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March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Williams, R.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1144 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: King

• Opinion

• Authorities (27)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (13.7K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by King

J-S05018-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
RODKEEM ERIC WILLIAMS :
:
Appellant : No. 1144 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 31, 2024
In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-15-CR-0000732-2022

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. *

MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED MARCH 27, 2026

Appellant, Rodkeem Eric Williams, appeals from the judgment of

sentence entered in the Chester County Court of Common Pleas, following his

open guilty plea to persons not to possess firearms, carrying a firearm without

a license, drivers required to be licensed, and driving with a suspended

license.1 We affirm.

The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows. On

February 19, 2022, Corporal Jared Davis of the Coatesville Police Department

initiated a traffic stop of a Kia Sportage. As Corporal Davis attempted to

maneuver his vehicle behind the Kia, the Kia fled. Corporal Davis found the

---

• Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6105(a)(1) and 6106(a)(1), 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501(a) and

1543(b)(1)(i), respectively.
J-S05018-26

Kia parked in an alley shortly thereafter. Corporal Davis saw the driver of the

vehicle, later identified as Appellant, running from the scene. During this

flight, Appellant discarded a firearm. Subsequent investigation revealed that

Appellant had a prior conviction that rendered him ineligible to possess a

firearm. Further, Appellant’s driver’s license was suspended.

On May 20, 2024, Appellant completed a written guilty plea colloquy.

That same day, the court conducted Appellant’s guilty plea hearing and oral

colloquy. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court accepted Appellant’s

guilty plea for the above-referenced offenses. Because the parties did not

have an agreement as to sentencing, the court ordered a pre-sentence

investigation (“PSI”) report and deferred sentencing. (See N.T. Guilty Plea

Hearing, 5/20/24, at 7).

With the benefit of the PSI report, the court held Appellant’s sentencing

hearing on October 31, 2024. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court

sentenced Appellant to six (6) to twelve (12) years’ imprisonment for persons

not to possess firearms.2 The court imposed a concurrent term of three (3)

to six (6) years’ imprisonment for carrying a firearm without a license, plus

fines and costs for the Motor Vehicle Code violations. On November 10, 2024,

---

2 With an offense gravity score of eleven (11) and a prior record score of five

(5), the standard range of the Sentencing Guidelines provided for a minimum
sentence of seventy-two (72) to ninety (90) months. (See Commonwealth’s
Memorandum in Aid of Sentencing, filed 10/30/24, at 2; N.T. Sentencing,
10/31/24, at 6).

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J-S05018-26

Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion. In it, Appellant moved to

withdraw the guilty plea. Appellant also challenged the discretionary aspects

of his sentence. On April 1, 2025, the court denied the post-sentence motion.

Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on April 29, 2025. That same

day, the court ordered Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement

of errors complained of on appeal. Appellant timely filed his Rule 1925(b)

statement on May 16, 2025.

Appellant now raises the following issues for this Court’s review:

Whether the trial court should have granted Appellant’s
motion to withdraw guilty plea when, inter alia, he was never
advised at the time of his plea that he would face a state
parole violation?

Whether Appellant’s sentence should be vacated as excessive
due to the trial court’s failure to adequately consider
mitigating factors and when he received two sentences for
two offenses that should have merged?

Whether this case should be remanded for either a
supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion on the sentencing issue
and/or for a hearing on [Appellant’s] motion to withdraw
guilty plea?

(Appellant’s Brief at 10).

In his first issue, Appellant asserts that the court did not conduct a

hearing in conjunction with his post-sentence request to withdraw the guilty

plea. Appellant complains that the lack of a hearing meant that the court did

not develop a record on two arguments supporting withdrawal: 1) Appellant

was unaware of possible defenses; and 2) Appellant did not understand why

he was pleading to two different charges for one firearm. Appellant maintains

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J-S05018-26

that he raised a third argument in his post-sentence motion, and there is a

sufficient record to permit withdrawal of the guilty plea on this basis.

Specifically, Appellant claims that he did not know that he was on state parole

when he entered the guilty plea. Appellant relies on the fact that he answered

“no” during the oral colloquy when asked if he was on probation or parole.

