Telecom Decision CRTC 2026-53

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Reference: Part 1 application posted on 22 August 2025

Gatineau, 27 March 2026

Public record: 8633-B186-202504381

Broadlytics Inc. – Application seeking clarification regarding SWIFT-funded projects under the wholesale high-speed access service framework

Summary

The Commission is working to increase competition while ensuring continued investments in high-quality networks.

In Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180, the Commission directed Canada’s largest telephone companies to provide competitors with workable wholesale access to their fibre networks.

In August 2025, Broadlytics Inc. (Broadlytics), a consulting agency based in St. Thomas, Ontario, filed an application requesting the Commission confirm that networks funded by Southwestern Integrated Fibre Technology (SWIFT) are subject to the Commission’s aggregated wholesale high-speed access requirements for fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP) facilities, as set out in Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180.

SWIFT is a not-for-profit corporation that operates in southwestern Ontario to promote private and public investment in broadband infrastructure. SWIFT is publicly funded and provides funding for telecommunications service providers (TSPs) to expand FTTP network coverage in underserved communities.

Broadlytics submitted that SWIFT and the TSPs that receive funding from its program (TSP recipients) should be subject to the requirements set out in Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180 because SWIFT is the majority owner of these facilities and its program is publicly funded.

The Commission received comments on Broadlytics’ application from a range of interveners, including large TSPs, competitors, and industry associations. All interveners submitted that Broadlytics’ application should be denied.

Upon review, the Commission finds that Bell Canada is the only TSP recipient that is subject to the Commission’s aggregated FTTP requirements over SWIFT-funded network facilities. The Commission also finds that Bell Canada is already meeting its obligations under Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180. Accordingly, based on the public record, the Commission denies the application.

A dissenting opinion by Commissioner Bram Abramson is attached to this decision.

Background

1. In Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180 (the Policy), the Commission took action to improve competition in Canada’s Internet market and ensure that Canadians benefit from affordable access to high-quality Internet services. The Policy delivered more choice to Canadians who want higher-speed Internet at lower prices by enabling competitors to use the fibre networks of the large telephone companies, also known as incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). Moreover, the Policy maintains incentives for companies to invest in high-quality networks.
2. In the Policy, the Commission directed Bell Canada, including Bell Aliant Regional Communications, Limited Partnership and Bell MTS Inc.; Saskatchewan Telecommunications; and TELUS Communications Inc. (TELUS) [collectively, the large ILECs] to offer aggregated wholesale high-speed access (HSA) services over fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP) facilities (aggregated FTTP services) in their incumbent serving territories throughout Canada by 13 February 2025 (the aggregated FTTP mandate). Footnote 1
3. In addition, the Policy exempted cable carriers from the requirement to offer aggregated FTTP services. Footnote 2 It also granted the large ILECs a five-year exemption from the requirement to offer aggregated FTTP services for any premises where the ILEC begins offering retail Internet services over FTTP for the first time on or after 13 August 2024. Footnote 3 The Policy indicated that disaggregated HSA services, including those offered over FTTP facilities, would remain mandated for the time being. Footnote 4
4. Southwestern Integrated Fibre Technology (SWIFT) is a not-for-profit corporation established by municipalities in southwestern Ontario to promote private and public investment in broadband infrastructure in that region. SWIFT is funded by its constituent municipalities and by the Government of Ontario and the Government of Canada. It has provided funding to various telecommunications service providers (TSPs) [TSP recipients], including Bell Canada; Brooke Telecom Co-operative Ltd.; Cogeco Connexion Inc.; EH!tel Networks Inc.; Execulink Telecom Inc.; GB Tel Inc.; Hay Communications Co-operative Ltd.; Huron Telecommunications Co-Operative Ltd.; Mornington Communications Co-operative Ltd.; North Frontenac Telephone Corporation Ltd.; Niagara Regional Broadband Network Ltd.; Quadro Communications Co-operative Inc.; Rogers Communications Canada Inc. (Rogers); Start.ca, a division of TELUS; TekSavvy Solutions Inc. (TekSavvy); Tuckersmith Communications Co-operative Ltd.; Vianet Inc.; Wightman Telecom Ltd.; and Xplore Inc. (Xplore).
5. Aside from Bell Canada, TSP recipients are either smaller competitors, incumbent cable carriers, or small incumbent local exchange carriers (ILECs). SWIFT funding has allowed TSP recipients to deploy and operate FTTP facilities to over 66,000 households and businesses in underserved communities throughout southwestern Ontario.
6. Under SWIFT funding agreements, SWIFT maintains a 51% equity interest in the network elements it funds for seven years after a project is completed. Once the seven-year period ends, the equity interest transfers to the TSP recipient that deployed and operates the network.
7. SWIFT funding agreements stipulate that TSP recipients must continue to uphold their existing regulatory obligations over any SWIFT-funded facilities, including those set out in the Policy.
8. SWIFT also requires that all TSP recipients allow wholesale interconnection with their SWIFT-funded facilities on a disaggregated basis, regardless of whether the Commission has previously required them to offer disaggregated FTTP services. This model allows competitors to interconnect with SWIFT-funded networks at 4,469 points of interconnection across southwestern Ontario.

