TWH Legal Services Ltd v Niazi - Libel Claim Preliminary Issues

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  TWH Legal Services Ltd (t/a B&l Solicitors) & Anor v Niazi & Anor [2026] EWHC 746 (KB) (27 March 2026)

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[2026] EWHC 746 (KB) | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 746 (KB) |
| | | Case No: KB-2025-000304 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
MEDIA AND COMMUNICATIONS LIST

| | | Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
| | | 27/03/2026 |
B e f o r e :

DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE GUY VASSALL-ADAMS KC

Between:
| | (1) TWH LEGAL SERVICES LIMITED T/A B&L SOLICITORS
(2) ELAINE LIDDLE | Claimants |
| | - and - | |
| | (1) SHANAZ NIAZI
(2) ELIZABETH RADCLIFFE | Defendants |

**Leo Davidson (instructed by Fitchett & Co) for the Claimants
Adrian Carr (direct access instruction) for the First Defendant

Hearing dates: 4 March 2026**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

3. This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 27 March 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
5. .............................
7. DHCJ Guy Vassall-Adams KC :
9. This is a trial of preliminary issues in a libel claim relating to three online reviews concerning a solicitor.
12. The Second Claimant, Ms Elaine Liddle, is a solicitor and the owner of the First Claimant, TWH Legal Services Limited ("TWH"), a firm of solicitors based in Croydon, which trades under the name B&L Solicitors ("B&L") ("the Company"). The Company describes itself as providing a range of legal services, including in relation to wills, trusts and probate.
15. The First Defendant, Ms Shanaz Niazi, worked for the Company as a Probate Executive for about two months between December 2022 and January 2023. The Second Defendant, Elizabeth Radcliffe, is a retired solicitor and was the principal of a firm called Rowe Radcliffe, a high street solicitor's firm based in Surrey, which closed in 2023.
18. On 28 January 2025, the Claimants issued proceedings for breach of contract, breach of confidence and unlawful means conspiracy against both Defendants, along with a defamation claim solely against the First Defendant. The claims against both defendants concern allegations that the First Defendant took client files and will banks (depositories of wills and other probate documents held by solicitors on behalf of clients) from the Claimants and that she conspired with the Second Defendant to advance their own economic interests at the expense of the First Claimant's.
21. The Defendants deny all of these allegations. In summary, the First Defendant's case in her Defence is that she started working with the Claimants on the expectation of working for a new firm that they said they were setting up. In the event, it became clear to her that what the Claimants really wanted to do was to acquire her clients that she brought with her from a previous firm and to get access to will banks that had originally belonged to the Second Defendant. On her case, the First Defendant did nothing wrong in taking her clients and documents she was entitled to retain with her.
24. I include this account simply by way of background, as I am concerned here solely with the libel claim and with a trial of the following preliminary issues ordered by Judge Amstrong on 25 October 2025, pursuant to CPR PD 53B para 6, by which I am asked to decide:
27. (i) the natural and ordinary meaning of the three reviews;
28. (ii) whether the meanings are defamatory of the Claimants at common law;
29. (iii) whether the statement complained of was, or contained, a statement of fact and/or an expression of opinion; and
30. (iv) insofar as the statement complained of was an expression of opinion, whether it indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion.
32. In accordance with the recommended practice referred to in Blake v Fox [2023] EWCA Civ 1000 at 20, I read these reviews in the form in which they were published and noted down my initial impressions on meaning before reading the skeleton arguments or hearing the parties' submissions at the hearing.
