Solicitor General v Seale - Contempt of Court Appeal

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  Solicitor General for England and Wales   v Seale [2026] EWCA Civ 362 (27 March 2026)

URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2026/362.html
Cite as:
[2026] EWCA Civ 362 | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 362 |
| | | Case No: CA-2025-001794 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
PROPERTY, TRUSTS AND PROBATE LIST (Ch)
Mr Justice Rajah
[2025] EWHC 1911 (Ch)

| | | Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
| | | 27/03/2026 |
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE COBB
and
LORD JUSTICE MILES

Between:
| | Solicitor General for England and Wales | Claimant/
Respondent |
| | - and - | |
| | Rana Kabbani Seale | Defendant/Appellant |

**The Appellant appeared in person
Simon Murray (instructed by the Government Legal Department) for the Respondent

Hearing dates : 24 March 2026**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

3. This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 27 March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
5. .............................
7. Lord Justice Cobb and Lord Justice Miles :
9. This is the judgment of the court on an appeal from the order of Mr Justice Rajah ("the judge") dated 2 July 2025 committing Dr Rana Kabbani Seale, the appellant, to prison for contempt of court for six months, suspended for two years.
11. Background
12. The background may be taken from the judge's judgment. Dr Seale, and her children and stepchildren are engaged in long-running probate proceedings concerning her late husband's estate. Dr Seale has made a large number of applications in those proceedings, many of which have been dismissed as totally without merit.
14. On 25 November 2021 Bacon J made an Extended Civil Restraint Order ("the ECRO") against the appellant for a period of two years, which was extended to three years, and then for a further three years. While the ECRO is operative, Dr Seale can only make applications in the proceedings with the permission of the court.
16. By an order dated 10 December 2021 Dr Seale was ordered to make any application for permission under the ECRO to Bacon J or Falk J (as she then was), and not to correspond with court staff as to the substance of the ECRO or any other order.
18. Dr Seale did not comply with that order, leading to Bacon J making an order endorsed with a penal notice on 30 March 2023 ("the 2023 Order"). This provides:
20. "1. Until further order of the Court, Mrs Seale is prohibited from sending any email to any individual member of court staff (including judges' clerks), and may only correspond with the court through the generic Chancery email address ChanceryJudgesListing@justice.gov.uk. The Court staff will be instructed to delete, unread, any emails sent to their individual email addresses, whether addressed directly to them or copied to them.
21. 2. Any communications sent by Mrs Seale to the generic Chancery email address listed in paragraph 1 above must be limited to routine administrative matters concerning the lodging of applications, bundles, submissions and draft orders, the fixing of hearings, and any applications for transcripts of hearing or judgments. The Court staff will be instructed not to respond to any emails that do not concern those matters.
22. 3. Unless otherwise directed by the Court, any applications to the Court made by Mrs Seale (including any application for permission under the ECRO) must be made formally, on the appropriate Court form, with payment of the appropriate fee. The court will not consider or respond to applications or requests made informally in correspondence."
23. The 2023 Order was served on the appellant by Bacon J's clerk by email.
25. On 12 June 2024 the Solicitor General for England and Wales ("the SG") issued an application to commit Dr Seale for contempt of court for breaching the 2023 Order. There were 28 alleged breaches, each relating to an email or a letter sent to the court by Dr Seale between 24 April 2023 and 25 April 2024 which allegedly contravened para 2 of the 2023 Order. Seven of the counts were also alleged to breach para 3.
27. The judge commented that para 2 was intended to limit Dr Seale's correspondence with the court to routine administrative matters only, and examples of that were given. That came against a history in which Dr Seale's correspondence was not routinely administrative, but was (according to Bacon J in a judgment given at the time of the 2023 Order) abusive of court staff.
29. The judge considered that para 3 added little to para 2 so far as the committal application was concerned.
31. The SG's evidence in support of the application summarised the content of the letters particularised in the committal proceedings as angry and aggressive letters directed mainly at Bacon J, demanding that she recuse herself, with various threats of criminal proceedings if she did not.
33. On 8 December 2023 the Government Legal Department ("the GLD"), on behalf of the SG, wrote to Dr Seale to explain that it was contemplating bringing proceedings against her, and requesting that she cease inappropriate correspondence with the court and start complying with the 2023 Order. The date range of the alleged breaches shows that the SG contended that the correspondence continued unabated.
35. Bacon J gave directions for the contempt application to be heard by a High Court Judge with a time estimate of two days. Lewison LJ refused Dr Seale's application for permission to appeal that order, and refused her permission to amend her grounds of appeal or to rely upon a supplementary skeleton argument.
