’s
testimony did not establish that [the] Campanella [property]
abuts the Mertz [property] and that, if such was the case, there
remained an additional [26] feet of land which would abut the
former lands of Knickerbocker on the far east end of the original
250 foot parcel. . . . [T]he court determined [Mr.] Ewald’s
testimony, when weighed against the remaining evidence of the
case, including, inter alia, [Mr.] Williams’ expert testimony, was
insufficient to prove [Appellant’s] immediate exclusive right to the
disputed land.

---

[The court] concluded that the [26] foot parcel in question would
be located to the east of the land in dispute and not be the land

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on the common boundary line of [the] Campanella and Mertz
[properties].

Trial Ct. Op., 2/13/25, at 5, 8-10 (some formatting altered). 10

After a careful review of the record, we find that the trial court’s

conclusion that Appellant failed to carry her burden of proof was supported by

the evidence presented at trial. See Billig, 853 A.2d at 1050-51. The call to

the lands of Knickerbocker appeared in the description of the property in the

Campanella property’s chain of title, going back to 1911. See N.T., 10/3/22,

at 40-41. Appellant argues that the call to Knickerbocker was an error and

should be disregarded in favor of other evidence, such as the monuments in

the field and the distance measurement in the deeds. See Appellant’s Brief

at 46. Doman holds, however, that parol evidence may not be employed “to

vary or contradict a boundary description contained within a deed” and,

further, that the call to an adjoinder typically carries more weight than the call

to a distance. Doman, 592 A.2d at 109-10. Accordingly, the trial court was

within its discretion to apply the Knickerbocker adjoinder call in the

Campanella property’s chain of title to identify the boundaries of the property,

and to correspondingly disregard conflicting calls in the chain of title for other

---

10 We note that the trial court in its opinion states that the Campanella and

Mertz properties do not abut each other, but also that the properties share a
common boundary line. See id. While they may be contradictory, these
statements do not impact the trial court’s dispositive conclusion that the 45-
foot width of the Campanella property should be measured from the
Knickerbocker boundary line, which results in Appellant’s property location
falling short of the disputed portion of land.

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nearby or adjoining properties. See id.; see also Long Run Timber Co.,

145 A.3d at 1228; Starling, 162 A.3d at 341. Further, we detect no error in

the trial court’s legal interpretation of the applicable property descriptions in

the chain of title pursuant to our de novo and plenary review of the relevant

deeds. See Kripp, 849 A.2d, 1164 n.5. Therefore, the trial court did not

abuse its discretion or commit an error of law in concluding that Appellant

failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that she held title to the

land in dispute. See Wyatt Inc., 976 A.2d at 564; see also Doman, 592

A.2d at 110; Kripp, 849 A.2d, 1164 n.5; Becker, 202 A.3d at 722; Billig,

853 A.2d at 1050-51.11

Judgment affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/26/2026

---

11 We note that while Mr. Ewald testified that he identified artificial monuments

in the field in support of his opinion of the location of the Campanella property
i.e., an iron pipe and iron fencing, these monuments did not appear in the
deeds in the chain of title for the Campanella property and, accordingly, the
trial court was not required to rely on these monuments over the
Knickerbocker adjoinder call. See N.T., 8/15/22, at 74-75; see also Doman,
592 A.2d at 109-10.

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