35. The Reviews
37. This libel claim relates to three reviews published by the First Defendant in the period April ? September 2024.
40. On 25 April 2024, the First Defendant published or caused to be published on the website Review a Solicitor, https://reviewasolicitor.com, the following "1-star" review (using a profile with the username "Shanaz") ("Review 1"):
43. "This lady is extremely dishonest and dodgy
45. AVOID !!!!! Worked for this lady for several weeks about 7 and she incompetent on a level you wouldn't believe. She kept promising to pay wages and didn't pay a penny. In the end I walked out and took my files with me and clients that wanted me to take their files with me. Elaine Liddle claimed the clients were hers even though she had never met any of them. I had already transferred client money over to her firm from another solicitors I had worked at and Elaine refused to transfer client money unless the file was transferred back to her firm so that she could make money on them. 99% of the client insisted for their late relatives money and files to be transferred out of this lady's firm. She also scammed Elizabeth Radcliffe out of her Rowe Radcliffe Will banks by making her hand over the wills and sign a document promising to pay Elizabeth commission on any probate work generated from the Will banks however Elaine has not done this and was lucky that Elizabeth didn't sue her. This lady also lives in Reading but doesn't tell clients around Coulsdon area that she lives in Reading. In terms of requesting original wills from her I left the original Will or Patricia Hussey in a drawer at Airport House however when formally requesting it from Elaine she claimed she doesn't have it. She just lied and in my opinion is a malicious natured person. I've never known a solicitor like her in my whole life. I was also told she was sacked from her last job for incompetency. She also has dyscalculia and can't do maths. While working for her I saw her get one clients papers and mistakenly put it in another."
47. On 25 July 2024, the First Defendant posted on https://reviews.birdeye.com the following "1-star" review (using the profile name "Hello Me S") ("Review 2"):
50. "My opinion she is a rubbish dishonest dodgy Malicious lady whose ex husband was a convicted criminal for drug driving. My opinion She is a bare faced liar and Is a fraudster she stole the Will banks off Elizabeth Radcliffe. She doesn't know the law so makes it up ! A devious and sly character. Don't use her"
52. At some point prior to 17 September 2024 ? according to the First Defendant, on 26 July 2024 ? the First Defendant posted the following "1 star" review on https://reviews.birdeye.com, this time under the profile name "Hello Me SS", ("Review 3"):
55. "DO NOT USE THIS WOMAN ELAINE LIDDLE**
56. It's my opinion that she is a DECEITFUL MALICIOUS NASTY PIECE OF WORK A CROOK AND A TOTAL FRAUDSTER AND A BARE FACED LIAR WHO IS TOTALLY INCOMPETENT !!!
57. DO NOT TRUST HER TO DEAL WITH CLIENT MONEY AT ALL !! HOW SHE EVEN QUALIFIED AS A SOLICITOR IS A MYSTERY.
58. Very surprised that she hasn't been STRUCK OFF yet by the SRA with the number of complaints she has had regarding holding onto client money and so many other issues.
59. She also doesn't live in the Coulsdon area at all but lives in Reading. She doesn't like Coulsdon and Croydon clients to know that she lives in Reading and doesn't tell clients . She just has a room in Airport House Purley rented so one assistant called Amanda can be there and it then seems the firm is Coulsdon Croydon based.
60. We only know of 2 employees at this firm Elaine Liddle and her assistant Amanda. Her firm B&L Solicitors has been trading for less than 2 years and in my opinion the foundations of it was based on THEFT of Elizabeth Radcliifes Will banks. Without the stolen Will banks this firm could not exist. She was meant to pay Elizabeth money for probate work secured but to date hasn't paid a penny.
61. Please look up her address on companies house. I have attached screenshots from companies house.
62. She deceived the owner of Rowe Radcliffe Solicitors out of her client Will banks . Elizabeth Radcliffe who was a solicitor in Coulsdon for 40 years had the Rowe Radcliffe Will bank and then from 2019 she had the Percy Holt and Nowers Will bank as she took over PHN. Elaine forced and pressured Elizabeth to sign a sale document for the 2 Will banks promising orally to pay Elizabeth money for the Will banks but once she got the signature on the document and the physical wills , Elaine did not pay a penny to Elizabeth and clearly had no intentions to.
63. Elaine then went onto to set up her own business ,B & L Solicitors , having defrauded Elizabeth Radcliffe out of her Will banks. She was meant to pay for probate work secured by to date hasn't paid anything.
64. It's my opinion Elaine has no shame at all lying to people so please AVOID. Don't get fooled by this ladies charm and friendliness. I would also recommend don't let her hold your wills or money and you will find she might recommend you to another law firm Streeter Marshalls but that's because she has gone and done some deal with that firm with the stolen Will banks that she defrauded Elizabeth Radcliffe out of.