37. Dr Seale was advised in the committal proceedings that she might be entitled to legal aid for representation, but she appeared at the trial before the judge as a litigant in person.
39. Orlando Seale, Delilah Jeary and Jasmine Seale, the claimants in the underlying probate proceedings, were named as respondents in the committal application but no relief was sought against them. They were not represented at the committal hearing before the judge, but attended by video link as observers only. They filed written submissions in the form of a witness statement verified by a statement of truth. Their evidence and submissions complained about Dr Seale's conduct in ways beyond that set out in the contempt application. The SG did not seek to rely on that material in support of the contempt application and the judge expressly did not take it into account (see judgment para 8).
41. Mrs Debra Chan-Smith, joint head of criminal case work and a senior lawyer of the Attorney General's Office, swore an affidavit dated 4 June 2024, exhibiting the correspondence said to have breached the 2023 Order. She was cross-examined by Dr Seale, including as to whether she had instructions from the SG to bring the committal proceedings, and whether the SG had authority to bring these proceedings. She answered yes to both questions, and stated that the SG had reviewed the proceedings in November 2024 and concluded that it was in the public interest to pursue the proceedings. The judge accepted her evidence (see para 9).
43. After being told of her right not to give evidence, Dr Seale chose to do so, and she was cross-examined by counsel for the SG. There were then submissions from both sides, including lengthy submissions from Dr Seale. The judge recorded in para 10 that, understandably, as a litigant in person, Dr Seale had found it hard to segregate her evidence from her submissions and also gave explanation of perceived injustices of which she felt that she and her son had been the victims at the hands of various judges, court staff and others. The judge held that she was aggrieved by decisions that had been taken over the years by Master Pester, Deputy Tribunal Judge Cousins, Bacon J, and Falk J.
45. In para 11 of the judgment the judge distilled Dr Seale's principal points. He recorded that she had not disputed that she sent the emails and letters in question. All were sent to Chancery Listing's generic email address in accordance with para 1 of the 2023 Order. In summary, her position was that:
47. i) Bacon J did not have jurisdiction to make the 2023 Order;
48. ii) para 3 of the 2023 Order should not have been made because complying with it would have put her in breach of the terms of the ECRO;
49. iii) it was her absolute legal right to write to the judges and to criticise them, whatever the terms of the 2023 Order;
50. iv) in any event, all of her communications with the court were routine administration within the terms of para 2 of the 2023 Order; and
51. v) some of her communications were merely notifying the court of changes of circumstances as required by the ECRO.
52. From para 12 of the judgment onwards the judge went through each of the alleged breaches of the 2023 Order, and in doing so considered Dr Seale's contention that the communications with the court were routine administration. It is unnecessary for the purposes of this judgment to address them all separately. But it is helpful to take the first five to illustrate the nature of the communications and the judge's approach to the issue of breach.
54. The first alleged breach was a four-page letter. It was wrongly dated, but was sent on 24 April 2023 to Chancery Listing's generic email address for the attention of Bacon J. This was shortly after the 2023 Order had been made and served by email. In the letter Dr Seale identified a purported anomaly in the rules relating to the hearing on 30 March 2023, and then said this:
56. "Clearly this irreconcilable contradiction within Civil Procedure Rules and the Practice Direction must not be permitted to endure, as it is a lunacy.
57. I therefore invite you to exercise your power to refer this issue to the Court of Appeal, as to the court being prohibited by authority in law from permitting an application without notice to proceed, or be processed by the court, against a person subject to civil restraint.
58. I have no doubt you will recognise the justice of such a reference in the present instance and will reflect it in your still pending judgement."
59. The judge held that this letter was not concerned with the routine administration of the case. It did not relate to transcripts, bundles, or listings, or anything of that routine nature. In addition, the application to refer the case to the Court of Appeal was not a formal application, and so was contrary to para 3.
61. The second alleged breach was a letter dated 24 April 2023 (though misdated in 2022). It was four and a half pages and made serious allegations of judicial misconduct. The focus was on Bacon J, and it was sent to her. It accused Bacon J of "vicious intent", and included this passage:
63. "You did this so as to silence me with a double-whammy, by adding an absurd Penal Notice in March 2023 to your already wrongfully-imposed ECRO of November 2021. It is of note that you have not offered & that you cannot offer any legal justifications for these vengeful actions, since none exist.
64. You threatened me, together with unnamed, unknown persons (real or imaginary, according to your personal whim) with outrageous punishments - including stripping of assets and imprisonment!
