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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Christopher Switlyk

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-12595
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (16)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 25-12595 Document: 27-1 Date Filed: 03/24/2026 Page: 1 of 21

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

---

No. 25-12595
Non-Argument Calendar

---

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

CHRISTOPHER SWITLYK,
Defendant-Appellant.

---

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 8:24-cr-00234-VMC-TGW-1

---

Before JORDAN, LAGOA, and KIDD, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Switlyk appeals his conviction for two counts of
removal of property to prevent seizure, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
2232(a). Switlyk argues that the district court abused its discretion
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2 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

by not admitting evidence of an alleged threat made by an Assistant
U.S. Attorney that occurred in February 2023. He also argues that
the district court abused its discretion by not admitting as hearsay
Switlyk’s father’s testimony about an alleged promise made by an
Assistant U.S. Attorney that occurred on November 16, 2022.
Lastly, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by ad-
mitting evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) that
Switlyk previously buried gold coins and silver bars because the ev-
idence was irrelevant, and the prejudicial effect of the evidence out-
weighed its probative value. For the reasons discussed below, we
affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In May 2024, a federal grand jury returned an indictment
charging Switlyk with four counts of knowingly disposing of and
transferring property for the purpose of preventing and impairing
the government’s lawful authority to take the property into its cus-
tody and control, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2232 (a). Switlyk
pleaded not guilty and proceeded to trial. Counts I and II related
to the disposal and transfer of two parcels of real property located
in Daytona Beach, Florida that occurred on or about November 16,
2022. Count III related to the disposal and transfer of a Tesla on or
about November 16, 2022. Count IV related to the disposal and
transfer of real property located in Tampa, Florida. Switlyk
pleaded not guilty to all counts.
As background, in 2010 Switlyk was charged with various
drug-conspiracy and money-laundering offenses stemming from
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 3

his operation of a pharmacy and the distribution of controlled sub-
stances not for a legitimate medical purpose and not in the usual
course of professional practice (the “2010 case”). Switlyk pleaded
guilty in 2012 and was sentenced to a term of 108 months’ impris-
onment, which was later reduced to 87 months.
As part of his sentence, a forfeiture money judgment for
$10,700,592 and a final order of forfeiture were entered against
Switlyk. In his plea agreement, Switlyk further agreed “to make a
full and complete disclosure of all assets over which [he] exercises
control and those which are held or controlled by a nominee.”
Also in 2012, prior to the entry of judgment in the 2010 case,
Switlyk buried in a friend’s backyard 270 bars of silver worth
$80,000 and 150 gold coins worth $250,000. The government later
seized some of the gold coins as substitute assets toward the forfei-
ture money judgment. Ultimately, the government was able to
obtain approximately $6.5 million toward the forfeiture money
judgment, but a balance of more than $4 million remained.
After his release from prison in 2017, Switlyk purchased two
real properties in Daytona Beach, Florida, of which he was the sole
titled owner. He also purchased a 2022 Tesla Model X, which was
registered in his name. And he had title to a third property located
in Tampa, Florida.
In 2022, the United States Marshals Service (“USMS”)
learned of assets that Switlyk possessed that could be forfeited as
substitute assets for the money judgment from his 2010 case. On
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4 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

November 13, 2022, the government moved ex parte in the 2010
case for a preliminary order of forfeiture for substitute assets,
which the district court granted that day. The order forfeited,
among other things, the three real properties, the Tesla, and the
contents of several financial accounts owned by Switlyk.
After learning that his accounts were frozen on November
15, 2022, the government stated that Switlyk called the U.S. Mar-
shals Service and spoke to an investigator the following day, No-
vember 16, 2022, who told him that she would send him paper-
work with the legal hold order later that day. Following the phone
call, Switlyk transferred the two properties located in Daytona
Beach and the Tesla to his father. With the Tesla, Switlyk had back-
dated the date of sale to his father, under penalty of perjury, to No-
vember 11, 2022—a few days before the preliminary order of for-
feiture. The same afternoon, but after he transferred the proper-
ties, the USMS emailed Switlyk the court’s forfeiture order that
listed the properties. The next day, Switlyk transferred the third
property, located in Tampa, to his father.
Switlyk and his father contested the forfeiture in the 2010
case. On February 15, 2023, their civil counsel sent a settlement
offer via email to an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”)
who was handling the forfeiture matter. In response, the AUSA
wrote, “It seems transferring the real properties and the Tesla
(from son to father) after learning of our forfeiture efforts would
constitute obstruction of justice, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1503 and
18 U.S.C. §2232.” The email quoted sections 1503 and 2232 and
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 5