65. She even said that she was going to store all the clients wills in her garage in Reading. This is without any clients knowing of course.
66. Her firm is a one man band consisting of just HER and an assistant called Amanda. Virtually all the services on Elaine's website she cannot do but has to encourage and pressure clients to go off to Streeter Marshall. She is a lady in her 70s who qualified as a solicitor in her very late 50s and in my opinion I have never seen or known anyone so malicious devious and incompetent and dishonest and unprofessional as this lady.
67. Despicable disgraceful and such dishonest behaviour !!!!!
68. One of Elaine's previous firms of employment said they sacked her due to how incompetent she was.
69. Elaine Liddle also communicated how her ex husband was a convicted criminal and how he did drink and drug driving. Please see attached text messages from Elaine Liddle. I've never known before for a solicitor to have been married to a convicted criminal. She kept talking about "magic mushrooms" when I didn't even know what they were. Elaine was familiar with "magic mushrooms" as she says her ex husband used to take the drugs.
70. She also said that her only child hasn't spoken to her for over 15 years. As sad as that is not sure why she would advertise that to someone she doesn't know very well maybe she wanted victim sympathy.
71. Having dealt with Elaine Liddle and witnessed her deceitful and malicious behaviour I feel sympathy for her only child that chooses not to speak to her.
72. DO YOURSELF A FAVOUR AND AVOID HER !!!"
75. The Parties' Positions on Meaning
77. The Claimants' plead in their Particulars of Claim that the ordinary and natural meaning of each of the three Reviews is that:
80. a. The Second Claimant (a practicing solicitor) (i) is dishonest; (ii) lacks integrity; (iii) fails to comply with her duties to her clients; (iv) committed fraud; (v) is incompetent; (vi) handles client affairs negligently; and (vii) ought to be struck off as a solicitor.
82. b. Prospective clients should not retain the services of the First Claimant and existing clients should cease to do so.
83. It should be noted that the Claimants have pleaded one identical meaning for all three Reviews. This is an unorthodox approach and I address this further below. The First Defendant has set out her case on meaning in a document entitled "First Defendant's Notice of Her Case on Preliminary Issues". Unusually, the First Defendant admits the Claimants' pleaded meanings set out above.
85. However, the parties diverge over whether the words are defamatory at common law, whether they are statements of fact or opinion and if the latter, whether the facts are sufficiently indicated.
87. In summary, the Claimants' position is that the words complained of are all defamatory at common law and they are exclusively statements of fact. In the alternative their position is that if I were to find that any of the statements is a statement of opinion, it is a bare comment unsupported by any facts. If I were to accept the Claimants' position the First Defendant would have to defend the claim on the basis of a defence that applies exclusively to statements of fact, such as Truth or Public Interest.
89. The First Defendant submits that the statements complained of are not defamatory at common law. If I were against the First Defendant and found that the Reviews are defamatory at common law, she argues that these are exclusively statements of opinion, and the facts on which they are based are set out in the Reviews. If the First Defendant is right, she would be able to defend the claim on the basis of Honest Opinion.
92. Legal Principles
93. Defamatory at common law
94. The test for whether a publication is defamatory at common law is set out in the Court of Appeal's judgment in Corbyn v Millett [2021] EMLR 19, where Warby LJ (with whom Sharp P and Vos MR agreed) said at [9]:
97. "At common law, a meaning is defamatory and therefore actionable if it satisfies two requirements. The first, known as "the consensus requirement", is that the meaning must be one that "tends to lower the claimant in the estimation of right-thinking people generally." The Judge has to determine "whether the behaviour or views that the offending statement attributes to a claimant are contrary to common, shared values of our society":? Monroe v Hopkins? [2017] EWHC 433 (QB),? [2017] 4 WLR 68?[51]. The second requirement is known as the "threshold of seriousness". To be defamatory, the imputation must be one that would tend to have a "substantially adverse effect" on the way that people would treat the claimant:? Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd? [2010] EWHC 1414 (QB),? [2011] 1 WLR 1985?98."
