AB v Chief Constable of North Wales Police - False Imprisonment and Assault/Battery Claim

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  AB v Chief Constable of North Wales Police [2026] EWCC 11 (27 March 2026)

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[2026] EWCC 11 | | |
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| | | Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCC 11 |
| | | Claim No: 185DC2014 |
IN THE COUNTY COURT AT WREXHAM
SITTING AT THE COUNTY COURT AT MOLD

| | | Hearing dates 25 and 26 February 2026 |
| | | Delivered in the Absence of the Parties on 27 March 2026 |
B e f o r e :

Her Honour Judge Owen

| | AB | Claimant |
| | - and - | |
| | Chief Constable of North Wales Police | |

Hywel Evans, Counsel for the Claimant
Michael Armstrong, Counsel for the Defendant

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

3. Her Honour Judge Owen:
4. Introduction
5. In these proceedings, the claimant brings a claim for false imprisonment and assault / battery following his arrest by PC Bannister in the early hours of the morning of 23 May 2024. All aspects of liability and quantum are in dispute. I have heard evidence from and on behalf of the parties on the issue of liability only and issues of quantum will, if appropriate, be dealt with on another day.
7. Proceedings were issued on 5 February 2025 and the defendant denies liability.
9. Background
10. On 14 May 2024 the defendant was contacted by the ex-wife ("CD") of the claimant alleging that she had been verbally abused by the claimant over a phone call and that texts relating to her had been sent to her friend by the claimant.
12. The defendant's occurrence enquiry log includes the following information:
14. (a) CD and the claimant had been in a relationship for 15 years before splitting up.
15. (b) Once they separated, there were reports from CD in respect of the claimant's behaviour and reports from the claimant in respect of CD's behaviour.
16. (c) The couple had a shared care arrangement for their children.
17. (d) CD reported that on 12 May 2024, the claimant telephoned her as the children did not have any socks packed for their stay with the claimant. During these calls, the claimant was verbally abusive, asking if she was "fucking stupid" and shouting at her. The children were present in the background during this call.
18. (e) On the same day, the claimant was due to drop the children off with CD at 18.30. However, he messaged CD saying that he wanted to drop them off early at 17.00. CD messaged that that was not possible as she would be out.
19. (f) At 17.00 CD received a message from her neighbour showing screenshots of messages sent by the claimant to the neighbour. CD had revealed personal information to the claimant during the course of their relationship about a previous relationship she had had and the abusive nature of it. The claimant had then shared some of that private information with CD's neighbour and implied that CD had lied about it.
20. (g) CD said that she felt humiliated and distressed that information had been disclosed to someone else.
21. (h) During the discussion with the police, CD revealed that the claimant had strangled her on 23 October 2022 when she had caught him being unfaithful to her. She also suggested that this had occurred at other times during the relationship. She also suggested that one of the children had once been strangled by the claimant.
22. (i) On 15 May 2024, the matter was allocated to PC Bannister as a priority 2 basis, meaning that the matter should be attended to within 24 hours or as soon as possible.
23. (j) PC Bannister was unable to attend to the matter on 15 and 16 May 2024 as she had been involved in a serious incident. She then had rest days and did not return to work until 21 May 2024. On that day, she contacted CD and arranged for a statement to be recorded. CD attended the police station that day and provided a statement to PC Bannister. On 22 May 2024 PC Bannister tried to contact the witness who had received the messages from the claimant but there was no answer.
24. (k) PC Bannister arranged to go out to arrest the claimant on suspicion of malicious communication, accompanied by 4 other officers, two of whom had tazers, on 23 May 2024. He was arrested at his home at 02.03 on that day. Whilst in his home, he was handcuffed and was then taken to the police station. He was interviewed at 11.56 when he admitted to sending the alleged messages and was released with no further action at 12.41.
25. (l) Following interview, the investigating officer, P Roberts, records that "I have seen the messages, there is nothing grossly offensive regarding the messages."
