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March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Vasquez v. Janelle Investment CA2/3

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B341597

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (16.3K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/19/26 Vasquez v. Janelle Investment CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

FERNANDO ALVARO VASQUEZ B341597
et al.,
Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Respondents, Super. Ct. No.
21STCV45484
v.

JANELLE INVESTMENT, INC.,
et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William F. Fahey, Judge. Affirmed.

Sepehr Omrani; Tisdale & Nicholson and Michael D. Stein
for Defendants and Appellants.

Castelblanco Law Group, Eric E. Castelblanco, Shilpa
Anand and Elena Sanchez for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

---

Defendants Isabel Shaff and her company Janelle
Investment, Inc. appeal an order denying their motion to vacate
a default judgment in this habitability action. They contend their
former attorney abandoned them during the litigation, ultimately
resulting in the default judgment.1 In denying their motion
to vacate, the trial court found defendants had engaged in a
long pattern of delay and obstruction, even after they were

1 Generally, an order denying a motion to vacate a default
judgment is not independently appealable and may be reviewed
only on an appeal from the judgment. (Rappleyea v. Campbell
(1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 981 (Rappleyea).) However, our high
court has recognized that the order may be appealable as a
postjudgment order where two requirements are met: (1) the
issues raised to challenge the order are necessarily “different
from those arising from an appeal from the judgment” and
(2) the order “ ‘affect[s] the judgment or relate[s] to it by
enforcing it or staying its execution.’ ” (Lakin v. Watkins
Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 650–652; Code Civ.
Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); accord Rooney v. Vermont Investment
Corporation (1973) 10 Cal.3d 351, 359 [“an appeal from an order
refusing to vacate a judgment will lie when the record available
to the appellate court on such appeal raises issues which are
not disclosed or could not be disposed of on appeal from the
judgment itself”].) Because defendants’ grounds for challenging
the order are based on a factual record developed after entry
of the judgment that implicates the propriety of the default
judgment itself, we conclude these requirements are met here.
(See, e.g., Daley v. Butte County (1964) 227 Cal.App.2d 380,
389 [Plaintiff who was abandoned by her attorney “might have
appealed, but the record on appeal would not have reflected
her side of the story. Under these circumstances, where
a direct appeal from the dismissal is relatively ineffectual,
the order refusing to vacate the dismissal is appealable.”].)

2
indisputably aware of the default judgment. The record supports
the court’s finding. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
By early June 2022, plaintiffs had served both defendants
with the summons and complaint. Defendants failed to file a
timely answer, and, in August and September 2022, the trial
court entered defaults against them.
Defendants eventually retained Michael Earle to
represent them in this litigation. Earle obtained a stipulation
from plaintiffs to set aside the defaults, and, in November 2022,
defendants filed their answer.
On March 29, 2023, plaintiffs moved to compel discovery
responses from defendants. In a supporting declaration,
plaintiffs’ attorney said she had attempted to meet and
confer with Earle by email but received no response.
On April 20, 2023, Earle moved to be relieved as
defendants’ counsel. He declared there was “ongoing animosity”
between his office and Shaff that made “an attorney/client
relationship impossible.”
On April 25, 2023, the court held a hearing on plaintiffs’
motions to compel.2 The court granted the motions; ordered
defendants to respond to plaintiffs’ discovery requests within
two weeks; and imposed $3,000 of monetary sanctions against
defendants and Earle, jointly and severally. Defendants failed
to comply with the court’s order.

2 Defendants have not provided a transcript of this or any
other hearings in this case. According to the court’s minute
order, an attorney specially appeared for defendants to advise
the court of Earle’s motion to be relieved as counsel.

