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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Fix the City, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: B339464

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (106)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 2/27/26
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

FIX THE CITY, INC., B339464

Plaintiff and Appellant, (Los Angeles County
v. Super. Ct. No. 23STCP03519)

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Curtis A. Kin, Judge. Affirmed.
The Silverstein Law Firm, Robert P. Silverstein and James
S. Link for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Hydee Feldstein Soto, City Attorney, Denise C. Mills, Chief
Deputy City Attorney, Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City
Attorney, Shaun Dabby Jacobs, Assistant City Attorney, Sara
Ugaz and Stephen D. Lee, Deputy City Attorneys for Defendants
and Respondents City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City
Council.
Patterson & O’Neill, Ryan Patterson and Brian O’Neill for
Yes In My Back Yard as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Defendants
and Respondents City of Los Angeles and Los Angeles City
Council.

---

INTRODUCTION
Section 8.33 of the City of Los Angeles Administrative Code
(section 8.33) confers various mayoral powers upon the
declaration of “a local housing and/or homelessness emergency.”
(Id., subd. (b).) On July 7, 2023, City of Los Angeles Mayor
Karen Bass declared such an emergency. The Los Angeles City
Council (City Council) thereafter renewed the state of emergency
and Mayor Bass exercised the powers granted to her to take
action regarding unhoused city residents. On November 4, 2025,
while this appeal was pending, the mayor lifted the emergency
declaration and it is no longer in force.
Appellant Fix the City, Inc. (Fix the City) claims section
8.33 is invalid, such that the City of Los Angeles (City) and the
City Council acted illegally during the time the emergency
declaration was in place. Fix the City asserts that the California
Emergency Services Act (CESA; Gov. Code,1 § 8550 et seq.) as
well as another provision of the City’s administrative code
preempted section 8.33, rendering it null and void.
We conclude CESA and section 8.33 do not conflict and that
CESA does not otherwise preempt section 8.33. We also conclude
other provisions of the City’s administrative code (LAAC) do not

1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Government
Code.

2
invalidate section 8.33. As the trial court denied Fix the City’s
requests for a writ vacating the emergency declaration along with
any directives, rules, and regulations issued under it, and for
declaratory relief that section 8.33 violated CESA and other
provisions of the LAAC, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
We summarize first the pertinent provisions of CESA and
the LAAC, then the Mayor’s July 7, 2023 emergency declaration,
and lastly the procedural history of Fix the City’s lawsuit.
A. CESA
In CESA, the Legislature expressed its intent to coordinate
the emergency responses of the state, its political subdivisions,
the federal government, and “private agencies”; to provide state
assistance to its political subdivisions; and to facilitate “the
rendering of mutual aid” by the state and political subdivisions
“to the end that the most effective use may be made of all
manpower, resources, and facilities for dealing with any
emergency that may occur.” (§ 8550, subds. (a)-(d).)
CESA establishes three “degrees of emergency”: a “ ‘[s]tate
of war emergency’ ” (§ 8558, subd. (a)); a “ ‘[s]tate of emergency’ ”
(id., subd. (b)); and a “ ‘[l]ocal emergency’ ” (id., subd. (c)). Only
the last of these is relevant here. A “ ‘[l]ocal emergency,’ ” as
defined by CESA, “may be proclaimed only by the governing body
of a city, county, or city and county, or by an official designated
by ordinance adopted by that governing body” (§ 8630) based on
“conditions of disaster or of extreme peril to the safety of persons
and property within the territorial limits of a county, city and
county, or city, caused by conditions such as air pollution, fire,
flood, storm, epidemic, riot, drought, cyberterrorism, sudden and

3
severe energy shortage, deenergization event,[2] electromagnetic
pulse attack, plant or animal infestation or disease, the
Governor’s warning of an earthquake or volcanic prediction, or an
earthquake, or other conditions . . . which are or are likely to be
beyond the control of the services, personnel, equipment, and
facilities of that political subdivision and require the combined
forces of other political subdivisions to combat” (§ 8558, subd.
(c)(1)).
During a “local emergency” under CESA “the governing
body of a political subdivision, or officials designated thereby,
may promulgate orders and regulations necessary to provide for
the protection of life and property, including orders or regulations
imposing a curfew within designated boundaries where necessary
to preserve the public order and safety.” (§ 8634.) Other political
subdivisions are provided “full power to provide mutual aid . . . in
accordance with local ordinances, resolutions, emergency plans,
or agreements therefor” (§ 8631) and state agencies are similarly
authorized to “provide mutual aid, including personnel,
equipment, and other available resources, to assist political
subdivisions during a local emergency” (§ 8632).
The state and its political subdivisions are immune from
liability for “the exercise or performance, or the failure to exercise
or perform, a discretionary function or duty on the part of a state