27. Evidence
28. I have heard evidence from the claimant. I have also heard evidence from the following on behalf of the defendant:
31. (a) PC Bannister
32. (b) PC Leigh
34. PS Cullen was not called to give evidence as the claimant did not propose to ask her any questions. She was the custody sergeant who dealt with the claimant after his arrest.
36. All of the witnesses appeared to me to be truthful and in reality this case relates more to the law than fact. The episode when the police attend the claimant's home to arrest him is clearly shown on body worn camera. The claimant has clearly been woken up. He is wearing nothing but a pair of very small underpants. He is polite throughout. The police arrest him on suspicion of malicious communications and he clearly does not understand what is meant by this. They explain that they will provide him with more information when he is taken to the police station. Whilst he is in the house, the male officers accompany him up the stairs so that he can dress and go to the toilet. They then return downstairs. He is compliant. His girlfriend comes into the downstairs room at one stage and speculates that the arrest may be something to do with CD at which point the claimant does appear to become agitated but he is not aggressive and he is never violent. PC Leigh tells him that he is going to put handcuffs on as "I don't know you mate and you're a bit of a unit aren't ya, so if it does go pete tong I don't really wanna be scrapping with ya that's all."
39. Issues
41. I have to answer the following questions in order to determine liability.
44. Has the Defendant proved that,
45. (i) PC Bannister actually suspected that the claimant may have committed an offence relating to malicious communication? (the subjective test on suspicion)
46. (ii) A reasonable man, with an accurate understanding of the law and possessed of the information known by the arresting officer would have suspected that the arrestee may have committed such an offence? (the objective test on suspicion)
47. (iii) The arresting officer actually believed that an arrest was necessary for one or more of the criteria set out in section 24(5) PACE? (the subjective test on necessity)
48. (iv) A reasonable man, with an accurate understanding of the law and possessed of the information known by the arresting officer would have believed that an arrest was necessary for one or more of the criteria set out in section 24(5) PACE? (the objective test on necessity)
49. (v) The claimant was informed of the ground for his arrest either at the time or as soon as was reasonably practicable thereafter (the grounds for arrest) pursuant to section 28(3) PACE?
50. (vi) If relevant, that the timing of the claimant's arrest did not make the detention unlawful?
51. (vii) The force used on the claimant was reasonable?
53. I propose to deal with each question in turn and rather than summarise the evidence each witness separately as I usually do, I will address what the witnesses say, where relevant, in my answer to each question. I will also address any relevant submissions made within my answers.
56. (i) Has the Defendant proved that PC Bannister actually suspected that the claimant may have committed an offence relating to malicious communication? (the subjective test on suspicion)
58. This is known as the subjective suspicion and is based on the state of the mind of the arresting officer at the time and what they genuinely suspected to be the case. It comes down to the honesty of PC Bannister and whether she genuinely suspected the claimant of having committed an offence based on the knowledge she had and the phone call made and messages sent by the claimant.
60. PC Bannister struck me as an honest witness. She has moved on from this type of work now and was not "up to speed" on the issues in this case but what came across was her genuine concern about the claimant's messages. She was particularly alert to the context of this dispute, that the relationship between the claimant and CD was acrimonious, that they had children together and that the claimant had a conviction for assault of CD. A history of domestic incidents was noted between the two individuals and it was also noted that the claimant and CD had been discussed at a MARAC in November 2023. CD had reported feeling "humiliated and distressed" that information about her past had been communicated by the claimant to her friend.
62. The offending message to CD's friend reads as follows:
65. ""HAVE YOUR MATES BACK WHO LIED ABOUT BEING RAPED."
66. "N?'s (daughter of CD but not the claimant) DAD ISN'T IN THE PICTURE BECAUSE HE RAPED ME." 15 YEARS LATER?.PLAYED THE VICTIM THAT TIME TOO."