continued: “It strikes me that by (1) executing and recording the
quitclaim deeds and (2) transferring title to the Tesla, the Switlyks
were both corruptly endeavoring to obstruct, or impede, the due
administration of justice and impeding a criminal forfeiture. Before
responding to your settlement offer, it would be helpful to know if
you agree with my conclusion.”
The government deposed Switlyk and his father. The par-
ties ultimately reached a settlement agreement in which the Swit-
lyks agreed to relinquish their claims to the properties subject to
forfeiture and to consent to the forfeiture of the properties. In ex-
change, the government agreed to forgo further collection efforts
against Switlyk as to the money judgment. The court then entered
its final forfeiture order.
Returning to the current case, the federal grand jury indict-
ment was returned in May 2024. Switlyk moved to dismiss his in-
dictment based on purported prosecutorial misconduct. He relied
on the forfeiture AUSA’s February 2023 email, which Switlyk char-
acterized as a threat of criminal prosecution. The district court de-
nied the motion as untimely and, alternatively, without merit. The
court found, among other things, that the AUSA “did not threaten
either Switlyk or [his father] with criminal prosecution” and that,
although the AUSA “expressed an opinion that Switlyk’s and [his
father’s] transfers were unlawful, the email does not include a
threat to prosecute either man criminally.”
Switlyk next moved to exclude references at trial to the con-
victions in his 2010 case and the details of the underlying criminal
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6 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

activity, and to admit a redacted version of the plea agreement.
The United States, meanwhile, moved to admit the indictment and
judgment in the 2010 case as to only the money-laundering convic-
tions and relevant forfeiture provisions, as well as evidence that
Switlyk had previously buried gold and silver in a friend’s backyard.
As for Switlyk’s burying of the gold and silver, the govern-
ment explained that, despite his obligations under the plea agree-
ment in the 2010 case, Switlyk had denied having other assets sub-
ject to forfeiture. Thus, the evidence was relevant under Federal
Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove his state of mind, intent, and mo-
tive to commit the instant offenses.
In an order resolving both motions, the district court ex-
cluded references to Switlyk’s money-laundering convictions and
the details of the underlying criminal activity but granted the
United States’ motion as to the admissibility of his burying of the
gold and silver. In addressing Rule 404(b), the court found that
there “is proof that Switlyk purchased and hid valuable gold coins
and silver bars during his previous criminal case,” that “Switlyk’s
concealment of other valuable assets so the government would not
find them is highly probative of his intent and motive in this case,”
and that Switlyk “will not be unduly prejudiced by introduction of
the evidence relating to the hidden gold coins and silver bars.” As
to the evidence’s probative value, the court explained:
Here, the major issue at trial will be Switlyk’s state of
mind or intent. That is, whether he transferred the
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 7

properties to his father in order to prevent govern-
ment seizure (as the government maintains) or be-
cause his father had a financial interest in the proper-
ties (as Switlyk maintains). Thus, evidence of Swit-
lyk’s previous attempts to hide valuable assets from
government seizure under the same forfeiture judg-
ment is probative of Switlyk’s intent and motive in
transferring multiple properties to his father . . . . This
evidence also rebuts Switlyk’s alternate explanation
for why he transferred the properties to his father.
As for the duration of time between the prior act and the instant
offenses, the court found that the acts were not “too remote in
time” to lack probative value, observing that the prior concealment
was “allegedly conducted to avoid forfeiture of these assets to the
government under the same forfeiture judgment at issue in this
case.” (emphasis in original). The court further agreed to provide
an appropriate instruction to the jury to limit any unfair prejudice.
The government also moved to exclude the eventual settle-
ment agreement and offers to compromise the forfeiture matter,
relying on Federal Rules of Evidence 401, 403, and 408 and United
States v. Arias, 431 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir. 2005). In the same motion,
the government moved to exclude references to Switlyk’s efforts
to seek advice of counsel around the time of the property transfers.
On the first day of trial, the district court granted the motion in part
and denied it in part. The court permitted Switlyk to introduce
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8 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

