Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. William Coleman

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-12788
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (273)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 1 of 7

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

No. 25-12788
Non-Argument Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

WILLIAM COLEMAN,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
D.C. Docket No. 1:19-cr-00157-JB-MU-1

Before ROSENBAUM, NEWSOM, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
William Coleman appeals his sentence of 24 months’ impris-
onment imposed upon revocation of his supervised release. He ar-
USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 2 of 7

2 Opinion of the Court 25-12788

gues that his sentence is procedurally unreasonable because the dis-
trict court clearly erred when it found that he had possessed and
displayed a firearm during a shoplifting offense. So he asks that we
vacate the district court’s sentence and remand for resentencing.
After careful review, we affirm the court’s decision because its fac-
tual findings were reasonable and supported by the record.
I.
In 2020, an indictment charged Coleman with theft of
United States property in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 641. The district
court imposed a time-served sentence with a three-year supervised-
release term. Then, in October 2022, the district court revoked
Coleman’s supervised release for failing to abide by various condi-
tions of the supervised release. Based on those violations, the dis-
trict court sentenced Coleman to 8 months of imprisonment fol-
lowed by 24 months of supervised release. The court re-imposed
all the conditions of the supervised release, including, among other
things, that Coleman could not commit new crimes or possess a
firearm.
In October 2023, the district court revoked Coleman’s su-
pervised release a second time for attempting to elude the police.
The court sentenced him to 14 months of imprisonment followed
by 12 months of supervised release.
In September 2024, a probation officer submitted a petition
to revoke Coleman’s supervised release for a third time, alleging
that he had possessed a firearm while shoplifting, among other
USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 3 of 7

25-12788 Opinion of the Court 3

things. At the revocation hearing, Coleman conceded that he shop-
lifted, failed to report to his probation officer, and did not pay res-
titution. So Coleman admitted all the allegations except for pos-
sessing a firearm. The allegations admitted were Grade C viola-
tions, while the firearm possession was a Grade B violation.
At the revocation hearing, a Walmart asset-protection man-
ager with 25 years’ experience in law enforcement testified about
an encounter with Coleman. During the night of the incident, the
employee saw Coleman leave the store with merchandise without
paying. When the employee confronted Coleman outside the
store about the unpaid items, Coleman took some of the items out
of his clothes and dropped them on the ground. Then, the em-
ployee testified, Coleman reached behind his back and pulled out a
firearm, pointing the weapon at him. As a result, the employee
took cover behind a pillar in front of the store. The next day, the
employee reported the incident, and a police report was made four
days later.
The district court also heard testimony from an investigator
for the defense. The defense investigator opined that Coleman was
not holding a gun, based on surveillance footage that was played at
the hearing. Coleman also testified, and he admitted shoplifting
but denied possessing a firearm since his release from prison.
Ultimately, after hearing the conflicting accounts, the dis-
trict court credited the store employee. The court reasoned that
the employee, after 25 years in law enforcement, was capable of
identifying a firearm and that, after he saw the gun pointed at him,
USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 4 of 7

4 Opinion of the Court 25-12788

he moved behind a column. Although video footage from the
store captured the incident, the court found that the quality of the
video made it difficult to determine what Coleman was holding.
Still, the court found, the video could be reconciled with the store
employee’s testimony.
As a result, the district court found that the government had
sustained a Grade B violation, with a corresponding guideline
range of 21 to 24 months’ imprisonment, due to the statutory max-
imum. The court entered judgment and imposed a prison term of
24 months with no supervised release to follow. Coleman’s timely
appeal follows.
On appeal, Coleman contends the district court erred in de-
termining his sentence because, he says, the court’s factual deter-
mination that he possessed a firearm is clearly erroneous.
II.
We review factual findings for clear error. United States v.
Rothenberg, 610 F.3d 621, 624 (11th Cir. 2010). Factual findings are
clearly erroneous, in turn, when, although evidence may support
them, we, based on the record as a whole, are left a “with a definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.” Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573 (1985) (citation and quota-
tion marks omitted). A factual finding cannot be clearly erroneous
when the factfinder is choosing between two permissible views of
the evidence. United States v. Saingerard, 621 F.3d 1341, 1343 (11th
Cir. 2010).
USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 5 of 7

