Williams v. Warden - Habeas Corpus Drug Offense Sentencing

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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Cameron D. Williams v. Shelbie Smith, Warden, Belmont Correctional Institution

District Court, S.D. Ohio

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:25-cv-00283

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (36)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (50.8K)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
EASTERN DIVISION AT COLUMBUS

CAMERON D. WILLIAMS,

Petitioner, : Case No. 2:25-cv-00283
- vs - Chief Judge Sarah D. Morrison
Magistrate Judge Michael R. Merz

SHELBIE SMITH, WARDEN,
Belmont Correctional Institution,

:
Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

This habeas corpus case under 28 U.S.C. §2254 is brought pro se by Petitioner Cameron
Williams to obtain relief from his conviction in the Common Pleas Court of Muskingum County,
Ohio, on drug-related offenses. The case is ripe for decision on the Petition (ECF No. 1), the State
Court Record (ECF No. 8), the Warden’s Return of Writ (ECF No. 9), and Petitioner’s Traverse
(ECF No. 12). The Magistrate Judge reference of the case was recently transferred to the
undersigned to help balance the Magistrate Judge workload in the District (ECF No. 13).

Litigation History

On April 26, 2023, a Muskingum County Grand Jury indicted Williams on one count of
possession of a fentanyl-related compound in violation of Ohio Revised Code § 2925.11(A) and
Ohio Revised Code § 2925.11(C)(11)(b) and one count of tampering with evidence in violation of
Ohio Revised Code § 2921.12(A), (1), (2), and R.C. 2921.12(B)(Indictment, State Court Record,
ECF No. 8, Ex. 1). Having originally pleaded not guilty, Petitioner changed his plea to guilty on
both counts. Id. at Ex. 4. The trial court sentenced Williams to fifty-four months imprisonment
and to be consecutively imprisoned for the remaining term of his violated post-release control. Id.
at Ex. 6.

Williams appealed to the Ohio Fifth District Court of Appeals which affirmed (Opinion,
State Court Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 10). The Ohio Supreme Court declined to exercise jurisdiction
over a subsequent appeal. Id. at Ex. 13. Petitioner filed his Petition in this case on March 13, 2025,
by mailing it to the Court on that date. He pleads the following grounds for relief:
Ground One: The court of appeals adjudication of the
proportionality of sentence claim amounted to an arbitrary or abuse
of discretion, resulting in a decision that is contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law; and
resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented.

Supporting Facts: The Court of Appeals decision amounted to an
arbitrary or capricious decision as his sentence violates the United
States Constitutional standards for proportionate sentences, in that
the sentence imposed is grossly disproportionate to the crime and
offender.

Ground Two: The proportionality of the sentence was inconsistent
with the principles set forth in O.R.C. 2929.11 and factors to be
considered in O.R.C. 2929.12

Supporting Facts: The sentence is disproportionate to the
seriousness of the offense and that the trial court erred in ordering
consecutive sentences.

Ground Three: The trial court’s decision to impose consecutive
sentences on counts 1-2 because the consecutive sentences are in
contravention of the sentencing statutes.

Supporting Facts: The trial court was not authorized to order his
sentence to be served consecutively.
(Petition, ECF No. 1).
Analysis

Ground One: Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Sentence Disproportionate to Offense and
Offender

In his First Ground for Relief, Williams contends he is suffering cruel and unusual
punishment because his sentence is disproportionate to his crime.
Williams’ First Assignment of Error on Direct Appeal was
{¶14} "I. THE PROPORTIONALITY OF THE SENTENCE WAS
INCONSISTENT WITH THE PRINCIPLES SET FORTH IN
O.R.C. 2929.11 AND FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN
O.R.C. 2929.12."

The Fifth District considered Williams’ two assignments of error together and wrote:
{¶16} Appellant's two assignments of error are related and will be
considered together. He argues his sentence is disproportionate to
the seriousness of the offenses and that the trial court erred in
ordering consecutive sentences. We disagree.

