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March 13, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

State v. Wang

Ohio Court of Appeals

• Citations: 2026 Ohio 861
• Docket Number: WD-25-014

• Judges: Duhart

• Opinion

• Authorities (17)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.6K)

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Syllabus

Judge Duhart. Trial court complied with Crim.R. 11(C) and plea was made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. Trial court improperly imposed post-release control at sentencing hearing.

Combined Opinion

[Cite as State v. Wang, 2026-Ohio-861.]

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
WOOD COUNTY

State of Ohio Court of Appeals No.WD-25-014

Appellee
Trial Court No. 2023CR0458
v.

Xiaosong Wang DECISION AND JUDGMENT

Appellant Decided: March 13, 2026

---

Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecutor, and
Kristofer A. Kristofferson, Assistant Prosecutor, for appellee.

Jeffrey P. Nunnari, for appellant.

---

DUHART, J.

{¶ 1} This case is before the court on appeal from the December 19, 2024 judgment of the

Wood County Common Pleas Court. For the reasons that follow, we affirm in part and reverse in

part.
I. Assignments of Error

1. APPELLANT'S GUILTY PLEAS WERE NOT KNOWINGLY,
   

   INTELLIGENTLY AND VOLUNTARILY ENTERED.

2. APPELLANT'S SENTENCES ARE CONTRARY TO LAW.
   

II. Background

{¶ 2} Appellant, Xiaosong Wang, was indicted on the following twelve counts: Counts 1

and 2 - aggravated murder, an unspecified felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.01(A) and R.C.

2929.02(A); Counts 3 and 4 - murder, an unclassified felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.02(B)

and (D) and R.C. 2929.02(B); Counts 5, 6, and 7 - attempted murder, a first-degree felony, in

violation of R.C. 2923.02, R.C. 2903.02(A) and (D) and R.C. 2929.02(B); Counts 8, 9 and 10 -

felonious assault, a second-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) and (D)(1)(a); and,

Counts 11 and 12 - possessing criminal tools, a fifth-degree felony, in violation of R.C.

2923.24(A) and (C). Counts 1 - 10 each also included a three-year firearm specification

pursuant to R.C. 2941.145(A) and two specifications for forfeiture of a weapon, under R.C.

2941.1417(A). Wang pled not guilty.

{¶ 3} On August 26, 2024, a change of plea hearing was held, and Wang withdrew his

not guilty pleas and entered a plea of guilty to each count and specification in the indictment.

As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed to merge certain offenses and to not seek a life-

without-parole sentence.

{¶ 4} On October 7, 2024, Wang’s attorneys were given leave to withdraw and a new

attorney was appointed to represent him.

2.
{¶ 5} Wang filed a motion to withdraw his plea. A hearing was held, and the motion was

denied.

{¶ 6} Wang was sentenced on December 11, 2024. Pursuant to the plea agreement,

Count 1 was merged with Count 3, Count 2 was merged with Count 4, and Counts 5 - 10 were

merged. The State elected to proceed on Count 1, 2, and 5. Wang was then sentenced to life

with the possibility of parole after 20 years for Count 1, life with the possibility of parole after

20 years for Count 2, a mandatory minimum term of 10 years and an indefinite maximum term

of 15 years on Count 5, and 12 months each for Counts 11 and 12. Additionally, there were

three-year firearm specifications attached to Counts 1, 2 and 5. Counts 1 and 2 were ordered to

run consecutively to each other and consecutively to the associated gun specifications.1 In the

judgment entry, Counts 5, 11, and 12 and the gun specification attached to Count 5 were ordered

to run consecutively to each other, but concurrent to Counts 1 and 2 and their associated gun

specifications. In total, Wang was sentenced to 46 years to life.

{¶ 7} Wang appealed.

1
There appears to be some inconsistency in the trial court’s sentence as stated at the
sentencing hearing as opposed to the judgment entry relating to whether the gun
specification attached to Count 5 runs consecutively or concurrently to Counts 5, 11 and
12. This issue has not been raised by either party and therefore is rendered moot by our
decision. Moreover, the inconsistency does not affect the length of Wang’s sentence.

3.
III. First Assignment of Error

A. Arguments

{¶ 8} Wang contends that his plea was not made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.

He points to the fact that his native language is Mandarin and alleges that the plea form and the

plea colloquy contained errors and misstatements and do not comply with Crim.R. 11.