Application

1. Broadlytics Inc. (Broadlytics), a consulting agency based in St. Thomas, Ontario, filed an application dated 18 August 2025 requesting that the Commission:

• confirm that TSP recipients are subject to the aggregated FTTP mandate established in the Policy;
• direct that SWIFT funding agreements require TSP recipients to offer aggregated FTTP services as well as disaggregated FTTP services, irrespective of the TSP recipient’s size;
• clarify that SWIFT’s 51% equity interest in the network elements it funds brings these networks under the Commission’s jurisdiction and subjects them to the aggregated FTTP mandate established in the Policy;
• prevent any public financial infrastructure asset transfer from SWIFT to TSP recipients until a permanent framework for a taxpayer-funded open access network is in place and until TSP recipients have demonstrated that they are offering end-to-end open access interconnection; and
• identify appropriate interconnection points throughout SWIFT-funded networks that are fair and equitable to competitors that intend to access these networks.
  1. Broadlytics submitted that SWIFT-funded networks, and the TSP recipients that operate them, should not be exempt from the Commission’s aggregated FTTP mandate set out in the Policy. It added that because SWIFT holds a majority ownership of these facilities, they are publicly owned and therefore fall within the scope of the mandate. Broadlytics further submitted that publicly funded and owned networks should serve the public interest. It added that mandated aggregated wholesale HSA services is an appropriate means to achieve this by increasing competition in the areas served.
  2. Broadlytics also submitted that allowing TSP recipients that operate SWIFT-funded networks to offer only disaggregated FTTP services would create an undue preference by shielding publicly funded carriers from the obligations imposed on the large ILECs through the Policy.
  3. The Commission received interventions from the Canadian Association of Wireless Internet Service Providers (CanWISP), Cogeco Communications Inc. (Cogeco), the Independent Telecommunications Providers Association (ITPA), Quebecor Media Inc. (Quebecor), Rogers, SWIFT, TekSavvy, and Xplore.

Positions of parties

1. All interveners submitted that Broadlytics’ application should be denied or dismissed. They broadly asserted that SWIFT and its contractual arrangements fall outside the jurisdiction of the Commission, and that the application shows a flawed understanding of the aggregated FTTP mandate set out in the Policy.
2. SWIFT submitted that, contrary to Broadlytics’ assertions, its funding agreements require TSP recipients to comply with the Commission’s applicable rules and regulations. SWIFT added that its disaggregated interconnection model does not preclude any of the TSP recipients that are subject to the Policy (i.e., Bell Canada) from offering aggregated FTTP services to wholesale customers. SWIFT indicated that Broadlytics’ proposed remedy, which involves preventing any asset transfer from SWIFT to TSP recipients, raises matters of contract and property law that are outside the jurisdiction of the Commission.
3. SWIFT asserted that it is only a financial investor for a limited, seven-year period and that it does not directly control, operate, or offer telecommunications services over the network facilities it owns.
4. Cogeco, Quebecor, and Rogers noted that FTTP facilities owned by incumbent cable carriers are exempt from the aggregated FTTP mandate set out in the Policy, and that they are compliant with the relevant SWIFT funding conditions.
5. Cogeco, Rogers, and TekSavvy submitted that ownership structure is not a determining factor for wholesale HSA regulatory obligations. The companies maintained that the Commission regulates telecommunications services, not financial relationships or equity interests held by third-party funding entities.
6. Cogeco, Rogers, and TekSavvy also noted that the issue of which networks should be subject to mandated aggregated FTTP access was considered in the proceeding Footnote 5 that led to the Policy. They added that the Commission decided not to make a distinction between publicly and privately funded projects when it set out the Policy’s wholesale obligations.
7. CanWISP, the ITPA, TekSavvy, and Xplore submitted that the Commission has not imposed either aggregated or disaggregated wholesale HSA services on small TSPs. They further claimed that imposing tariff-based obligations on small facilities-based TSPs would create disproportionate administrative and technical burdens.
8. Bell Canada submitted that both disaggregated and aggregated wholesale HSA services are available over the SWIFT-funded facilities it operates. It added that its funding agreement with SWIFT acknowledges that where the company is subject to the Commission’s regulations, it will comply with its obligations. Footnote 6
9. In its reply, Broadlytics reiterated that all TSP recipients should be subject to the aggregated FTTP mandate established in the Policy. Broadlytics submitted that because SWIFT owns facilities used to provide telecommunications services to the public and benefits from those operations, the Commission should require it to (i) register as a TSP, (ii) impose conditions of service to prevent undue preference, and (iii) mandate wholesale access to the facilities it owns if the Essentiality Test is met. Footnote 7