2 A “ ‘deenergization event’ ” is a “planned power outage . . .
to reduce the risk of wildfires caused by utility equipment.”
(§ 8557, subd. (h).) Where a “sudden and severe energy shortage”
or “deenergization event” involves a “regulated energy utilit[y]” it
can be the basis for the proclamation of a “ ‘[l]ocal emergency’ ” if
it “requires extraordinary measures beyond the authority vested
in the Public Utilities Commission.” (§ 8558, subd. (c)(1).)

4
or local agency or any employee of the state or its political
subdivisions in carrying out the provisions of [CESA].” (§ 8655.)
In addition, a political subdivision’s “officers, agents, [and]
employees,” when performing any functions or duties outside of
their territory pursuant to CESA, enjoy all “privileges and
immunities . . . [and] exemptions from laws, ordinances, and
rules[,] . . . and . . . benefits which apply to the[ir] activity” within
their territory. (§ 8656.)
Although the governing body of a political subdivision may
designate an official to initially proclaim a “local emergency”
pursuant to CESA, an emergency proclaimed by such an official
must be “ratified by the governing body” within seven days.
(§ 8630, subd. (b).) In addition, “[t]he governing body shall
review the need for continuing the local emergency at least once
every 60 days until the governing body terminates the local
emergency,” which “shall” be done “at the earliest possible date
that conditions warrant.” (Id., subds. (c) & (d).)
B. The City’s Authority to Declare a “Local Housing
and/or Homelessness Emergency” under its Charter
and Administrative Code
The City is a charter city. Article XI, section 5, subdivision
(a) of the California Constitution provides, “It shall be competent
in any city charter to provide that the city governed thereunder
may make and enforce all ordinances and regulations in respect
to municipal affairs, subject only to restrictions and limitations
provided in their several charters and in respect to other matters
they shall be subject to general laws. City charters adopted
pursuant to this Constitution shall supersede any existing
charter, and with respect to municipal affairs shall supersede all
laws inconsistent therewith.” This constitutional provision “was

5
originally ‘enacted upon the principle that the municipality itself
knew better what it wanted and needed than the state at large,
and to give that municipality the exclusive privilege and right to
enact direct legislation which would carry out and satisfy its
wants and needs.’ [Citation.] The provision represents an
‘affirmative constitutional grant to charter cities of “all powers
appropriate for a municipality to possess . . .” and [includes] the
important corollary that “so far as ‘municipal affairs’ are
concerned,” charter cities are “supreme and beyond the reach of
legislative enactment.” ’ ” (State Building & Construction Trades
Council of California v. City of Vista (2012) 54 Cal.4th 547, 556.)
The City has invoked this constitutional “home rule”
authority over its municipal affairs. (L.A. City Charter, vol. I,
art. I, § 101 (Charter).) The Charter authorizes the mayor to
“declare a local emergency and coordinate the City’s emergency
response activities in accordance with procedures established by
ordinance.” (Charter, vol. I, art. II, § 231, subd. (i).) The Charter
does not define the term “local emergency” as used in it, but the
coordination it discusses involves only City resources and not (as
CESA’s definition of the same term does) “the combined forces of
other political subdivisions.” (§ 8558, subd. (c)(1).)
The LAAC provides for a mayoral declaration of a “ ‘[l]ocal
[h]ousing and/or [h]omeless [e]mergency,’ ” which is defined as “a
local emergency due to the existence of a critical shortage of local
affordable housing and/or an emergency on homelessness.”
(§ 8.33, subd. (a).) “The [m]ayor is . . . empowered to declare the
existence of a local housing and/or homelessness emergency” if
the City’s housing supply and the number of homeless