B. Law

{¶ 9} A defendant’s decision to enter a guilty plea must be knowing, intelligent and

voluntary. State v. Dangler, 2020-Ohio-2765, ¶ 10. Crim.R. 11(C) sets forth the procedures

trial courts must follow when accepting pleas and “‘ensures an adequate record on review by

requiring the trial court to personally inform the defendant of his rights and the consequences of

his plea and determine if the plea is understandingly and voluntarily made.’” Id. at ¶ 11, citing

State v. Stone, 43 Ohio St.2d 163, 168 (1975). Specifically, a trial court must “‘must make the

determinations and give the warnings required by Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) and (b)’” and “‘notify the

defendant of his or her constitutional rights enumerated in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c).’” State v.

Gowdy, 2025-Ohio-5575, ¶ 23, quoting State v. Veney, 2008-Ohio-5200, ¶ 13. Traditionally, “a

defendant is not entitled to have his plea vacated unless he demonstrates he was prejudiced by a

failure of the trial court to comply with the provisions of Crim.R. 11(C).” State v. Blackman,

2023-Ohio-3535, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.), quoting Dangler at ¶ 16. “When a trial court complies with

the requirements set out in Crim.R. 11, misstatements of law or premature pretrial rulings on

ancillary issues, even if erroneous, do not invalidate an otherwise valid plea.” Gowdy at ¶ 2.

{¶ 10} When an appellant seeks to vacate his plea on the basis that the plea was not

entered in a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary manner due to the trial court’s failure to comply

4.
with Crim.R. 11, the questions to consider are: “(1) has the trial court complied with the relevant

provision of the rule? (2) if the court has not complied fully with the rule, is the purported

failure of a type that excuses a defendant from the burden of demonstrating prejudice? and (3) if

a showing of prejudice is required, has the defendant met that burden?”2 Dangler at ¶ 17.

Generally, an appellant must show prejudice to have his plea vacated unless the court fails to

explain a constitutional right in Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(c) or completely fails to comply with any

portion of Crim.R. 11(C). State v. Lucas, 2025-Ohio-5303, ¶ 13 (6th Dist.), citing Dangler at ¶

13-16. “The test for prejudice is ‘“‘whether the plea would have otherwise been made.’”’” Id.

{¶ 11} We note that Wang’s arguments in this assignment of error generally pertain to

failures under Crim.R.11(C)(2), and he claims that both the written plea form and the plea

colloquy did not comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2). However, Crim.R. 11(C)(2) requires that the

court address the defendant personally, and when considering whether the trial court complied

with Crim.R. 11(C), our focus is on the dialogue between the court and the defendant to

determine whether the defendant understood the consequences of his plea. Dangler at ¶ 12.

Nevertheless, we may consider the plea form to clarify any alleged ambiguity during the

Crim.R. 11 oral plea colloquy. State v. Williams, 2025-Ohio-2331, ¶ 36 (6th Dist.), quoting

State v. Barker, 2011-Ohio-4130, paragraph two of the syllabus.

2 Both parties base their arguments on a standard which considers whether the trial court
strictly complied with the constitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11 and substantially
complied with the nonconstitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11. However, more
recently in Dangler, the Ohio Supreme Court set forth this test, which we have used to
analyze the Wang’s assigned errors.
5.
C. Analysis

1. English was not Wang’s First Language

{¶ 12} We first address general comments throughout Wang’s brief relating to the fact

that his native language is Mandarin, and that this may have contributed to his plea not being

made knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily. The record shows that Wang had an interpreter

during the events relevant to this appeal and there is no evidence that there were any issues with

the interpreter. When Wang was asked at the plea hearing if he felt he understood the plea

agreement, he said that he did. His previous attorney, who represented him through the plea,

also testified that she believed he understood the plea agreement.

{¶ 13} Additionally, Wang has at least some familiarity with the English language. As

stated in his brief, “he studied English in China for five years before coming to the United

States. He can read and write English with some proficiency, but has trouble with the spoken

language.” Wang himself made comments to that effect at the plea hearing, stating that “I can

write, I can read, but listening and speaking, limited,” and then also stating that he had “two

years full-time student in college, teacher’s college, and another three - - two years continuing

education in teaching English and education. That’s my education background. Also, I have

eight years as a school master in China.” His most recent trial attorney, during the hearing to

withdraw the plea, also stated that he met with Wang “several times on my own without an

interpreter” and that Wang “does have some English language skills” and that they “were able to

communicate back and forth” about the case. Wang agreed.