3
Plaintiffs moved for terminating sanctions. Defendants
failed to file an opposition and did not appear at the noticed
hearing. On June 26, 2023, the court granted the motion; struck
defendants’ answer; and entered default against them. In the
same order, the court denied Earle’s motion to be relieved as
counsel, finding he “failed to provide proper proof of service.”
On July 26, 2023, Earle filed another motion to be relieved
as counsel, again asserting “ongoing animosity” between his office
and Shaff. He said the “attorney client relationship has been
torn asunder by the client’s refusal to communicate with [Earle]
and his office in an effective and civil matter” and Shaff had
“berat[ed] Mr. Earle and his associate(s) in the hallway of the
court.” He served Shaff by mail at her last known address,
which he had confirmed by telephone within the last 30 days.
On August 22, 2023, the court granted Earle’s motion to be
relieved as defendants’ counsel. Earle served defendants with
the order the next day.
On September 26, 2023, plaintiffs served defendants by
mail with an application to enter default judgment.
On September 27, 2023, the court entered default judgment
against defendants, awarding plaintiffs a total of $1,675,785.57
in general damages, restitution, statutory damages, attorney
fees, and costs.
On January 16, 2024, defendants, in propria persona,
filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. In a supporting
declaration, Shaff claimed she was not personally served with
the summons, rendering the default judgment void. She also
said Earle and his associate had failed to file an answer to the
complaint and they did not conduct an investigation to prepare

4
her defense. She declared, they “took my money and dropped
my case.”
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, relying in part on court
records showing Shaff had appeared at a September 27, 2022
hearing before Earle successfully negotiated the stipulation
to set aside defendants’ original default.3 They argued Shaff’s
“actual presence in court” necessarily “contradict[ed] any possible
claim of lack of notice or knowledge of this litigation.”
The court summarily rejected defendants’ motion to vacate,
citing their failure to comply with the court’s standing order
on mandatory courtesy copies.
On February 21, 2024, defendants, in propria persona,
filed a second motion to vacate the default judgment. The motion
and supporting declaration were nearly identical to their original
filing. Plaintiffs opposed the motion on the same grounds. The
court rejected the motion, again due to defendants’ failure to
comply with the court’s standing order.
In April 2024, defendants retained new counsel to
represent them in the litigation.
On June 27, 2024, defendants filed a third motion to vacate
the default judgment. This time, defendants sought equitable
relief, arguing they had been “abandoned” by Earle. In her
supporting declaration, Shaff said Earle had “never alerted”
her about plaintiffs’ discovery requests; Earle “did not alert”
her about plaintiffs’ motion to compel; she learned “in October
or November 2023” that the default judgment had been entered

3 Plaintiffs also produced proofs of service showing Shaff
was personally served with the summons, as was Janelle
Investment’s registered agent for service of process.

5
against defendants; Earle “had not been responding to [her]
for months” and “took no steps to notify [her] of what happened”;
after learning of the judgment, she “hired a paralegal” to file
defendants’ first and second motions to vacate; and it was only
after she met with her new attorney that she realized she “was
failed by [Earle] and the paralegal.” Shaff asserted she had
a viable defense to the habitability action. She admitted the
Housing Department had “issued notices” to her, but she claimed
“[m]ost” of these citations were due to complaints made by “one
tenant that was causing deliberate damage to the property” and
she had “made diligent efforts to make repairs” that the Housing
Department requested.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, relying principally on
Shaff’s admission that she learned of the judgment in October
or November 2023. They argued defendants’ long delay in hiring
new counsel to bring the current motion was “inexcusable” and
precluded equitable relief from default.
The trial court denied the motion, concluding equitable
relief was not warranted because defendants, “often while in
pro per and also when represented by counsel, ha[d] engaged
in a long pattern of delay and obstruction” despite plaintiffs’
stipulation to set aside the original default.
Defendants filed a timely notice of appeal from the order.
DISCUSSION
We review an order denying equitable relief from default
for an abuse of discretion. (Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at p. 981;
Kramer v. Traditional Escrow, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 13, 27
(Kramer).) “The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified
standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect
of a trial court’s ruling under review. The trial court’s findings