{¶17} A court reviewing a criminal sentence is required by R.C.
2953.0B(F) to review the entire trial court record, including any oral
or written statements and presentence investigation reports. R.C.
2953.08(F)(1) through (4). We review felony sentences using the
standard of review set forth in R.C. 2953.08. State v. Marcum, 146
Ohio St.3d 516, 2016-Ohio-1002, 59 N.E.3d 1231, ¶22. R.C.
2953.08(G)(2) provides we may either increase, reduce, modify, or
vacate a sentence and remand for resentencing where we clearly and
convincingly find that either the record does not support the
sentencing court's findings under R.C. 2929.13(8) or (D),
2929.14(8)(2)(e) or (C)(4), or 2929.20(1), or the sentence is
otherwise contrary to law. See, a/so, State v. Bonnell, 140 Ohio St.3d
209, 2014-Ohio-3177, 16 N.E.2d 659, ¶ 28.
Maximum sentence

{¶18} A trial court's imposition of a maximum prison term for a
felony conviction is not contrary to law if the sentence is within the
statutory range for the offense, and the court considers both the
purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C.
2929.12. State v. Carbaugh, 5th Dist. No. CT2022-0050, 2023-
Ohio-1269, 213 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 26, internal citations omitted.
"[N]either R.C. 2929.11 nor 2929.12 require [the] court to make any
specific factual findings on the record." State v. Jones, 163 Ohio
St.3d 242, 2020-Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649, ¶ 20, citing State v.
Wilson, 129 Ohio St.3d 214, 2011-Ohio-2669, 951 N.E.2d 381, ¶
31, and State v. Arnett, 88 Ohio St.3d 208, 215, 724 N.E.2d 793 (2000).

{¶19} In State v. Bryant, the Court clarified,

The narrow holding in Jones [163 Ohio St.3d 242, 2020-
Ohio-6729, 169 N.E.3d 649 ] is that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)
does not allow an appellate court to modify or vacate a
sentence based on its view that the sentence is not
supported by the record under R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12.
See Jones at ¶ 31, 39. Nothing about that holding should
be construed as prohibiting appellate review of a sentence
when the claim is that the sentence was improperly
imposed based on impermissible considerations-Le.,
considerations that fall outside those that are contained in
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Indeed, in Jones, this court
made clear that R.C. 2953.08(G)(2)(b) permits appellate
courts to reverse or modify sentencing decisions that are "
'otherwise contrary to law.' " Jones at ,r 32, quoting R.C.
2953.08(G)(2)(b). This court also recognized that
"otherwise contrary to law" means " 'in violation of statute
or legal regulations at a given time.' " Id. at ¶ 34 quoting
Black's Law Dictionary 328 (6th Ed.1990).

Accordingly, when a trial court imposes a sentence based
on factors or considerations that are extraneous to those
that are permitted by R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that
sentence is contrary to law. Claims that raise these types of
issues are therefore reviewable.

State v. Bryant, 168 Ohio St.3d 250, 2022-Ohio-1878, 198 N.E.3d
68,¶ 22.
{¶20} In the instant case, on the record at the sentencing hearing,
the trial court noted appellant was released from prison two months
before he was found with fentanyl. Appellant's criminal history was
replete with failures to complete post-release control and probation
orders. He has prior convictions for aggravated drug trafficking and
trafficking fentanyl, along with having a weapon while under
disability. Appellant was convicted of escape and possession of
heroin. Upon judicial release from prison in those cases, he violated
probation by failing to complete counseling. Appellant admitted on
the record he's never completed judicial release requirements
because he's always "caught a new case" while on probation from a
prior case. T. 11. Appellant agreed with the trial court that while on
probation from numerous felonies, he continued to commit new
felonies. T. 13. Appellant claimed to be sober but admitted using
drugs in prison to "help [him] get through the time." T. 13. The
offenses in the instant case were committed while appellant was on
probation in Summit County, and he claimed he thought he bought
cocaine but someone gave him fentanyl. The trial court further noted
appellant's numerous write-ups in prison for drug use.

{¶21} Appellant argues generally that the trial court failed to
recognize he had "turned a corner" in his life and was living lawfully
and productively, an assertion belied by the fact that he admittedly
bought fentanyl two months after release from prison. We can
discern from the record that the trial court considered the sentencing
factors in R.C. 2929.11 and R.C. 2929.12. Appellant fails to point
to any factors or considerations extraneous to those permitted by
R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, that would establish the sentence is
contrary to law.