65. If you could have ordered that I be sent to the scaffold (along with my alleged invisible cohorts), you most certainly would have.
66. I cannot but laugh, Your Very Exalted Ladyship, at the idea that YOU are meant to represent women's empowerment or racial/religious diversity, on England's benches! In seven years of aggressive and appallingly-handled Claim against me by the Court, I have yet to encounter any archetypal 'elderly white male' judge who comes anywhere near your misogynistic and sectarian abuse of a Muslim woman's defence. Is one to suppose that you bring your own Islamophobe Indian background (? la Narendra Modi), and therefore fail to be either neutral or fair with someone of my religion?
67. Permit me to repeat once more, since it bears repeating a hundredfold: despite the extremely-punitive measures you imposed upon me, you failed to give any legal grounds or judicial justifications for your extremist's order."
68. The judge held in para 14 that the letter was not limited to routine administrative matters within para 2 of the 2023 Order.
70. The third alleged breach was a letter of 10 May 2023 (though misdated to 2022) addressed to Bacon J. It consisted of seven pages, accusing Bacon J and Master Pester of serious judicial misconduct in deliberately preventing Dr Seale from having access to the law by the making of the ECRO, and requiring Bacon J to recuse herself. The judge held in para 15 of the judgment that these were not routine administrative matters within para 2 of the 2023 Order.
72. On 6 June 2023 there was an exchange of emails about transcripts, which was alleged to be the fourth breach. The judge gave one example in para 16. Having been told that the approved transcript of the judgment had been sent to her on 21 April 2023, Dr Seale responded saying:
74. "Dear Dir (sic) or Madam,
75. I NEVER RECEIVED IT BEFORE THIS MINUTE!
76. Whoever informed you that it was sent to me before - presumably Bacon J herself, to cover up her almost two-year suppression of various transcripts - is lying.
77. Thank you,
78. Mrs R Seale."
79. The judge deprecated the language but concluded that the email was arguably concerned with routine administrative matters as the email exchange was concerned with obtaining a transcript, although it also contained serious allegations of judicial impropriety. He held that this alleged breach was not proved.
81. The next alleged breach was a letter of 6 June 2023. This was a five-page letter, in what the judge called "increasingly directive and threatening terms", addressed to Bacon J. There were various allegations of barristers and judges being liable to prosecution for fraud, and contentions about wrong information or mistakes in earlier decisions in the underlying proceedings. It ended by saying:
83. "The Chancery Division court's order of 3 October 2017, given in summary judgement upon impermissible 'mini trial' on documents alone, in abuse of its own powers, must now be revoked in the interests of the Chancery Division court's own reputation and repute for the administration of justice.
84. Application for revocation pursuant to CPR 3.1(7) will, therefore, be to the Chancellor of the High Court, Sir Julian Flaux.
85. Under the terms of your ECRO, permission for that application to go before the Chancellor must be given by you in advance.
86. The application will be formally prepared in compliance with Practice Direction 3C. The unsigned Form N244 with accompanying evidence, without prior payment of court fee, will then be presented to you for grant of permission, pursuant to your obligations to your court's mandatory overriding objective.
87. If, after 7 days you have not granted the required permission you will be reported for perversions of the course of justice in your court.
88. You will bear at the forefront of your judicial mind that perversion of the course of justice is considered a criminal offence; one so serious that it can carry a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment upon conviction.
89. If, in advance of the procedures now made necessary by your oppression and injustice, you wish to confirm your recusal and your withdrawal upon recusal of all orders made by you in the above-recited claim and interim appeals, you must give a formal judicial statement to that effect."
90. The judge found in para 17 that this letter was not about routine administrative matters and was therefore contrary to para 2.
92. These examples suffice for present purposes to show the way in which the judge addressed the allegations of breach. Any reader wishing to understand the full nature of the 28 communications should refer to the judgment at [2025] EWHC 1911 (Ch). The judge went through each of the alleged breaches one-by-one and concluded that 27 of the 28 communications were in breach of the order.
94. The judge then turned to the elements of the contempt application. He held at para 43 of the judgment that a claimant had to prove beyond reasonable doubt that: (a) there was breach of the clear and unambiguous terms of an order; (b) the defendant knew of the order; (c) the defendant's conduct which breached the order was intentional conduct as opposed to inadvertent; and (d) the defendant knew all of the facts which made her acts a breach of the order, but knowledge that the order was being breached or an intention to commit a breach was not necessary, although it might be relevant to the appropriate sanction.