6
individuals living in the City meet certain metrics.3 (Id., subd.
(b)(i), (ii).) Upon the mayor’s declaration of such an emergency,
the mayor “shall coordinate citywide planning and response with
respect to unsheltered or unhoused individuals in conjunction
with” various City departments and agencies and “coordinate the
City’s efforts to address” the emergency “with the County of Los
Angeles, the State of California, and the federal government.”
(Id., subd. (c).) Furthermore, during such a state of emergency,
the mayor is empowered to “[p]romulgate, issue and enforce
rules, regulations, orders and directives which the Mayor
considers necessary to address the emergency,” “[c]ommandeer
property deemed necessary to meet interim and temporary
housing needs and bind the City for the fair value,” “[r]equire
emergency service of any City officer or employee and requisition
necessary personnel or material of any City department or
agency,” “[o]rder any action relative to the procurement of
construction contracts, service provider contracts, supplies, and

3 To proclaim an emergency under section 8.33, the mayor
must find that “(i) The City’s housing supply is projected to be at
least 40 percent below its annual housing production goals as
established in the Housing Element approved by the State
Department of Housing and Community Development and
reported in the City Planning Department’s quarterly Housing
Production Report; and/or ¶ Homelessness in the City has
reached a crisis as indicated by either: ¶ The unhoused
population in the City is greater than two times the total number
of interim beds as established in the annual Homeless Inventory
Count submitted to the federal Department of Housing and
Urban Development; or ¶ There is a citywide increase by
more than 20 percent in a single year as reported in the annual
Point-in-Time Count.” (§ 8.33, subd. (b).)

7
equipment for homelessness facilities to safeguard life, health or
property caused by the emergency” and, subject to some
restrictions, “[s]uspend competitive bidding restrictions” set forth
in the Charter and LAAC. (§ 8.33, subd. (d)(i)-(v).)
C. Other Emergency Authority in the LAAC
Separate and distinct from any emergency related to local
housing/homelessness under section 8.33, the LAAC separately
empowers the mayor “to declare the existence of a local
emergency or disaster when he [or she] finds that any of the
circumstances described in [LAAC s]ection 8.22 . . . exist, or at
any time a disaster or local emergency is declared by the
President of the United States or the Governor of California.”
(LAAC, § 8.27.) LAAC section 8.22 defines “ ‘local emergency’ ” as
“any occurrence which by reason of its magnitude is or is likely to
become beyond the control of the normal services, personnel,
equipment and facilities of the regularly constituted branches
and departments of the City government.” During a “local
emergency,” the mayor is provided with similar powers as are
conferred during a “[l]ocal [h]ousing and/or [h]omelessness
[e]mergency.” (See id., §§ 8.29, 8.30.)
D. Mayor Bass Declares an Emergency under
Section 8.33
On July 7, 2023, Mayor Bass declared an emergency under
section 8.33. On October 31, 2023, the City Council adopted a
resolution “[affirming] that the local emergency [concerning
persons experiencing homelessness declared by the Mayor on
July 7, 2023] did exist . . . and . . . there is a need to renew the
declaration of local emergency.” On January 23, 2024, the City
Council adopted a resolution further continuing the emergency.

8
On November 4, 2025, the Mayor lifted the emergency
declaration.
E. Fix the City Challenges Mayor Bass’s Declaration of
Emergency
On September 23, 2023, while the homelessness emergency
declaration was in place, Fix the City sought writ and declaratory
relief against the City and the City Council challenging that
emergency declaration.4 In the operative petition and complaint,
Fix the City sought to require the City to vacate the Mayor’s
July 7, 2023 emergency declaration and any directives, rules, and
regulations issued under it. Fix the City argued the declaration
was not ratified by the City Council within seven days as
required by section 8630 and not reviewed by the City Council
every 60 days as required by section 8630. Fix the City also
sought a declaration that section 8.33 (1) violated CESA because
a lack of housing and homelessness are not grounds for a “ ‘[l]ocal
emergency’ ” under section 8558 and because section 8.33 does
not require City Council ratification or rescission of an emergency
declaration within seven days, nor City Council review every 60
days, as required by section 8630; and (2) violated the LAAC by
establishing a type of local emergency inconsistent with the
definition of “local emergency” in LAAC section 8.22.5

4 Fix the City also named Mayor Bass as a defendant in her
official capacity but later dismissed her.
5 Although the emergency declaration is no longer in place,
this appeal is not moot because Fix the City’s lawsuit challenged
the validity of section 8.33, which remains part of the LAAC. Fix
the City asserted additional grounds for relief before the trial

