Schamens v. Cournoyer - Default Judgment Entered, Discharge Denied

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April 3, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: David Wayne Schamens v. John Paul H. Cournoyer, U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator

United States Bankruptcy Court, M.D. North Carolina

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-02010

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

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Trial Court Document

SIGNED this 2nd day of April, 2026. We)

BBRNJAMIN A. KAHN
UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA
GREENSBORO DIVISION
In re: )
)
David Wayne Schamens, )
) Chapter 7
) Case No. 23-10483
Debtor. )

John Paul H. Cournoyer, )
U.S. Bankruptcy Administrator, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
Vv. ) Adv. No. 24-02010
)
David Wayne Schamens, )
)
Defendant. )

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
DEFENDANT’S ANSWER AND ENTERING DEFAULT JUDGMENT
This adversary proceeding is before the Court on the Motion
to Strike Defendant’s Answer, Enter Default Judgment, or for Other
Sanctions Under Rule 37, filed by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Administrator, John Paul Hughes Cournoyer (“Plaintiff”) on March
4, 2025, ECF No. 36, and the Court’s Order on Motion by Bankruptcy
Administrator for Sanctions entered on June 20, 2025. ECF No. 49.

At the hearing, Plaintiff and David Wayne Schamens (“Defendant”)
appeared. Defendant is proceeding pro se. Due to Defendant’s
persistent and willful failure to engage in the pre-trial process

and to comply with the orders of the Court, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s motion, strike Defendant’s answer, and enter default
judgment, denying a discharge to Defendant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this adversary proceeding
under 28 U.S.C. § 1334. Under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (a), the United
States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina
has referred the above-captioned bankruptcy case and this
adversary proceeding to this Court by its Local Rule 83.11. This
is a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157 (b)(2)(J) and the Court
has constitutional and statutory authority to hear and determine
this proceeding by final order. See ECF No. 14, ¶ 8 (and
authorities cited therein). Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. §

1. The Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendant. See ECF No. 19 at 16-17. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND On July 11, 2024, Plaintiff commenced this adversary proceeding seeking denial of Defendant’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2), (3), (4) & (6). ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant failed to disclose assets, liabilities, and pending litigation in his schedules and statement of financial affairs, knowingly and fraudulently testified at his meeting of creditors, and presented or used a false claim in an attempt to prevent the bankruptcy trustee from administering his residential real

property, among other things. See id. On August 12, 2024,
Defendant filed a timely motion to extend time to file an answer,
ECF No. 5, which was granted through September 10, 2024. ECF No.
6. On September 10, 2024, Defendant filed a motion to dismiss or
stay the adversary proceeding. ECF No. 10. Plaintiff filed a
response to Defendant’s motion to dismiss or stay the adversary
proceeding on September 17, 2024, ECF No. 11, and on December 13,
2024, the Court entered an order denying Defendant’s motion and
determining that the complaint plausibly stated claims for relief
under § 727. ECF No. 19. Defendant timely filed an answer. ECF
No. 28.
Before the Court entered its order denying the motion to

dismiss, the parties filed a joint scheduling memorandum, setting
November 1, 2024, as the deadline for Defendant to file his initial
disclosures, and February 15, 2025, as the date on which discovery
must be completed. ECF Nos. 13 & 14. On November 15, 2024,
Plaintiff issued written discovery requests to Defendant,
including requests for admission, interrogatories, and requests
for production of documents. ECF No. 36, at 9-18 (collectively
the “Discovery Requests”). Defendant failed to timely file his
initial disclosures or to respond to any of these discovery
requests. Having missed these deadlines, Plaintiff and Defendant
informally agreed to extend the deadlines to December 2, 2024;
Defendant still did not provide his initial disclosures and failed

to respond to the Discovery Requests. ECF No. 31, ¶ 3.
On January 15, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel
Defendant to make initial disclosures and respond to Plaintiff’s
interrogatories and requests for production. ECF No. 31. On
January 22, 2025, the Court held a hearing on Plaintiff’s motion
to compel. ECF No. 33. At that hearing, Defendant requested that
all deadlines in the scheduling order, including the deadline for
Defendant to file his initial disclosures, be extended by sixty
days. On January 23, 2025, the Court entered an order amending
the scheduling order and directing Defendant to provide initial
disclosures and respond to the outstanding discovery requests
within thirty days of the date of the order, which was more time

than was requested by Defendant at the hearing. ECF No. 34 (the
“January 23 Order”).
Over a year ago, on March 4, 2025, Plaintiff filed a motion
requesting sanctions under Rule 37, including the striking of
Defendant’s answer and entry of default judgment. ECF No. 36. On
March 21, 2025, the Clerk of Court issued a Notice of Right to
Respond to Dispositive Motion, setting April 4, 2025, as the
deadline for Defendant to respond to Plaintiff’s motion for
sanctions, and providing Defendant notice that failure to timely
respond could result in entry of default judgment, among other
things. ECF No. 37.
On April 4, 2025, Defendant filed a motion requesting an

extension of time to file a response to Plaintiff’s motion, ECF
No. 39, and although Defendant failed to establish cause necessary
for granting such a motion, the Court granted an extension through
April 15, 2025. ECF No. 40. On April 15, 2025, Defendant filed
a second motion requesting an extension of time to file a response
in order to confer with his counsel representing him in the
criminal proceeding discussed below. ECF No. 43. The Court
granted Defendant’s second motion for an extension of time through
April 22, 2025, which was more time than Defendant requested, and
provided that the Court would not grant further extensions absent
extraordinary circumstances. ECF No. 44. On April 22, 2025,
Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions and

attached as an exhibit his purported discovery response. ECF No.
46, at 5-7. At the hearing on Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions
under Rule 37, Defendant indicated that he was subject to an order
from the United States District Court for the District of New
Jersey prohibiting him from using computers. See ECF No. 49, at
5-6; United States v. Schamens et al., Case No. 2:22-mj-10299-JBC-
1 (D.N.J.).
The Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on Plaintiff’s
motion to compel on May 28, 2025. On June 20, 2025, the Court
issued an order (the “June 20 Order”) determining that: (1)
Defendant had waived objections to Plaintiff’s interrogatories and
requests for production of documents, ECF No. 49, at 11; (2)

Defendant failed to verify his interrogatory responses, and they
were therefore invalid, in addition to their substantive
insufficiency, id. at 8; (3) Defendant still had not provided his
initial disclosures, id. at 9; (4) Defendant’s responses did not
constitute a good faith attempt to comply with Plaintiff’s
requests, id.; (5) Defendant “has engaged in a pattern of dilatory
and bad faith conduct throughout this adversary proceeding and the
underlying case,” id.; and (6) despite his bad faith, the Court
would not yet deem Defendant to have admitted to the requests for
admission, but Defendant’s failure to respond sufficiently in the
future might result in the Court deeming the requests admitted.
Id. at 12.