96. The judge then addressed Dr Seale's points (as listed in para 17 above). At para 43 of the judgment he noted the submission that Bacon J did not have jurisdiction to make the 2023 Order, which, Dr Seale contended, could only be made by the Divisional Court on an application by the Attorney General. The judge rejected the submission. First, court orders must be obeyed. Unless and until an order is stayed or set aside, it has full effect and must be complied with. Secondly, at para 44 the judge held that Bacon J clearly had jurisdiction to make the 2023 Order she did. The court has an inherent jurisdiction to control its processes and prevent them from being abused. So long as the essence of a litigant's right of access to the court is not extinguished, a court has a right to regulate its processes in such manner as it thinks fit, as long as they are proportionate to the perceived abuse: Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113, [2004] 1 WLR 88. One of those ways is to prohibit communication with the court except in a specified manner: Attorney General v Ebert [2001] EWHC Admin 695, [2002] 2 ALL ER 789, at paras 24 and 31. The judge said that the purpose of such an order is to protect court staff from aggressive and hostile communications, prevent the time of court staff and judges being wasted, or to prevent the disruption of the administration of justice. This also meant that Dr Seale was wrong when she said that it was her absolute legal right to write to these judges and to criticise them, whatever the terms of the 2023 Order. Dr Seale was also wrong to contend that only the Divisional Court could make such an order restricting communication with the court. Ebert was an application of the inherent jurisdiction which is exercisable by all divisions of the High Court.
98. At para 45 the judge rejected Dr Seale's contention that para 3 of the 2023 Order should not have been made because complying with it would have put her in breach of the terms of the ECRO. Para 3 of the 2023 Order requires her to make any application, including an application for permission under the ECRO, by way of formal application notice. That was clear and unambiguous. Dr Seale said that there was a Catch-22 because the ECRO prohibited her from making any application in the proceedings without permission, thereby preventing her from complying with para 3 of the 2023 Order. The judge rejected this argument. He noted that the ECRO itself refers to an application for permission being made in writing. Applications to the court for orders such as an order granting permission to make an application are required, by Part 23, to be brought by application notice with payment of the appropriate fee. There was therefore no inconsistency or clash between the terms of the ECRO and para 3 of the 2023 Order. Moreover, when she applied informally by letter for permission under the ECRO none of the other requirements of CPR PD 3C, such as obtaining the prior comments of the respondents and sending them in with her application, had been complied with. The judge also noted that most of the cases of breach of para 3 of the 2023 Order were not applications for permission under the ECRO but were applications for relief being made by letter without regard to the ECRO.
100. The judge concluded in para 46 that there had been a persistent and significant breach of the 2023 Order by Dr Seale.
102. The judge then turned to the requirement that Dr Seale had notice of the order. He noted that Dr Seale accepted that she had known of the order from the email of 30 April 2023. The judge dispensed with the need for personal service under CPR 81.4.
104. The judge concluded in para 48 that Dr Seale's conduct was intentional: she wrote and sent the emails and correspondence which breached the 2023 Order. He also found that she knew all the facts which made her acts a breach of the 2023 Order, namely the contents of the emails and correspondence. The judge also found, although it was not a necessary requirement, that Dr Seale knew or did not care whether her emails and correspondence were in breach of the 2023 Order. As she repeatedly said in cross-examination and in her submissions, she believed she was entitled to write as she did, whatever the 2023 Order said.
106. The judge therefore found that that the application for committal for contempt had been established in that there had been a breach of the 2023 Order in 27 of the 28 alleged instances.
108. The judge then turned to sanction. He recited the relevant principles, taken from National Highways v Heyatawin [2021] EWHC 3078 (QB), [2022] Env LR 17, at paras 48 and 49. There is no challenge to that summary.
110. The judge first considered culpability. He held that there had been serious and persistent breaches of the 2023 Order. There were 27 breaches of the 2023 Order, with about 17 of them occurring after the 8 December 2023 warning letter from the GLD. Dr Seale acted the way she did knowing or not caring that she was breaching the 2023 Order. She continued to see it as her right to act the way she had, regardless of the terms of the 2023 Order. She had not apologised and was unrepentant. The judge assessed culpability as high.
112. The judge turned to harm. He said there was serious prejudice, through the repeated and deliberate flouting of court orders, to the due administration of justice. The offending acts involved bombarding the court and particular judges with offensive correspondence, making fanciful allegations of criminality, conspiracy, corruption, bias and prejudice. The judge described the harm as moderate.