67. "HE USED TO PUNCH ME AND SAY "YOU HAVE TO HAVE SEX WITH ME BECAUSE YOUR MY GF"
68. " YES THAT'S EXACTLY WHAT YOUR "VICTIM" OF A MATE TOLD ME"."
69. Section 1 Malicious Communications Act 1988 states as follows:
72. 1Offence of sending letters?etc.?with intent to cause distress or anxiety.
73. (1)Any person who sends to another person?
74. (a)a?letter, electronic communication or article of any description **** which conveys?
75. (i)a message which is indecent or grossly offensive;
76. (b)any?article or electronic communication?which is, in whole or part, of an indecent or grossly offensive nature,
77. is guilty of an offence if his purpose, or one of his purposes, in sending it is that it should, so far as falling within paragraph (a) or (b) above, cause distress or anxiety to the recipient or to any other person to whom he intends that it or its contents or nature should be communicated.
79. I note that the defence also refers to sending information which is known or believed to be false coming within section 1 of the Act but that was not the case at the time as the law has been amended to remove the reference to false information. PC Bannister was asked about this issue by Counsel for the claimant and she conceded that she did not know about this change in the law at the time. She considered that the information was false and also grossly offensive and confirmed that she would have continued to arrest the claimant on the basis that the message was grossly offensive in any event, even if she had understood that false information was no longer included in section 1 of the Act.
81. It was put to her that this was simply an argument between two people and I consider that her reply was convincing that "I believe it is more than that. When you have taken it to a 3 rd party who has nothing to do with your relationship and you are poking fun at your partner re rape, that is not just two people arguing."
83. I find that PC Bannister actually suspected that the claimant may have committed an offence relating to malicious communications.
86. (ii) Has the Defendant proved that a reasonable man, with an accurate understanding of the law and possessed of the information known by the arresting officer would have suspected that the arrestee may have committed such an offence? (the objective test on suspicion)
88. I note that suspicion is a very low level of belief in something. I have been referred to the judgment of Lord Devlin in Hussein v Chong Fook Kam (1970) 942 in which it was held that "suspicion in its ordinary meaning is a state of conjecture or surmise where proof is lacking. "I suspect but I cannot prove." Suspicion arises at or near the starting point of an investigation of which the obtaining of prima facie proof is the end.".
90. I have also been referred by Counsel for the defendant to the judgment of Sir Brian Levison in Parker v Chief Constable of Essex (2018) EWCA Civ 2788 in which he held that "Suspicion may be based on assertions that turn out to be wrong?The factors in the mind of the arresting officer fall to be considered cumulatively."
92. Counsel for the claimant relies on the fact that the claimant was not later charged with this office and was released on an NFA (no further action) basis. However, that is irrelevant for my purposes as that decision was made after the police had interviewed the claimant and he had had the opportunity to put his version of events forward. What I have to consider is whether a reasonable man would have suspected that the claimant may have committed such an offence. I have read the message and I have seen the information which was available at the material time. This was more than a spat about child care when one sees it in the context of an abusive and toxic relationship. To make out to a third party that a person has lied about being raped is grossly offensive. It cannot be compared to being told to "fuck off" or being called a "gimp" as CD said to the claimant. That is simply name calling and the term "fuck off" has sadly become a normal part of people's vocabulary.
94. I find that the defendant has proved that a reasonable man with an accurate understanding of the law and possessed of the information known by PC Bannister would have suspected that the claimant may have committed the offence of malicious communication.
97. (iii) Has the defendant proved that the arresting officer actually believed that an arrest was necessary for one or more of the criteria set out in section 24(5) PACE? (the subjective test on necessity)
98. Section 24(5) PACE states that "where an arrestable offence has been committed, any person may arrest without a warrant?.(b) anyone whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be guilty of it." The custody record states that an arrest is needed to "allow the prompt and effective investigation; protect a child or other vulnerable person." This is one of the grounds for arrest under section 25(3)(d)(v) PACE.