The Court ordered Defendant to respond within thirty days to
all of Plaintiff’s interrogatories and to Plaintiff’s requests for
production of documents numbers 1-7 and 10. Id. at 13. The Court
further explained that Defendant’s inability to use a computer or
the 2021 seizure related to the criminal case were not valid
excuses for failure to comply. See id. at 10-11, 14-15. The Court
set a compliance hearing on July 22, 2025, and again warned
Defendant that failure to comply could result in sanctions,
including striking the responses to Plaintiff’s request for
admission and deeming those requests admitted, striking his
answer, entering default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, and
denying his discharge. Id. at 15-17.

The deadline for Defendant to comply with the June 20 Order
expired. The Court directed Defendant to appear at a compliance
hearing on July 22, 2025, and show through admissible evidence,
rather than statements to the Court, all reasonable efforts made
to obtain information from sources other than through Defendant’s
use of a computer or demonstrate why any requested information is
unavailable through means other than the use of a computer. Id.
at 15.
Defendant appeared at the compliance hearing but did not
present admissible evidence and conceded that he had not made any
effort to comply with the June 20 Order, including without
limitation supplementing or verifying the responses to Plaintiff’s

interrogatories. ECF No. 53, at 8. On July 31, 2025, the Court
entered an order further continuing the compliance hearing to
September 9, 2025, and finding Defendant in contempt of both the
January 23 Order and the June 20 Order and indicating that
Defendant’s contempt is continuing. Id. at 9-10. Defendant was
warned again that sanctions for contempt could include entry of a
default judgment denying his discharge. Id. at 11. At Defendant’s
request, the Court again continued the compliance hearing to
October 28, 2025. ECF No. 56, at 8.
The day before the continued compliance hearing, Defendant
once again requested a continuance, claiming that he had only
recently learned of the continuance date, and because it conflicted

with a concurrent eviction proceeding ongoing in the Davie County
State Court for which the Court determined that the automatic stay
did not apply. ECF No. 59, at 1-2; see also Case No. 23-10483,
ECF No. 293. The Court found that, according to the record,
“Defendant’s claim to have discovered the date of the hearing
belatedly is again inaccurate.” ECF No. 60, at 2. Nevertheless,
the Court granted the continuance due to Defendant’s documented
medical issues and the conflicting state court proceeding
regarding his residence. Id. at 3. The Court set the continued
compliance hearing for November 25, 2025. Id.
On November 21, 2025, Defendant filed a motion representing
that he would be unable to attend the November 25 hearing because

of medical issues and requesting to appear via Zoom. ECF No. 63.
The Court again continued the hearing to January 6, 2026. ECF No.
64. A day before the January 6 hearing, Defendant again untimely
requested the hearing be held via Zoom. Despite the untimeliness,
the Court permitted the appearance. ECF No. 67. Although
permitted to appear remotely, Defendant did not appear at the
January 6 hearing. Despite proper notice of the hearing and
Defendant’s unexplained absence, the Court again continued the
hearing to January 21, 2026. ECF No. 68. At the January 6 hearing,
Plaintiff noted that “over 400 days hav[e] passed since the
discovery requests were issued, and [they] still have not been
complied with.” Id. at 00:02:13-00:02:23. When the Court asked

whether Defendant had produced any additional information or
responses to interrogatories since the last order, Plaintiff
responded that he had not. Id. at 00:02:25-00:02:33.
At the January 21, 2026, hearing,1 Defendant testified and
admitted that he still had not attempted to comply with the
discovery requests or the Court’s June 20 Order, and despite the
Court’s prior detailed orders and his failure even to attempt to
respond, contended that he did not understand what was required of
him.2 Nevertheless, Defendant requested that the Court provide
Defendant and Plaintiff with additional time to resolve this
adversary proceeding by consent, and that no Opinion be issued on
Plaintiff’s motions prior to February 18, 2026. January 21, 2026,

hearing, 00:23:38-00:23:50. On March 24, 2026, thirty-four days
after this Court indicated that an order may be entered, Defendant
sent an email to the Deputy Clerk requesting more time to resolve
this adversary proceeding by consent. Defendant again represented
that his medical issues hindered his attempt to consensually

1 Because it contained discussion of Defendant’s medical status, the audio
recording of this hearing is not included on the publicly available docket.
2 “I don’t even know what you want, . . . whatever you want, I don’t have.”
January 21, 2026, Hearing, 00:15:00-00:15:40.
resolve this adversary proceeding, and that additional time may
result in the voluntary resolution of this case. On March 24,
2026, the Court yet again granted Defendant an additional seven

days, up to and including March 31, 2026, to resolve this adversary
proceeding by consent. ECF No. 70. Failing to find a consensual
resolution to the satisfaction of all parties, on April 1, 2026,
Defendant once again sent an email to the Deputy Clerk requesting
a hearing on further matters prior to entry of this Order. As the
Court indicated in the March 24 order, the Court will not further
delay its ruling.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND3
Because an understanding of the background in this case and
the underlying claims is necessary to assess the materiality of
the Defendant’s misstatements and obfuscation in these
proceedings, the Court will briefly summarize that history.