114. As for mitigation, the judge took account of Dr Seale's age, 67, and the medical conditions she told the court about. Dr Seale also told the court that she was the sole carer for her son who she said had Asperger's syndrome, epilepsy and other conditions. He considered two reports by Dr Alcock, a consultant forensic psychiatrist, in 2018 and 2020. The judge noted that there was a helper and a housekeeper, and there was assistance from friends and godparents, which had enabled Dr Seale to go to Syria for an extended period. She wrote a letter to the GLD on 28 April 2025 indicating that she was in Syria and intended to remain in Syria until after the date for trial. In the event she returned for the trial. The judge was not satisfied with Dr Seale's explanation about this matter but said that he would need further exploration of the issue.
116. The judge concluded that if Dr Seale's caring responsibilities for her son were going to tip the scales as to whether there should be an immediate custodial sentence he would have required further evidence on the issue. In the event, that was not required because he had concluded that any custodial sentence should be suspended. He said that he was not satisfied, on the evidence which he had heard so far, that Dr Seale's son was totally dependent on her.
118. The judge then considered the minimum sanction. He concluded that Dr Seale's persistent breaches of the 2023 Order were so serious that only a custodial sanction would suffice. Having regard to the principle of totality, the aggregate sentence for the breaches which would be appropriate before consideration of mitigation was nine months' imprisonment. Taking into account the mitigation above, and in particular Dr Seale's age and medical conditions, he reached a term of six months' imprisonment.
120. He then decided that he should suspend the sentence. He expressed the hope that Dr Seale would realise that she was on the brink of imprisonment. He observed that she appeared to think that her conduct was a game but it was not. The judge said that he would give her a final chance and suspend the order for two years. He said that if Dr Seale committed a further breach of the order within that two-year period, she would be brought back to court and she should expect to have her prison sentence activated. The judge expressly did not take into account, in deciding to suspend the sentence, Dr Seale's alleged position as a sole carer for her son. This was because, as already indicated, there was a real question as to whether she really was.
122. The appeal
123. No permission to appeal has been required for this appeal. Dr Seale has served several documents in support of the appeal: "Appellant's Preliminary Grounds of Appeal" dated 23 July 2025; "Appellant's Preliminary Skeleton Argument" dated 6 August 2025; "Appellant's Case Summary" dated 9 March 2026, and a further document entitled "Divergencies Between Respondent's Skeleton Argument And Official Transcript Of Hearing" served on the eve of the appeal hearing. She also made oral submissions. We have identified the following grounds:
125. i) The judge applied the civil standard of balance of probabilities to the case.
126. ii) The judge relied on his own interpretation of the words "routine administrative matters", rather than an objective standard.
127. iii) The SG had no standing to bring the committal application. The judge was wrong to accept the evidence of Ms Chan-Smith, which in any event failed to establish that the proceedings were in the public interest.
128. iv) The Order was made in the form permitted by the Ebert case, but such an order can only be made in proceedings in the Divisional Court on the Attorney-General's application in a case under section 42 of the Senior Courts Act 1981. A litigant has a constitutional right to correspond with the Court which the 2023 Order unlawfully interfered with. For these various reasons, the court therefore lacked the power to make the 2023 Order and it was therefore a nullity.
129. v) The 28 allegedly offending communications were no more than attempts by her to obtain the permission of the court under the terms of the ECRO.
130. vi) The Order was made with the intention of extinguishing all avenues for Dr Seale to exercise her fundamental right of access to justice. The Order was also made to frustrate scrutiny and investigation of the unlawful act of a public authority perpetrated by a Chancery Master. This was contrary to section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
131. vii) The suspended sanction imposed by the judge was contrary to Art 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights as it prevented her having access to justice. It was also contrary to her rights under Art 5 (right of liberty and security) and Art 8 (right to respect for private and family life).
132. viii) The judge denied Dr Seale a fair and impartial hearing.
133. ix) The judge allowed the claimants in the action (Orlando Seale, Delilah Jeary and Jasmine Seale, who had been made respondents to the committal application) to lodge prejudicial evidence with the court. This was procedurally unfair. It affected the sanction that he imposed on Dr Seale.
134. x) The claimants in the action should not have been respondents to the committal application and the proceedings were flawed because of this.
135. xi) The sanction was manifestly excessive and disproportionate. Dr Seale was merely seeking to bring her grievances before the court.
136. xii) The judge erred in ordering Dr Seale to pay the costs. This was wrong because the claimant in the proceedings was the SG, and the Crown is entitled to recoup its losses by fines or forfeiture but not by costs under CPR 44. A defendant should not be required to pay for her own prosecution. The order for costs was not quantified and Dr Seale does not have the resources to meet them.