6
of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of
law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the
facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.” (Haraguchi
v. Superior Court (2008) 43 Cal.4th 706, 711–712, fns. omitted.)
“Thus, in reviewing the trial court’s factual findings in this
matter, ‘our review begins and ends with a determination
as to whether there is any substantial evidence, contradicted
or uncontradicted, to support the findings below. [Citations.]
In assessing whether any substantial evidence exists, we view
the record in the light most favorable to respondents, giving
them the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving
all conflicts in their favor.’ ” (Kramer, at p. 28.)
Although defendants sought relief from the default
judgment under the court’s inherent equitable powers, we first
discuss the availability of statutory relief under Code of Civil
Procedure section 473, subdivision (b), as it provides helpful
context for our review of the trial court’s order.4 (See, e.g.,
Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at pp. 28–29.) Under section 473,
“a court may relieve a party from a default or default judgment
due to ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect’ if
the party files an application for relief within six months from the
date of the default.” (Kramer, at p. 28, quoting § 473, subd. (b).)
“ ‘ “Section 473 is often applied liberally where the party in
default moves promptly to seek relief, and the party opposing the
motion will not suffer prejudice if relief is granted. [Citations.]
In such situations ‘very slight evidence will be required to justify
a court in setting aside the default.’ [Citations.] [¶] Moreover,
because the law strongly favors trial and disposition on the
merits, any doubts in applying section 473 must be resolved

4 Statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

7
in favor of the party seeking relief from default.” ’ ” (Kramer,
at p. 28.)
Here, because more than six months had elapsed from
the entry of default, and hence relief under section 473 was
unavailable, defendants moved to vacate the default judgment
under the trial court’s inherent equitable authority. (See
Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 980–981.) Even when
statutory relief is unavailable, “courts have the inherent
authority to vacate a default and default judgment on equitable
grounds such as extrinsic fraud or extrinsic mistake.”5 (Bae
v. T.D. Service Co. of Arizona (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 89, 97;
see Rappleyea, at p. 981.) But “[t]he court’s ability to grant
relief under its inherent power is narrower than its ability to
grant relief under section 473, subdivision (b).” (Kramer, supra,
56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29, citing Carroll v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
(1982) 32 Cal.3d 892, 901, fn. 8.) “This is especially true after
a default judgment has been entered. ‘A party who seeks to

5 “ ‘Extrinsic fraud occurs when a party is deprived of
the opportunity to present his claim or defense to the court;
where he was kept ignorant or, other than from his own
negligence, fraudulently prevented from fully participating
in the proceeding.’ ” (Sporn v. Home Depot USA, Inc. (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1300.) “Extrinsic mistake occurs ‘when
circumstances extrinsic to the litigation have unfairly cost
a party a hearing on the merits.’ [Citation.] In contrast with
extrinsic fraud, extrinsic mistake exists when the ground of relief
is not so much the fraud or other misconduct of one of the parties
as it is the excusable neglect of the defaulting party to appear
and present his claim or defense. . . . Relief will be denied,
however, if the complaining party’s negligence permitted
the fraud to be practiced or the mistake to occur.” (Manson,
Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 36, 47.)