A. Dugan Judgment
On August 11, 2015, Guy M. Dugan, Karen Dugan, and the GDM

3 As a result of striking Defendant’s answer as set forth below, the Court has
accepted the factual allegations in the complaint, ECF No. 1, and the response,
ECF No. 11, as true. Opportunities Dev. Grp., LLC v. Andruss, Case No. 1:14-
cv-00062, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57614, at *12 (E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (citing
Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6)); see also Anderson v. Found. for Advancement, 155 F.3d
500, 506 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court erred in granting
default where complaint failed to state a claim). The Court also has deemed
Plaintiff’s requests for admission as admitted. In addition, the Court has
taken judicial notice of its own records and the record of this proceeding and
the main bankruptcy case. See, e.g., Anderson v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 918
F.2d 1139, 1141 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that a district court “should
properly take judicial notice of its own records”).
Family Trust (collectively, the “Dugan Plaintiffs”) filed a
lawsuit against Defendant, Defendant’s spouse, and various
business entities affiliated with Defendant in the United States

District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Case
No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No. 1. On October 2, 2017, default
judgment was entered against Defendant, Defendant’s spouse, and
the affiliated business entities for an aggregate amount over
$640,000.00. Case No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No. 69 (the “Dugan
Judgment”).4
B. Aggie Investment Judgment
In December 2014, Aggie Investment LLC (“Aggie Investment”),
an entity owned or controlled by Guy Dugan, filed a lawsuit in
state court against Defendant, Defendant’s spouse, and other
affiliated entities. ECF No. 1, ¶ 13. On June 28, 2016, judgment
was entered against Defendant and the other defendants in the
amount of $570,179.69 (the “Aggie Judgment”). Id. ¶ 14. After

this judgment, the parties reached a settlement agreement in which
Aggie Investment received a deed of trust against residential real
property located at 138 Arnold Palmer Drive, Advance, North

4 Defendant appealed the Dugan Judgment, Case No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No.
76, and on October 29, 2020, the Court of Appeals remanded the matter back to
the District Court. Dugan v. Schamens, 833 F. App’x 981 (4th Cir. 2020). On
March 7, 2022, the district court vacated the Dugan Judgment as to one of
Defendant’s affiliated business entities, but the judgment remained the same in
all other respects. Case No. 15-00366 (W.D.N.C.), ECF No. 108.
Carolina (the “Advance Property”)5 in the amount of the Aggie
Judgment. Id. ¶ 22. Defendant defaulted under the terms of the
settlement agreement, id. ¶ 24, and in September 2017, Aggie

Investment foreclosed on the Advance Property. Id. ¶ 25. Aggie
Investment was the purchaser at foreclosure with a bid of
$450,000.00 – leaving a portion of the Aggie Judgment unsatisfied. Id. In December 2019, Defendant purchased residential real
property at 812 Northern Shores Point, Greensboro, North Carolina
(the “Greensboro Property”).6 Id. ¶ 26. Aggie Investment
domesticated the Aggie Judgment in Guilford County, North
Carolina, thereby creating a judgment lien against the Greensboro
Property. Id. ¶ 28. In May 2021, the Guilford County Sheriff
provided Defendant with Notice of Execution Sale with respect to
the Greensboro Property. Id. C. Daufuskie Judgment
On June 25, 2021, after Defendant received the Notice of

5 When Aggie Investment’s lawsuit was filed, the Advance Property was held in
the name of Invictus Real Estate Investment LLP (“Invictus”) – an entity owned
or controlled by Defendant. ECF No. 1, ¶ 15. In January 2015, shortly after
Aggie Investment’s lawsuit was filed, Defendant signed a warranty deed on behalf
of Invictus, transferring the Advance Property to himself in his individual
name. Id. ¶ 16. In May 2015, a deed of trust, signed by Defendant and granted
in favor of “Pillar Capital Partners” (“Pillar Capital”) in the amount of
$548,876.71 was recorded against the Advance Property. Id. ¶ 19. Pillar
Capital did not actually make a loan to Defendant, and that the deed of trust
was recorded as an attempt to protect the Advance Property from execution by
creditors. Id. ¶ 20.
6 In connection with the purchase of the Greensboro Property, Defendant granted
to Carter Bank & Trust (“Carter Bank”) a deed of trust against the property in
the amount of $900,000.00. Id. ¶ 27.
Execution Sale of the Greensboro Property with respect to the Aggie
Judgment, a deed of trust was recorded against the Greensboro
Property in favor of Daufuskie Lending Partners, LLC

(“Daufuskie”), in the amount of $756,814.70 (the “Daufuskie Deed
of Trust”).7 Id. ¶ 29; see also A.P. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 1, at
6. In February 2022, the Dugan Plaintiffs domesticated the Dugan
Judgment in Guilford County, North Carolina. ECF No. 1, ¶ 12.
The Daufuskie Deed of Trust references a note dated January 5,
2015.8 Id. ¶ 29. The Dugan Plaintiffs then commenced an action
in Guilford County, North Carolina, seeking a determination that
the Daufuskie Deed of Trust was fraudulent or otherwise invalid. Id. ¶ 30. Despite discovery requests regarding the invalidity of
the Daufuskie Deed of Trust, the state court found that Defendant
did not produce any documentation supporting its validity in the
Guilford County action. Id. ¶ 39. On May 12, 2023, the state

court entered judgment in the Guilford County action determining
that the Daufuskie Deed of Trust was fraudulent and directing the
registrar of deeds to strike it from the public record.9 Case No.

7 Defendant signed the Daufuskie Deed of Trust. Id. ¶ 29.
8 Daufuskie did not exist when the note secured by the Daufuskie Deed of Trust
was executed or when the deed of trust was recorded. Id. ¶ 35.
9 Defendant appealed this judgment even though he contended that Daufuskie was
a third party and even though the judgment determined that the putative claim
against him was invalid. Id. ¶ 32. Daufuskie did not appeal the judgment. Id. On November 14, 2023, the Court entered its order modifying the automatic
stay to permit the state court proceedings brought by the Dugans against
Daufuskie to be brought to conclusion and final judgment. Case No. 23-10483,
23-10483, ECF No. 30-14 (the “Daufuskie Judgment”).
D. Defendant’s prior bankruptcy filings
Defendant has previously filed successive bankruptcy cases in
this Court on May 23, 2022, and August 16, 2022, with each case
being dismissed and Defendant failing to take substantial steps to

move the cases forward. Case Nos. 22-10260 & 22-10418,
respectively. In the first case, Defendant listed Daufuskie in
his bankruptcy schedules as having a lien encumbering the
Greensboro Property in the amount of $350,000.00. Case No. 22-
10260, ECF No. 17, at 18. The Court dismissed the case on June
30, 2022, for Defendant’s failure to obtain credit counseling as
required under 11 U.S.C. § 109 (h). Case No. 22-10260, ECF No. 26.
On October 17, 2022, the Court entered its order dismissing
Defendant’s second case10 with a 12-month bar to refiling a chapter
13 petition for the reasons as stated at the hearing held in that
case on October 11, 2022. Case No. 22-10418, ECF No. 28. Further,

on April 19, 2023, this Court dismissed a chapter 13 case filed by
Defendant’s spouse with a 180-day bar to refiling a case under
title 11, because among other reasons, the Court found that the
record indicated the filing was “part of a further use of the