Appellant argues “that no one—not plea counsel, not the prosecutor, nor the

court—deigned to correct Appellant” when he misstated his parole status. (Id.

at 17). “An argument could be made that Appellant would have never pled

open in this case had he known he was on parole in the first place.” (Id. at

18). Appellant concludes that this Court must permit him to withdraw his

guilty plea or remand the matter for a fact-finding hearing. We disagree that

Appellant is entitled to any relief.

Our review of a post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea

implicates the following principles:

Post-sentence motions for withdrawal are subject to higher
scrutiny [than pre-sentence motions to withdraw a plea]
since courts strive to discourage entry of guilty pleas as
sentence-testing devices. A defendant must demonstrate
that manifest injustice would result if the court were to deny
his post-sentence motion to withdraw a guilty plea.
Manifest injustice may be established if the plea was not
tendered knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.

Commonwealth v. Kehr, 180 A.3d 754, 756-57 (Pa.Super. 2018) (citation

omitted).

“In determining whether a plea is valid, the court must examine the

totality of circumstances surrounding the plea.” Commonwealth v. Hart,

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J-S05018-26

174 A.3d 660, 664-65 (Pa.Super. 2017). “A valid plea colloquy must delve

into six areas: 1) the nature of the charges, 2) the factual basis of the plea,

3) the right to a jury trial, 4) the presumption of innocence, 5) the sentencing

ranges, and 6) the plea court’s power to deviate from any recommended

sentence.” Commonwealth v. Reid, 117 A.3d 777, 782 (Pa.Super. 2015)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 107 (Pa.Super.

2005)). “Furthermore, nothing in [Pa.R.Crim.P. 590] precludes the

supplementation of the oral colloquy by a written colloquy that is read,

completed and signed by the defendant and made a part of the plea

proceedings.” Commonwealth v. Bedell, 954 A.2d 1209, 1212-13

(Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 742, 964 A.2d 893 (2009). See

also Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment.

“A person who elects to plead guilty is bound by the statements he

makes in open court while under oath and he may not later assert grounds for

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements he made at his plea

colloquy.” Commonwealth v. Pier, 182 A.3d 476, 480 (Pa.Super. 2018)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Pollard, 832 A.2d 517, 523 (Pa.Super. 2003)).

“[T]he law does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of

his decision to plead guilty. The law requires only that a defendant’s decision

to plead guilty be made knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently.”

Commonwealth v. Jabbie, 200 A.3d 500, 506 (Pa.Super. 2018).

“Generally, ‘a defendant’s lack of knowledge of collateral consequences

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J-S05018-26

of the entry of a guilty plea does not undermine the validity of the plea[.]’”

Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 1221, 1227 (Pa.Super. 2022)

(quoting Commonwealth v. Abraham, 619 Pa. 293, 304, 62 A.3d 343, 350

(2012)). Regarding the impact of an offender’s parole status on the entry of

a guilty plea, this Court has observed:

[T]he granting and rescinding of parole are purely
administrative functions. Parole is a penological measure
for the disciplinary treatment of prisoners who seem capable
of rehabilitation outside the prison walls; it does not affect
the sentence.

Commonwealth v. Oliver, 128 A.3d 1275, 1282 (Pa.Super. 2015) (internal

citations and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). See also

Commonwealth v. Paden, No. 594 MDA 2025, unpublished memorandum

at 7 (filed February 20, 2026) (explaining: “[A] parole revocation is a collateral

consequence of a guilty plea, and, unless a defendant is affirmatively misled

or erroneously advised about the consequences of his plea, the plea is not

involuntarily and unknowingly entered simply because the defendant was

unaware that his guilty plea would subject him to a revocation sentence”).

Instantly, Appellant executed the written guilty plea colloquy on May 20,

1. In it, Appellant acknowledged the crimes to which he agreed to plead

guilty, as well as the statutory elements for these crimes. (See Written Plea

Colloquy, filed 5/20/24, at 1-2). For each offense, Appellant filled out the

maximum possible sentence. (Id.) The written colloquy also included

Appellant’s handwritten statement of the factual basis for the plea, as well as

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J-S05018-26

Appellant’s confirmation that there was no plea bargain. (Id. at 2-3).

Appellant acknowledged his right to a jury trial and the presumption of

innocence. (Id. at 7). Finally, the section titled “SENTENCING RIGHTS,”

appeared as follows:

(Id. at 8).