25-12788 Opinion of the Court 5

Credibility determinations are “the province of the fact
finder,” and we defer to those determinations unless they appear
to be unbelievable. United States v. Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d 744, 749
(11th Cir. 2002). If the district court’s account of the evidence is
plausible considering the entire record, we may not substitute our
own interpretation of the evidence even if we would have weighed
the evidence differently. Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573–74.
A sentence is procedurally unreasonable when a district
court bases its sentence on clearly erroneous facts. Gall v. United
States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007).
III.
The government must prove a violation of supervised re-
lease by a preponderance of the evidence. 18 U.S.C. § 3583 (e)(3).
Likewise, when a defendant challenges one of the factual bases of
his sentence, the government bears the burden of proving that fact
by a preponderance of the evidence. United States v. Aguilar-Ibarra,
740 F.3d 587, 592 (11th Cir. 2014). This standard requires proof that
the existence of a fact is more probable than its nonexistence.
United States v. Trainor, 376 F.3d 1325, 1331 (11th Cir. 2004). The
government must carry its burden with reliable and specific evi-
dence. United States v. Almedina, 686 U.S. 1312, 1315 (11th Cir.
2012).
Here, the district court did not clearly err when it found that
Coleman possessed a firearm during the shoplifting offense. This
finding was supported by the testimony of the Walmart employee
who was present during the incident. The employee testified that,
USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 6 of 7

6 Opinion of the Court 25-12788

after he confronted Coleman when he was exiting the store with
stolen merchandise, Coleman threw the merchandise on the
ground, and then he “reached behind his back and pulled out [a]
gun and pointed it in my direction.” After that, the employee re-
counted, Coleman turned the firearm sideways, moved backwards,
and turned around and ran through the parking lot. The district
court also heard from the defense’s investigator who suggested the
supposed firearm was likely an article of clothing instead. All par-
ties, including the district court, agreed the captured video cover-
age from the store was not the best quality.
The district court also considered the facts that law enforce-
ment recovered no weapon from the scene, the employee delayed
in reporting the incident, and the video evidence was of low qual-
ity. Although it recognized that “experienced people might disa-
gree,” the court credited the employee’s account, citing his 25 years
of law-enforcement experience and his ability to identify a firearm,
as well as the immediate action he took in hiding behind a pillar
after Coleman pointed a firearm at him.
We cannot say that the district court’s choice based on this
record was unreasonable. Indeed, the district court reasonably
weighed the witnesses’ credibility and chose one permissible view
of the evidence over another. See Saingerard, 621 F.3d at 1343.
In cases where testimonies are in direct conflict, the district
court’s “choice of whom to believe is conclusive on the appellate
court unless the judge credits exceedingly improbable testimony.”
Ramirez-Chilel, 289 F.3d at 749 (quotation marks omitted). Nothing
USCA11 Case: 25-12788 Document: 25-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 7 of 7

25-12788 Opinion of the Court 7

in the record shows that the district court credited evidence that
was so inconsistent or improbable on its facts that no reasonable
factfinder could accept it. See id. And given the undisputed low-
quality footage, nothing “completely” or “clearly” contradicts the
employee’s testimony. See Morton v. Kirkwood, 707 F.3d 1276, 1284
(11th Cir. 2013) (“[W]here an accurate video recording completely
and clearly contradicts a party’s testimony, that testimony becomes
incredible.”).
Because the district court’s view of the evidence was plausi-
ble in light of the record as a whole, Coleman has not shown that
the court clearly erred in finding that he possessed a firearm while
shoplifting. As a result, the government met its burden in proving
a Grade B violation of supervised release.
For the reasons we have explained, Coleman’s sentence is
not procedurally unreasonable. See Saingerard, 621 F.3d at 1343.
Accordingly, we affirm Coleman’s sentence of 24 months’ impris-
onment.
AFFIRMED.