ECF No. 100. Defendant’s appeal was dismissed by the North Carolina Court of
Appeals on June 20, 2024, and the state court judgment determining that the
Daufuskie deed was fraudulent and invalid is final. Id. 10 During Defendant’s second bankruptcy case, the Dugan Plaintiffs commenced an
adversary proceeding seeking a judgment determining that the Daufuskie Deed of
Trust was invalid, unenforceable, and cancelled. Adv. No. 22-02020, ECF No. 1.
bankruptcy system by Defendant and her spouse as a delay and
litigation tactic.” Case No. 23-10057, ECF No. 58.
E. Defendant’s current bankruptcy case
On September 5, 2023, and while subject to the order barring
Defendant from filing a case under chapter 13 due to abuse of the
bankruptcy system,11 Defendant filed a petition for relief under

chapter 11, commencing the underlying bankruptcy case. Case No.
23-10483, ECF No. 1. The Court entered its chapter 11 operating
order, which includes the requirement that Defendant close any
preexisting bank accounts, establish a debtor-in-possession
depository account, and provide the bankruptcy administrator
(“BA”) with account information within seven days. Case No. 23-
10483, ECF No. 6, ¶ 5. On September 11, 2023, Defendant filed a
motion to extend the time allotted under the operating order, Case
No. 23-10483, ECF No. 17, and the Court granted the extension,
allowing Defendant until September 18, 2023, to establish a deposit

account. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 21. On September 19, 2023,
Defendant filed a designation of depository, Case No. 23-10483,
ECF No. 24; however, Defendant never provided any evidence of any
new depository account to the BA, in violation of the operating
order. ECF No. 1, ¶ 47.
On September 19, 2023, Defendant filed his initial bankruptcy

11 See Case No. 22-10418, ECF No. 28.
schedules and statement of financial affairs (“SOFA”). Case No.
23-10483, ECF No. 28. In his initial schedules, Defendant listed
ownership of a half-interest in the Greensboro Property in the

amount of $800,000.00. Id. at 3. Contrary to the representation
in his schedules, Defendant owned 100% of the Greensboro Property.
ECF No. 1, ¶ 49. Defendant also indicated that he owned 0%
interests in entities listed as “Bold Analytics, Ltd.” and
“GeniHealth, Inc.” Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 28, at 7. In
contrast, Defendant indicated in his SOFA that within the four
years prior to filing his petition, Defendant was the owner of at
least 5% of the voting or equity securities of both Bold Analytics,
Ltd. and GeniHealth, Inc. Id. at 47. Defendant further scheduled
electronics valued at $500.00, golf clubs valued at $500.00, and
shoes valued at $1,000.00. Id. at 6. Defendant did not schedule
any other assets. See id. at 3-12. With regard to scheduled
claims, Defendant listed Carter Bank and Daufuskie12 as holding

secured claims against the Greensboro Property. Id. at 18.
Defendant scheduled unsecured claims belonging to “Dugan et.
al.,”13 Wells Fargo Bank, Chase Bank, Capital One, Discover, and
“Duke Energy/Piedmont Nat Gas.” Id. at 23–24. Defendant did not

12 Daufuskie has not filed a proof of claim in this case or in any of the
previous bankruptcy cases filed in this Court by Defendant or his spouse.
13 Defendant scheduled the claim of “Dugan et. al.” as disputed. Case No. 23-
10483, ECF No. 28, at 23.
schedule any other claims.14 Id. at 18-25. Defendant also
indicated in his schedules that he was the CEO of Bold Analytics,
Ltd., with a monthly income of $1,500.00, and that Defendant’s

non-filing spouse was unemployed with a monthly income of
$1,500.00. Id. at 31.
In his SOFA, Defendant indicated that he had no income from
any source during 2022 or during the portion of 2023 prior to
filing his petition. Id. at 38. In part 4 of the SOFA, Defendant
identified only one lawsuit to which he was a party in the year
preceding the filing of his petition – a lawsuit described as
“fraudulent case” brought by “Dugan, et al [sic]” in the United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina. Id. at 41. Defendant did not disclose that he was the defendant
in a pending civil securities fraud action brought by the
Securities and Exchange Commission in the New Jersey District

Court, which action alleges that Defendant defrauded at least 16
investors of at least $1.8 million. Id.; see Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Schamens, No. 22-01219 (D.N.J.).
Similarly, Defendant did not disclose that he is the defendant in
a pending criminal case in the New Jersey District Court for wire

14 The BA asserts that Defendant’s schedules omit the claims of “Aggie
Investment, Theodore Van Leer, Caroline Van Leer, Anne M. Blanken, the Credit
Shelter Share Trust, the Lambertsen Charitable Remainder Unitrust, a claim for
unpaid costs to the N.C. Court of Appeals, Weeks Hardwood Flooring Inc., and
Zayo Group LLC.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 55.
fraud, securities fraud, and money laundering. United States v.
Schamens, Case No. 23-00255 (D.N.J) (the “Criminal Case”).15
Further, Defendant’s appeal of the Daufuskie Judgment remained

pending at the time Defendant filed his SOFA, but Defendant failed
to disclose this information. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 28, at
41; ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 32-33.
On September 20, 2023, the Dugan Plaintiffs and the BA filed
motions to convert Defendant’s bankruptcy case from chapter 11 to
chapter 7. Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 30 & 31. On October 23,
2023, the Court granted the motions and converted the case to
chapter 7 for the reasons set forth on the record at the hearing
held on October 17, 2023. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 68.
On October 26, 2023, Defendant filed a motion seeking
authority to file documents with the Court electronically. Case
No. 23-10483, ECF No. 78. The Court entered an order allowing

Defendant to submit filings via electronic mail to the courtroom
deputy, to be followed by a complete signed original by regular
mail within seven business days. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 98.
Defendant violated this order on multiple occasions. ECF No. 1,
¶ 70. As a result, the court first modified this permission, and