100. PC Bannister said that she wanted to ensure that the claimant was arrested and that bail conditions were imposed before she went off on a five day break from work. She had arrested the claimant as soon as she could after speaking to CD. If she had asked the claimant to come in for a voluntary interview, she could not impose bail conditions on the claimant. She arrested the claimant so that she could impose bail conditions on him.
102. PC Bannister's decision is consistent with the documentation provided. Prior to arresting the claimant she has specifically recorded that a voluntary interview has been considered and rejected this "as bail conditions required" (page 98 trial bundle).
104. Counsel for the defendant has referred me to Hayes v Chief Constable of Merseyside Police [2011] EWCA Civ 911 which was a case where the claimant was arrested as the arresting officer stated that had he not done so, it would have hampered his investigation as he wanted to seize the claimant's phone. In that case, the Court of Appeal endorsed the approach recommended to it by leading Counsel for the police in relation to the arrest issues as follows (para 21):
107. "Mr Beer submits that what must be shown is:
108. (i) that the constable actually believed that arrest was necessary, and for a
109. subsection (5) reason; and
110. (ii) that objectively that belief was reasonable.
111. He accepts that even if a constable believes arrest to be necessary, there remains a
112. discretion not to carry it out, but he contends that except for this residual situation the
113. concept of discretion, which was previously a distinct stage in the legality of arrest, is
114. for all material purposes subsumed within the new statutory test."
117. Counsel for the defendant invites me to make a finding in relation to this issue. I accept the evidence of PC Bannister which is supported by the contemporaneous documentation. I find that prior to arrest, she specifically considered whether she should invite the claimant to attend the station for a voluntary interview. She specifically excluded this because she needed to ensure that CD and her children were protected from the claimant. The only way she could do that was to impose bail conditions which she could not if the claimant simply attended for a voluntary interview. She said that had there not been a number of domestic incidents prior to this complaint being made she would have invited the claimant to the police station for a voluntary interview.
119. I find as a fact that PC Bannister considered whether it would be appropriate to invite the claimant into the station for a voluntary interview and excluded this as she was aware that there was a history of domestic incidents involving the claimant and CD. She was concerned about the safety of CD and the children when she arrested him and provided him with the grounds of arrest. She knew that she would need to impose bail conditions whilst investigations continued so as to protect CD and the children. She actually believed that arrest was necessary and she had a reason to justify her arrest.
121. Accordingly, I find that the defendant has proved that PC Bannister actually believed that an arrest was necessary for one or more of the criteria set out in section 24(5) PACE.
124. (iv) Has the defendant proved that a reasonable man, with an accurate understanding of the law and possessed of the information known by the arresting officer would have believed that an arrest was necessary for one or more of the criteria set out in section 24(5) PACE? (the objective test on necessity)
126. Counsel for the claimant now appears to concede (contrary to the particulars of claim) that it can be lawful to arrest for the purposes of bail but that in this case it was not necessary. He submits that the claimant should simply have been invited to the police station for interview without telling him what the nature of the alleged offence was. That would have mitigated the risks.
128. Counsel for the defendant submits that in a case where there is a clear history of domestic abuse, it was entirely appropriate to arrest with a view to protecting CD and the children. The risk to CD would have escalated once the claimant was told of the nature of the alleged offence.
130. He has referred me to R (on the application of TL) v Chief Constable of Surrey (2017) EWHC 129 (Admin) in which it was confirmed that if there were reasonable grounds for believing that bail conditions were necessary to protect a witness from intimidation which might render an investigation substantially less effective, it could be lawful to arrest a suspect under section 24(5)(2) solely to impose such conditions.
132. He has also referred me to DE v Chief Constable of West Midlands Police [2023] EWHC 146 (KB) which related to arrest with a view to imposing bail conditions in which the appeal court carefully considered the earlier caselaw to which I have also been referred and dismissed an attempt to appeal the decision of the trial judge that the decision to arrest was objectively reasonable.