testimony regarding some aspects of the settlement agreement and
his efforts to contact counsel.
Switlyk’s trial lasted three days. USMS personnel testified
regarding the case’s background, including prior forfeiture efforts,
the preliminary order of forfeiture, and Switlyk’s subsequent trans-
fers. The forfeiture settlement offer came up during cross-exami-
nation of the USMS investigator. The following exchange took
place outside the presence of the jury:
[Defense counsel]: . . . I do intend to ask whether, in
response to that settlement offer, [the forfeiture
AUSA] threatened criminal charges against the Swit-
lyks . . . .
...
[Prosecutor]: Your Honor, that’s getting into hearsay
as to what [the AUSA] said in an email—
...
[Defense counsel]: . . . It’s not for the truth, your
Honor. It’s to show the effect on the Switlyks that
they gave back all these properties under threat of
criminal prosecution, which then, of course, hap-
pened anyway.
The Court: . . . [Y]ou can ask [the AUSA] that. [The
AUSA] will be here. You’re calling him as a witness.
[Prosecutor]: No. No, your Honor, not anymore. . .
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 9

. I figured he might be needed for, like, a rebuttal
case, but I was not planning on calling him in my case-
in-chief.
When the parties revisited the purported threat evidence,
the district court stated its ruling on the matter:
The Court: . . . It’s one thing to tell your story. It’s
quite another thing when the timeline just doesn’t
make any sense. It just doesn’t make any sense here.
Let’s go back. Transfer, November 2022. Settlement
agreement, February 2023. What did [the AUSA] say
or didn’t say is kind of irrelevant, honestly. I mean, it
really is. Because the crime is November 2022, the
transfer. Who cares what happened afterwards?
...
The Court: … [I]t’s going to confuse—it’s confusing
the jury. I mean, I had to sit here and take notes on
the dates and everything so that I would understand
it and, you know, I’ve done this stuff for a long time.
So I mean, the operative date here, would you agree,
Mr. Roberts, is November 2022, right, when the stuff
took place?
Prosecutor: Yes, your Honor.
...
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10 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

The Court: . . . So what I said earlier was the settle-
ment agreement could come in to prevent prejudice
to the defendant that might result from the jury think-
ing that he got to keep the property, so he has the
fancy car, whatever it was, the Tesla or something
like that. Was it the Tesla?
Defense counsel: Yes, your Honor.
The Court: I know it was a fancy car. Okay. He got
to keep the Tesla and he got to keep the properties.
And so now you’re trying to use the admission of set-
tlement as an argument that he’s being treated un-
fairly by the government. I mean, you’ve really—you
know, it’s like give him an inch, they’ll take a mile. I
mean, that’s what you’ve done, Mr. Rankin. I mean,
you’ve taken ten miles. I said this and you’re like way
out there. No. So that’s my ruling on that matter.
The court thus excluded the purported threat.
As for Switlyk’s burying of the gold and silver, a former in-
vestigator involved in forfeiture efforts related to the 2010 case tes-
tified regarding the matter. The district court overruled Switlyk’s
renewed objection to the evidence under Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 401 and 403. Consistently with its prior order, the court then
instructed the jury as follows:
You have just heard evidence of acts allegedly done
by the defendant that may be similar to those charged
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 11

in the indictment, but were committed on other oc-
casions. You must not consider this evidence to de-
cide if the defendant engaged in the activity alleged in
the indictment, but you may consider this evidence
to decide whether the defendant had the state of mind
or intent necessary to commit the crime charged in
the indictment, the defendant had a motive or an op-
portunity to commit the acts charged in the indict-
ment, the defendant acted according to a plan or in
preparation to commit a crime, or the defendant
committed the acts charged in the indictment by ac-
cident or mistake.
After the government rested, Switlyk moved for a judgment
of acquittal. The district court denied the motion.
While Switlyk elected not to testify, he called his father as a
witness. The father maintained that he had loaned his son money
to purchase the real properties and Tesla pursuant to unrecorded
promissory notes and that he had directed the transfer of the titles
based on his son’s default on the loans. He also testified that he
had expressed concerns to his son about his son’s transferring the
Tampa property after receipt of the preliminary order of forfeiture,
which expressly identified the property as subject to forfeiture. He
testified that, during a conversation with “the attorney,” there was
a comment made “point-blank, if your parents can show documen-
tation that they paid for these properties, I will take them off the
list.” The government objected and moved to strike the testimony
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12 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