15 Defendant’s criminal indictment alleges that multiple victims suffered
significant losses due to Defendant’s wire fraud, securities fraud, and money
laundering between 2014 and 2021. Case No. 23-00255 (D.N.J.), ECF No. 31.
Defendant did not list these victims’ claims in his schedules. Case No. 23-
10483, ECF No. 28.
ultimately revoked it after continued violations. Case No. 23-
10483, ECF Nos. 116, 117, 126 & 151.
Defendant appeared at the chapter 7 meeting of creditors on

November 20, 2023, but refused to answer most of the questions
asked, invoking his privilege against self-incrimination. ECF No.
1, ¶ 71. The BA then filed a motion seeking to compel Defendant
to answer certain questions at his meeting of creditors. Case No.
23-10483, ECF No. 127. At the hearing on this motion on January
9, 2024, Defendant stated that he needed to file amended schedules.
ECF No. 1, ¶ 72. On January 9, 2024, the Court entered an order
requiring Defendant to file the amended schedules by January 19,
2024, Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 134, which was later extended to
January 26, 2024. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 151. Defendant
failed to comply with the order and did not file amended schedules
by this deadline.16

At the continued meeting of creditors on February 5, 2024,
Defendant testified that he had outstanding debt to Daufuskie
and/or Pillar Capital, and that he “never had an ownership interest

16 Defendant filed an amendment to his schedules on January 29, 2024, three days
after the deadline set by the Court’s order, to add two credit card accounts
with negative balances. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 164. In February 2024,
Defendant amended his Sched. A/B, again listing a half-interest in the
Greensboro Property, but this time valuing his interest in the real property at
$750,000.00, instead of $800,000.00. Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 182, at 1; cf.
Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 28, at 3. Defendant also listed a putative cause of
action against the realtor authorized to list and market the Greensboro Property
for “aiding and abetting in identity theft, and conspiracy.” Case No. 23-
10483, ECF No. 182, at 8. Defendant did not list any other assets in the
amended schedules. See Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 182.
in” Daufuskie or Pillar Capital. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 80-81. Defendant
further testified that the furniture17 in the Greensboro Property
was subject to a note in favor of Pillar Capital. Id. ¶ 78.

Defendant never disclosed any furniture or any secured claim or
lease in favor of Pillar Capital in his initial or amended
schedules. See Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 28, 164 & 182.
On March 8, 2024, the chapter 7 trustee filed a motion to
sell the Greensboro Property pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363 (f). Case
No. 23-10483, ECF No. 188. Defendant objected to the sale arguing,
inter alia, that the putative Daufuskie Deed of Trust fully
encumbered Defendant’s interest in the property. See Case No. 23-
10483, ECF Nos. 217 & 223. On May 3, 2024, the Court authorized
the sale of the Greensboro Property free and clear of the Daufuskie
Deed of Trust.18 Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 226.
F. Daufuskie Adversary Proceeding
On February 14, 2024, and while Defendant’s appeal of the

state court judgment against Daufuskie was pending, the bankruptcy
trustee initiated an adversary proceeding in the above-captioned

17 The complaint alleges that the Greensboro Property contained furniture and
other household goods that one would expect in a residence valued at
$1,500,000.00. ECF No. 1, ¶ 76.
18 Under 11 U.S.C. § 363 (f), a trustee may sell property of the estate free and
clear of any interests in such property of an entity other than the estate, if
“such interest is in bona fide dispute.” 11 U.S.C. § 363 (f)(4). As of the
date of the Court’s order authorizing the sale of the Greensboro Property, the
validity of the Daufuskie Deed of Trust was in bona fide dispute. See Case No.
23-10483, ECF No. 226.
chapter 7 case by filing a complaint against Daufuskie Lending
Partners, LLC. Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 1. In his complaint,
the trustee alleged that Daufuskie is an artifice and sought entry

of a judgment by the Court deeming that the Daufuskie Deed of Trust
is void “or otherwise avoiding” it under 11 U.S.C. § 544 (a). Id. Although not a party to the adversary proceeding, Defendant,
proceeding pro se, filed a motion in the adversary proceeding on
March 25, 2024, requesting that the Court allow Daufuskie
additional time to respond to the complaint. Adv. No. 24-02001,
ECF No. 7. Defendant also attached to the motion a letter
purporting to be from “Steven K. Novak” as manager of Daufuskie,
asserting that Daufuskie is a valid Delaware limited liability
company.19 Id. at 4–5. On March 26, 2024, the trustee filed an
objection to Defendant’s motion, attaching records tending to show
that the entity registered as Daufuskie Lending Partners, LLC was

created on March 11, 2024, by reviving a different dormant Delaware
limited liability company and filing a name change for that entity
to Daufuskie Lending Partners, LLC.20 Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No.

19 The Complaint asserts that around this time, the trustee received emails from
“Steven K. Novak.” ECF No. 1, ¶ 86. The trustee requested a phone call with
Mr. Novak, but he declined. Id. In response, the trustee stated that he
suspected the emails may be Defendant posing as “Steven K. Novak” and that it
would be helpful to speak with Mr. Novak on the phone to dispel that suspicion. Id. Mr. Novak declined to speak with the trustee on the phone. Id. 20 Defendant is deemed to have admitted that he caused Pillar Capital Partners
LLC to change its name to Daufuskie Lending Partners LLC in March 2024, and
that Daufuskie Lending Partners LLC did not exist prior to November 7, 2023.
ECF No. 36, at 13. Defendant now contends that Daufuskie and Pillar have always
been the same entity. See, e.g., Case No. 23-10483, at ECF No. 223, at ¶ 12.
8. On March 29, 2024, the Court denied Defendant’s motion because
the sole named defendant in the adversary proceeding was Daufuskie,
a putative corporate entity which may not appear before this Court

except through licensed counsel — and Defendant is not licensed
counsel. Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 11.
On March 26, 2024, the trustee filed a motion seeking entry
of default against Daufuskie. Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 9. Two
days later, Defendant filed a notice stating that the manager of
Daufuskie “was making a substantial filing with the Court via
overnight Federal Express.” Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 10. On
April 1, 2024, an objection to the trustee’s motion for default
was filed, seeking more time for Daufuskie to respond to the
complaint. Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 14. This objection was
delivered to the court via Federal Express and was purportedly
filed by “Steven K. Novak” as manager of Daufuskie. Id. On April

9, 2024, the Court entered an order staying the adversary
proceeding pending resolution of the prepetition state court
proceedings. Adv. No. 24-02001, ECF No. 20. Thereafter, the state
court judgment determining that the Daufuskie deed was fraudulent
and invalid became final, and the trustee dismissed the adversary
proceeding without prejudice. Id., ECF No. 37.
DISCUSSION
I. Default judgment is warranted under the circumstances.
“Courts have broad discretion to manage discovery, including
the authority to impose sanctions for discovery abuses as part of
their case management responsibilities.” Smith v. Devine, 126
F.4th 331, 342 (4th Cir. 2025) (citing Russell v. Absolute
Collection Services, Inc., 763 F.3d 385, 396 (4th Cir. 2014)).