{¶ 14} Moreover, after thoroughly reviewing the plea hearing transcript, it appears that

Wang was not impeded by the language. He appeared to understand the proceedings and

6.
occasionally personally responded to questions asked by the judge. He raised concerns he had

with the plea and generally responded that he understood when queried about his understanding

of an issue. At one point Wang indicated he did not understand, and after a more thorough

explanation, he stated that he understood.

{¶ 15} We, therefore, do not find that there was a language barrier that affected the plea.

1. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b)

{¶ 16} Wang contends that Crim.R. 11(B)(1) and (C)(2)(b) were violated, both through

the plea form and during the plea colloquy, in that in both instances he was not informed of the

effect of his guilty plea - that it was a complete admission of guilt.

{¶ 17} Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b) requires a trial court inform the defendant and determine that

he understands (1) “the effect of the plea of guilty or no contest,” and (2) “that the court, upon

acceptance of the plea, may proceed with judgment and sentence.” A trial court satisfies the

requirement of informing a defendant of the effect of a plea when it advises a defendant of the

appropriate language under Crim.R. 11(B). State v. Jones, 2007-Ohio-6093, ¶ 25, 51. Crim.R.

11(B)(1) requires a trial court inform a defendant that “‘[t]he plea of guilty is a complete

admission of the defendant's guilt.”

{¶ 18} Wang contends that the trial court failed to inform him that his plea of guilty is a

complete admission of guilt.3 We agree that Wang was not specifically notified at the plea

3
In his appellate brief, it appears that Wang also argues that the trial court did not
inform him “that the court could proceed directly to sentencing once it accepted the
plea.” However, in his reply brief, he indicates that that language was “superfluous” and
that he “merely alleges that he was not advised, in the plea [form] or by the trial court,
that a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilt.” Nonetheless, we note that he was
7.
hearing that his plea of guilty is a complete admission of his guilt. However, our focus is not on

the exact verbiage, but “on whether the dialogue between the court and the defendant

demonstrates that the defendant understood the consequences of his plea.” Dangler at ¶ 12. As

we have previously stated,

In [State v.] Griggs, . . . 2004-Ohio-4415, . . .¶ 14, the Supreme Court of
Ohio recognized that a trial court’s failure to inform the defendant of the effect of
a guilty plea, specifically, is subject to a unique analysis because “[a] plea of
guilty is a complete admission of guilt.” . . . That is, when a defendant
affirmatively indicates that he or she is “guilty” of the charge, it is - necessarily
and patently - a complete admission of guilt. In other words, “a complete
admission of guilt” is more than just the effect of a guilty plea; it is the very nature
of a guilty plea. For that reason, “a defendant who has entered a guilty plea
without asserting actual innocence is presumed to understand that he has
completely admitted his guilt. In such circumstances, a court’s failure to inform
the defendant of the effect of his guilty plea as required by Crim.R. 11 is presumed
not to be prejudicial.” Id. at ¶ 19. (Emphasis sic).

State v. Hubbard, 2025-Ohio-5604, ¶ 27 (6th Dist.), quoting State v. Willis, 2019-Ohio-1182, ¶

16 (6th Dist.). Here, there was no claim of actual innocence, and a review of the plea transcript

shows that Wang understood that he was admitting his guilt to the charges and specifications.

He was specifically told that he was going to be asked if he was “prepared to make a complete

admission to the allegations against” him once the court read all the charges and potential

penalties. The trial court then went through each charge and related specification, if applicable,

and Wang pled guilty to each. He was also asked if he went through the plea form and

understood it, to which he responded in the affirmative; and the plea form does specifically say

that “a plea of guilty is a complete admission of guilty [sic].” We therefore find that the

informed that the court could proceeding directly to sentencing in both the plea form and
at the hearing.
8.
dialogue between the court and Wang establishes that the trial court sufficiently conveyed, and

Wang understood, that a guilty plea was a complete admission of guilt. Therefore, we do not

find that the trial court completely failed to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(b).

1. Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a)

{¶ 19} Wang also maintains that the trial court failed to comply with Crim.R.