8
set aside a default judgment pursuant to the court’s equity power
must make a substantially stronger showing of the excusable
nature of his or her neglect than is necessary to obtain relief
under . . . section 473.’ ” (Kramer, at p. 29; see Rappleyea, at
pp. 981–982, 984.) As our Supreme Court has explained, “[w]hen
a default judgment has been obtained, equitable relief may be
given only in exceptional circumstances. ‘[W]hen relief under
section 473 is available, there is a strong public policy in favor
of granting relief and allowing the requesting party his or her
day in court. Beyond this period there is a strong public policy
in favor of the finality of judgments and only in exceptional
circumstances should relief be granted.’ ” (Rappleyea, at pp. 981–
982, second italics added; Kramer, at p. 29.)
“A party seeking relief under the court’s equitable powers
must satisfy the elements of a ‘stringent three-pronged test’:
(1) a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense, (2) a
meritorious defense, and (3) diligence in seeking to set aside
the default.” (Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 29, quoting
Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th at pp. 982–983.) Here, the trial court
found defendants “ha[d] engaged in a long pattern of delay and
obstruction,” implicitly denying equitable relief under the first
and third prongs of this test. Substantial evidence plainly
supports the court’s finding with respect to the third prong
—defendants did not act diligently to set aside the default.
We therefore need not address the test’s other elements. (See
Rappleyea, at p. 984 [equitable relief from default is available
only if the moving party satisfies “all three prongs of the
stringent test”]; see also Kramer, at p. 38 [moving party’s failure
to demonstrate a satisfactory excuse or diligence in setting aside
default mandates denial of equitable relief, regardless of whether

9
a meritorious defense could be established]; Cruz v. Fagor
America, Inc. (2007) 146 Cal.App.4th 488, 503 (Cruz) [same].)
Cruz is instructive. The plaintiff in Cruz filed a product
liability suit against the distributor of a pressure cooker in
December 2004. (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 493.)
After the defendant failed to answer the complaint, the plaintiff
filed a request for entry of default and mailed it to the defendant
in early February 2005. (Id. at pp. 493–494.) The head of the
defendant’s claims and insurance department forwarded the
default request to the defendant’s insurer on February 22, 2005,
but neither the insurer nor the defendant took any action to seek
relief from the default. (Id. at pp. 504, 506.) The court entered
default on February 25, 2005, and a default judgment was
entered against the defendant in May 2005. Finally, in late-
November 2005, the defendant filed a motion for relief. (Id. at
p. 494.) The trial court granted the motion on equitable grounds,
relying on declarations from the defendant’s president and the
head of its insurance department who said they were unaware of
the lawsuit until the filing of the default request. (Id. at pp. 494,
497, 502, 504.) The plaintiff appealed the order. The reviewing
court reversed, concluding the defendant had not acted diligently
in attempting to set aside the default after learning of it. (Id. at
pp. 494–495, 506, 510.)
The defendant in Cruz maintained it had acted diligently
by forwarding the default request to its insurer, “ ‘assuming
[its] interest would be protected by [its] insurance broker and
carrier.’ ” (Cruz, supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 506–507.) The
reviewing court held this was insufficient to meet the defendants’
burden under the stringent test for equitable relief. (Id. at
pp. 502–503.) As the Cruz court explained, “[r]eliance on a third

10
party constitutes a satisfactory excuse only if it is reasonable,”
and the record did “not support the conclusion that [the
defendant’s] reliance on its broker and/or insurance carrier
was reasonable” under the circumstances. (Id. at p. 507.) On
the contrary, the evidence compelled a finding that the defendant
had not acted reasonably or diligently because, “two months”
after it forwarded the notice of request for default to its insurer,
the plaintiff served the defendant with a request for entry of
judgment that—“[a]t a minimum”—put the defendant “on
reasonable inquiry notice that the insurer had not acted in
response to the entry of default.” (Id. at pp. 507–508.) Despite
this, the defendant waited “nine months after it admit[ted] it was
aware that [the plaintiff] was seeking entry of default[ ]before
taking any action.” (Id. at p. 508.) Under these circumstances,
the defendant’s “failure to inquire as to the status of the case or
to follow up with its insurer [could not] be considered diligent.”
(Ibid.)
While the evidence in Cruz compelled a finding that the
defendant did not act diligently (thus requiring reversal of
the lower court’s order), here, we need determine only whether
substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—supports
the trial court’s finding that defendants unreasonably delayed
in seeking appropriate relief from the default judgment. (See
Kramer, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 28.) It plainly does.
The record shows that, on August 22, 2023, the court
granted Earle’s motion to be relieved as defendants’ counsel,
and Earle served defendants with the court’s order the next day.
On September 25, 2023, plaintiffs filed and served defendants
by mail with an application to enter default judgment. Shaff
admits she learned “in October or November 2023” that the