as hearsay. The district court sustained the government’s objec-
tion.
The jury found Switlyk guilty on Counts III and IV, which
pertained to the transfers of a 2022 Tesla Model X and the property
located in Tampa and not guilty on the remaining counts. The dis-
trict court sentenced him to serve 18 months’ imprisonment,
which was at the bottom of the applicable sentencing guidelines
range.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“All evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discre-
tion.” United States v. Akwuba, 7 F.4th 1299, 1313 (11th Cir. 2021).
“The abuse of discretion standard has been described as allowing a
range of choice for the district court, so long as that choice does
not constitute a clear error of judgment,” and we defer to the dis-
trict court’s decisions to a considerable extent. Id. (quotation
marks omitted). Even if the district court’s ruling violated the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence, we will not reverse if the error was harm-
less. United States v. Holley, 166 F.4th 139, 148 (11th Cir. 2026). An
error is harmless unless “there is a reasonable likelihood that [it]
affected the defendant’s substantial rights.” United States v. Haw-
kins, 905 F.2d 1489, 1493 (11th Cir. 1990). We need not reverse a
conviction if the evidentiary error “had no substantial influence on
the outcome and sufficient evidence uninfected by error supports
the verdict.” United States v. Fortenberry, 971 F.2d 717, 722 (11th Cir.
1992).
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 13

III. ANALYSIS
First, Switlyk argues that the district court erred by exclud-
ing as hearsay evidence that the AUSA threatened Switlyk with
prosecution if they did not settle the case during a February 2023
settlement agreement. He frames the district court’s ruling as
based on the grounds of hearsay, but the record shows that the dis-
trict court concluded that this evidence was irrelevant and likely to
confuse the jury. The district court’s decision to not admit evi-
dence of an alleged threat did not constitute a clear error of judg-
ment.
Only relevant evidence is admissible at trial. See Fed. R.
Evid. 402. “Evidence is relevant if: (a) it has any tendency to make
a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence;
and (b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” Fed.
R. Evid. 401. Relevant evidence may be excluded “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the
following: unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the
jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumula-
tive evidence.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. “Although a defendant has a
right to present crucial, relevant evidence to his defense, he does
not have a right to introduce evidence that does not bear a logical
relationship to an element of the offense or an affirmative defense,
whether direct or indirect.” United States v. Watkins, 42 F.4th 1278,
1288 (11th Cir. 2022) (quotation marks omitted).
Switlyk argues that the threat evidence should have been ad-
mitted because it was not offered to prove that the threat was
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14 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

backed by fact but rather was offered to show the effect the state-
ment had on Switlyk, namely, intimidating him into surrendering
the property. But because the evidence related to a statement
made in February 2023, it is not relevant to Switlyk’s intent at the
time of the November 2022 property transfers.
It was thus within the district court’s considerable discretion
to conclude that a statement that occurred in February 2023 was
not probative of Switlyk’s intent at the time he transferred the as-
sets in November 2022, which was the primary fact at issue in this
case. See Watkins, 42 F.4th at 1288; Fed. R. Evid. 401. Additionally,
the district court acted within its discretion under Rule 403 in ruling
that introducing this evidence would confuse the jury as to the
timeline of the relevant offense conduct. See Akwuba, 7 F.4th at
1313; Fed. R. Evid. 403. Because the district court’s ruling was
based on relevancy and Rule 403, the issue of whether the state-
ment was hearsay need not be broached. We thus affirm the dis-
trict court’s exclusion of evidence that the AUSA allegedly threat-
ened Switlyk with prosecution.
Next, Switlyk argues that the district court erred by exclud-
ing as hearsay the following statement from the AUSA: “if your
parents can show documentation that they paid for these proper-
ties, I will take them off the list.” He argues that this statement
should not have been excluded because it was offered to show the
effect the statement had on Switlyk and his father, namely, that the
statement erroneously induced them to believe that the forfeiture
would be nullified. Denying the jury insight into his statement of
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 15