11(C)(2)(a), which requires that the trial court “[d]etermin[e] that the defendant is making the

plea voluntarily, with understanding of the nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty

involved, and if applicable, that the defendant is not eligible for probation or for the imposition

of community control sanctions at the sentencing hearing.”

a. Maximum Prison Term

{¶ 20} First, Wang contends that the plea form erroneously informed him that a prison

term was not mandatory regarding the three counts of attempted murder and the three counts of

felonious assault. Wang claims that prison was mandatory as firearm specifications were

attached, citing to State v. Logan, 2025-Ohio-1772 and State v. Ridener, 2025-Ohio-2845 (6th

Dist.). Wang is correct that a prison term is mandatory for any underlying felony offense when

a defendant is found guilty of a corresponding firearm specification, Logan at ¶ 2, 25, and that

the mandatory nature of these sentences was not included in the plea form. Nonetheless, at the

plea hearing, the trial court made the following statement in which Wang was informed of that

these sentences were mandatory:

. . . On Counts 5, 6, and 7, attempted murder, all felonies of the first degree
and with specifications for firearm and forfeiture of a weapon, there’s a potential
mandatory minimum definite term of three to 11 years, up to 16-and-a-half years
as a maximum indefinite term on each charge. Each comes with a possible
$20,000 fine, two to five years of post-release control, and three years on each

9.
firearm specification. On Counts 8, 9, and 10, felonious assault, felonies of the
second degree, each of them come with a mandatory minimum definite term of
two to eight years, a maximum indefinite term of up to 12 years, up to a $15,000
fine, post-release control of 18 months to three years. 8, 9, and 10 also have a
specification for a firearm, and each of those specifications comes with three years
in prison. (Emphasis added.)

{¶ 21} Thus, any misconception Wang might have had based upon the plea form was

corrected in the plea hearing itself as the trial court properly informed him of the mandatory

nature of his sentence.

b. Post-Release Control

{¶ 22} Additionally, Wang alleges numerous errors regarding the information provided to

him regarding post-release control. Specifically, he claims: (1) that the plea form failed to

inform him that post-release control would be mandatory for the three counts of attempted

murder and the three counts of felonious assault, (2) although the plea form informed him that

“‘a period of supervision by the Adult Parole Authority after release from prison is mandatory

on some of the charges’ to which he pleaded, … it doesn’t identify for which charges, and then

erroneously informs Wang that he ‘will have five (5) years of control’ for ‘some of the

offenses,’” (3), although the plea form informed him that if he committed a new felony while on

post-release control, he could receive an additional consecutive sentence for the violation “of the

greater of one year or the time remaining on post[-]release control,” Wang was not informed “of

the ‘greater than one year or the time remaining on post[-]release control’ aspect of the

sentence” at the plea hearing, and (4) at the plea hearing, although Wang was informed that he

was subject to post-release control, he was not informed as to the mandatory or discretionary

nature of the periods of post-release control.

10.
{¶ 23} We note that Wang has alleged the plea form omitted certain information.

However, as discussed above, we look to the plea colloquy to see whether the trial court

complied with Crim.R. 11(C).

{¶ 24} At his plea hearing, Wang was informed that Counts 5, 6, and 7 came with “two to

five years of post-release control,” Counts 8, 9, and 10 came with “post-release control of 18

months to three years,” and Counts 11 and 12 came with “two years of post-release control.”

The court then had the following conversation with Wang:

THE COURT: … And you understand that if, after the service of
your period of incarceration, you are released from custody, you would be
on a period of post-release control?
INTERPRETER: Yes, I know.
THE COURT: And you would have a bunch of rules that you have
to follow on post-release control. You understand that?
THE INTERPRETER: Yes.
THE COURT: And if you violated once, you could be back in
prison up to nine months. And if you violated multiple times, you could be
back in prison up to 50 percent of your maximum term.
THE INTERPRETER: I understand.
THE COURT: If you committed a new felony while you are on
post-release control, do you understand that you could be punished for the
new offense, and more time could be added to your term in this case?
THE INTERPRETER: I understand.
THE COURT: The amount of time that could be imposed would be
one year or the time that’s remaining on your post-release control, and it
would have to be imposed consecutively to any new felony time. Do you
understand that?
THE INTERPRETER: I understand.