99. In addition to satisfying the common law test, today a claimant must show that the publication has caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to his reputation, under s.1 of the Defamation Act 2013. This test focusses not on the defamatory tendency of the words but on whether as a matter of fact they caused serious harm to the claimant's reputation. However, serious harm is not one of the issues for this preliminary issues trial.
102. Natural and ordinary meanings
104. In most cases the court's task at a preliminary issues trial is to identify the natural and ordinary meaning of the words complained of. This is the single meaning which the words complained of would convey to the hypothetical ordinary, reasonable reader of those words. No evidence is admissible on the natural and ordinary meaning save for the publication itself but the court may also take into account matters of general knowledge, described by Nicklin J as, "Matters of common knowledge: facts so well-known that for practical purposes everybody knows them" (Blake v Fox [2022] EWHC 3542 (KB), [2023] EMLR 12 at [25(i)]).
107. Applying this purely objective test, the court must enter into the mindset of the ordinary, reasonable reader. For this purpose, the courts have developed a series of well-established principles for deciding meaning in libel cases. The classic summary of these principles was given by Sir Anthony Clarke MR in Jeynes v News Magazines [2008] EWCA Civ 130 at [14], restated and elaborated by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis v Random House Group [2019] EWHC 48 (QB) and reaffirmed by the Supreme Court in Stocker v Stocker [2019] UKSC 17, [2020] AC 593 at [35]-[38].
110. The restatement of the principles governing meaning in libel cases by Nicklin J in Koutsogiannis at [12] is a very helpful reference point in applications of this kind:
112. "i)? The governing principle is reasonableness.
113. (ii)? The intention of the publisher is irrelevant.
114. (iii)? The hypothetical reasonable reader is not na?ve but he is not unduly suspicious. He can read between the lines. He can read in an implication more readily than a lawyer and may indulge in a certain amount of loose thinking but he must be treated as being a man who is not avid for scandal and someone who does not, and should not, select one bad meaning where other non-defamatory meanings are available. A reader who always adopts a bad meaning where a less serious or non-defamatory meaning is available is not reasonable: s/he is avid for scandal. But always to adopt the less derogatory meaning would also be unreasonable: it would be na?ve.
115. (iv)? Over-elaborate analysis should be avoided and the court should certainly not take a too literal approach to the task.
116. (v)? Consequently, a judge providing written reasons for conclusions on meaning should not fall into the trap of conducting too detailed an analysis of the various passages relied on by the respective parties.
117. (vi)? Any meaning that emerges as the produce of some strained, or forced, or utterly unreasonable interpretation should be rejected.
118. (vii)? It follows that it is not enough to say that by some person or another the words might be understood in a defamatory sense.
119. (viii)? The publication must be read as a whole, and any "bane and antidote" taken together. Sometimes, the context will clothe the words in a more serious defamatory meaning (for example the classic "rogues' gallery" case). In other cases, the context will weaken (even extinguish altogether) the defamatory meaning that the words would bear if they were read in isolation (e.g. bane and antidote cases).
120. (ix)? In order to determine the natural and ordinary meaning of the statement of which the claimant complains, it is necessary to take into account the context in which it appeared and the mode of publication.
121. (x)? No evidence, beyond the publication complained of, is admissible in determining the natural and ordinary meaning.
122. (xi)? The hypothetical reader is taken to be representative of those who would read the publication in question. The court can take judicial notice of facts which are common knowledge, but should beware of reliance on impressionistic assessments of the characteristics of a publication's readership.
123. (xii)? Judges should have regard to the impression the article has made upon them themselves in considering what impact it would have made on the hypothetical reasonable reader.
124. (xiii)? In determining the single meaning, the court is free to choose the correct meaning; it is not bound by the meanings advanced by the parties (save that it cannot find a meaning that is more injurious than the claimant's pleaded meaning)."
125. Fact or opinion
127. The honest opinion defence is set out in s.3 of the Defamation Act 2013. The first condition for the defence, under s.3(2), is that "the statement complained of is a statement of opinion."
130. The court's approach to determining whether a statement is one of fact or opinion is summarised in Koutsogiannis at [16]:
133. (i) The statement must be recognisable as comment, as distinct from an imputation of fact.
135. ii) Opinion is something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation, etc.