137. Before turning to these grounds, we record that in the week before the hearing Dr Seale wrote to the court stating that Miles LJ should recuse himself. This was based on bundling directions. Dr Seale had served an electronic bundle of more than 900 pages. In order to assist with preparation, Miles LJ on behalf of the court, directed that a core bundle of the principal orders and applications should be prepared and, owing to Dr Seale's lack of representation, directed the respondent to prepare it. Dr Seale regarded that direction as indicating bias. She also noted that in other cases Miles LJ had sat on panels of this court with Falk LJ, who she contended, was guilty of judicial misconduct. At the hearing the court reminded Dr Seale of their judicial oaths and she did not press the recusal application. In any event we are satisfied that it would have had no merit. No fair minded observer and informed observer, having considered the facts would have concluded that there was a real possibility that either member of the court was biased or incapable of hearing this appeal fairly.
139. As to ground (i), Dr Seale submitted first that the judge failed to apply the balance of probabilities. She said that he had chosen a personal interpretation of the civil standard. We are unable to accept this. The judge made it clear that he was applying the criminal standard and there is nothing in the judgment to suggest that he did otherwise.
141. As to ground (ii), Dr Seale submitted that the judge failed to apply a proper objective approach to the meaning of the words "routine administrative matters". We are unable to accept this. The words of para 2 of the 2023 Order were clear and unambiguous. The order itself gave examples of such matters, concerning lodging applications, bundles, submissions hearing dates, transcripts etc. The judge went though the 28 alleged breaches one-by-one and properly asked himself whether they concerned routine administrative matters. We have already given five examples, which demonstrate beyond doubt that Dr Seale's communications with the court were not limited to such matters. The judge went through the alleged breaches carefully and methodically. Having reviewed them ourselves, we are satisfied that he was correct in his conclusions in each case.
143. As to ground (iii), Dr Seale contended that the SG had no standing to bring the committal application. We are unable to accept this. The Attorney General has a right to bring before the court any matter which he thinks may amount to a contempt of court and which he considers should in the public interest be brought before the court: Attorney General v Times Newspapers Limited [1974] AC 273 at 293. By section 1(1) of the Law Officers Act 1997 any function of the Attorney General may be exercised by the Solicitor General and by section 1(2) anything done by or in relation to the Solicitor General in the exercise of or in connection with a function of the Attorney General has effect as if done by or in relation to the Attorney General.
145. Dr Seale submitted that there had been an interregnum as result of the general election on 4 July 2024. We are unable to accept this point. Mr Robert Courts was the SG from 7 December 2023 to 5 July 2024. The committal application was issued on 12 June 2024. On 9 July 2024 Ms Sarah Sackman became the SG. There have been further holders of the office of SG since then. Ms Chan-Smith stated that the SG had reviewed the proceedings in November 2024 and was satisfied that they were in the public interest. In our judgment the judge was entitled to accept that evidence.
147. We are satisfied that the SG was entitled to bring the proceedings in the public interest. There is a clear public interest in upholding orders of the court. This is particularly the case where the order is designed to protect the court's own processes and resources. In such a case there may well be little incentive for the parties to the proceedings to bring committal proceedings, and unless the Attorney General (or SG) were to apply the order would be completely toothless.
149. As to ground (iv), Dr Seale contended, first, that the jurisdiction to grant an injunction in the nature of the 2023 Order was restricted to cases in the Divisional Court brought by the Attorney-General and, in particular to cases under s. 42 of the 1981 Act. She also contended that a litigant has a constitutional right to correspond with the court and that the 2023 Order unlawfully interfered with this right. She contended that the Order was therefore a nullity and that it did not prevent the communications she had sent to the court. We are unable to accept these submissions, for two reasons.
151. First, as the judge explained, unless and until it is set aside or stayed an order of the court must be obeyed. Compliance is not optional. It is not for respondents to determine whether orders are valid and effective; it is for the court. However strongly and sincerely a respondent disagrees with an order they must comply with it unless and until it is discharged or stayed. This is a constitutional principle which underpins the rule of law in a democratic society. Dr Seale was also wrong to submit that the 2023 Order was a nullity even if she had grounds for saying that it was made without jurisdiction (as to which see further below). Even an order which the court ought never to have made is effective and binding unless and until discharged.