{¶ 25} Pursuant to R.C. 2967.28(B) and (C), Wang was subject to a minimum of two

years, up to a maximum of five years, of post-release control for Counts 5, 6, and 7, a minimum

of 18 months up to three years for Counts 8, 9, and 10, and up to two years of discretionary post-

release control for Counts 11 and 12. R.C. 2967.28(G)(1) states that “[i]f an offender is

11.
simultaneously subject to a period of parole under an indefinite or life sentence and a period of

post-release control, or is simultaneously subject to two periods of post-release control, the

period of supervision that expires last shall determine the length and form of supervision for all

the periods and the related sentences.” According to R.C. 2967.28(G)(1) then, the maximum

term of post-release control to which Wang would be subject is a minimum of two years up to a

maximum of five years. He was informed of the two-to-five-year term at the plea hearing.4

Wang disputes that he was made aware of the mandatory nature of the post-release control,

pointing to the trial court’s statement that “Each [of the three counts of attempted murder]

comes with a possible $20,000 fine, two to five years of post-release control, and three years on

each firearm specification.” Wang contends that the term “possible” applies to the term of post-

release control as well as the fine. However, we find it clear from the context of the sentence,

where possible is preceded by the word “a,” that “possible” references only the fine, and that he

was informed he would have “two to five years of post-release control.” The mandatory nature

of the post-release control is also made clear in the court’s subsequent question to Wang as to

whether he understood that, after incarceration, he “would be on a period of post-release

control.” (Emphasis added.) Therefore, we cannot say that the trial court completely failed to

comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) regarding the maximum term of Wang’s post-release control

or the mandatory or discretionary nature of that term.

{¶ 26} With regard to Wang’s argument that he wasn’t informed “of the ‘greater than one

year or the time remaining on post[-]release control’ aspect of the sentence, at the plea hearing

4 To the extent that the plea form improperly stated that Wang was subject to five years
of post-release control, the error was corrected at the plea hearing.
12.
he was asked if he understood that “[t]he amount of time that could be imposed would be one

year or the time that’s remaining on your post-release control, and it would have to be imposed

consecutively to any new felony time.” While the “greater than” aspect was not stated in the

hearing, we can look to the plea form to clear up any ambiguity as to whether Wang understood

which of the two timeframes would apply. See Williams, 2025-Ohio-2331, at ¶ 36 (6th Dist.).

The plea form includes the relevant “greater than” language. Therefore, we do not find a

complete failure to comply with this requirement.

c. Eligibility for Probation or Community Control

{¶ 27} Wang also contends that the trial court failed to orally inform him that he was

ineligible for probation or community control, whereas the plea form informed him “that he

could be eligible for ‘non-prison sanctions’ on ‘some of the offenses,’ but doesn’t say which

ones.”

{¶ 28} We do not find that Wang’s argument concerning the trial court’s alleged failure

to inform him that he was ineligible for probation or community control to be a complete failure

under Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a). While he was informed in the plea form that the court could

“impose non-prison sanctions” on “some of the charges,” based upon the circumstances of this

case, where he was pleading guilty to charges that resulted in mandatory and life sentences,

Wang was aware that he was going to serve actual incarceration. Previously, in cases where

defendants were aware that they were going to be incarcerated, courts have found substantial

compliance with the Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) requirement that they be informed that they were

ineligible for probation. See State v. Nero, 56 Ohio St.3d 106, syllabus (1990) (“Where the

circumstances indicate that the defendant knew he was ineligible for probation and was not

13.
prejudiced by the trial court’s failure to comply with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a), the trial court’s

acceptance of the defendant’s guilty plea to the nonprobationable crime of rape without

personally advising the defendant that he was not eligible for probation constitutes substantial

compliance with Crim.R. 11.”); State v. Hurst, 2001 WL 108761 (6th Dist. Feb. 9, 2001) (trial

court substantially complied with Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a) where “appellant was informed of the

maximum potential sentences he faced and was told several times that he was facing an actual

term of incarceration which would clearly preclude him from being placed on probation or

community control sanctions a[t] the time of sentencing.”). While it is not clear that the

“substantial compliance” standard has any application after Dangler, at a minimum, previous

caselaw finding “substantial compliance,” is relevant to show that there was not a complete

failure to meet a necessary Crim.R. 11(C)(2) notification. As such, based upon the

circumstances here, we cannot find that the trial court completely failed to comply with this

aspect of Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).