{¶ 22} We conclude that the trial court did not commit error when
it sentenced appellant to the maximum sentences. Upon review, we
find that the trial court's sentencing on the charges complies with
applicable rules and sentencing statutes. While appellant may
disagree with the weight given to these factors by the trial judge, his
sentence was within the applicable statutory range and therefore, we
have no basis for concluding that it is contrary to law. Appellant has
not demonstrated that the trial court imposed the sentence based on
impermissible considerations-i.e., considerations that fall outside
those that are contained in R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12. Carbaugh,
supra, 2023-Ohio-1269, 213 N.E.3d 180, ¶ 29 (5th Dist.).

State v. Williams, supra.

As pleaded here, Ground One sets forth a claim cognizable in habeas corpus, to wit, that
Petitiomner’s sentence amounts to cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, applicable to the States by incorporation in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). But before a constitutional claim
can be presented in habeas corpus, it must have been fairly presented to a complete round of State
court consideration. O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 846-7 (1999).

A claim is fairly presented if the petitioner
(1) relied upon federal cases employing constitutional analysis; (2)
relied upon state cases employing federal constitutional
analysis; (3) phrased the claim in terms of constitutional law or
in terms sufficiently particular to allege a denial of a specific
constitutional right; or (4) alleged facts well within the
mainstream of constitutional law.

Hand v. Houk, 871 F.3d 390, 418 (6th Cir. 2017). In his brief on appeal, Williams phrased his
First Assignment of Error purely in terms of Ohio sentencing statutes; he neither phrased the claim
in constitutional terms, nor cited any federal case law in support (Appellant’s Brief, State Court
Record, ECF No. 8, Ex. 8, PageID 56-57). Nor did the Fifth District cite any Supreme Court
precedent or phrase its decision in constitutional terms.
Because Williams did not fairly present his disproportionate sentencing claim to the Ohio
courts as a federal constitutional claim, it is procedurally defaulted and Williams has offered no
excusing cause and prejudice. Ground One should be dismissed as procedurally defaulted.
Alternatively, Ground One is without merit.
The Supreme Court has applied a proportionality principle to Eighth Amendment claims
about noncapital sentences.
The Eighth Amendment proportionality principle also applies to
noncapital sentences. In Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 63 L. Ed.
2d 382, 100 S. Ct. 1133 (1980), we acknowledged the existence of
the proportionality rule for both capital and noncapital cases, id., at
271-274, and n. 11, but we refused to strike down a sentence of life
imprisonment, with possibility of parole, for recidivism based on
three underlying felonies. In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374, 70
L. Ed. 2d 556, 102 S. Ct. 703, and n. 3 (1982), we recognized the
possibility of proportionality review but held it inapplicable to a 40-
year prison sentence for possession with intent to distribute nine
ounces of marijuana. Our most recent decision discussing the
subject is Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637, 103 S. Ct.
3001 (1983). There we held that a sentence of life imprisonment
without possibility of parole violated the Eighth Amendment
because it was "grossly disproportionate" to the crime of recidivism
based on seven underlying nonviolent felonies. The dissent in Solem
disagreed with the Court's application of the proportionality
principle but observed that in extreme cases it could apply to
invalidate a punishment for a term of years. Id., at 280, n. 3. See also
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 685, 57 L. Ed. 2d 522, 98 S. Ct. 2565 (1978) (dicta); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 667, 51 L. Ed. 2d
711, 97 S. Ct. 1401 (1977) (dicta).

Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 997-998 (1991). The Sixth Circuit “adheres to the ‘narrow
proportionality principle’ for evaluating Eighth Amendment claims articulated in Harmelin.”
United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017), citing United States v. Graham, 622 F.3d
445, 452 (6th Cir. 2010); United States v. Hill, 30 F.3d 48, 50-51 (6th Cir. 1994).
“One governing legal principle emerges as "clearly established" under § 2254(d)(1): A
gross disproportionality principle is applicable to sentences for terms of years.” Lockyer v.
Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 72 (2003).
The Court's cases addressing the proportionality of sentences fall
within two general classifications. The first involves challenges to
the length of term-of-years sentences given all the circumstances in
a particular case. The second comprises cases in which the Court
implements the proportionality standard by certain categorical
restrictions on the death penalty.