137. iii) The ultimate question is how the word would strike the ordinary reasonable reader. The subject matter and context of the words may be an important indicator of whether they are fact or opinion.
139. iv) Some statements which are, by their nature and appearance opinion, are nevertheless treated as statements of fact where, for instance, the opinion implies that a claimant has done something but does not indicate what that something is, i.e. the statement is a bare comment.
141. v) Whether an allegation that someone has acted "dishonestly" or "criminally" is an allegation of fact or expression of opinion will very much depend upon context. There is no fixed rule that a statement that someone has been dishonest must be treated as an allegation of fact.
143. As Sharp LJ held in Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 933 at [39], "The ultimate determinant? is "how the statement would strike the ordinary reasonable reader? - that is, whether the statement is discernibly comment" having regard to the subject matter, the nature of the allegation and the context of the relevant words. This is encapsulated in the third Koutsogiannis principle set out above.
146. There are some statements, which though they might appear as opinion, are treated as statements of fact i.e. bare comments (the fourth principle). There is a helpful explanation in Gatley on Libel and Slander, 13 th edition, para 13-008, where the authors state:
149. "On occasion, a defamatory statement might seem to have been intended to be understood as a comment but is not defensible by an honest opinion defence. For instance, a publisher might state "in my view, Jones is a disgrace", without giving any indication of what the underpinning facts are or even that there are any such facts. Alternatively, a speaker might allude to a matter which he believes to be common background knowledge?"given what we all know ?"?but misreads the audience and leaves them underinformed as to any alleged factual underpinning for his remarks. The language used clearly implies that an evaluative process has been undertaken by the publisher, but the failure to present or indicate the reasoning prevents the audience from understanding adequately what the remarks are about. Hence, the personal opinion expressed stands in effect as an unexplained and unreasoned factual allegation. This situation has become known as "bare comment".?Such a statement will be treated as a statement of fact?."
151. At [24] of Corbyn v Millett (ibid.) Warby LJ stated:
154. "The cases on "bare comment" do not lay down a rigid rule of law that requires a court to depart from this key principle, and artificially treat a statement of opinion as if it was a statement of fact. On the contrary. The authorities show that "bare comment" is a pointer, or guideline, or rule of thumb that? reflects?the key principle. The question is, would the words used strike the ordinary viewer as a statement of fact or opinion? The answer does not turn on whether any given word is an adjective, noun, or verb, or some other part of speech. This is a matter of substance, not a formal, analytical matter of grammar or linguistics. In practice, when someone uses a descriptive word without giving any detail of what he is describing, that will tend to come across as an allegation of fact.?That is what the cases on "bare comment" say."
158. Basis of opinion
160. S.3(3) of the Defamation Act 2013 sets out the second condition which must be satisfied in order to make out an honest opinion defence: "the statement complained of indicated, whether in general or specific terms, the basis of the opinion."
163. The Explanatory Note 22 to the 2013 Act states: "Condition 2 (in?subsection (3)), reflects the test approved by the Supreme Court in? Joseph v Spiller?that "the comment must explicitly or implicitly indicate, at least in general terms, the facts on which it is based"."
166. The passage from Joseph and others v Spiller and another [2010] UKSC 53 [2011] 1 AC 852 from which the wording of Condition 2 is taken is set out immediately below, with the key sentence underlined. It is relevant to assessing whether a basis of opinion has been sufficiently indicated in a statement complained of:
169. "104. Such considerations are, I believe, what Mr Caldecott had in mind when submitting that a defendant's comments must have identified the subject matter of his criticism if he is to be able to advance a defence of fair comment. If so, it is a submission that I would endorse. I do not consider that Lord Nicholls was correct to require that the comment must identify the matters on which it is based with sufficient particularity to enable the reader to judge for himself whether it was well founded. The comment must, however, identify at least in general terms what it is that has led the commentator to make the comment, so that the reader can understand what the comment is about and the commentator can, if challenged, explain by giving particulars of the subject matter of his comment why he expressed the views that he did. A fair balance must be struck between allowing a critic the freedom to express himself as he will and requiring him to identify to his readers why it is that he is making the criticism." (emphasis added)
171. The Parties' submissions
173. Mr Davidson for the Claimants argued that the Reviews carry a clear imputation not only that Ms Liddle is dishonest in her character, but that she has in fact acted fraudulently. He argued that all of the statements in the Reviews are unqualified. There is no reference to the author's belief, or grounds to believe, or grounds to investigate. None of these meanings require inference or extrapolation. They are bare assertions made in the body of the Reviews.
