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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Beton Holdings v. Summit Camp

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 749 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Dubow

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (17K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Dubow

J-S44026-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

BETON HOLDINGS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SUMMIT CAMP, LLC AND SIMAD :
HOLDINGS, LLC :
: No. 749 EDA 2025
Appellant :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 6, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
2023-00588

BETON HOLDINGS, LLC : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
SUMMIT CAMP, LLC AND SIMAD : No. 853 EDA 2025
HOLDINGS, LLC :

Appeal from the Judgment Entered May 6, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Wayne County Civil Division at No(s):
2023-00588

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., DUBOW, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MARCH 26, 2026

These are cross-appeals1 from the judgment entered May 6, 2025, in

the Wayne County Court of Common Pleas following a jury verdict in favor of

---

1 On August 15, 2025, this Court issued an order sua sponte consolidating the

cross-appeals and designating Summit Camp, LLC (“Summit Camp”) and
Simad Holdings, LLC (“Simad Holdings”) as Appellants, and Beton Holdings,
LLC (“Beton Holdings”) as Appellee.
J-S44026-25

Appellee Beton Holdings. After careful review, we affirm. We remand this

case, however, for the limited purpose of calculating and awarding post-

judgment interest.

The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. In 2022,

Appellant Summit Camp made a distribution to Appellant Simad Holdings, a

51% member of Summit Camp, but made no distribution to Appellee, a 49%

member of Summit Camp. Appellee filed a complaint alleging that Appellant

Summit Camp should have made a cash distribution of $509,262.00 to

Appellee. Appellee alleged a creditor claim and a claim of breach of fiduciary

duty.

On November 13, 2024, following a jury trial, the jury determined that

Appellee was entitled to a distribution in the amount of $254,631.09. The jury

found in Appellee’s favor based on the creditor claim but not on Appellee’s

claim of breach of fiduciary duty.

Appellee filed a motion for post-trial relief, requesting that the court 1)

modify the amount of the distribution to $509,262.00 and 2) mold the total

verdict amount to include pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

Appellants filed an answer and brief in opposition, but did not file a post-trial

motion raising any independent grounds for relief. On February 24, 2025, the

trial court modified the distribution to $509,262.00 and denied Appellee’s

request for pre-judgment and post-judgment interest.

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J-S44026-25

These cross-appeals followed. The parties each filed 1925(b)

statements and in response, the trial court issued a 1925(a) opinion adopting

and incorporating its February 24, 2025 opinion and order.

On April 23, 2025, this Court filed an order directing Appellants to show

cause as to why the appeal should not be quashed or dismissed as Appellants

had not filed post-trial motions and judgment had not been entered. In

response, on May 6, 2025, Appellants filed a praecipe for the entry of

judgment, perfecting this Court’s jurisdiction.

A.

We first address Appellants’ claims on appeal. Appellants raise the

following issues:

1. Did the trial court err in granting [] Beton Holding[’s] Motion
   for Post Trial Relief?

2. Did the trial court err or otherwise abuse[] its discretion in
   modifying the verdict to $509,262.00[?]

3. Did the trial court err or otherwise abuse its discretion in
   modifying the jury verdict beyond thirty days of the verdict
   being entered[?]

4. Did the trial court err or otherwise abuse its discretion in
   modifying the jury verdict beyond thirty days of the verdict
   where the [c]ourt did not expressly toll the appeal period[?]

5. Did the trial court err or otherwise abuse its discretion in
   modifying the verdict where Beton Holdings did not object to
   same at trial[?]

6. Did the trial court err or otherwise abuse its discretion in
   modifying the verdict because the verdict was against the
   weight of the evidence[?]

7. Did the trial court err or otherwise abuse its discretion in finding
   the verdict was against the weight of the evidence[?]

-3-
J-S44026-25

Appellants’ Br. at 4-5.

Before addressing the merits of these claims, we must determine

whether Appellants preserved their issues on appeal. “It is well-established

that issues not raised in post[-]trial motions are waived for purposes of

appeal.” Diener Brick Co. v. Mastro Masonry Cont., 885 A.2d 1034, 1038

(Pa. Super. 2005) (citing Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1). Moreover, “the filing of a

1925(b) statement raising the issue is not an adequate substitute for the

raising of the issue in post-trial motions.” Id. at 1039. Here, Appellants did

not file a post-trial motion and filed only a response in opposition to Appellee’s

post-trial motion.2 Appellants have, thus, waived all issues on appeal and we

are constrained to dismiss their appeal.