In the first classification the Court considers all of the circumstances
of the case to determine whether the sentence is unconstitutionally
excessive. Under this approach, the Court has held unconstitutional
a life without parole sentence for the defendant's seventh nonviolent
felony, the crime of passing a worthless check. Solem v. Helm, 463
U.S. 277, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983). In other cases,
however, it has been difficult for the challenger to establish a lack
of proportionality. A leading case is Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S.
957, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (1991), in which the
offender was sentenced under state law to life without parole for
possessing a large quantity of cocaine. A closely divided Court
upheld the sentence. The controlling opinion concluded that the
Eighth Amendment contains a “narrow proportionality principle,”
that “does not require strict proportionality between crime and
sentence” but rather “forbids only extreme sentences that are
'grossly disproportionate' to the crime.” Id., at 997, 1000-1001, 111
S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (Kennedy J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Again closely divided, the Court rejected
a challenge to a sentence of 25 years to life for the theft of a few golf
clubs under California's so-called three-strikes recidivist sentencing
scheme. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 123 S. Ct. 1179, 155 L.
Ed. 2d 108 (2003); see also Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 123
S. Ct. 1166, 155 L. Ed. 2d 144 (2003). The Court has also upheld a
sentence of life with the possibility of parole for a defendant's third
nonviolent felony, the crime of obtaining money by false pretenses,
Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S. Ct. 1133, 63 L. Ed. 2d 382 (1980), and a sentence of forty years for possession of marijuana
with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, Hutto v.
Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 102 S. Ct. 703, 70 L. Ed. 2d 556 (1982) (per
curiam).

The controlling opinion in Harmelin explained its approach for
determining whether a sentence for a term of years is grossly
disproportionate for a particular defendant's crime. A court must
begin by comparing the gravity of the offense and the severity of the
sentence. 501 U.S., at 1005, 111 S. Ct. 2680, 115 L. Ed. 2d 836 (opinion of Kennedy J.). “[I]n the rare case in which [this] threshold
comparison . . . leads to an inference of gross disproportionality” the
court should then compare the defendant's sentence with the
sentences received by other offenders in the same jurisdiction and
with the sentences imposed for the same crime in other jurisdictions. Ibid. If this comparative analysis “validate[s] an initial judgment
that [the] sentence is grossly disproportionate,” the sentence is cruel
and unusual. Ibid. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59-60 (2010).
The Fifth District did not expressly engage in the weighing process outlined in Graham.
Instead, it found the sentence imposed was within the range allowed by Ohio statute and the trial
court had considered “both the purposes and principles of felony sentencing set forth in R.C.
2929.11 and the seriousness and recidivism factors set forth in R.C. 2929.12.” Williams, supra, at
¶ 18.
Ohio Revised Code § 2929.11 provides:
(A) A court that sentences an offender for a felony shall be guided
by the overriding purposes of felony sentencing. The overriding
purposes of felony sentencing are to protect the public from
future crime by the offender and others, to punish the offender,
and to promote the effective rehabilitation of the offender using
the minimum sanctions that the court determines accomplish
those purposes without imposing an unnecessary burden on
state or local government resources. To achieve those purposes,
the sentencing court shall consider the need for incapacitating
the offender, deterring the offender and others from future
crime, rehabilitating the offender, and making restitution to the
victim of the offense, the public, or both.

(B) A sentence imposed for a felony shall be reasonably calculated
to achieve the three overriding purposes of felony sentencing set
forth in division (A) of this section, commensurate with and not
demeaning to the seriousness of the offender's conduct and its
impact upon the victim, and consistent with sentences imposed
for similar crimes committed by similar offenders.

(C) A court that imposes a sentence upon an offender for a felony
shall not base the sentence upon the race, ethnic background,
gender, or religion of the offender.

Ohio Revised Code § 2929.12 provides:
(A) Unless otherwise required by section 2929.13 or 2929.14 of
the Revised Code, a court that imposes a sentence under this
chapter upon an offender for a felony has discretion to determine
the most effective way to comply with the purposes and
principles of sentencing set forth in section 2929.11 of
the Revised Code. In exercising that discretion, the court shall
consider the factors set forth in divisions (B) and (C) of this
section relating to the seriousness of the conduct, the factors
provided in divisions (D) and (E) of this section relating to the
likelihood of the offender's recidivism, the factors set forth in
division (F) of this section pertaining to the offender's service in
the armed forces of the United States, and the factors set forth
in division (G) of this section relating to Alford pleas and, in
addition, may consider any other factors that are relevant to
achieving those purposes and principles of sentencing.