134. I am satisfied that in this case the defendant has proved that a reasonable man with an accurate understanding of the law and possessed of the information known by PC Bannister would have believed that an arrest was necessary for one or more of the criteria set out in section 24(5) PACE. Any reasonable person would conclude that an arrest was entirely appropriate here. The claimant had a conviction for violence involving CD. CD had made serious allegations against him in her conversation with CD. Whilst the claimant and CD had an arrangement for the children which meant that there was a handover and therefore contact between the claimant and CD might be happening, a reasonable man would conclude that when the claimant discovered that CD had reported him to the police over the message to her friend, he would likely be very angry and would take it out on CD and, possibly, the children in some way. That would have been the trigger for the claimant and it was wholly appropriate to arrest him in these particular circumstances so that bail conditions could be imposed to protect CD and the children from the real risk which he would have presented to CD once he knew about her action.
137. (v) Has the defendant proved that the claimant was informed of the ground for his arrest either at the time or as soon as was reasonably practicable thereafter (the grounds for arrest) pursuant to section 28(3) PACE?
139. There is no dispute that the claimant was not told about the grounds for his arrest until he was in the police station. The body worn camera shows that he is told in his home that he is being arrested on suspicion of malicious communications. He clearly does not understand what is meant by this and his girlfriend starts to speculate that this may have something to do with CD and he does become agitated (but not violent) at that point.
141. Section 28(3) PACE states that "no arrest is lawful unless the person arrested of the ground for the arrest at the time of, or as soon as is practicable after, the arrest." Here the defendant argues that the claimant was told of the grounds for arrest as soon as was practicable after the arrest, namely at the police station. Counsel for the claimant submits that the claimant should have been told of the grounds for his arrest at the time of arrest and refers me to Code G which reinforces what is said in PACE and also states that the arrested person must be told "of the relevant circumstances of the arrest." He notes that in Abassy v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (1989) WL 651247 it was stressed that the need to provide this information is not "a "technical matter" but involves informing the person who is arrested in non-technical and not necessarily precise language of the nature of the offence said to constitute the crime for which he is being arrested."
143. What Purchas LJ says in Abbassy is that all the police need to inform the arrested person of is "of the offence or type of offences for which he is being arrested. This is quite sufficient to give him the opportunity of volunteering information which would avoid the arrest?.". That approach was endorsed in Clarke v Chief Constable for North Wales (2000) WL 324127.
145. It was entirely appropriate not to tell the claimant of the grounds of the arrest until he was at the police station and that was as soon as reasonably practicable. PC Bannister was aware of the claimant's history of violence. She was so concerned that she arranged for 5 of them to attend the claimant's home to arrest him, and that included two officers with tazers. The arrest passed without issue but that was because of her good planning, in my judgment. I have already commented on how agitated the claimant quickly becomes when his girlfriend speculates that CD is the reason behind the arrest. It was important that the details of the reasons for the arrest were provided to the claimant in a more controlled environment than in his home where his girlfriend was an unknown quantity and where there was also a dog present whose temperament the police were also unaware of.
148. (vi) Has the defendant proved that the timing of the claimant's arrest did not make the detention unlawful?
150. The claimant was arrested at 02.03 hours. Counsel submits that there was no need to arrest the claimant at 02.03. He refers me to ST v Chief Constable of Nottinghamshire (2022) EWHC 1280 (QB) in which Cotter J held that the question to be asked in terms of the timing of an arrest was "given the material circumstances of the case did the officer have reasonable grounds for the belief that the arrest was necessary at the time it took place?.. An arrest must be necessary; not merely convenient." He submits that the alleged offence took place on 14 May 2024. PC Bannister was aware of it on 16 May 2024, although PC Bannister states that she did not have the full details until she interviewed CD on 21 May 2024. PC Bannister said that she was not able to arrest the claimant until early on 24 May 2024 because she was busy with other incidents prior to that, she needed others to accompany her, including an officer with a tazer, and she was about to finish work for 5 days so wanted to carry out the arrest before she finished her shift. She told me that she could not delegate this task. Counsel for the claimant submits that PC Bannister sought to conduct the arrest for her own convenience and that it could have waited until her return given that 10 days had already elapsed between the offence occurring and 24 May 2024 in any event.