mind at the time of the property transfer, Switlyk says, entitles him
to a new trial. We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion by not admitting the alleged promise.
Hearsay is a “statement that: (1) the declarant does not make
while testifying at the current trial or hearing; and (2) a party offers
in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted in the state-
ment.” Fed. R. Evid. 801(c). Hearsay is generally not admissible.
Fed. R. Evid. 802. “Generally, an out-of-court statement admitted
to show its effect on the hearer is not hearsay.” United States v. Ri-
vera, 780 F.3d 1084, 1092 (11th Cir. 2015).
A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind is
not excluded under the rule against hearsay. Fed. R. Evid. 803(3).
This exception to the rule against hearsay refers to the state of mind
of the declarant, not the state of mind of the listener. United States
v. De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d 1202, 1216 (11th Cir. 2010). Even if a
district court erroneously excluded a statement on the grounds that
it was hearsay, we can affirm a district court’s evidentiary ruling if
it was correct on any ground, such as relevancy or the grounds as
stated in Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v. Elysee, 993
F.3d 1309, 1338-39 (11th Cir. 2021).
When an out-of-court statement is offered for a non-hearsay
purpose, “the primary risk is that the jury will take the statement[]
not for the permissible use, but for the truth of the matter as-
serted,” and this danger is greatest when the statement bears di-
rectly on the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Id. at 1342. We
have also noted that out-of-court statements offered to illuminate
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16 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

the state of mind of an individual other than the defendant were
properly excluded as irrelevant. See United States v. Jeri, 869 F.3d
1247, 1261 (11th Cir. 2017) (noting that, to the extent transcripts
between the defendant and Lopez were offered to illuminate the
state of mind of either the defendant or Lopez, they were properly
excluded because the transcripts revealed Lopez’s state of mind,
which was irrelevant because Lopez was not on trial).
Here, the district court did not err in not admitting a state-
ment about an alleged promise made by the AUSA because, even
if the statement was admissible as not hearsay, the statement was
not relevant and its probative value was outweighed by the danger
of misleading the jury. As a threshold matter, if the statement was
offered for the truth of the matter asserted, it would be inadmissi-
ble as hearsay because it was not being offered to show the AUSA’s
state of mind, but rather was being offered to show Switlyk’s fa-
ther’s, and by extension defendant Switlyk’s, state of mind upon
hearing the statement. See De La Cruz Suarez, 601 F.3d at 1216. If
the statement was being offered not for the truth that the proper-
ties would be taken off the list, but rather for the effect that this
statement had on the Switlyks, as argued by Switlyk, then the state-
ment would not be considered hearsay. See Rivera, 780 F.3d at 1092.
However, we need not attempt to parse this nuance of trial
because the district court’s ruling can still be affirmed on the
grounds that the statement was not relevant or would mislead the
jury. See Elysee, 993 F.3d at 1338–39, 1342. The statement was not
relevant regarding the transfer of the Tesla in Count III because the
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 17

Tesla was transferred before the phone call where the statement
was allegedly made, and therefore it is not probative of Switlyk’s
intent at the time of that transfer and can be affirmed on that
ground. Fed. R. Evid. 401.
Regarding the transfer of the Tampa property in Count IV,
the statement is potentially relevant to Switlyk’s intent, but ulti-
mately, introducing the statement into evidence would likely have
misled the jury. Switlyk stated during the trial that this evidence
was being offered to show his father’s reaction to the AUSA’s out
of court statement, which was irrelevant given that the father was
not the defendant in this case. See Jeri, 869 F.3d at 1261. However,
Switlyk’s father did testify that Switlyk was with him during the
November 16, 2022, phone call where the AUSA made the alleged
statement, so it is plausible that this statement could have had the
same effect on Switlyk as it did on the father, making the facts here
differ from those in Jeri. See Jeri, 869 F.3d at 1261.
Additionally, the statement that the properties would be
taken off the list if Switlyk could prove that they belonged to his
father is probative of Switlyk’s intent at the time of the property
transfer, which occurred the day after the phone call where the al-
leged statement was made. But despite the potential probative
value of the statement, the risk of misleading the jury would likely
have been high because the jury may have taken the statements for
the truth that the properties would actually be taken off the forfei-
ture order, rather than for speculative impact the statement may
have had on Switlyk’s state of mind. See Elysee, 993 F.3d at 1342.
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18 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