Specifically, “[i]f a party . . . fails to obey an order to provide
or permit discovery, . . .” sanctions may include “dismissing the
action” or “rendering a default judgment against the disobedient
party[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(v)-(vi); Fed. R. Bankr. P.
3037; see also Young Again Products, Inc. v. Acord, 459 Fed. Appx.
294, 301 (4th Cir. 2011).
A lower “court’s finding that [a party] deliberately
disregarded [a] pre-trial order is a factual finding. .
. that can be overturned [on appeal] only if clearly
erroneous.” Rabb v. Amatex Corp., 769 F.2d 996, 1000 (4th Cir. 1985). . . . Nevertheless, “[w]hen the sanction
involved is judgment by default, the district court’s
‘range of discretion is more narrow’ because the
district court’s desire to enforce its discovery orders
is confronted head-on by the party’s rights to a trial
by jury and a fair day in court.” Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th
Cir. 1989). To balance those competing interests in
determining whether default judgment is an appropriate
sanction, courts must consider the Wilson factors: “(1)
whether the noncomplying party acted in bad faith; (2)
the amount of prejudice his noncompliance caused his
adversary; (3) the need for deterrence of the particular
sort of noncompliance; and (4) the effectiveness of less
drastic sanctions.” Mey v. Phillips, 71 F.4th 203, 217 (4th Cir. 2023) (quoting Richards, 872 F.2d at 92).
Devine, 126 F.4th at 342 (citation modified).
Defendant acted in bad faith by repeatedly evading
Plaintiff’s discovery requests, in the face of repeated warnings
from the Court. Mey, 71 F.4th, at 219. Bad faith can include

repeatedly employing “evasive discovery tactics” despite warnings
from the court, and a pattern of “failure to disclose discoverable
materials . . . .” Id. at 219-20. Bad faith can also manifest as
a party’s flagrant disregard of the trial court’s orders and
noncompliance with deadlines when the noncompliant party has ample
opportunity to comply with the court’s orders. See National Hockey
League v. Metro. Hockey Club, Inc., 427 U.S. 639, 642 (1976).
Over 400 days have passed since Plaintiff made the November
15, 2024, discovery requests. ECF No. 36, at 9-19. The Court
entered two separate Orders on January 23, 2025, and June 20, 2025,
respectively, commanding compliance in responding to discovery
orders of which Defendant remains in continuing contempt. January

21, 2026, Hearing, 00:15:00-00:15:40. The Court has conducted
multiple evidentiary hearings and warned Defendant on multiple
occasions of the potential for serious sanctions if Defendant
continued to disregard this Court’s discovery orders. When
Defendant did submit “responses” they were both five months late,
facially invalid, and grossly inadequate – evincing Defendant’s
bad faith. ECF No. 49, at 9. The Court has determined that
“Defendant . . . can produce at least some documents and
information requested by Plaintiff,”21 id. at 10, nevertheless
Defendant made no attempt to provide further information or to
verify the information previously provided as ordered by the Court.

Defendant was repeatedly made aware of the deficiencies in his
response, and the steps Defendant was required to take to comply
with discovery and the Court’s orders. Id. at 14. Despite the
prior orders and instructions, Defendant, by his own admission,
did not make any effort to comply and has been in contempt since
at least July 31, 2025. ECF No. 53, at 9. At the January 21,
2026, hearing, Defendant maintained that he could not, and cannot
now, comply because of his medical status and the location of the
requested documents.22 This Court granted Defendant numerous and
liberal deadline extensions and has found that Defendant could
provide additional responses to the requested discovery. See,

21 Defendant’s response that his records were seized in 2021 is insufficient to
ward off discovery claims related to post-petition conduct, communications, and
knowledge, all of which necessarily accumulated after the filing of his petition
on September 5, 2023. Id. Nor has Defendant attempted to disclose the
“substance and timing of communications” he cannot access, as the Court ordered.
Id. Defendant did not attempt to answer the discovery requests through non-
computer sources. Id. at 14.

22 On October 27, 2025, Defendant filed a Motion for Continuance, ECF No. 59,
indicating that he could not attend a hearing previously scheduled on October
28, 2025, because it conflicted with a concurrent eviction proceeding ongoing
in the Davie County State Court for which the Court determined that the automatic
stay did not apply. See Case No. 23-10483, ECF No. 293. That same day the
Court granted Defendant a continuance in contemplation of Defendant’s concurrent
litigation. ECF No. 60. Defendant fully participated in the Davie County State
Court litigation since at least April 2, 2025, including effectuating and
briefing an appeal of an eviction proceeding to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals. See Bermuda Properties, LLC v. Beard, No. 25CVD000297-290 (N.C. Ct.
App. filed Dec. 16, 2025).
e.g., ECF Nos. 34, 40, 44 & 49. Defendant’s willful disregard of
this Court’s orders amounts to bad faith.
Defendant’s non-compliance has prejudiced Plaintiff. Mey, [71

F.4th at 220](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/9409285/diana-mey-v-judson-phillips/#220). Defendant’s filibuster has effectively immobilized
this case, and the only discovery Defendant has provided is
deficient. After a discovery period spanning more than 400 days,
Defendant has failed to take any steps to further the resolution
of this case. Plaintiff contends that Defendant concealed his
assets, falsified and concealed documents, made false statements,
and disobeyed the orders of the Court in the underlying bankruptcy
case. ECF No. 1. Defendant’s unwillingness to engage in discovery
has prejudiced Plaintiff and his case.
The need for deterrence weighs heavily in favor of default
judgment. “While pro se litigants are entitled to some deference,
they . . . also . . . [must] . . . ‘respect . . . court orders

without which effective judicial administration would be
impossible.’” Andruss, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57614, at *10-11
(E.D. Va. Mar. 3, 2015) (quoting Ballard v. Carlson, 882 F.2d 93,
96 (4th Cir. 1989)). Defendant’s stalling and continued contempt
shows a callous disregard for the authority of this Court and the
Rules. “[T]o ignore such bold challenges to the . . . court’s
power would encourage other litigants to flirt with similar
misconduct.” Richards, 872 F.2d at 92 (citing National Hockey
League, 427 U.S. at 643). Defendant’s noncompliance must be
deterred, weighing heavily in favor of default judgment.
Lesser sanctions will not ensure Defendant’s compliance.