That same day, the court conducted the oral guilty plea colloquy. During

the oral colloquy, Appellant explained that he had reviewed each paragraph

of the written colloquy with his attorney. (See Guilty Plea Hearing at 6).

Appellant agreed with the factual basis for the plea, which the district attorney

presented at the start of the hearing. (Id. at 5). Appellant reiterated his

understanding of the charges, the sentencing ranges, his right to a jury trial,

and the presumption of innocence. (Id. at 4-6). Finally, the court asked

Appellant: “Are you currently on probation or parole?” (Id. at 6). Appellant

responded, “No.” (Id.)

While Appellant may not be pleased with the outcome of his decision to

plead guilty, the law requires only that he made a knowing, voluntary, and

intelligent decision to plead guilty. See Jabbie, supra. Although Appellant

now complains that no one attempted to correct his responses to the questions

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J-S05018-26

about his parole status, Appellant is bound by the statements made in the

written and oral colloquies. See Pier, supra. Moreover, any parole violation

amounted to a collateral consequence to the entry of the plea, and Appellant’s

lack of knowledge regarding such a consequence does not undermine the

validity of the plea. See Thomas, supra; Oliver, supra. Under the totality

of these circumstances, Appellant’s plea was valid. See Hart, supra.

Therefore, Appellant cannot demonstrate a manifest injustice, and he is not

entitled to relief on his first issue. See Kehr, supra.

In his second issue, Appellant contends that the court failed to consider

a statement provided by his grandfather, Reverand James Williams, at the

sentencing hearing. Further, Appellant asserts that the court ignored his

diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder, “which was not elaborated upon

on the record.” (Appellant’s Brief at 19). Under these circumstances,

Appellant argues that the court imposed an excessive sentence. 3 Appellant

concludes that this Court must vacate the sentence and remand the matter

for a new sentencing hearing. We disagree.

---

3 Aside from this straightforward challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing, Appellant also complains that the sentences for persons not to
possess firearms and carrying a firearm without a license should have merged.
We need not tarry long with this question, however, where this Court has
repeatedly held that sentences for these two offenses do not merge. See
Commonwealth v. Taggart, 997 A.2d 1189, 1200-01 (Pa.Super. 2010),
appeal denied, 610 Pa. 578, 17 A.3d 1254 (2011) (explaining that offenses
under Section 6105 and Section 6106 do not merge because each offense
contains element that other does not).

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J-S05018-26

“Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an

appellant to an appeal as of right.” Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d

103, 112 (Pa.Super. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S. Ct. 2450, 174

L.Ed.2d 240 (2009). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary aspects of

sentencing issue:

[W]e conduct a four part analysis to determine: (1) whether
appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see Pa.R.A.P.
902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly preserved
at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
sentence, see Pa.R.Crim.P. 1410 [now Rule 720]; (3)
whether appellant’s brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P.
2119(f); and (4) whether there is a substantial question that
the sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).

Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal

denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183 (Pa.Super. 2005)).

When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant

must invoke this Court’s jurisdiction by including in his brief a separate concise

statement demonstrating a substantial question as to the appropriateness of

the sentence under the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571

Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002); Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). “The requirement that an

appellant separately set forth the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal

furthers the purpose evident in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any

challenges to the trial court’s evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging

on the sentencing decision to exceptional cases.” Phillips, supra at 112

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J-S05018-26

(emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be

evaluated on a case-by-case basis.” Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830

A.2d 1013, 1018 (Pa.Super. 2003).

A substantial question exists only when the appellant
advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s
actions were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision
of the Sentencing Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental
norms which underlie the sentencing process.

Caldwell, supra at 768 (quoting Commonwealth v. Prisk, 13 A.3d 526,

533 (Pa.Super. 2011)). “Applying Mouzon, this Court has held that an

excessive sentence claim—in conjunction with an assertion that the court

failed to consider mitigating factors—raises a substantial question.”

Commonwealth v. Raven, 97 A.3d 1244, 1253 (Pa.Super. 2014), appeal

denied, 629 Pa. 636, 105 A.3d 736 (2014).

Here, Appellant timely filed his notice of appeal, he preserved his issue

by including it in his post-sentence motion, and his appellate brief includes a

Rule 2119(f) statement. Appellant’s claim also raises a substantial question

as to the appropriateness of the sentence imposed. See id. Accordingly, we

proceed to address the merits of Appellant’s issue.