(B) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that
apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any
other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct
is more serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:

(1) The physical or mental injury suffered by the victim of
the offense due to the conduct of the offender was
exacerbated because of the physical or mental condition or
age of the victim.

(2) The victim of the offense suffered serious physical,
psychological, or economic harm, including serious
physical harm the victim caused to the victim's self, as a
result of the offense.

(3) The victim died by suicide as a result of the offense.

(4) The offender held a public office or position of trust in
the community, and the offense related to that office or
position.

(5) The offender's occupation, elected office, or profession
obliged the offender to prevent the offense or bring others
committing it to justice.

(6) The offender's professional reputation or occupation,
elected office, or profession was used to facilitate the
offense or is likely to influence the future conduct of others.

(7) The offender's relationship with the victim facilitated
the offense.

(8) The offender committed the offense for hire or as a part
of an organized criminal activity.

(9) In committing the offense, the offender was motivated
by prejudice based on race, ethnic background, gender,
sexual orientation, or religion.

(10) If the offense is a violation of section 2919.25 or a
violation of section 2903.11, 2903.12, or
2903.13 involving a person who was a family or household
member at the time of the violation, the offender
committed the offense in the vicinity of one or more
children who are not victims of the offense, and the
offender or the victim of the offense is a parent, guardian,
custodian, or person in loco parentis of one or more of
those children.

(C) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that
apply regarding the offender, the offense, or the victim, and any
other relevant factors, as indicating that the offender's conduct
is less serious than conduct normally constituting the offense:

(1) The victim induced or facilitated the offense.

(2) In committing the offense, the offender acted under strong
provocation.

(3) In committing the offense, the offender did not cause or
expect to cause physical harm to any person or property.

(4) There are substantial grounds to mitigate the offender's
conduct, although the grounds are not enough to constitute a
defense.

(D) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that
apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as
factors indicating that the offender is likely to commit future
crimes:

(1) At the time of committing the offense, the offender was under
release from confinement before trial or sentencing; was under
a sanction imposed pursuant to section 2929.16, 2929.17,
or 2929.18 of the Revised Code; was under post-release control
pursuant to section 2967.28 or any other provision of
the Revised Code for an earlier offense or had been unfavorably
terminated from post-release control for a prior offense pursuant
to division (B) of section 2967.16 or section 2929.141 of
the Revised Code; was under transitional control in connection
with a prior offense; or had absconded from the offender's
approved community placement resulting in the offender's
removal from the transitional control program under section
2967.26 of the Revised Code.

(2) The offender previously was adjudicated a delinquent child
pursuant to Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January
1, 2002, or pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, or
the offender has a history of criminal convictions.
(3) The offender has not been rehabilitated to a satisfactory degree
after previously being adjudicated a delinquent child pursuant to
Chapter 2151. of the Revised Code prior to January 1, 2002, or
pursuant to Chapter 2152. of the Revised Code, or the offender
has not responded favorably to sanctions previously imposed for
criminal convictions.

(4) The offender has demonstrated a pattern of drug or alcohol abuse
that is related to the offense, and the offender refuses to
acknowledge that the offender has demonstrated that pattern, or
the offender refuses treatment for the drug or alcohol abuse.

(5) The offender shows no genuine remorse for the offense.

(E) The sentencing court shall consider all of the following that
apply regarding the offender, and any other relevant factors, as
factors indicating that the offender is not likely to commit future
crimes:

(1) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not
been adjudicated a delinquent child.

(2) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had not
been convicted of or pleaded guilty to a criminal
offense.

(3) Prior to committing the offense, the offender had led a
law-abiding life for a significant number of years.

(4) The offense was committed under circumstances not
likely to recur.

(5) Except as provided in division (G) of this section, the
offender shows genuine remorse for the offense.

(F) The sentencing court shall consider the offender's military
service record and whether the offender has an emotional,
mental, or physical condition that is traceable to the offender's
service in the armed forces of the United States and that was a
contributing factor in the offender's commission of the offense
or offenses.