176. Mr Davidson submitted that the contents of the three Reviews were, self-evidently, defamatory. They reflect upon both personal character and professional reputation. In the context of a solicitor's profession, honesty, integrity, regulatory compliance and competence are each (albeit to different degrees) of paramount importance. The Reviews expressly (as well as impliedly) ?seek to deter third parties from dealing with, or being associated with, the Claimants.
179. He further submitted that, in each Review, the ordinary reader would understand the contents to be statements of fact. Even where the assertions of dishonesty, lack of integrity, professional misconduct and incompetence can be linked to granular factual assertions, they are still assertions of inferential fact. They are not presented, nor would they be understood by the reasonable reader to be, merely the author's opinion.
182. In relation to whether the Reviews, if they are opinion, indicate their basis, Mr Davidson submitted that in Reviews 1 and 3, there are several factual allegations, but several of these are inherently defamatory, even if they also provide a feasible basis for any inferential statements of opinion. However, where the First Defendant asserts that the Second Claimant has acted fraudulently, non-compliantly or incompetently, she does not give any basis for that opinion.
185. In Review 2, the only possible "basis" to be found is the allegation (itself defamatory) that the Second Claimant " stole the Will banks off Elizabeth Radcliffe ". The reference to the ex-husband is, plainly, not capable of forming the basis of an opinion about the honesty or integrity of the Second Claimant.
188. Mr Carr for the First Defendant argued that the reviews would be understood by the ordinary, reasonable reader as expressing the personal views of someone who used to work with the Second Claimant.
191. Mr Carr submitted that the Reviews were not defamatory at common law. The ordinary reasonable reader would not take these reviews seriously as they would see them as having been written by a disenchanted former employee. By the time a reader had finished reading the review they would "just switch off" and wouldn't be interested in what the reviewer had to say.
194. He further submitted that these were all reviews which, by their nature, are statements of opinion. In addition, many of the words or phrases were obviously statements of opinion, which were explained by the context in which they appear. Mr Carr made detailed submissions on the contents of Reviews 1, 2 and 3, emphasising the matters which he said were clearly statements of opinion.
197. Mr Carr appeared to accept that the Reviews contain some factual assertions, but submitted that in each case these simply supported the comments that had been made.
201. Assessment
203. The Claimants' pleading in support of their libel claim does not comply with CPR PD 53B, rule 4.2. This rule requires a claimant in any defamation claim to set out, in respect of every statement complained of, (i) "the precise words of the statement complained of" (Rule 4.2(1)) and (ii) "the imputation(s) which the claimant alleges that the statement conveyed? as to its ordinary and natural meaning" (Rule 4.2(4)). This means that in respect of each Review the specific words complained of should have been identified and there should have been a pleaded meaning for each publication, rather than a single pleaded meaning for all three Reviews.
206. Part of the purpose of requiring a claimant to specify the words complained of is to make it clear what words are relied upon for each meaning that has been identified, assisting the overall aim of these trials which is to arrive at the right meanings for the relevant words. That focus and clarity has been missing here.
209. The second rule on pleading a meaning for each publication reflects the legal principle that every publication gives rise to its own cause of action, with the potential for differently worded publications on the same theme to give rise to different defences. For this reason, I am unable to adopt the Claimants' approach and to arrive at one meaning that applies to all three Reviews; I must form my own view about the meaning of each individual publication. However, the three Reviews do cover similar themes and so inevitably there will be a significant degree of overlap between the meanings that I find.
212. The First Defendant has not taken issue with the Claimants' approach and has admitted their pleaded meaning. However, it is well-established that a judge deciding meaning at a trial of preliminary issues is not bound to accept the meaning advanced by either party, or here by both parties, but is free to find their own meaning, providing that it is not more injurious to the claimant's reputation than the claimant's pleaded meaning: Koutsogiannis principle (xiii).