B.

We next address Appellee’s claims on cross-appeal, which Appellee

preserved in its post-trial motion. Appellee raises the following issues:

1. Whether the trial court erred or otherwise abused its discretion
   in declining to award the verdict winner pre[-]judgment
   interest?

2. Whether the trial court erred or otherwise abused its discretion
   in declining to award the verdict winner post-judgment
   interest?

---

2 Appellants, in their response to this Court’s rule to show cause, argue that

they preserved their issues by filing a response in opposition to Appellee’s
post-trial motion to mold the verdict. Appellants do not cite, and this Court
cannot locate, any authority that allows a response in opposition to a post-
trial motion to substitute for a post-trial motion for the purpose of issue
preservation.

-4-
J-S44026-25

Appellee’s Br. at 2.3

In Appellee’s first issue, it argues that the trial court erred when it

declined to award Appellee pre-judgment interest. Id. at 13-16. “Our review

of an award of pre-judgment interest is for abuse of discretion.” E. Steel

Constrs., Inc. v. Int'l Fid. Ins. Co., 282 A.3d 827, 858 (Pa. Super. 2022),

aff'd 2026 WL 457805 (Pa. filed Feb. 18, 2026). “An abuse of discretion is not

merely an error of judgment, but occurs only where the law is overridden or

misapplied, or the judgment exercised is manifestly unreasonable, or the

result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will, as shown by the evidence of

record.” James v. Wal-Mart Distrib. Ctr., 310 A.3d 316, 319 (Pa. Super.

2024) (citation omitted).

Pre-judgment interest is recoverable as of right in breach of contract

cases “[i]f the breach consists of a failure to pay a definite sum of money or

to render a performance with fixed or ascertainable money value.” E. Steel,

282 A.3d at 858 (citation omitted). In any other case, the trial court has

discretion to award pre-judgment interest “as justice requires on the amount

that would have been just compensation had it been paid when performance

was due.” Id. (citation omitted). “Thus, before awarding pre[-]judgment

interest, the court must identify the nature of the breach.” Id.

This case did not involve a breach of contract, and Appellee’s claims rely

on the Pennsylvania Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 15 Pa.C.S. §§

---

3 We do not include or address Appellee’s arguments in opposition to
Appellants’ appeal, as we dismiss Appellants’ appeal supra.

-5-
J-S44026-25

8811-98. Appellee is not, therefore, entitled to pre-judgment interest as of

right.

The trial court had discretion to award pre-judgment interest as an

equitable remedy and explained that it declined to do so here because the

case did not involve “breach of any kind” and the jury did not find in Appellee’s

favor on its claim of breach of fiduciary duty. Op. and Order, 2/24/25, at 3.

While Appellee asserts that the trial court should have reached a different

conclusion because Appellant Summit Camp was in possession of an

ascertainable sum that belonged “in good conscience” to Appellee, 4 we cannot

conclude on this basis that the trial court’s decision was manifestly

unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Our review

of the record and relevant case law supports the trial court’s exercise of its

discretion and Appellee’s claim that the trial court erred in denying pre-

judgment interest, thus, warrants no relief.

Appellee next argues that the trial court erred when it declined to award

Appellee post-judgment interest. Appellants’ Br. at 16-17. Appellee asserts

that the trial court did not separately evaluate Appellee’s entitlement to post-

judgment interest and that, unlike pre-judgment interest, “post-judgment

interest is awarded as a matter of right on the amount of the verdict (as

molded) from the date judgment is entered until the date judgment is paid.”

---

4 Appellant’s Br. at 16.

-6-
J-S44026-25

Id. at 17. Appellee concludes that the trial court did not have discretion to

deny the award of post-judgment interest. Id.

In Pennsylvania, awards of post-judgment interest are governed by

statute. Section 8101 provides:

Except as otherwise provided by another statute, a judgment for
a specific sum of money shall bear interest at the lawful rate from
the date of the verdict or award, or from the date of the judgment,
if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or award.

42 Pa.C.S. § 8101.

In its opinion, the trial court fails to explain its reasons for denying

Appellee’s request for post-judgment interest and addresses only its denial of

pre-judgment interest. See Op. and Order, 2/24/25, at 3. As the trial court

must award post-judgment interest as of right, we remand this case for the

trial court to calculate and award post-judgment interest pursuant to Section

8101.

Judgment affirmed. Case remanded for award of post-judgment

interest. Jurisdiction relinquished.

Date: 3/26/2026

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