(G) If the offender enters an Alford plea, the sentencing court shall
not consider whether the offender showed genuine remorse for
the offense.
The Fifth District found that the appellate record supported the following findings
regarding sentencing:
{¶7} Appellant appeared for sentencing on September 18, 2023. On
the record and in the sentencing entry, the trial court noted appellant
had a lengthy criminal history; the instant offenses were committed
shortly after appellant was released from prison and while he was
on post-release control; appellant had multiple write-ups while in
prison; and appellant was historically unsuccessful on probation,
judicial release, and post-release control. The trial court imposed a
prison term of 18 months upon Count I and 36 months upon Count
II, ordering the terms to be served consecutively.

{¶8} The trial court terminated appellant's post-release control on
three Summit County cases and imposed the remaining time on
those terms to be served in prison, consecutive to the 54-month term
in the instant case.

{¶9} The trial court found the imposition of consecutive sentences
to be necessary to protect the public from future crime or to punish
appellant, that consecutive sentences are not disproportionate to the
seriousness of appellant's conduct, and to the danger appellant poses
to the public.

{¶10} The trial court further found appellant's history of criminal
conduct demonstrates that consecutive sentences are necessary to
protect the public from future crime by appellant.

State v. Williams, supra.

Williams makes the conclusory claim that the Fifth District misapplied the gross
disproportionality principle derived from Supreme Court precedent, but he does not say how he
reaches that conclusion. He does not offer any of the analysis called for by Graham, to wit,
sentences received by others in Ohio or other jurisdictions for like or similar crimes. He was
sentenced for two separate crimes committed on the same occasion. The drug offense to which
Williams pleaded guilty involved more than ten but less than fifty unit doses of a fentanyl-related
compound. Ohio Revised Code § 2925.11(C)(11)(b). The seized drugs weighed 4.2 grams. The
Ohio Department of Health reports 4, 452 drug overdose deaths in 2023 with 63.4% attributed to
fentanyl1. Eighteen months is therefore not grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the drug
possession conviction. Nor is thirty-six months grossly disproportionate for the tampering with
evidence conviction, given that the drugs were recovered from an evident attempt to dispose of
them. In Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (1982), the Supreme Court upheld a sentence of forty years

for possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and distribution of marijuana, conduct which
is now lawful in some States.
Nor does Williams offer any analysis of how the particular characteristics of an offender
figure into the disproportionality calculation. Here the Ohio court found Williams had a long
criminal record including prior drug and firearm offenses, a history of drug use in prison, recent
release on post-release control, the conditions of which he was obviously violating when arrested,
and an apparently cavalier attitude about drug possession, having admitted the presence of
marijuana in the stopped vehicle. He claimed the trial judge did not consider that he had recently
“turned a corner,” but he gave no proof of that and in fact committed this offense two months after

his release from prison.
In sum, Williams has failed to show that the Fifth District’s decision is in any way an
unreasonable application of relevant Supreme Court precedent.
Beginning at page fourteen of his Traverse, Williams makes an entirely new claim
The Court Of Appeals Violated Petitioner's Constitutional Right To
Due Process And Equal Protection Of The Law Where It Treated
Petitioner Differently From Others Similar Situated, And Failed To
Apply The Law Equally In Review Of The Allied Offense Of
Similar Import Issue, Thereby Treating Him Differently And
Violating The Equal Protection Clause Of The Fourteenth
Amendment To The United States Constitution.

1 https://odh.ohio.gov, visited February 26, 2026.
(ECF No. 12, PageID 195). The Court declines to consider this Equal Protection claim because it
is not part of the Petition and new claims may not be introduced in a traverse. A district court may
decline to review a claim a petitioner raises for the first time in his traverse or reply. Jalowiec v.
Bradshaw, 657 F.3d 293 (6th Cir. 2011), citing Tyler v. Mitchell, 416 F.3d 500, 504 (6th Cir. 2005).
Petitioner also makes a new claim under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000):

Petitioner asserts that the trial court used facts not found by a jury to
justify imposing consecutive sentence, in violation of clearly
established United States Supreme Court law as set forth in Blakely
v. Washington.