215. Review 1
217. The first question for me is whether I agree with the Claimants' pleaded meaning. While the pleaded meaning does embrace a number of the allegations that emerge from Review 1, I believe that the ordinary reasonable reader would understand the review to involve a discrete allegation of fact about the Rowe Radcliffe will banks having been improperly acquired by the Second Claimant. There are also other discrete allegations of fact but some of these have a common sting.
220. Just as I reject the Second Defendant's submission that every allegation is a comment, I am also unable to accept the Claimants' submission that Review 1 (indeed all three Reviews on their case) consists entirely of statements of fact. In my view, the ordinary reasonable reader would regard the headline to this review ? "extremely dishonest and dodgy" - as a criticism based on the factual allegations that the Second Claimant improperly acquired Ms Radcliffe's will banks without paying for them and lied about having a will in her possession.
223. I find that the ordinary and natural meaning of Review 1 is as follows:
226. (1) The Second Claimant dishonestly acquired the will banks held by Elizabeth Radcliffe by falsely promising Ms Radcliffe payment in return for them and then refusing to pay her once she had them in her possession.
227. (2) The Second Claimant is a liar.
228. (3) The Second Claimant is extremely dishonest and unscrupulous.
229. (4) The Second Claimant is incompetent, unprofessional and fails to comply with her duties to her clients.
231. I accept Mr Carr's submissions that the ordinary reasonable reader would recognise that these allegations are made by a disgruntled former employee. I think the ordinary reasonable reader would form the impression that the First Defendant is someone with an axe to grind. However, it does not follow that the ordinary reasonable reader wouldn't take the allegations seriously. Here we are dealing with allegations by someone who worked with the Second Claimant, who has first-hand knowledge of the events she describes and would be well-placed to provide an insider's view. In the circumstances, I think the ordinary reasonable reader would take the allegations seriously. Allegations about a professional person that impugn their honesty, integrity and professionalism are plainly likely to lower their estimation in the eyes of others and to have a substantial adverse effect on the way they are treated by other people. Review 1 is defamatory at common law.
234. It follows from what I have said above that Review 1 contains mixed statements of fact and opinion. Statements (1), (2) and (4) are statements of fact and statement (3), which is underlined, is a statement of opinion. The statement of opinion indicated, in specific terms, the basis of the opinion, namely the allegations of dishonestly acquiring the will banks and of lying.
237. Review 2
238. I am not persuaded by the Claimants' pleaded meanings in respect of Review 2. Review 2 also contains what I believe would strike the ordinary reasonable reader as a specific factual allegation about the dishonest acquisition of the will banks of Elizabeth Radcliffe.
240. I find that the ordinary and natural meaning of Review 2 is as follows:
242. (1) The Second Claimant dishonestly acquired will banks from Elizabeth Radcliffe. Her actions were tantamount to theft.
243. (2) The Second Claimant is a fraudster.
244. (3) The Second Claimant is a liar.
245. (4) The Second Claimant is incompetent and unprofessional.
246. These allegations are all defamatory at common law for the same reasons as in respect of Review 1. These are serious allegations to level at any person, particularly a professional person whose business depends on securing the trust of the general public.
248. As with the first review, I consider that Review 2 contains a mix of allegations, some of fact and some of opinion. The statements of fact are everything apart from the underlined words, which are statements of opinion.
251. The Second Claimant submitted that the allegation she is a fraudster is a statement of fact on the basis that the statement did not indicate the grounds for the First Defendant's belief. I disagree. In my view, the ordinary reasonable reader reading the whole sentence in which that word "fraudster" appears, would understand the fraudster allegation as a deduction founded on the factual allegation that the Second Claimant "stole the Will banks" (sic).
253. Review 2 also contains a factual allegation that the Second Claimant's former husband had a conviction for driving while under the influence of drugs. The Second Claimant doesn't suggest that this is defamatory of her and I agree. I don't consider that it is defamatory at common law to say of the Second Claimant that a former partner of hers had a conviction of this kind. There is no suggestion that the Second Claimant was complicit in any way or that she is approved of the alleged misconduct.