9
Respondents filed a demurrer on February 16, 2024. As
relevant to this appeal, respondents contended that Fix the City’s
mandamus claim failed because section 8630 does not apply to
charter cities and, even if it did, because section 8.33 addresses a
municipal affair the ordinance would be enforceable despite any
conflict with section 8630. Respondents further contended that
Fix the City’s declaratory relief claims, which were based on the
premise that section 8.33 violated CESA and was inconsistent
with LAAC section 8.22, failed.
Fix the City contended in its opposition that CESA applies
to charter cities and preempts local legislation concerning local
emergencies. Fix the City further contended that the City could
not legislate for a local emergency based on a housing shortage or
homelessness because those were not grounds for a “ ‘[l]ocal
emergency’ ” under section 8558, subdivision (c)(1), and CESA
preempted the field.
In their reply, respondents contended that, even if CESA
applies to charter cities, it does not preempt contrary local
ordinances such as section 8.33.
After holding a hearing on the demurrer, the trial court
solicited supplemental briefing on the pertinent LAAC sections
and whether CESA’s legislative history showed the Legislature
intended CESA to apply to charter cities. In its supplemental
briefing, Fix the City contended that section 8.33 “illegally
permits a declaration of local emergency” based on conditions
that do not fall with the definition of “local emergency” in LAAC
section 8.22.

court but, as it has abandoned those arguments on appeal, we do
not summarize them.

10
On May 30, 2024, the court sustained the demurrer without
leave to amend. Among other things, the court concluded that
section 8630 does not apply to charter cities because the
Legislature did not clearly evince such an intent in the statute.
The court also concluded the definition of “local emergency” in
LAAC section 8.22 did not apply to section 8.33.
On June 5, 2024, the court entered a judgment of dismissal.
Fix the City timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“In reviewing the sufficiency of a complaint against a
general demurrer, we are guided by long-settled rules. ‘We treat
the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded,
but not contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law.
[Citation.] We also consider matters which may be judicially
noticed.’ [Citation.] Further, we give the complaint a reasonable
interpretation, reading it as a whole and its parts in their
context. [Citation.] When a demurrer is sustained, we determine
whether the complaint states facts sufficient to constitute a cause
of action. [Citation.] And when it is sustained without leave to
amend, we decide whether there is a reasonable possibility that
the defect can be cured by amendment: if it can be, the trial court
has abused its discretion and we reverse; if not, there has been no
abuse of discretion and we affirm. [Citations.] The burden of
proving such reasonable possibility is squarely on the plaintiff.”
(Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) The trial court’s
reasoning does not bind us, and we may affirm the judgment if it
was correct under any theory. (One Technologies, LLC v.
Franchise Tax Bd. (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 748, 759.)

11
The interpretation of statutes and city codes are issues of
law which we review de novo. (David S. Karton, a Law Corp. v.
Musick, Peeler & Garrett LLP (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1027, 1040;
People v. Venice Suites, LLC (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 715, 725.)
B. CESA Does Not Preempt Section 8.33
The parties and amicus curiae spill considerable ink over
whether section 8630—which governs who may proclaim a “local
emergency” under CESA and how long such a proclamation may
remain in place—applies to charter cities such as the City. We
need not resolve that question because even if CESA applies to
charter cities, the City was empowered to enact section 8.33
because the ordinance does not conflict with CESA.
1. Applicable Legal Framework
“The California Supreme Court has developed a four-part
‘analytical framework’ to determine whether a state law
unconstitutionally infringes the home rule authority of charter
cities granted by article XI, section 5 of the California
Constitution. [Citations.] First, the court determines whether
the local law at issue regulates an activity that can be
characterized as a municipal affair. [Citations.] Second, the
court determines whether there is an actual conflict between
state law and the local law. [Citations.] If no conflict exists, the
analysis is complete and there is no need to go to the next step.
[Citation.] Third, the court decides whether the state law
addresses a matter of ‘ “statewide concern.” ’ [Citations.] Fourth
and finally, the court determines whether the state law is
‘ “reasonably related to . . . resolution” ’ of the identified statewide
concern and is ‘ “narrowly tailored” to avoid unnecessary
interference in local governance.’ ” (City of Huntington Beach v.
Becerra (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 243, 255.)