Commission’s analysis

1. The record of this proceeding does not demonstrate that any TSP recipient is non-compliant with the Policy, or that Commission intervention is required.
2. The Commission notes that Bell Canada is the only TSP recipient that is subject to the aggregated FTTP mandate established in the Policy. Bell Canada and SWIFT have both confirmed that, under their funding agreement, disaggregated and aggregated FTTP services are available over the SWIFT-funded facilities that Bell Canada operates, in accordance with Bell Canada’s wholesale HSA service tariffs.
3. The other TSP recipients are either (i) incumbent cable carriers that are exempt from the requirement to offer aggregated FTTP services or (ii) smaller competitors or small ILECs that are not subject to the Policy.
4. Given that the Commission grounds its authority to mandate wholesale services in subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act, it generally does not mandate access to services without applying the Essentiality Test. The Commission notes that the record of this proceeding does not provide a sufficient basis to reconsider the Commission’s application of the Essentiality Test or its determinations in the Policy.
5. With respect to Broadlytics’ other requests, they relate to the private contractual relationship between a provincial funder and TSP recipients. The Commission considers that these matters fall outside its jurisdiction.

Conclusion

1. In light of all of the above, the Commission denies Broadlytics’ application. Secretary General

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180, paragraph 68.

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Footnote 2 Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180, paragraphs 47 to 52.

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Footnote 3 Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180, paragraph 57.

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Footnote 4 Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-180, paragraph 72.

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Footnote 5 Telecom Notice of Consultation 2023-56.

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Footnote 6 While Bell Canada did not submit an intervention in response to Broadlytics’ application, it provided responses to the request for information issued by Commission staff.

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Footnote 7 The Commission typically relies on the Essentiality Test to determine whether wholesale measures are appropriate. This test assesses, among other things, whether competition will be lessened or prevented substantially in the relevant retail market if wholesale access is denied.

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Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Bram Abramson

1. Like the Eastern Ontario Regional Network and Northern Ontario’s Blue Sky Net, Ontario’s Southwestern Integrated Fibre Technology (SWIFT) catalyzes investment to redress coordination and scale-related market failures in rural and remote broadband deployment. SWIFT structures network procurement, matches it with public funding, and governs from a distance via contract conditions and limited-term equity participation.
2. What Broadlytics asks the Commission to do falls into two categories:

• In respect of SWIFT, that we “confirm” that beneficial public-sector ownership of SWIFT-funded networks subjects them to the Commission’s long-standing wholesale high-speed access (HSA) framework, Footnote 1 including aggregated fibre-to-the-premises (FTTP), Footnote 2 both before and after SWIFT’s limited-term participation falls away. Footnote 3
• In respect of wholesale HSA more broadly, that the Commission create a “permanent framework for a promised taxpayer-funded open access network,” including principles to “[d]etermine appropriate interconnection points through the network that are fair and equitable to parties who wish to access the network.” Footnote 4
  1. My Telecommunications Committee colleagues and I Footnote 5 are unanimous in declining the first set of proposed remedies. It is one thing to argue smaller subsidized networks ought to be made open access. It is another to suggest that our rules already require this. They do not. Since the introduction of what would become wholesale HSA on large incumbent local exchange carrier (large ILEC) Footnote 6 and cable carrier (together, large incumbent) networks, Footnote 7 that framework has consistently targeted a limited set of carriers. Variability has mostly concerned whether affiliated brands or operating companies fell within its scope. Footnote 8
  2. However, my colleagues and I diverge with respect to the second set of proposed remedies. My colleagues assert, with little elaboration, that the Commission “grounds its authority to mandate wholesale services in subsection 27(2) of the Telecommunications Act [the Act].” Footnote 9 That proposition is at best legally incomplete. It sidesteps a competition issue hiding in plain sight: market power is not the province of large incumbents alone.
  3. Where a non-market investor deploys capital into a broadband desert, it suggests a market whose structural conditions would not otherwise sustain a local provider. A network deployed under such conditions may reasonably be presumed, at least initially, to possess market power.
  4. That presumption does not automatically justify a prior constraint. Subsidized terrestrial broadband networks that are not large incumbents are often small, local, and subject to public-interest obligations tied to their funding. These factors may temper both the incentive and ability to exercise market power, including through supra-competitive pricing, so Broadlytics’ proposed remedy is likely too blunt. But declining to consider the issue at all does a disservice to the competition and affordability goals the Commission seeks to advance.

Where we’ve been

1. To situate the matter, consider four features of the broader regulatory landscape on which Broadlytics’ application, and my colleagues’ response to it, tread.
2. First, the Act anticipates monopoly. Its default is that every telecommunications service offered by a facilities-based carrier requires Commission review and sign-off, lest rates be too high. Footnote 10 The result of this precautionary principle is hundreds of pages of telephone-era ILEC tariffs which, perplexingly, are being modernized only through applications that percolate through the Commission one narrow proceeding at a time.
3. Second, faced in 1995 with impending competition from all directions, the Commission largely exempted competitors from that regulatory default through a single, decisive intervention. Telecom Decision 95-19 established what Commissioner Anderson and I have elsewhere described as the Commission’s “structural approach”. Across geographic and product markets, non-ILECs were defined as “non-dominant carriers”, in effect reversing the default. Footnote 11
4. The structural approach, though, only goes so far. To temper it where non-ILECs may in fact be dominant the Commission introduced, third, a market power approach that carves out specific markets for analysis at both the retail and upstream wholesale levels. Based on that analysis the Commission applies the minimum necessary regulatory intervention to constrain the exercise of market power. In practice, this has meant focusing on upstream wholesale regulation to lower entry barriers and discipline downstream market power. Grounded in the Essentiality Test, this approach gives effect to the Act’s framework for competition. Footnote 12
5. It is those foundational rules that Broadlytics invoked in asking the Commission to create a “permanent framework for a promised taxpayer-funded open access network,” including principles to “[d]etermine appropriate interconnection points through the network that are fair and equitable to parties who wish to access the network.” Footnote 13 Having been hurdled over entry barriers too insurmountable for any market participant to overcome unaided, subsidized networks may reasonably be presumed to possess market power untamed by “competition sufficient to protect the interests of users.” Footnote 14
6. Fourth, and separately from the continuing market power approach that acts as a rejoinder to the structural presumption, the Commission-led Broadband Fund program has developed a distinct approach to excluding supra-competitive pricing. Rather than mandate open access in the local network segment, the program adopted a suggestion from the Government of the Northwest Territories by “requir[ing] applicants to commit to providing retail broadband Internet access service at proposed prices that are no higher than those offered in non-funded areas where there is generally competition between major fixed facilities-based service providers, such as an ILEC and a cable company.”

To define the above-mentioned non-funded areas, the Commission will issue, in the application guide, a list of areas that could be used as a basis to compare proposed broadband Internet access service packages, by province and territory. [...] The Commission considers that this approach would (i) not discourage applicants from submitting project proposals to provide broadband Internet access services in rural and remote communities that are more costly to serve because they would have a relatively local comparative, and (ii) give some assurance that customers will receive equitable rates. Footnote 15
7. In doing so, the Commission declined expressly to address whether a subsidized network build into an unconnected area ought to attract a presumption of market power. Footnote 16 Building a more robust record to address the matter eight years later would not have constituted a review of the HSA panel’s 2024 or subsequent decision Footnote 17 nor, to any meaningful degree, prior Commission HSA determinations.