152. Counsel for the defendant wholly disagrees with Counsel for the claimant's interpretation of ST. In ST the claimant was a 14 year old child who was arrested at 05.30 hours whereas the primary offender was arrested in the afternoon. Cotter J makes it clear that the position is different with children as opposed to adults and that the arrest of a child is a last resort measure. Counsel for the defendant is aware of no case where a court has said that an arrest in the early hours of the morning invalidates what would be a lawful arrest at a different time of the day.
154. I have carefully considered ST. This related to the theft of a mobile phone by another young person who promptly blamed ST, who had chased the thief and returned the phone to its owner without its SIM and phone cover, for theft of the phone cover and SIM. ST was arrested whilst in bed at 05.30 and his father pleaded with the police to allow him to bring him to the police station for interview later that day. Cotter J agreed with the judge at first instance that this represented a "reprehensible and lamentable state of affairs?".
156. He noted that the trial judge was "rightly concerned about what he referred to as the "principal" and "stark" feature and the "elephant in the room"; that the police chose to arrest a 14 year old boy with no criminal record at 5.30 in the morning." He found the conduct "disturbing", "extra ordinary", lamentable" and "reprehensible" and part of the explanation given for the timing of the arrest "glib".
158. Cotter J goes on to consider the caselaw and also refers to "code G1.3 which reminds officers that the use of the power of arrest must be fully justified and in exercising the power they should consider if the necessary objectives can be met by other, less intrusive means. Arrest must never be used simply because it can be used (or is simply convenient for the progression of the investigation. In the present case there was a central and obvious consideration; the Appellant was a child?.As a broad principle, the starting point must be that it is wrong not to differentiate between children and adults when considering the test of necessity of arrest and detention. Age is an obviously material consideration and some thought must be given to it. In my judgment the Judge should have concluded that the approach of the officers failed to factor into the assessment of the necessity, the best interests of a 14 year old child. Where time for reflection exists, the test of necessity for arrest and detention requires anxious scrutiny of the fact that a child is involved. This approach is consistent with the duty under the Children Act 2004 and wider obligations.".
160. Cotter J goes on to say that "there was no evidence before the Judge that any consideration was given by PC Lilliman to the welfare of the Appellant. ?.it was an obviously material circumstance that he was obliged to consider within his assessment of the necessity of arrest?.Within the Convention the arrest of a child should be a measure of last resort and after adequate consideration of any realistic practical alternatives."
162. One cannot compare ST to the case with which I am concerned. He was a minor with no criminal conviction who was accused of stealing a Sim card and phone cover in circumstances when another individual (who made the allegation of theft against ST) had stolen the phone and ST had in fact retrieved it. His father was offering to bring ST to the police station for interview later that day. In the case with which I am concerned, the claimant had a history of violence toward CD and there was a clear risk had he not been arrested that the risk which he already presented to CD would increase once he was made aware of the allegations which she was making.
164. Ideally, it would have been better to arrest the claimant at a more "civilised" time of the day when he was not sleeping. However, what I have to consider is what was objectively necessary. PC Bannister had wanted to arrest the claimant on 23 May 2024 but had been unable to because other matters had taken priority. She needed other officers to accompany her to the claimant's home including an officer with a tazer. She wanted to arrest the claimant before she went off on a 5 day break. Whilst Counsel for the claimant submits that PC Bannister had known of CD's allegations since 16 May 2024, she had not interviewed CD until 21 May 2024 and I accept her evidence that she wanted to deal with the matter before she was off for 5 days. She was not confident that an arrest would have occurred in her absence. It is easy for me to say that it would have been better if the arrest had taken place at a later time of day, that is not always possible in real life. I note that Counsel for the defendant, who has developed a specialty in this type of police work, knows of no case where the timing of an arrest makes the arrest unlawful.