12
If there is not “an actual conflict between” the state statute
and charter city legislation, “a choice between the conclusions
‘municipal affair’ and ‘statewide concern’ is not required.”
(California Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles
(1991) 54 Cal.3d 1, 16; accord, Rider v. City of San Diego (1998)
18 Cal.4th 1035, 1054-1055.)
2. Analysis
We address only the first two parts of this test because
section 8.33 is a matter of municipal concern and it does not
conflict with CESA. Because no conflict exists, “the analysis is
complete [at the second step] and there is no need to go” further.
(City of Huntington Beach v. Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at
p. 255.)
With regard to step one, section 8.33 concerns a “municipal
affair” because it governs the City’s own response to conditions
exclusively within its territory and provides powers to its
executive (the mayor) to address those conditions. (City of
Huntington Beach v. Becerra, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 255.)
Section 8.33 thus falls squarely within the City’s home rule
authority.
With regard to step two, there is no “actual conflict”
between section 8.33 and CESA. (California Fed. Savings &
Loan Assn. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 54 Cal.3d at p. 16.)
CESA authorizes political subdivisions to proclaim the type of
emergency described in the act; it does not limit political
subdivisions from declaring other types of emergencies. CESA
and section 8.33 define the types of emergencies to which they
apply in very different terms. Section 8.33 governs a specific type
of emergency arising from a housing shortage and/or
homelessness, and the triggering levels of such conditions are

13
specific and limited to those within the City—a shortage of
housing units in the City and the presence of unhoused people in
the City. In contrast, CESA defines emergencies which a political
subdivision can proclaim as “conditions of disaster or of extreme
peril to the safety of persons and property” which are caused
either by specific types of events (such as floods and fires but not
including homelessness or a lack of housing) or “other conditions”
which are beyond the control of the political subdivision’s
resources and require assistance from other political
subdivisions. (§ 8558, subd. (c)(1).)
Section 8.33 also does not conflict with CESA because it
provides the mayor with different powers than CESA does.
Although both section 8.33 and CESA confer the power to issue
orders and regulations to address the emergency (compare § 8631
with § 8.33, subd. (d)(i)), section 8.33 confers additional powers
related to the City’s own personnel, departments, resources, and
ordinances, and also authorizes the mayor to “commandeer
property . . . and bind the City for the fair value thereof.” (§ 8.33,
subd. (d)(ii)-(v).) CESA, in contrast, benefits the political
subdivision proclaiming the emergency by permitting it to receive
mutual aid from other political subdivisions and the state (and to
more effectively combat the disaster by providing aid to other
political subdivisions dealing with the same conditions).
(§§ 8631, 8632.) In addition, CESA expressly provides a political
subdivision declaring a “local emergency” with immunities and
protects the officials, employees, and agents of the political
subdivision when they assist other political subdivisions.
(§§ 8655, 8656.) Section 8.33 itself lists no such protections.
Fix the City contends that section 8.33 conflicts with CESA
because CESA preempts the field of local emergencies. We

14
disagree. Preemption is present “when the Legislature has
expressly manifested its intent to ‘fully occupy’ the area
[citation], or when it has impliedly done so in light of one of the
following indicia of intent: ‘(1) the subject matter has been so
fully and completely covered by general law as to clearly indicate
that it has become exclusively a matter of state concern; (2) the
subject matter has been partially covered by general law couched
in such terms as to indicate clearly that a paramount state
concern will not tolerate further or additional local action; or
(3) the subject matter has been partially covered by general law,
and the subject is of such a nature that the adverse effect of a
local ordinance on the transient citizens of the state outweighs
the possible benefit to the’ locality [citations].” (Sherwin-
Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles (1993) 4 Cal.4th 893, 898.)
The Legislature has not expressed an intent in CESA to
occupy the field of local governmental response to emergency or
harmful conditions within local borders, particularly with regard
to charter cities and their constitutional authority to regulate
their own affairs. To the contrary, the Legislature has expressed
the opposite intention in section 8668, subdivision (b), which
states, “Nothing in [CESA] shall be construed to diminish or
remove any authority of any city, county, or city and county
granted by [s]ection 7 of [a]rticle XI of the California
Constitution.” That constitutional provision establishes that “[a]
county or city may make and enforce within its limits all local,
police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in
conflict with general laws.” (Cal. Const., art. XI, § 7.)
Nor does CESA “ ‘so fully and completely cover[] [the area
of emergency declarations] . . . as to clearly indicate that it has
become exclusively a matter of state concern.’ ” (Sherwin-