Where we ought to head

1. The Commission’s past HSA decisions reasonably defined the relevant geographic markets as the serving territories of large ILECs and large cable carriers. But they did not consider that other carriers might emerge as first movers within discrete portions of those territories. Since 2018, the funding environment for connectivity has changed considerably, with an influx of public funding from multiple orders of government. Those changes alter market structure. They cannot simply be assumed away. The Commission is the sector’s national coordinating agency, and must take notice of these changes’ consequences. Footnote 18
2. The HSA regime presumes a level of scale and sophistication smaller carriers may not possess. Imposing it without adjustment risks overburdening them or deterring participation in subsidy programs designed to address structural gaps.
3. I have elsewhere called for the Commission to take leadership in considering the consequences of uncoordinated funding programs which, while individually designed rationally, may collectively produce inefficient or unintended outcomes. Footnote 19 Declining again to review what sustainable, lightweight mechanisms have been adopted to constrain presumptive market power in various local subsidy programs does not, in my respectful view, serve the competition and affordability goals the majority affirms.
4. The record before us is insufficient to resolve these questions definitively. But Parliament has entrusted the Commission with mastery of its procedure precisely so that we can get to the bottom of matters raised in applications before us. That authority exists so the Commission can confront difficult questions, not defer them until a perfectly-framed application and perfectly-developed evidentiary record materializes before us.
5. Decisive and predictable action does not require hasty or ill-considered intervention. The Commission could have expanded the record by making subsidized non-incumbents parties to this proceeding and issuing requests for information. It could have initiated a follow-up proceeding or commissioned targeted research. Any of these paths would have let the Commission address the underlying question: how, in the absence of well-tempered market conditions, should affordability and competitive choice play out in subsidized local network footprints?
6. That question admits of more than one answer. Broadlytics’ approach would treat subsidized local networks as a distinct class subject to a rebuttable presumption of market power. Within that class, the Commission could expect carriers to choose at least one of several mechanisms:

a) a retail constraint model, following the Broadband Fund’s guidance;

b) a workable form of open access, with simplified interconnection requirements and cost-based rates derived through proxies; or

c) a functionally equivalent mechanism imposed by a non-market funder like SWIFT.
7. If open access were to be adopted, what principles should assist the Commission in determining what interconnection points are fair and equitable to parties who wish to access the network? In all cases, does the presumption of market power persist indefinitely, or should it fall away as subsidized networks grow further away from their initial funding?
8. By declining to engage with these questions, the Commission leaves unresolved a central tension. Non-market investment expands access. The regulatory framework is meant to ensure access translates into affordability and competitive choice. Without guidance, that translation cannot be taken for granted, and parties like Broadlytics will continue to be confused about where one stops and the other begins.
9. That tension will not resolve itself. As more subsidized networks become more integral to local connectivity, often within a cacophony of funding schemes and contractual conditions, failing to consider a principled, lightweight approach to their presumptive market power will become more consequential. Broadlytics’ application underscored those consequences.
10. I would have taken up the second branch of Broadlytics’ request, not by granting the remedies sought, but by initiating a structured inquiry into the regulatory treatment of subsidized access networks, including appropriate interconnection and access principles. The majority instead defers. That approach risks drip regulation and unduly delayed decision-making. I respectfully dissent.