This Court reviews discretionary sentencing challenges based on the

following standard:

Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. An abuse of
discretion is more than just an error in judgment and, on

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appeal, the trial court will not be found to have abused its
discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
partiality, bias or ill-will.

Commonwealth v. McNabb, 819 A.2d 54, 55 (Pa.Super. 2003) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Hess, 745 A.2d 29, 30-31 (Pa.Super. 2000)).

“When imposing sentence, a court is required to consider the particular

circumstances of the offense and the character of the defendant.”

Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), cert. denied,

545 U.S. 1148, 125 S. Ct. 2984, 162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005). “In particular, the

court should refer to the defendant’s prior criminal record, his age, personal

characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation.” Id. “Where PSI reports

exist, we shall continue to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of

relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those

considerations along with mitigating statutory factors.” Commonwealth v.

Watson, 228 A.3d 928, 936 (Pa.Super. 2020) (quoting Commonwealth v.

Devers, 519 Pa. 88, 101-02, 546 A.2d 12, 18 (1988)). “Where the sentencing

court imposes a standard-range sentence with the benefit of a [PSI] report,

we will not consider the sentence excessive.” Commonwealth v. Bankes,

286 A.3d 1302, 1307 (Pa.Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Corley,

31 A.3d 293, 298 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

Instantly, the sentencing court had the benefit of a PSI report, counsels’

arguments, and the statement from Appellant’s family member. Under these

circumstances, we can presume the court was fully aware of and considered

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mitigating factors, such as Appellant’s mental health struggles. See Watson,

supra. Additionally, the court imposed a sentence within the standard range.

As such, we see no merit to Appellant’s claim that the sentence was excessive.

See Bankes, supra.

Additionally, the record belies Appellant’s claim that the court failed to

consider his diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder. In fact, the court

initially raised this diagnosis when providing relevant details about Appellant’s

background:

His father is disabled. His mother is out of work also, due
to an unspecified injury. I think it may be related to an
illness.

He has good and close relationships with both of his parents.

He denies ever being subjected to incidents of abuse or
neglect.

He’s single, never been married. He has no children. He
lives with his parents in Coatesville.

He was diagnosed with ADHD in fourth or fifth grade. He
had an IEP while he was in high school. He graduated from
Coatesville in 2009. And he graduated from Automotive
Training Center in 2012.

He has been unemployed for the past two years, but does
some side work with a landscaping business.

He is supported from a settlement from an auto—looks like
an injury or medical malpractice lawsuit, where he receives
a set amount of money per month.

He does have debts related to many prior criminal cases.

He was injured in a car accident at the age of 3. Developed
problems with his kidneys. He takes medication for that.

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He’s also asthmatic.

---

He does have a medical marijuana card. He uses that
to cope with anxiety and PTSD.

(N.T. Sentencing Hearing at 4-5).

At that point, the court asked defense counsel to elaborate on the cause

of Appellant’s post-traumatic stress disorder. After conferring with Appellant,

counsel responded: “Being incarcerated so many times and dealing with the

stressors of that, Your Honor.” (Id. at 5). The court then added that Appellant

had “received recommendations in the past that he needs mental health

services,” and Appellant believed “he could benefit from mental health

treatment[.]” (Id. at 5-6).

Thereafter, Reverand Williams provided his statement on Appellant’s

behalf, which emphasized Appellant’s religious upbringing and repentance for

his crimes. (See id. at 10-11). The court acknowledged Reverand Williams

by thanking him for his statement, and then the court asked counsel whether

anyone else would be speaking. On this record, the court adequately

considered the mitigating circumstances at issue. Thus, we see no reason to

disrupt the court’s sentencing discretion. See McNabb, supra.

In his final issue, Appellant suggests that this Court remand his case for

either: 1) a supplemental Rule 1925(a) opinion on the issue of sentencing; or

2) a hearing on Appellant’s request to withdraw the guilty plea. (See

Appellant’s Brief at 20). As we have already determined that these issues are

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without merit, we decline Appellant’s request for remand. 4 Accordingly, we

affirm the judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/27/2026

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4For the same reasons, we deny the separate application for remand that
Appellant filed on December 4, 2025.

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