11
default judgment had been entered against defendants.
Despite this, Shaff waited until April 2024 to retain new counsel
to represent defendants (including the corporate defendant that
could be represented only by counsel). Even then, defendants
did not seek equitable relief from the default judgment until
June 27, 2024—at least eight months after Shaff admits she
learned of the judgment. This evidence proves defendants
did not act diligently to set aside the default. (Cf. Cruz, supra,
146 Cal.App.4th at pp. 508–509 [lack of action for nine months
after learning of default was “unreasonable”].)
Like the defendants in Cruz, defendants argued in their
moving papers that they had acted diligently by relying on a
third party to assist them with their two earlier failed attempts
to seek relief from the default in propria persona. The trial court
rejected this argument, and the evidence supports its implicit
finding that defendants’ conduct was unreasonable. (See Cruz,
supra, 146 Cal.App.4th at p. 507.) First, as the court noted
with respect to the corporate defendant, Janelle Investment
could seek relief from the default only through retained counsel
—the company could not reasonably rely on its officer Shaff (or
a paralegal) to represent it in those proceedings. (See Vann v.
Shilleh (1975) 54 Cal.App.3d 192, 199 [“A corporation cannot
represent itself in court, either in propria persona or through
an officer or agent who is not an attorney.”].)
Second, with respect to both defendants, the failed motions
hardly demonstrate reasonable or diligent efforts to set aside
the default. Both motions were based principally on the blatantly
false assertion that defendants had not been personally served
with the summons—a claim obviously contradicted by the answer
that defendants filed in November 2022 after plaintiffs stipulated

12
to set aside defendants’ original defaults. In her declaration,
Shaff asserted the improper handling of the first motion was
due to a paralegal’s neglect; however, she also admitted that she
“engaged the same paralegal” to file a nearly identical second
motion that was again rejected for the same procedural defect.
Setting aside whether it was reasonable to enlist a paralegal
to seek relief from a $1.6 million default judgment, it plainly
was not reasonable to engage the same paralegal after the
first motion was rejected. (See Rappleyea, supra, 8 Cal.4th
at pp. 984–985 [“self-representation is not a ground for
exceptionally lenient treatment”; equitable relief from default
cannot be based on “defendants’ ill-advised self-representation”].)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that
defendants unreasonably delayed in seeking appropriate relief
from the default judgment after they admittedly learned of it.
On appeal, defendants argue the trial court should have
excused their lack of diligence because plaintiffs had not argued
they would be prejudiced if equitable relief were granted.
Defendants rely on Rappleyea for the principle that, of the three
prongs of the stringent test for equitable relief, “diligence is the
most inextricably intertwined with prejudice.” (Rappleyea, supra,
8 Cal.4th at pp. 983–984.) However, our high court’s application
of this principle makes clear that it does not help defendants
in this case. As the Rappleyea court explained, “[p]rejudice to a
plaintiff is obviously less if judgment has not been entered when
a defendant seeks equitable relief.” (Id. at p. 984, italics added.)
That was the case in Rappleyea, which led the court to reason
that “the diligence prong simply cannot assume the importance
here that it would in the ordinary case wherein the trial court
would be reversing a judgment and divesting a plaintiff of a

13
property right by granting equitable relief from default.” (Ibid.,
italics added.) That is not the case here. Here, plaintiffs
diligently sought and obtained a judgment against defendants
in September 2023—at least nine months before defendants
moved for equitable relief. The trial court did not err in
implicitly concluding plaintiffs would be prejudiced by being
divested of this established property right.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Plaintiffs are entitled to costs.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

EGERTON, Acting P. J.

We concur:

ADAMS, J.

HANASONO, J.

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