Related documents

• Bell Canada – Addition of exchanges to Service Provided in Out-of-Footprint Territory, Telecom Order CRTC 2025-292, 13 November 2025
• Northwestel Inc. – Tariff Notice 1241 – Addition of Speed Option for Special Assembly #4 Layer 3 IP/VPN Service, Telecom Order CRTC 2025-159, 27 June 2025
• Bell Canada – Tariff Notice 7710 – Service Provided in Out-of-Footprint Territory, Telecom Order CRTC 2025-115, 21 May 2025
• Telecommunications in the Far North, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2025-9, 16 January 2025
• Broadband Fund policy review – New policy for funding capital projects, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2024-328, 12 December 2024
• Bell Canada – Tariff Notice 7692 – Introduction of Service Provided in Out-of-Footprint Territory, Telecom Order CRTC 2024-214, 20 September 2024
• Competition in Canada’s Internet services markets, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2024-180, 13 August 2024
• Call for comments – Broadband Fund policy review, Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2023-89, 23 March 2023, as amended by Telecom Notices of Consultation CRTC 2023-89-1, 17 April 2023, and 2023-89-2, 25 July 2024
• Notice of hearing – Review of the wholesale high-speed access service framework, Telecom Notice of Consultation CRTC 2023-56, 8 March 2023, as amended by Telecom Notices of Consultation CRTC 2023-56-1, 11 May 2023; 2023-56-2, 4 July 2023; 2023-56-3, 6 November 2023; and 2023-56-4, 8 April 2024
• Development of the Commission’s Broadband Fund, Telecom Regulatory Policy CRTC 2018-377, 27 September 2018
• Digital subscriber line service providers' access approved for unbundled loops and co-location, Order CRTC 2000-983, 27 October 2000
• Regulation under the Telecommunications Act of cable carriers’ access services, Telecom Decision CRTC 99-8, 6 July 1999
• Regulation under the Telecommunications Act of certain telecommunications services offered by “broadcast carriers”, Telecom Decision CRTC 98-9, 9 July 1998
• Co-location, Telecom Decision CRTC 97-15, 16 June 1997
• Local competition, Telecom Decision CRTC 97-8, 1 May 1997
• Forbearance—services provided by non-dominant carriers, Telecom Decision CRTC 95-19, 8 September 1995

Footnotes

Footnote 1 Broadlytics Part 1 application, 18 August 2025, section 6, item (c).

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Footnote 2 Broadlytics application, section 6, items (a) and (b).

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Footnote 3 Broadlytics application, section 6, item (d), first sentence.

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Footnote 4 Broadlytics application, section 6, item (d), final sentence, and item (e).

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Footnote 5 Unusually, this wholesale HSA matter is delegated to the Telecommunications Committee rather than to the continuing panel first struck to hear the proceeding initiated by Telecom Notice of Consultation 2023-56, as amended, and then the various subsequent related proceedings that have ensued. Like a panel, to which the delegation of telecom matters is described in Shoan v. Canada [Attorney General], 2016 FCA 261, para 6, the Telecommunications Committee makes decisions on behalf of the Commission: Telecommunications Committee, By-Law No. 10 (CRTC), paragraph (e) (“[a]ny act or thing done by the Telecommunications Committee shall be deemed to be an act or thing done by the members […]”), pursuant to paragraph 11(1)(b) and subsection 12(3) of the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission Act (duties delegated to standing committees by by-law).

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Footnote 6 Telecom Decisions 97-8 and 97-15; Telecom Order 2000-983.

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Footnote 7 Telecom Decisions 98-9 and 99-8.

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Footnote 8 See, e.g., dissents to Telecom Orders 2024-214 and 2025-115 (Télébec), Telecom Regulatory Policy 2025-9 (Northwestel), and Telecom Order 2025-292 (NorthernTel).

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Footnote 9 Majority decision, paragraph 25 (above).

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Footnote 10 The Act, section 25 and subsection 27(1). One might wonder why, if Commission oversight is required to remedy the presence of market power and corresponding absence of vigorous competition, the same provisions do not task us in certain terms to ensure terms and conditions are just and reasonable, too—even if such a duty may reasonably be implied, as suggested by Recommendation 31 and its accompanying text in Canada’s Communications Future: Time to Act (Final Report of the Broadcasting and Telecommunications Legislative Review, January 2020).

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Footnote 11 Telecom Decision 95-19; dissent to Telecom Order 2025-159.

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Footnote 12 The Act, subsection 34(2); Telecom Decision 2008-17, paragraphs 36 to 47. As opposed to the predicate element, which is the Act’s subsection 27(2) authority to impose particular forms of remedy.

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Footnote 13 Broadlytics application, section 6, item (d), final sentence, and item (e).

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Footnote 14 The Act, subsection 34(2).

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Footnote 15 Telecom Regulatory Policy 2018-377, paragraphs 211 and 212. See also paragraphs 191 to 193 (declining to mandate open access in the access segment), and 210 and 212 (retail constraint model).

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Footnote 16 Telecom Regulatory Policy 2018-377, paragraph 192.

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Footnote 17 On behalf of the Commission: note 5, above.

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Footnote 18 Telecom Notice of Consultation 2023-89, paragraph 7.

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Footnote 19 Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Bram Abramson to Telecom Regulatory Policy 2024-328, paragraphs 45 to 46.

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Date modified:

2026-03-27