(Traverse, ECF No. 12, PageID 196). The Court declines to reach that claim for the same reason
given above as to the Equal Protection claim. The claim is without merit as well, because there
was no sentence enhancement fact in the case which had to be found by a jury under Apprendi or
Blakely.

Ground Two: Sentence Disproportionate Under Ohio Law
In his Second Ground for Relief, Williams asserted that the Ohio courts misapplied the
proportionality sentencing factors in Ohio Revised Code § 2929.11 and § 2929.12. Williams does
not argue this claim separately from his First Ground for Relief.
Ground Two is not cognizable in federal habeas corpus because it raises only a question of
state law. Federal habeas corpus is available only to correct federal constitutional violations. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (a); Wilson v. Corcoran, 562 U.S. 1 (2010); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209 (1982), Barclay v. Florida, 463 U.S. 939 (1983). "[I]t is
not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state court determinations on state law
questions. In conducting habeas review, a federal court is limited to deciding whether a conviction
violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62,
67-68 (1991); see also Elmendorf v. Taylor, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 152, 160 (1825)(Marshall C. J.);
Bickham v. Winn, 888 F.3d 248 (6th Cir. Apr. 23, 2018)(Thapar, J. concurring). Furthermore, the
Fifth District Court of Appeals considered this precise question and found no violation of those
two statutes. Its conclusions are binding on this Court. Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74 (2005).

Ground Three: Improper Imposition of Consecutive Sentences

In his Third Ground for Relief, Williams claims imposition of consecutive sentences was
not authorized in this case. The Fifth District concluded to the contrary and we are bound by their
interpretation of Ohio law. Bradshaw, supra. To the extent Williams is claiming that imposition
of consecutive sentences is unconstitutional, that claim is not cognizable in habeas corpus.
The historical record demonstrates that the jury played no role in the
decision to impose sentences consecutively or concurrently. Rather,
the choice rested exclusively with the judge. See, e.g., 1 J. Bishop,
Criminal Law § 636, pp 649-650 (2d ed. 1858) ("[W]hen there are
two or more convictions, on which sentence remains to be
pronounced; the judgment may direct, that each succeeding period
of imprisonment shall commence on the termination of the period
next preceding."); A. Campbell, Law of Sentencing § 9:22, p 425
(3d ed. 2004) ("Firmly rooted in common law is the principle that
the selection of either concurrent or consecutive sentences rests
within the discretion of sentencing judges."). This was so in England
before the founding of our Nation,n8 and in the early American
States. Ice "has no quarrel with [this account] of consecutive
sentencing practices through the ages." Brief for Respondent 32.
The historical record further indicates that a judge's imposition of
consecutive, rather than concurrent, sentences was the prevailing
practice.

Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 168-9 (2009).
Request for an Evidentiary Hearing

Williams concludes his Traverse by asking for an evidentiary hearing (ECF No. 12, PageID
199-200). He gives no indication of what evidence he would present at such a hearing. Thus he
has not shown an entitlement to a hearing under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Furthermore, the Court is
limited in deciding the case to the record that was before the Fifth District Court of Appeals.
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011). Pinholster bars a federal court “from admitting new
evidence upon which to assess the reasonableness of a state court's constitutional analysis.”
Upshaw v. Stephenson, 97 F. 4th 365, 372 (6th Cir. 2024), quoting Mitchell v. Genovese, 974 F.3d
638, 647 (6th Cir. 2020).

Conclusion
Based on the foregoing analysis, the Magistrate Judge respectfully recommends the
Petition be dismissed with prejudice. Because reasonable jurists would not disagree with this
conclusion, it is also recommended that Petitioner be denied a certificate of appealability and that
the Court certify to the Sixth Circuit that any appeal would be objectively frivolous and should not

be permitted to proceed in forma pauperis.
February 27, 2026.
s/ Michael R. Merz
United States Magistrate Judge
NOTICE REGARDING OBJECTIONS

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), any party may serve and file specific, written objections to the
proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being served with this Report
and Recommendations. Because this document is being served by mail, three days are added under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 6, but service is complete when the document is mailed, not when it is recetved. Such
objections shall specify the portions of the Report objected to and shall be accompanied by a
memorandum of law in support of the objections. A party may respond to another party’s
objections within fourteen days after being served with a copy thereof. Failure to make objections
in accordance with this procedure may forfeit rights on appeal. #

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