Regardless, even if the district court did err, any error was
harmless because there was sufficient other evidence in the record
that supported the verdict. See Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 722. For
example, as to Count III, there was evidence that on November 16,
2022, Switlyk backdated the sale for the Tesla under penalty of per-
jury to November 11, 2022. And as to Count IV, Switlyk’s father
testified that the Tampa property was transferred on November 17,
2022, rather than November 16, 2022, because the transfer had to
be done in a different county. We thus affirm the district court’s
exclusion of the AUSA’s alleged promise.
Finally, Switlyk argues that the district court erred by admit-
ting testimony regarding his act of burying gold coins and silver
bars in a friend’s backyard in 2012 because this evidence was non-
relevant, prejudicial propensity evidence. He argues that this evi-
dence should have been excluded because it was not relevant to
any issue other than his character and that the probative value of
this evidence was substantially outweighed by its undue prejudicial
effect.
Rule 404(b) of the Federal Rules of Evidence prohibits the
introduction of evidence of a “crime, wrong, or act” to “prove a
person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character.” Fed. R. Evid.
404(b)(1). It does, however, allow such evidence for other pur-
poses, “such as proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2).
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 19

We have held that Rule 404(b) is a “rule of inclusion” that
generally favors admission of such evidence if it is core to the pros-
ecution’s case. United States v. Karpordelis, 569 F.3d 1291, 1313 (11th
Cir. 2009) (quotation marks omitted). We apply a three-part test
to determine the admissibility of rule 404(b) evidence: (1) the evi-
dence must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s char-
acter; (2) sufficient evidence must be presented for a jury to find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the
extrinsic act; and (3) the probative value of the evidence must not
be substantially outweighed by its undue prejudice, and the evi-
dence must satisfy Federal Rule of Evidence 403. United States v.
Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007).
Factors to be considered include the overall similarity of the
extrinsic and charged offenses, the time separating the extrinsic and
charged offenses, the government’s need for the evidence, and
“whether it appeared at the commencement of trial that the de-
fendant would contest the issue” for which the evidence is to be
used. United States v. Dorsey, 819 F.2d 1055, 1061 (11th Cir. 1987).
“A defendant who enters a not guilty plea makes intent a material
issue which imposes a substantial burden on the government to
prove intent, which it may prove by qualifying Rule 404(b) evi-
dence absent affirmative steps by the defendant to remove intent
as an issue.” United States v. Zapata, 139 F.3d 1355, 1358 (11th Cir.
1998). We have “refrained from adopting a bright-line rule with
respect to temporal proximity.” United States v. Matthews, 431 F.3d
1296, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005); see also United States v. Lampley, 68 F.3d
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20 Opinion of the Court 25-12595

1296, 1300 (11th Cir. 1995) (upholding the admission of Rule 404(b)
evidence where the other acts occurred 15 years earlier than the
charged offense).
A court’s limiting instruction can reduce the risk of undue
prejudice. United States v. Ramirez, 426 F.3d 1344, 1354 (11th Cir.
2005); see also United States v. Diaz-Lizaraza, 981 F.2d 1216, 1225
(11th Cir. 1993) (noting that, where the district court issued a lim-
iting instruction both at the presentation of the evidence and in its
final charge to the jury, “any unfair prejudice possibly caused by its
introduction was mitigated”).
We conclude that the district court did not abuse its discre-
tion in admitting evidence of Switlyk burying gold coins and silver
bars because the evidence was probative of Switlyk’s intent, which
was the primary issue in this case, and any undue prejudice was
mitigated by the court’s two limiting jury instructions. By pleading
not guilty, Switlyk made his intent a material issue, and his intent
while transferring the properties was the primary issue in this case.
See Zapata, 139 F.3d at 1358; Karpordelis, 569 F.3d at 1313. It was
also not in dispute that Switlyk buried the gold coins and silver
bars. See Edouard, 485 F.3d at 1344.
Although the conduct occurred ten years earlier, the evi-
dence of Switlyk burying the gold coins and silver bars was not so
remote, especially because the evidence involved similar conduct
and related to the same forfeiture proceedings. See Dorsey, 819 F.2d
at 1061; Lampley, 68 F.3d at 1300. Switlyk argues that he buried the
coins and bars before a final forfeiture order was in place, but it is
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25-12595 Opinion of the Court 21

clear from the record that this act occurred after he had been
charged in the 2010 criminal case and while he was undergoing for-
feiture proceedings. Further, any unfair prejudice was mitigated
by the district court’s multiple limiting instructions. See Ramirez,
426 F.3d at 1354; Diaz-Lizaraza, at 1225.
As stated above, even if the district court did err, any error
was harmless because there was sufficient other evidence in the
record that supported the verdict. See Fortenberry, 971 F.2d at 722.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, we affirm Switlyk’s conviction on all
grounds.
AFFIRMED.