255. I reject the Claimants' submission that the statements of opinion are bare comment. Review 2 indicates, in specific terms, the basis of the opinions, namely the allegation that the Second Claimant "stole" the will banks of Elizabeth Radcliffe.
257. Review 3
258. As with Reviews 1 and 2, I am not persuaded by the Claimants' pleaded meanings, as Review 3 contains a specific and quite detailed factual account of the Second Claimant improperly acquiring the will banks from Elizabeth Radcliffe as well as other assertions of fact that lend themselves to a common sting.
260. I find that the ordinary and natural meaning of Review 3 is as follows:
262. (1) The Second Claimant dishonestly acquired the will banks held by Elizabeth Radcliffe by falsely promising Ms Radcliffe payment in return for them and then refusing to pay her once she had them in her possession.
263. (2) The Second Claimant is extremely dishonest and unscrupulous. She is a fraudster.
264. (3) The Second Claimant is a liar.
265. (4) The Second Claimant is incompetent and unprofessional and fails to comply with her duties to her clients.
266. (5) The Second Claimant is unfit to be in practice as a solicitor.
267. These allegations are all defamatory at common law for the same reasons as in respect of Reviews 1 and 2.
269. As with Reviews 1 and 2, I consider that Review 3 would strike the ordinary reasonable reader as a mixture of fact and opinion. The statements of fact are everything apart from the underlined words, which are statements of opinion.
271. The headline consists of a rambling diatribe of criticisms, the most serious of which is the "total fraudster" allegation. In the context of what follows, I consider that the ordinary reasonable reader would understand this allegation as a criticism based on the detailed allegations of dishonesty in relation to the will banks. The headline also refers to the Second Claimant as a "bare faced liar" and in the Review it is asserted that the Second Claimant "has no shame at all lying to people". Although prefaced with the words "In my opinion", I believe the allegation of lying would strike the ordinary reader as an assertion of fact. The exhortations in the headline not to use Elaine Liddle, that she can't be trusted with client money and how she even qualified as a solicitor being a mystery I read as statements of opinion, the sting being that she is unfit to be in practice as a solicitor. The headline also contains the words "nasty piece of work", which are abuse rather than defamatory.
273. Again, I reject the Second Claimant's submission that the statements of opinion are bare opinion. Review 3 indicates, in specific terms, the basis of the opinions, namely the factual assertions concerning the dishonest acquisition of the will banks and the allegations of lying, incompetence and lack of professionalism.
275. The claim of the Company
276. The pleaded meaning of the three Reviews in relation to the Company is that "Prospective clients should not retain the services of the First Claimant and existing clients should cease to do so". I have some difficulty with this as a defamatory meaning; it feels more like a conclusion that some readers might arrive at after reading certain defamatory statements, rather than a defamatory meaning, in and of itself.
278. In any event, having looked at each review separately, I don't think the ordinary reasonable reader would take this meaning from any of the Reviews. The focus of the reviews is on the Second Claimant and things she is alleged to have done, or failed to do, as I have found. Review 1 doesn't say anything that supports this pleaded meaning. Review 2 doesn't refer to the Company at all. Review 3 does mention the Company, but the focus is on other matters and readers are not exhorted to avoid the Company, but to avoid the Second Claimant. Furthermore, it is not clear what specific words are relied upon in relation to the Company because the Claimants have not pleaded them, as they were required to do: see [39] above.
280. The Claimants' argument in their skeleton is that as the Reviews refer to the Company and as the Second Claimant is the only solicitor involved in the operation of the Company, "all of the factual and other imputations in the Reviews necessarily attach to both Claimants". This is an argument of reference by association. If that is the argument, one would expect the pleaded meaning for the Company to be the same or at least very similar to the pleaded meaning for the Second Claimant. However, the Claimants have not pleaded a meaning consistent with this argument, permission to amend has not been sought and the First Defendant has not had a proper opportunity to address it. For these reasons, it is not open to the Claimants to contend for this different meaning at trial.
282. In these circumstances, I find that that the Reviews are not defamatory of the Company at common law. It follows that the Company does not have its own libel claim and that, going forward, the libel issues will be litigated exclusively between the Second Claimant and the First Defendant.

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