153. Secondly, we are unable to accept the contention that the 2023 Order ought not to have been made. As the judge explained, the Ebert case illustrates the well-established principle that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to protect its own processes as a court of law. The court may protect itself by making orders which prevent litigants, by acting abusively, taking up an unfair share of valuable judicial resources. Courts are entitled to take steps to prevent persistent litigants, however convinced of the importance of their own grievances, from unduly occupying the time of judges and court officials and staff. Part of the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly and at a proportionate cost includes allotting to a case an appropriate share of the court's resources, while taking into account the need to allot resources to other cases. In Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113, [2004] 1 WLR 88 this court confirmed that the court has an inherent jurisdiction to make orders concerning the way in which litigation is to be conducted and that this power is additional to the express powers of the court under statute or the rules of court. Indeed, under CPR 3.1(1) the inherent powers of the court are preserved and are not superseded by the rules of court.
155. As the judge found, Dr Seale had bombarded the court with letters complaining about widespread judicial misconduct, bias and criminality. Dealing with such communications consumes an unjustified amount of the court's time and resources. The power of the court to protect its own processes, being part of the inherent jurisdiction, is available to any part of the High Court and is not restricted to the Divisional Court. Nor is it restricted to cases brought by the Attorney-General under section 42 of the 1981 Act.
157. Dr Seale submitted that the case of Golder v The United Kingdom (1980) 1 E.H.R.R. 524 established that any litigant has an unqualified right to correspond with the court and that the 2023 Order improperly infringed that right. We are unable to accept this broad submission. Golder concerned the ability of a prisoner to correspond with persons outside prisons and the limitations set out in the Prison Rules 1964. Mr Golder complained that restrictions on his ability to correspond with a solicitor with a view to bringing a civil action against a prison officer for libel interfered with his rights of access to justice under Article 6 ECHR. The ECtHR upheld that complaint, holding that Art 6 inherently included the right of access to justice. It also held that the right of access to justice is not absolute; but that in Mr Golder's case the limitation placed on his ability to consult a solicitor had failed to respect his Art 6 rights. The court also held that there had been a breach of his Art 8 rights.
159. Dr Seale also relied to the decision of the House of Lords in Raymond v Honey [1983] AC 1. The appellant was a prison governor. The respondent, Mr Raymond, was serving a sentence in the prison. The Divisional Court held that the governor was in contempt of court for stopping Mr Raymond from lodging an application to commit the governor for contempt of court; but was not in contempt of court for stopping a letter written by Mr Raymond to his solicitor. Lord Wilberforce (with whom the others agreed) said that suitors had a constitutional right to have their legal rights and obligations ascertained and enforced by courts of law. He noted that this basic common law principle had been affirmed in Golder. The question was whether the constitutional right was taken away or affected by the Prison Rules 1964 or standing orders made by the Secretary of State. The answer was that the Rules and standing orders were insufficiently clear to take away the prisoner's right of access to the courts.
161. Beyond underscoring the importance of the general constitutional principle of access to justice, these cases are of very little assistance. The present question is whether an order may be made which limits the manner in which a person may be able to litigate. In para 16 of Bhamjee (No 2) this court referred to Golder and other Strasbourg caselaw and stated that the right of access to the court may be subject to limitations in the form of regulation by the state, so long as (a) the limitations applied do not restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired and (b) the restriction must pursue a legitimate aim and must be proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved.
163. Hence we are unable to accept Dr Seale's contention that Bacon J exceeded her jurisdiction or that a litigant has an unqualified right to correspond with the court. There has been no appeal against the 2023 Order in the present case, and we have seen nothing to suggest that it was anything other than a necessary and proportionate response to Dr Seale's conduct. As already noted, the Order was self-evidently made to protect the processes of the court from Dr Seale's abusive conduct. It allowed her access to justice, by allowing her to make applications, file bundles, submissions and participate fully in hearings. Nothing in the 2023 Order prevented her from conducting ordinary litigation in compliance with the rules. It did not contravene her rights under Arts 6 or 8 of the ECHR.
165. As to ground (v), Dr Seale contended that the 28 allegedly offending communications were no more than attempts by her to obtain the permission of the court under the terms of the ECRO. We do not agree. The ECRO set out the process for obtaining permission. Dr Seale had to make an application, having first given notice to the intended respondent. We agree with the judge that 27 of the 28 communications were not applications made under the terms of the ECRO. We also find that there was nothing in the 2023 Order which restricted Dr Seale's ability to seek permission under the terms of the ECRO. We agree with the reasoning of the judge as summarised in para 31 above.