This Court has, as detailed above, issued several warnings about
the consequences of failure to make good faith discovery responses.
Defendant repeatedly has indicated that he is unable to afford
monetary sanctions, and the imposition of such sanctions will not
be effective. Because of Defendant’s noncompliance, resolving the
dispute on the merits is not possible. Re-opening discovery or
further extensions of time would not alter the result in the case.
Defendant has stated on the record that he does not intend to
provide further discovery responses. Therefore, the Court will
strike Defendant’s answer, strike the responses to Plaintiff’s
request for admission, deem those requests admitted, and enter a
default judgment in favor of Plaintiff.

All four factors weigh in favor of these sanctions and default
judgment against Defendant.
II. The Complaint and Response sufficiently state facts which,
as admitted, support a denial of discharge.
As indicated by the Court in its June 20 Order, the Court
will strike Defendant’s inadequate responses to Plaintiff’s
requests for admission and deem the request admitted. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(i), (ii); United States v. Renfrow, 612 F.
Supp. 2d 677, 682-83 (E.D.N.C. 2009) (explaining that because pro
se litigant received fair notice of the consequences of failing to
respond to requests for admission, the court deemed the unanswered
requests admitted); see ECF No. 49 at 12. Furthermore, when

default judgment is entered, the defendant admits all factual
allegations in the complaint. Fed R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6) (“An
allegation—other than one relating to the amount of damages—is
admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation
is not denied.”); 10A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller,
Federal Practice & Procedure § 2688.1 (4th ed.) (“If the court
determines that defendant is in default, the factual allegations
of the complaint, except those relating to the amount of damages,
will be taken as true . . . .”). “Even after default, however, it
remains for the court to consider whether the unchallenged facts
constitute a legitimate cause of action . . . .” Id.
Plaintiff asserts claims in its complaint under 11 U.S.C. §

727 (a)(2), (3), (4) & (6). Plaintiff seeks a declaration on all
four counts finding that the complaint and response constitute a
legitimate cause of action. Although plead, the Court did not
reach Count IV, whether a discharge should be denied under 11
U.S.C. § 727 (a)(6). Defendant’s repeated and continuing
disobedience of the Court’s orders in this case itself would likely
support barring his discharge under that section if the Court were
not otherwise bound by the bases in the pleadings under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 54(c), applicable by way of Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7054, in
connection with default judgement. But, because Debtors discharge
will be denied on the other grounds, the Court does not need to
reach this section. See In re Abell, 549 B.R. 631, 674 (Bankr. D.

Md. 2016) (quoting Farouki v. Emirates Bank Int'l, 14 F.3d 244,
250 (4th Cir. 1994)). Defendant’s discharge is denied as detailed
below.
1. Defendant’s discharge is denied under 11 U.S.C. §
727 (a)(2). 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2) provides that a debtor shall not receive
a discharge if “the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or
defraud a creditor or an officer of the estate charged with custody
of property under this title, has transferred, removed, destroyed,
mutilated, or concealed . . . property of the debtor, within one
year before the . . . filing of the petition; or . . . property
of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition.” 11
U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2). The intent required under § 727(a)(2) is
“actual intent.” In re McGalliard, 183 B.R. 726, 732 (Bankr.
M.D.N.C. 1995). Actual intent “requires that there be not only a
deliberate act, but also that there be a specific intent to harm
in the sense of delaying or hindering a creditor.” Id. Since
direct evidence of intent is rare, courts often rely on
circumstantial evidence, course of conduct, or reckless

indifference to the truth to infer intent. See In re White, 128
F. App’x 994, 998-99 (4th Cir. 2005).
Defendant failed to schedule his full interest in the
Greensboro Property, or any interest in the furniture or household
goods within the Greensboro Property. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 49, 75-76.

Defendant failed to disclose in his schedules that he owned
business interests in Bold Analytics, Ltd. and GeniHealth, Inc.,
id. ¶ 50, and falsely stated at his meeting of creditors that he
had no ownership interest in Daufuskie or Pillar Capital.
Defendant is deemed to have admitted that he was a member-manager
of each.23 ECF No. 1, ¶ 21; ECF No. 36, at 12-13. Defendant’s
residence contained significant personal property that Defendant
did not list on his schedules and for which he paid a moving
company over $14,000.00 to move after the sale of the property.
ECF No. 1, ¶ 76. Finally, Defendant falsely stated in filings
with the Court that his bankruptcy case was a “no asset case,” due
to the false Daufuskie claim and the absence of other personal

property. Id. ¶ 83.
The pleadings and deemed admissions are sufficient to support
Plaintiff’s claim under § 727(a)(2). These actions support, at
minimum, a reckless indifference to the true state of Defendant’s
financial affairs such that Defendant acted with the requisite
intent in transferring, removing, or concealing property of the

23 Defendant opened a bank account in July 2015 in Pillar Capital’s name, signing
the documents necessary to open the account as Pillar Capital’s member and was
the only person with signature authority on the account. ECF No. 1, ¶ 21; see
also Case No. 23-10483, at ECF No. 223, at ¶ 12.
estate. Thus, denial of discharge is warranted under § 727(a)(2)
as Plaintiff has provided an appropriate basis for default judgment
as to Count I of the complaint.
2. Defendant’s discharge is denied under 11 U.S.C. §
727 (a)(3). 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(3) provides that a debtor may be denied a
discharge if “the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated,
falsified, or failed to keep or preserve any recorded information
. . . from which the debtor's financial condition or business
transactions might be ascertained, unless such act or failure to
act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case.”24 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(3).
Defendant has been deemed to admit that he created Daufuskie
Lending Partners LLC, and that he falsified documentation
purporting to establish that a secured claim existed against the
Greensboro Property in favor of Daufuskie. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 26-39;
ECF No. 36, at 13. Defendant filed falsified documents with the
Court and sent falsified letters to the trustee. ECF No. 1, ¶¶

24 A plaintiff need only allege that the debtor failed to produce adequate
records and that those records relate to the debtor’s financial condition or
business transactions. In re Anderson, No. 03-13586C-7G, 2006 WL 995856, at *6
(Bankr. M.D.N.C. Feb. 13, 2006). The burden of proof then shifts to the debtor
to justify the lack of records under all the circumstances of the case. Id. Thus, a plaintiff need not allege in their complaint that a debtor’s lack of
records was unjustified under the circumstances. See id.; see also In re Abell, 549 B.R. 631, 646, 676 (Bankr. D. Md. 2016) (holding that plaintiff’s
allegations that debtor refused to provide discovery were sufficient to state
a claim for objection to discharge under § 727(a)(3), even when debtor argued
they could not gain access to records due to their incarceration).
85-89. Defendant prepared these documents and letters and
presented them to the Court to support the putative Daufuskie claim
while “posing as Steven Novak, or acting in concert with him.”25

Id. ¶ 89. Daufuskie did not exist when the note secured by the
Daufuskie Deed of Trust was executed or when the deed of trust was
recorded. ECF No. 36, at 13. Indeed, in March 2024, Pillar
Capital, an entity controlled by Defendant, id. at 13, attempted
to change its name to Daufuskie Lending Partners, LLC after the
commencement of this case, and despite discovery requests in the
prepetition state court litigation, Defendant did not provide
documentation supporting the validity of the Daufuskie claim. Id.;
ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 17-18, 21, 26-39. The validity of the Daufuskie
claim affects the disposition of the Greensboro Property, which is
property of Defendant’s bankruptcy estate and relevant to
Defendant’s financial condition. Defendant submitted falsified

documents and letters related to the Daufuskie claim, and denial
of discharge is warranted under § 727(a)(3).
3. Defendant’s discharge is denied under 11 U.S.C. §
727 (a)(4).
The false claim, along with Defendant’s misstated schedules,
also warrant a denial of discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(4).

25 Alternative pleading is permitted under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2), made
applicable to this adversary proceeding by Rule 7008. Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(2)
(“A party may set out 2 or more statements of a claim or defense alternatively
or hypothetically . . . . [T]he pleading is sufficient if any one of them is
sufficient.”).
That section provides that a debtor’s discharge may be denied if
the debtor, in connection with the case, knowingly and fraudulently
“made a false oath or account,” “presented or used a false claim,”

or “withheld from an officer of the estate entitled to possession
. . . any recorded information . . . relating to the debtor’s
property or financial affairs.” 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(4); see also
Williamson v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 828 F.2d 249, 251 (4th Cir.
1987) (“The false oath made by the debtor must have related to a
material matter.”). For purposes of § 727(a)(4), a debtor’s
petition, schedules, statement of financial affairs, and responses
made at a meeting of creditors all constitute statements under
oath. In re Worley, 517 B.R. 593, 601 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2014).
Courts have found the requisite intent to defraud where a debtor’s
statements contain inconsistencies that exceed the bounds of
honest mistake or are incompatible with a debtor’s own knowledge

and information. Id. at 602; In re Michael, 452 B.R. 908, 919 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. 2011); see also Matter of Beaubouef, 966 F.2d
174, 178 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding finding that debtor had
requisite intent to deceive where debtor’s schedules contained
multiple falsehoods, and debtor did not remedy falsehoods when he
filed amended schedules). Finally, the subject matter of a false
oath is material when it concerns the existence and disposition of
a debtor’s property. Williamson, 828 F.2d at 252.
There are a number of instances in Defendant’s main case of
Defendant making false statements and omissions in his petition,
schedules, SOFA, and meeting of creditors, and many of Defendant’s
statements and omissions are inconsistent. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 48-65,

74-81. For example, Defendant failed to schedule several claims
asserted against him, failed to disclose pending litigation,
falsely scheduled Daufuskie as a secured creditor, scheduled no
deposit accounts despite scheduling monthly income, and scheduled
no interest in any furniture or household goods within the
Greensboro Property despite paying $14,840.00 post-petition to
move personal property from the residence.26 Id. ¶¶ 55-65, 75-
76. Defendant filed these schedules under penalty of perjury.
In re Evans, 538 B.R. 268, 298 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2015). Defendant
did not remedy these inconsistencies when he filed his amended
schedules. See ECF No. 1, ¶ 75. He claimed that he had no bank
accounts, cash on hand, furniture, household goods, clothes,

firearms, electronics, vehicles, business interests, or any other
property. Id. ¶¶ 75-76. Yet, Defendant paid a moving company
$14,840.00 to move his personal property to another location.
Defendant’s schedules indicated only that he owned a TV, computer,
golf clubs, and clothing valued at $2,000.00. Id. ¶ 77.

26 At his meeting of creditors, Defendant testified that the furniture in the
Greensboro Property was subject to a note in favor of Pillar Capital, that he
“never had an ownership interest in” Pillar Capital, and that he had to “pay
rent” to Pillar Capital for the furniture. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 78-81. Defendant
never disclosed any furniture or any secured claim or lease in favor of Pillar
Capital in his schedules. Id. ¶ 79; see Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 28, 134 &
164.
Additionally, as discussed above, Defendant manufactured the
Daufuskie claim to hinder or avoid recovery against the Greensboro
Property. ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 26-39; ECF No. 36, at 13. These

inconsistencies, coupled with Defendant’s failure to remedy them,
show that Defendant acted with the requisite intent to deceive,
and additionally because those deceptions relate to Defendant’s
property and financial condition, they are related to material
matters. See Case No. 23-10483, ECF Nos. 217 & 223. Thus, default
judgment is warranted under § 727(a)(4).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein, the Court will strike
Defendant’s answer and his responses to Plaintiff’s requests for
admission, the requests for admission are deemed admitted, and the
Court will enter a default judgment in favor of Plaintiff, denying
Defendant’s discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 (a)(2), (3) & (4). The
Court will enter judgment consistent with this opinion.

[END OF DOCUMENT]
Parties to be Served
(24-02010)

All parties to this adversary proceeding.