1. Failure to Establish Prejudice

{¶ 29} As Wang has only argued that the trial court failed to comply with the

nonconstitutional requirements of Crim.R. 11(C)(2), and as we have not found any of the

alleged failures to be complete, Wang was required to demonstrate prejudice. Wang has not

presented this court with any evidence, nor even made any argument, that he would not have

entered the plea had he been fully informed of the information he claims he was unaware.

{¶ 30} Therefore, Wang’s first assignment of error is found not well-taken.

14.
IV. Second Assignment of Error

A. Arguments

{¶ 31} Wang asserts that the trial court did not properly impose post-release control.

B. Standard of Review

{¶ 32} We review felony sentences under R.C. 2953.08(G)(2). State v. Purley, 2022-

Ohio-2524, ¶ 8 (6th Dist.). R.C. 2953.08(G)(2) allows an appellate court to increase, reduce, or

otherwise modify a sentence, or vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing if the court

clearly and convincingly finds that either of the following apply: (1) “the record does not

support the sentencing court’s findings under division (B) or (D) of section 2929.13, division

(B)(2)(e) or (C)(4) of section 2929.14, or division (I) of section 2929.20 of the Revised Code” or

(2) “the sentence is otherwise contrary to law.” Clear and convincing evidence is defined as

“‘that measure or degree of proof which is more than a mere “preponderance of the evidence,”

but not to the extent of such certainty as is required “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal

cases, and which will produce in the mind of the trier of facts a firm belief or conviction as to

the facts sought to be established.’” State v. Gwynne, 2023-Ohio-3851, ¶ 14, quoting Cross v.

Ledford, 161 Ohio St. 469 (1954), paragraph three of the syllabus.

C. Law

{¶ 33} A trial court is required to provide a defendant with notice of post-release control

at the sentencing hearing. State v. Bates, 2022-Ohio-475, ¶ 11, quoting State v. Jordan, 2004-

Ohio-6085, ¶ 23, overruled on other grounds by State v. Harper, 2020-Ohio-2913. Also see

R.C. 2929.19(B)(2)(d) and (e). This notice must include “the term of supervision, whether

15.
post[-]release control is discretionary or mandatory, and the consequences of violating post[-

]release control.” Bates at ¶ 11.

{¶ 34} A sentence is contrary to law if a defendant is not properly notified of post-release

control. State v. Humphries, 2025-Ohio-455, ¶ 33 (8th Dist.), quoting State v. Bolan, 2024-

Ohio-2640, ¶ 5 (8th Dist.). Moreover, “if a court improperly imposes post[-]release control on a

sentence imposed on or after July 11, 2006, it may correct the sentence in accordance with the

procedures set forth in R.C. 2929.191, which provides that a court must hold a hearing before

issuing the correction.” State v. Sprouse, 2023-Ohio-2983, ¶ 24 (6th Dist.), quoting State v.

Schleiger, 2014-Ohio-3970, ¶ 15.

D. Analysis

{¶ 35} Wang contends that there are numerous errors in the trial court’s post-release

control notifications. As we find one argument to be determinative, we begin there. Wang

insists that the post-release control term ordered by the trial court at the sentencing hearing was

incorrect. We agree.

{¶ 36} As discussed above, Wang was subject to a minimum of two years, up to a

maximum of five years, of post-release control. However, at the sentencing hearing the trial

court incorrectly informed him that he would be subject to a mandatory five-year term of post-

release control. As the trial court did not accurately notify Wang as to the post-release control

term to which he would be subject, the post-release control portion of his sentence is contrary to

law. We therefore find Wang’s second assignment of error well-taken. We further find Wang’s

remaining arguments pertaining to the imposition of post-release control to be moot.

16.
V. Conclusion

{¶ 37} The judgment of the Wood County Common Pleas Court is affirmed in part and

reversed in part. The portion of the judgment imposing post-release control is reversed and

vacated. The remaining portions of the judgment are affirmed. The case is remanded for the

limited purpose of properly imposing post-release control pursuant to R.C. 2929.191(C).

Pursuant to App.R. 24, the parties are ordered to evenly split the costs incurred on appeal.

Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.

Gene A. Zmuda, J
JUDGE

Myron C. Duhart, J
JUDGE

Charles E. Sulek, J
CONCUR. JUDGE

This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.

17.