166. I am satisfied that whilst it was not ideal to arrest the claimant at 02.03, it does not render a lawful arrest unlawful simply because of the time of arrest.
168. Accordingly, I find that the defendant has proved that the timing of the claimant's arrest did not make the detention unlawful.
171. (vii) Has the defendant proved that the force used on the claimant was reasonable?
173. This relates to the application of handcuffs on the claimant whilst he was at home shortly before he was taken to the police station.
175. Section 117 PACE provides that a police officer may use "reasonable force, if necessary" in exercising his or her powers under PACE.
177. Counsel for the claimant has referred me to the case of Afriyie v Commissioner of Police for the City of London (2024) EWCA Civ 1269. I note that in that case, reference was made to the College of Policing Guidance on the use of force which requires that "any form of restraint should be a last resort only; and where there must be recourse to restraint it is the minimum necessary, and applied for the shortest time necessary, to ensure safety." I note that the use of handcuffs on arrest is not an automatic right on arrest, something which PC Leigh did not appreciate at the time.
179. I note that in Okoro v The Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis (2011) EWHC 0003 (QB) it was held that the reasons for handcuffing Mr Okoro were insufficient, namely that he was tall, had a "large build" and represented an "unknown risk". He had not been violent prior to being handcuffed. "The highest that PC Watkins or PC Phillips put it was that Mr Okoro had been verbally aggressive, which seemed to mean little more than that he argued with them and protested his innocence of the charge of attempted fraud."
181. Counsel for the claimant also refers me to Gilchrist v The Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police (2019) EWHC 1233 (QB) in which it was held that where there are sufficient officers to deal with an arrest, there will be less need for the use of force.
183. I note that in the case with which I am concerned, when the claimant asks PC Leigh why he is handcuffing him, PC Leigh replies that "I don't know you mate and you're a bit of a unit aren't ya, so if it does go pete tong I don't really wanna be scrapping with ya that's all." What is meant by "a bit of a unit" is that the claimant is of a large build. The claimant is clearly a man who is very strong. He is not fat, he is muscular and clearly works out. PC Leigh is small in stature and very slim. This was not, however, his only reason for handcuffing the claimant. He explained in his evidence to me that he was aware of the claimant's history of violence. Whilst the claimant was compliant in his home, based on his experience, things can change. He did not cuff him earlier because he had little clothing on and it would have been inappropriate to handcuff the claimant and then remove the handcuffs so that the claimant could dress. He did not consider that use of the tazer would have been effective as he was standing too close to the claimant to use it and once dressed the claimant was wearing a puffer coat which would also have made use of the tazer inappropriate.
185. I appreciate that the claimant was compliant whilst in the home. However, the police knew about his history of violence and he did become agitated when his girlfriend speculated that CD was behind his arrest.
187. I have considered the caselaw to which counsel for the claimant has referred me. Mr Afriyie was a social worker who was stopped by the police and breathalysed. There were difficulties obtaining an adequate breath sample because of Mr Afriyie's breathing difficulties, then the police wanted to handcuff him to which he said "are you joking me". It is understandable that he was not happy about this. He then ended up being tazered by the police. That case was nothing like the case with which I am concerned. The case also seems to have revolved around the use of the tazer as opposed to the handcuffs.
189. In Okoro , the trial judge had to make findings as the claimant was giving a different version of events to the police. The judge found in his favour and found that he had not been aggressive towards the police. On that basis, the fact that he was of a large build and an unknown risk was an inadequate reason for handcuffing him, He was being arrested on suspicion of fraud, not an offence involving violence.
191. This is very different to the scenario faced by the police when they arrested AB. PC Leigh was aware of his violent history as well as his size. The fact that he had been compliant did not mean that he would not change. The use of handcuffs amounted to reasonable force, particularly as he was handcuffed with his arms in front of him which is likely to have been more comfortable than with his arms behind him.
194. Conclusion
195. As a result of these findings, I dismiss the claimant's claim in its entirety.

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