15
Williams Co. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.)
The definition of “ ‘[l]ocal emergency’ ” in section 8558,
subdivision (c)(1) is not all-inclusive. The definition is focused on
specific conditions which can affect more than one political
subdivision at a time or spread from one to another, and its
catch-all provision expressly refers to conditions “which are or are
likely to be beyond the control of the services, personnel,
equipment, and facilities of that political subdivision and require
the combined forces of other political subdivisions to combat.”
(Ibid.) In turn, section 8630 places procedural requirements only
on the proclamation and continuation of a “ ‘[l]ocal emergency’ ”
as defined in section 8558, subdivision (c)(1). In sum, these
sections serve to facilitate coordination and mutual aid among
the state, its political subdivisions, and others in responding to
emergencies—not to preempt a city from using its own resources
to address issues unique to it.6
Fix the City contends, “[s]ections 8550, 8558 and 8630 . . .
express the Legislature’s intent to fully and completely occupy
the field of emergencies by declaring that emergencies are the
State’s responsibility and by empowering the Governor and local
governments to declare emergencies that trigger coordination of

6 For the reasons discussed, sections 8558, subdivision (c)
and 8630 are not “ ‘couched in such terms as to indicate clearly
that a paramount state concern will not tolerate further or
additional local action.’ ” (Sherwin-Williams Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, supra, 4 Cal.4th at p. 898.) Fix the City does not contend
that section 8.33 imposes any “ ‘adverse effect . . . on the
transient citizens of the state’ ” and we are unaware of any such
effect which could outweigh the benefits of the ordinance to the
City. (Sherwin-Williams Co., supra, at p. 898.)

16
emergency services across the political subdivisions of this State.”
None of these sections evinces any legislative intent to restrict
local entities from legislating responses to types of emergencies
not addressed in CESA, to impose conditions or limitations on
actions taken by a political subdivision to address disasters
within its territory, or to make emergencies solely a state
responsibility. Section 8550 references the state’s “responsibility”
to address and prepare for emergencies, but this does not suggest
that political subdivisions do not also have parallel
responsibilities with respect to their residents, or that local
efforts to address emergencies necessarily conflict with state
efforts. Fix the City appears to suggest that local legislation is
inimical to coordination among the state and its political
subdivisions in their emergency responses but fails to articulate
in practice how this is necessarily so or why every localized
emergency is one size fits all. In any event, merely providing for
coordination does not evince an intent to preclude local
legislation on the topic of emergencies.
Lastly, Fix the City contends that “only CESA empowers
the declaration of local emergencies.” Not so. Under our state
constitution, “A county or city may make and enforce within its
limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and
regulations not in conflict with general laws” (Cal. Const., art. XI,
§ 7), and this provision authorizes local governments to enact
ordinances allowing for the declaration of a local emergency
(Davis v. Justice Court (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 1002, 1007).
C. LAAC Section 8.22 Does Not Render Section 8.33
Invalid
LAAC section 8.22 defines a “ ‘local emergency’ . . . [to]
mean any occurrence which by reason of its magnitude is or is

17
likely to become beyond the control of the normal services,
personnel, equipment and facilities of the regularly constituted
branches and departments of the City government.” Fix the City
contends that the conditions supporting an emergency
declaration under section 8.33 do not constitute an “occurrence”
as defined by LAAC section 8.22 and therefore section 8.33 is
invalid. This argument is meritless.
“Established rules of statutory construction are equally
applicable to municipal ordinances,” including that “ ‘ “the
various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by
considering the particular clause or section in the context of the
statutory framework as a whole.” ’ ” (Chun v. Del Cid (2019) 34
Cal.App.5th 806, 815.)
The City Council enacted section 8.33 after LAAC section
8.22. It therefore either understood the conditions upon which an
emergency could be declared under section 8.33 to constitute an
“occurrence” as that term is used in LAAC section 8.22, or
intended to establish an additional type of emergency under its
authority to do so. (Chun v. Del Cid, supra, 34 Cal.App.5th at
p. 815; see Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627,
634 [“ ‘If conflicting statutes cannot be reconciled, later
enactments supersede earlier ones [citation], and more specific
provisions take precedence over more general ones’ ”].) Either
way, the two provisions do not conflict.
D. Denial of Leave to Amend
Fix the City has not shown how it could amend its
allegations to state a viable claim. Therefore, the trial court did
not err in sustaining respondents’ demurrer without leave to
amend.

18
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are awarded their
costs on appeal.
CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

WEINGART, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

BENDIX, J.

19