167. As to ground (vi): We are unable to accept that the 2023 Order was made with the intention of extinguishing all avenues for Dr Seale to exercise her own fundamental right to justice or was made to frustrate scrutiny and investigation of the unlawful act of a public authority perpetrated by a Chancery Master, contrary to section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. As already noted, the Order was self-evidently made to protect the processes of the court from Dr Seale's abusive conduct. It allowed her access to justice. Nothing in it interfered with her ability to conduct ordinary litigation in compliance with the rules. The terms of the 2023 Order were entirely consistent with her rights to pursue her claims or defend those brought against her and to have access to the courts for that purpose. Whether any proceedings she brought would have any proper legal basis or merit is a separate issue, but there is nothing in the 2023 Order which stands in her way.
169. As to ground (vii): Dr Seale contended that her ECHR rights would be contravened because, if she simply exercised her right of access to justice, the suspensory condition of the sanction would be triggered and she would face imprisonment. We are unable to accept this. The suspensory condition imposed by the judge was to comply with the terms of the 2023 Order. As already explained, the terms of the 2023 Order were entirely consistent with Dr Seale's Article 6 rights and her access to justice. There was nothing in the 2023 Order which prevented her from fully participating in the proceedings. It only prevented her from acting abusively so as to take an unfair proportion of the court's limited resources.
171. As to ground (viii), Dr Seale contended that the judge had denied her a fair hearing. This was partly dependent on a number of other complaints, including that Bacon J lacked jurisdiction to make the 2023 Order in the first place and had reached conclusions which Dr Seale said were clearly wrong. We have addressed these above. Dr Seale was unable to demonstrate any respect in which the judge had failed to conduct the committal hearing fairly. We have reviewed the entire transcript of the hearing and are satisfied that Dr Seale was not denied a fair hearing.
173. As to ground (ix): Dr Seale complained that the judge allowed prejudicial evidence to be lodged by the claimants, who were not substantive parties to the committal application. However, the judge expressly stated in the part of the judgment concerned with liability that he would not take the evidence into account and there is nothing to suggestion that he did. There is a specific complaint that he allowed them to provide evidence in relation to sanction, particularly in relation to the position of Dr Seale's son. However the judge explained that he was not reaching any view on this question as it was not material to the decision whether to suspend the sentence. He also said that if the suspensive condition was breached and the matter came back it was likely that further evidence would be required on this issue. Hence the judge's decision was not influenced by any evidence concerning Dr Seale's son. Nor do we consider that the approach taken by the judge amounts to a procedural error. For the same reasons we are unable to accept Dr Seale's contention that the judge's error in accepting this evidence affected the sanction that he imposed on her.
175. As to ground (x), we are not persuaded that any material issue arises from the nominal joinder of the claimants in the probate proceedings as respondents to the committal application. They were no doubt joined because the 2023 Order was made in the proceedings to which they are parties. But they have not applied for the committal of Dr Seale, they have filed no submissions nor have they played any part in the appeal hearing, and no relief is sought against them.
177. As to ground (xi), concerning the sanction imposed, we have carefully considered the judge's approach and the overall sanction he imposed. There is no flaw in his approach, which was in accordance with well-established authorities. This being so, this court is only able interfere with the sanction arrived at by a judge where it considers the sanction to be manifestly excessive. The judge was in our view entitled, indeed right, to conclude that the breaches were serious. He took account of the harm to the administration of justice and allowed some mitigation. The judge also found that Dr Seale knew or did not care whether her emails and correspondence were in breach of the 2023 Order. As Dr Seale repeatedly said in cross-examination before Rajah J and in her submissions to him, she believed she was entitled to write as she did, whatever the 2023 Order said. The judge also found that Dr Seale had bombarded the court and particular judges with offensive correspondence, making fanciful allegations of criminality, conspiracy, corruption, bias and prejudice. We are satisfied that there was ample material for the judge to make these findings. In these circumstances, we are not persuaded that the sanction was excessive.
179. As to ground (xii): we are not satisfied that there is any substance in Dr Seale's challenges to the judge's costs order. First, there is nothing in CPR 44 which would operate to prevent the SG from seeking her costs. These were civil proceedings and not a criminal prosecution. It is entirely normal for an order for costs to be made for costs to be assessed. The amount of costs payable will be subject to the rules on reasonableness and proportionality. The fact that a paying party lacks resources is not a reason for declining to make an order for costs that would otherwise be appropriate. The inability of the paying party to pay may be grounds for seeking an instalment order when it comes to execution of the order.
181. Conclusions
182. For these reasons the appeal is dismissed.

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