Inmate Denied Leave to Amend Conditions-of-Confinement Claim

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April 22, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Benjamin Cortez Gomez v. Michael Downey et al.

District Court, C.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:25-cv-02002

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
SPRINGFIELD DIVISION

BENJAMIN CORTEZ GOMEZ, )
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) Case No. 3:25-cv-02002-SEM
)
MICHAEL DOWNEY et al., )
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge:
Before the Court is a Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint (Doc. 21) filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by Plaintiff
Benjamin Cortez Gomez, an inmate at Federal Correctional
Institution Terre Haute. Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an
Amended Complaint is denied for the following reasons.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed a Complaint (Doc. 1) alleging constitutional and
state law violations at Jerome Combs Detention Center (“JCDC”).
Specifically, Plaintiff alleged that during the forty-one months he
was detained at JCDC, he was not permitted access to natural

sunlight and fresh air. Plaintiff asserted that he complained to
Kankaee County Sheriff Michael Downey and JCDC Chief of
Operations Chad Kolitwenzew, through JCDC’s grievance process,

about the lack of outdoor recreational or common areas. On at least
one occasion, Kolitwenzew confirmed that JCDC did not afford any
outdoor recreation to detainees. (Mer. Rev., Doc. 7 at 3-5.)

Following screening of Plaintiff’s pleading, the Court
determined that Plaintiff stated a conditions-of-confinement claim
against Defendant Kolitwenzew in his individual capacity only. In

this regard, the Court determined that allegations of widespread
conditions of confinement throughout a jail may justify the
inference that the official had sufficient knowledge of and

involvement in the violation. The Court also determined that
Plaintiff stated a claim against Defendant Downey in his official
capacity, “due to the construction and operation” of JCDC “without

any outdoor spaces for detainees to receive direct sunlight or fresh
air.” (Id. at 5-6.)
However, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s state law claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”), concluding that

the alleged conduct of depriving him of sunlight and fresh air by not
releasing him from JCDC was not extreme and outrageous under
existing law. (Id. at 8.)

II. AMENDED COMPLAINT
A. Screening Standard
The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint and dismiss any

legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be

granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the complaint, the Court
accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing

them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are
insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for

relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721
F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
B. Alleged Additional Claims
“In bringing a conditions-of-confinement claim, a pretrial

detainee ‘can . . . prevail by showing that the actions are not
“rationally related to a legitimate nonpunitive governmental
purpose” or that the actions “appear excessive in relation to that
purpose.”’” Reed v. Bowen, 769 F. App’x 365, 369 (7th Cir. 2019)

(quoting Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 135 S. Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015)).
Plaintiff’s proposed amended pleading seeks to add two new
Defendants and renew his IIED claim to his existing Fourteenth

Amendment conditions of confinement claims against Defendant
Kolitwenzew in his individual capacity and Defendant Downey in
his official capacity.

Plaintiff explains that after receiving discovery, he learned that
JCDC Lieutenant L. Perkins and Corporal Memenga responded to
Plaintiff’s November 21, 2022, grievance in which he raised his

existing conditions of confinement claims. Despite Plaintiff’s assertion
that Perkins and Memenga disregarded his plight, his account does not
state a plausible claim against either of them.

“Only persons who cause or participate in [constitutional] violations
are responsible.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007). “Prison

officials who simply processed or reviewed inmate grievances lack
personal involvement in the conduct forming the basis of the grievance.”
Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2017). A guard who stands and
watches while another guard beats a prisoner violates the Constitution; a

guard who rejects an administrative complaint about a completed act of
misconduct does not. George, 507 F.3d at 609-10. Additionally,
“[b]ureaucracies divide tasks; no prisoner is entitled to insist that one

employee do another’s job.” Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.
2009) (holding that grievance examiner’s rejection of complaint as untimely
without investigation was not deliberate indifference).

State law claims “rely on the court’s supplemental jurisdiction.”
Dixon v. County of Cook, 819 F.3d 343, 351 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing 28 U.S.C. §

1367 (a)); see also Benson v. Cady, 761 F.2d 335, 343 (7th Cir. 1985) (“A federal
court may, in its discretion, entertain state law claims when a plaintiff’s
complaint presents a substantial federal question and the federal and state

claims ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative fact.’” (quoting United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966))).

To prevail on a claim of intentional infliction of emotional
distress under Illinois law, a plaintiff must show that “(1) the
defendants engaged in ‘extreme and outrageous’ conduct; (2) the
defendants ‘either intended that [their] conduct would inflict severe

emotional distress, or knew there was a high probability that [their]
conduct would cause severe emotional distress’; and (3) the
defendants’ ‘conduct in fact caused severe emotional distress.’”

McGreal v. Village of Orland Park, 850 F.3d 308, 314 (7th Cir. 2017)
(quoting Zoretic v. Darge, 832 F.3d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 2016)); see
also Dixon, 819 F.3d at 351 (“In Illinois, this tort requires a showing

of (1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant, (2) either
intent to cause distress or knowledge that there was a high
probability that the defendant’s conduct would cause severe

emotional distress, and (3) severe emotional distress that actually
resulted.”).
“For conduct to be extreme and outrageous it must go ‘beyond

all bounds of decency’ and be ‘considered intolerable in a civilized
community.’” Fox v. Hayes, 600 F.3d 819, 842 (7th Cir. 2010)
(quoting Lopez v. City of Chicago, 464 F.3d 711, 721 (7th Cir. 2006)

(citations omitted)). “
As noted, the Court dismissed Plaintiff’s IIED claim,
concluding that the allegations against Defendants Downey and
Kolitwenzew could not plausibly or fairly be characterized as

extreme and outrageous. (Mer. Rev., Doc 7 at 9.)
In his amended pleading, Plaintiff provides a listing of the
negative physical and mental consequences that can occur based
on the prolonged deprivation of direct sunlight and fresh air, as

noted by “Boston University researchers.” (Amend. Compl., Doc. 21
at 4-5). Although Plaintiff does not cite the document he relies
upon, the listed mental and physical conditions include weak

bones, reduced lung development, deteriorating eyesight, and
severe anxiety, among other serious conditions, that Plaintiff does
not demonstrate he experienced. See Roe v. Elyea, 631 F.3d 843,

864 n.19 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[U]nder tort principles applicable in §
1983 actions, a plaintiff must show that ‘he has suffered an “actual”
present injury and that there is a causal connection between that

injury and the deprivation of a constitutionally protected right
caused by a defendant.’”) (quoting Henderson v. Sheahan, 196 F.3d
839, 848 (7th Cir. 1999)).

Thus, despite Plaintiff’s conclusory assertion that “Defendants
engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct,” his listing does not
establish or permit the inference that Defendants Downey or
Kolitwenzew possessed the requisite intent to inflict that damage or

that Plaintiff experienced the mental and physical harm listed.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended
Complaint is denied.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint
(Doc. 21) is DENIED.

ENTERED April 22, 2026.

s/ Sue E. Myerscough

---

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE