In re Timothy T. Trainor - Motion to Dismiss Denied

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March 4, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Timothy T. Trainor

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-11154

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (10)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

So Ordered.
Signed this 4 day of March, 2026.

wee 4 Patrick G. Radel
Rep United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

IN RE:
Chapter 7
TIMOTHY T. TRAINOR, No. 25-11154-1-PGR
Debtor.

APPERANCES:
TIMOTHY T. TRAINOR TIMOTHY T. TRAINOR
Debtor
LAW OFFICES OF EDWIN M. ADESON EDWIN M. ADESON, ESQ.
Attorney for Debtor
1 Lawrence Street, Suite LL-1
Glen Falls, NY 12801
BOYLE LEGAL, LLC MICHAEL LEO BOYLE, ESQ.
Attorney for Jean & Kim Ndjongo
64 24 Street
Troy, NY 12180

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS

Presently pending is a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707 (a), or
in the alternative, to extend the deadline to Object to Discharge (“Motion to
Dismiss” or “Motion”), filed by Jean and Kim Ndjango, creditors of Timothy T.
Trainor (“Debtor”). (Docket No. 12). Debtor opposes the Motion to Dismiss. (Docket
No. 15).
This Court heard oral argument on December 23, 2025, in Albany, New York,
with Debtor and the Ndjangos appearing through their above-referenced counsel
and being heard. After oral argument, counsel advised that this Court could make a
determination on the Motion on the current record without an evidentiary hearing.
The matter was deemed submitted and this Court reserved decision.
For the following reasons, this Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.1

Jurisdiction
The Court has core jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this
contested matter in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334 (b) and 157(b)(2). Venue is
proper in this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1408 and 1409.

1 On December 29, 2025, this Court granted the Ndjangos’ alternative request for an extension of
time to file a complaint to determine dischargeability and/or object to discharge. (Docket No. 17).
Background
In August of 2022, Bruce Smith filed a personal injury lawsuit against the
Ndjangos seeking compensation for injuries Smith allegedly sustained while

working at their home. (Docket No. 12, at ¶ 7). In September of 2023, the Ndjangos
asserted a third-party claim against the Debtor, arguing that he was liable for
Smith’s injuries as the general contractor with respect to the home improvement
project. (Docket No. 12, at ¶ 10).
Debtor, by and through counsel, filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 7 of
the United States Bankruptcy Code (Docket No. 1) on October 6, 2025.

On December 2, 2025, the Ndjangos, by and through counsel, filed a motion to
dismiss pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707 (a), or in the alternative, to extend the deadline
to Object to Discharge. (Docket No. 12). On December 9, 2025, Debtor filed
opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. (Docket No. 15).
The Ndjangos argue that Debtor’s bankruptcy petition was filed solely to
frustrate their collections efforts as the only identified creditor with an enumerated
amount; the filing was made in response to a pending judgment in state court; and

the Debtor is utilizing the automatic stay to obstruct the state court proceedings.
(Docket No. 12). At the December 23, 2025 hearing, the Ndjangos also argued that
Debtor’s bankruptcy is essentially a two-party dispute. (Docket No. 16).
In sum, according to the Ndjangos, this bankruptcy was filed in bad faith and
should be dismissed.
Analysis
The purpose of bankruptcy “is to provide a procedure by which certain
insolvent debtors can reorder their affairs, make peace with their creditors, and

enjoy a new opportunity in life.” Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286 (1991)
(internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234,
244 (1934)).
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 707 (a), a bankruptcy court “may dismiss a [chapter
7] case. . .only after notice and a hearing and only for cause.” The Code provides
examples of “cause,” but none of the identified examples (unreasonable delay,

nonpayment of required fees, failure to file required information) are applicable
here. 11 U.S.C. § 707 (a).
However, the enumerated examples are non-exclusive. See In re Nogin Com.
LLC, 670 B.R. 711, 725-26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2025). “[T]he Court has discretion to
determine what additional circumstances, not enumerated in the statute, may
constitute cause.” In re Newbury Operating LLC, 2021 WL 1157977, at *7 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2021) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Clear Blue

Water, LLC v. Oyster Bay Mgmt. Co., LLC, 476 B.R. 60, 67 (E.D.N.Y. 2012)).

Courts have consistently held that the Bankruptcy Code “imposes a general
good faith requirement, and that [t]he absence of a debtor’s ‘good faith’ has been
generally recognized as a valid ‘cause’ for dismissal under Code § 707(a).” Gilboy v.
Reukema, 2014 WL 2532475, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. June 5, 2014) (quoting In re Griffieth, 209 B.R. 823 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1996)).
However, the debtor’s bad faith must be egregious to justify dismissal under §

707(a). See In re Gutierrez, 528 B.R. 1, 14 (Bankr. D. Vt. 2014). Specifically,
“[d]ismissal. . .should be confined carefully and is generally utilized only in those
egregious cases that entail concealed or misrepresented assets and/or sources of
income, and excessive and continued expenditures, lavish life-style, and intention to
avoid a large single debt based on conduct akin to fraud, misconduct, or gross
negligence.” Id. (quoting In re Zick, 931 F.2d 1124, 1129 (6th Cir. 1991)).

Courts in this Circuit analyze whether a case was filed in bad faith using the
“Lombardo factors”:
(1) The debtor’s manipulations having the effect of frustrating one
particular creditor;

(2) The absence of an attempt to pay creditors;
(3) The debtor’s failure to make significant lifestyle changes;
(4) The debtor has sufficient resources to pay substantial portion of
debts;

(5) The debtor inflates expenses to disguise financial well-being;
(6) The debtor is overutilizing protections of the Bankruptcy Code to
the conscious detriment of creditors;

(7) The debtor reduced his creditors to a single creditor in the months
prior to the filing of the petition;

(8) The debtor filed in response to a judgment, pending litigation or
collection action; there is an intent to avoid a single debt;

(9) The unfairness of the use of Chapter 7;
(10) The debtor transferred assets;
(11) The debtor is paying debts to insiders;
(12) The debtor failed to make candid and full disclosure;

(13) The debts are modest in relation to assets and income; and
(14) There are multiple bankruptcy filings or other procedural
“gymnastics.”

In re Lombardo, 370 B.R. 506, 511-12 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2007).
“While the presence of one of these factors alone will not be sufficient to
support a dismissal for cause, a finding of a combination of factors may suffice.” Id. at 512 (citing In re Eddy, 288 B.R. 500, 505 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2002)).
The Ndjangos argue that the first, sixth, and eighth Lombardo factors are
present and that this is sufficient for the Court to find bad faith.2 (Docket No. 12).
As to the first factor, the Ndjangos maintain they are the only identified
creditor with an enumerated amount owed and the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing
frustrated their litigation efforts. Id. As to the eighth factor, the Ndjangos note that the Debtor filed for
bankruptcy less than a week he filed an Answer in the state court proceeding. In
addition, they contend that the Debtor failed to submit documents or otherwise
participate in the state court proceedings until they sought a default judgment on

2 The Ndjangos have not alleged, and there is nothing before this Court that indicates, that the Debtor inflated his
expenses to disguise his financial well-being, reduced his creditors to a single creditor in the months prior to the
filing of the petition, is paying debts to insiders, has debts that are modest in relation to assets and income, has filed
multiple bankruptcy cases, has sufficient resources to pay substantial portion of his debts, has failed to pay creditors,
and/or has engaged in other procedural “gymnastics.” Thus, none of these factors support a determination that the
Debtor filed in bad faith.
their third-party claim against him. Id. Thus, they contend, Debtor’s bankruptcy
filing is a direct result of pending litigation. Id. However, “the fact that a debtor files a chapter 7 solely to avoid the large

debt of a single creditor or to frustrate that creditor’s collection efforts, standing
alone, is not enough to warrant dismissal under § 707(a).” Gutierrez, 528 B.R. at 15.
Rather, “there must be evidence of an ‘intention to avoid a large single debt based
on conduct akin to fraud, misconduct or gross negligence.’” Id. (quoting Zick, 931
F.2d at 1129).
Moreover, “the fact that the Debtor filed for bankruptcy in response to

pending litigation without more additional evidence of misconduct is not enough to
dismiss … for cause under 11 U.S.C. § 707 (a).” In re Mazzella, No. 09-78449-478, 2010 WL 5058395, at *6 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010); compare Deglin v.
Keobapha (In re Keobapha), 279 B.R. 49, 53 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2002) (finding no
cause for dismissal when debtor essentially had one creditor, but there was no
evidence of manipulating his financial situation, no evidence of misleading the
court, no evidence of hampering the trustee’s management of the case, debtor did

not live a lavish lifestyle, made no pre-petition transfers of assets, could barely
make ends meet, and the bankruptcy filing was in response to a pending wrongful
death lawsuit), with Lombardo, 370 B.R. at 513 (finding that debtor’s pre-petition
deceit in promising her attorney a share of a settlement in payment of the
attorney’s fees then filing for bankruptcy before the attorney could perfect a lien on
the funds constitutes egregious conduct).
At the December 23, 2025 hearing, counsel for the Debtor pointed to the fact
that the Debtor has no significant assets, no insurance, and no lawyer in the State
Court proceeding. (Docket No. 16). He would need to defend himself pro se in that

action, and filed for bankruptcy protection due to the threat of having a large
judgment against him. Id. He seeks a fresh start. Id. The Ndjangos’ Motion does not establish egregious conduct. The Motion
mentions the Debtor’s bankruptcy filing and concomitant frustration of their
litigation efforts. (Docket No. 12). While these facts indicate an obvious intent to
halt the state court litigation, as noted above, this is generally considered a proper

purpose for a bankruptcy filing, and there is nothing before this Court that shows
Debtor engaged in any egregious behavior.
Although the Ndjangos appear to allege fraud or other misconduct in the
underlying conduct of the Debtor giving rise to their claim, the “Bankruptcy Code
does not disqualify a debtor from seeking bankruptcy even if the debtor’s largest
[unliquidated] debt arose from wrongful or improper conduct, but instead the Code
allows the particular debt to be excepted from a bankruptcy discharge depending on

the nature and type of wrongful conduct.” In re Minick, 588 B.R. 772, 778 (Bankr.
W.D. Va. 2018).
In other words, the fact that the debt to the Ndjangos, if any, may have
arisen from fraud or other misconduct is not grounds for dismissal, but is an issue
that can be addressed through an objection to discharge and/or an action to
determine dischargeability. See In re Adler, 673 B.R. 109, 114 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
2025) (“[W]here a debtor’s misconduct is addressed by relief available under more
specific provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, such misconduct cannot properly
constitute grounds for dismissal under a vague general equitable concept such as

‘bad faith.’” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
Accordingly, the first and eighth factors weigh against granting the Motion to
Dismiss.
As to the sixth Lombardo factor, the Ndjangos argue that Debtor is
obstructing their state court litigation through the automatic stay and contend that
Debtor’s bankruptcy filing three days after filing an Answer shows a conscious

effort to use bankruptcy as a sword, rather than as a shield. (Docket No. 12).
The fact that the Debtor is utilizing the protections of the Bankruptcy Code
does not indicate bad faith. See Minick, 588 B.R. at 778 (“Because [§ 362] authorizes
a stay of certain stated court civil actions when a debtor voluntarily files a
bankruptcy petition, a debtor’s decision to take advantage of that stay does not
establish bad faith.”).
Debtor has little income, minimal assets, and a disputed debt he is incapable

of satisfying. (Docket No. 1). Indeed, Debtor’s Schedule I indicates a monthly deficit
of $220, and Schedule A indicates that his only significant assets are a two-family
residence valued at $59,880 and a 2002 Chevrolet Venture 4 Door Van valued at
$2,287. Id. Debtor has claimed the entire amount of both assets as exempt under 11
U.S.C. § 522 pursuant to N.Y.C.P.L.R. § 5206 and N.Y. Debt. & Cred. L. § 282 (1). Id. There is, therefore, nothing before this Court that indicates overutilization of the
Bankruptcy Code.
Accordingly, application of the sixth factor weighs against granting the

Motion to Dismiss.
Based on the totality of the circumstances and duly weighing the Lombardo
factors, there is no bad faith or other cause under § 707(a) to dismiss Debtor’s case.
The Ndjangos’ Motion to Dismiss (Docket No.12) is DENIED.
###