Balash v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association — Chapter 13 Motion to Amend Denied, Motions to Dismiss Granted

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Feb. 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

In re: Anna Theresa Balash v. U.S. Bank Trust National Association, et al.

United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. New York

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 25-90026

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (48.7K)

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Trial Court Document

So Ordered.
Signed this 27 day of February, 2026.

% anne Ja Patrick G. Radel
ey or Ss United States Bankruptcy Judge

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
In re:
ANNA THERESA BALASH,
Chapter 13
Case No. 25-11042-1-pgr
Debtor.
ANNA THERESA BALASH,
Plaintiff, Adv. Pr. No. 25-90026-1-pgr
v.
U.S. BANK TRUST NATIONAL
ASSOCIATION], et al.,
Defendants

' not in its individual capacity but solely as owner trustee for RCF2 Acquisition Trust (“US Bank”).

APPEARANCES:

ANNA THERESA BALASH ANNA THERESA BALASH
Debtor

DAY PITNEY LLP KEVIN MACTIERNAN, ESQ.
Attorneys for Selene and U.S. Bank
605 Third Avenue
New York, NY 10158

HINSHAW & CULBERTSON LLP ELLIS M. OSTER. SR., ESQ.
Attorneys for SPS and Fay
800 Third Avenue, 13th Floor
New York, New York 10022

ROBERTSON, ANSCHUTZ, SCHNEID, KEVIN ROGER TOOLE, ESQ.
CRANE & PARTNERS, PLLC
Attorneys for PHH
900 Merchant Concourse
Suite 310
Westbury, NY 11590

ANDREA E. CELLI-TRUSTEE BONNIE BAKER, ESQ.
Standing Chapter 13 Trustee
7 Southwoods Boulevard
Albany, NY 12211

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEBTOR’S MOTION
TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND GRANTING U.S. BANK’S AND SELENE’S
MOTION TO DISMISS

1. Anna Theresa Balash (“Debtor”) filed a Voluntary Petition under Chapter 13 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (25-11042, Docket No. 1) pro se on September 11, 2025.

2. On November 3, 2025, Debtor filed this Adversary Proceeding against six
   Defendants: U.S. Bank National Association (“US Bank”); PHH Mortgage
   Corporation (“PHH”); Select Portfolio Servicing (“SPS”)2; Fay Servicing LLC
   (“Fay”); Selene Finance (“Selene”); and Nationstar Mortgage LLC as Mr.
   Cooper (“Nationstar”). (Docket No. 1)

3. In the Complaint, Debtor asserts three3 causes of action: violations of the
   Foreign Agents Registration Act (“FARA”); violations of the Fair Debt
   Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”); and asks that this Court to quiet title and
   remove an allegedly invalid lien from 615 State Street, Hudson, NY
   (“Property”) obtained from an allegedly fraudulent mortgage. (Complaint at 16,
   18, & 24).

4. On January 20, 2026, in response to this Court’s Memorandum Decision and
   Order dismissing Debtor’s Complaint against SPS (Doc. No. 27), Debtor filed
   an Emergency Motion to Amend her Complaint (“Emergency Motion”) (Doc.
   No. 28).

5. At the time, U.S. Bank and Selene had a pending joint Motion to Dismiss (Doc.
   No. 6), which was fully briefed (see Debtor’s Response at Doc. No. 16) and set
   to be heard on January 22, 2026.

6. The Court scheduled a conference on Debtor’s Emergency Motion for the same
   date.

7. Debtor appeared pro se, Bonnie Baker, Esq. appeared on behalf of the Chapter
   13 Trustee, Kevin MacTiernan appeared on behalf of Selene and US Bank,

2 A Memorandum Decision and Order granting SPS’s Motion to Dismiss it from this adversary proceeding was
entered on January 15, 2026. (Doc. No. 27).
3 The Complaint contains Counts One, Two, and Four but no Count Three.
Kevin Toole appeared on behalf of PHH, and Ellis M. Oster Sr., Esq. appeared
on behalf of Fay and SPS.
8. At the January 22, 2026, The Court heard argument on US Bank’s Motion to

Dismiss (Doc. No. 6) and the Debtor’s Emergency Motion (Doc. No. 28).
9. After the hearing, the Court entered a Text Order directing the Debtor to file
a statement in support of her Emergency Motion and attach the proposed
amended Complaint as an accompanying exhibit. (Doc. No. 35). In light of the
Emergency Motion, the Court set briefing for the Emergency Motion and
extended the deadlines for PHH and Fay to file dispositive motions. (Doc. Nos.

35 & 36).
10. On February 5, 2026, the Debtor filed her supplemental Motion to Amend
Complaint (“Motion to Amend”) (Doc. No. 39) and on February 19, 2026, US
Bank and Selene filed a joint objection (Doc. No. 57) to the Motion to Amend.4
11. The Motion to Amend was deemed submitted as of February 19, 2026. (Doc.
Nos. 35 & 44).
12. For the reasons outlined below, Debtor’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 39) is denied

and US Bank’s and Selene’s Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is granted.

4 PHH filed a letter (Doc. No. 47) indicating that it takes no position on Debtor’s Motion to Amend and SPS filed a
letter (Doc. No. 48) asking that the Motion to Amend be denied as to SPS and this Court has already granted its
Motion to Dismiss.
Motion to Amend
13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), as made applicable by Bankruptcy
Rule 7015, provides that: “A party may amend its pleading once as a matter

of course no later than:
(A) 21 days after serving it, or
(B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21
days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a
motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.”
14. “In all other cases, a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing

party’s written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave
when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).
15. Debtor’s Complaint was served on November 9, 2025, and US Bank and
Selene’s joint Motion to Dismiss was filed on December 3, 2025. The
Emergency Motion was not filed until January 20, 2026. Thus, the Court’s
leave is necessary in order for Debtor to amend her Complaint.
16. “It is well established that leave to amend a complaint need not be granted

when amendment would be futile.” Ellis v. Chao, 336 F.3d 114, 127 (2d Cir.
2003).
17. “Futility is directly intertwined with the standard for a motion to dismiss. A
court may properly deny leave to amend where the amended complaint would
not withstand a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.” Pergament v. Yerushalmi
(In re Yerushalmi), No. 07-72816-478, 2009 WL 2982964, at *4 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. Sept. 14, 2009).
18. In this case, permitting the Debtor to amend her Complaint would be futile.

1. While the Debtor has added additional causes of action in the proposed Amended Complaint (Doc. No. 39-1), the relief that Debtor seeks remains the same: that this Court undue the judgment of foreclosure and sale of the Property.
2. Second Circuit law is clear that a federal court, other than the Supreme Court, may not review a state court judgment even when the federal court

litigant argues that the state court judgment is void. Buckskin Realty Inc. v.
Windmont Homeowners Association, Inc. (In re Buckskin Realty Inc.), No. 01-
13-40083-NHL, 2016 WL 5360750, at *4 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016); see
also Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82, 101 (2d Cir. 2021). (“The Rooker-
Feldman doctrine bars federal district courts from hearing cases that in effect
are appeals from state court judgments, because the Supreme Court is the
only federal court with jurisdiction over such cases.”).

1. This Court has issued multiple decisions and orders explaining that the Court cannot grant the relief Debtor seeks. See Memorandum, Decision and Order (Doc. 25); see also In re Balash, 25-11042, Decision and Order Granting In Rem Relief From Stay (Doc. No. 67) & Order Denying Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order to Stay Eviction Proceedings (Doc. No. 94).
   1. Additionally, the District Court has issued decisions holding that the Rooker- Feldman doctrine bars federal courts from hearing cases that in effect are appeals from state court judgments. See (Doc. No. 6, Ex. F) (Balash v. U.S.

Bank, et al., 1:23-cv-00614 (AMN/DJS), Memorandum Decision and Order
(N.D.N.Y. Aug,. 15, 2024)); Doc. No. 6, Ex. G) (Balash v. Yiannakis Costa
Ioannides Estate, et al., 1:24-cv-00679 (AMN/DJS), Memorandum-Decision
and Order (N.D.N.Y. July 24, 2025)).
23. As Judge Nardacci explained:
The Court has carefully considered whether to grant leave to amend the
Complaint, given Plaintiff’s pro se status. See Gomez v. USAA Federal Sav.
Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 796 (2d Cir. 1999). However, the Court finds that
amendment would be futile because the lack of subject matter jurisdiction here
is a substantive defect which cannot be cured with better pleading. See Cuoco
v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (“The problem with [plaintiff]’s
causes of action is substantive; better pleading will not cure it. Repleading
would thus be futile. Such a futile request to replead should be denied.”);
Planck v. Schenectady Cnty., No. 12-cv-0336, 2012 WL 1977972, at *6
(N.D.N.Y. June 1, 2012) (denying pro se plaintiff leave to amend because “lack
of subject-matter jurisdiction is generally viewed as a substantive defect”); see
also Balash-Ioannidou v. Contour Mortgage Corp., No. 22-cv-4506, 2022 WL
3358082, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2022) (dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint
without prejudice and without leave to amend because “amendment would be
futile”) (citation omitted).

(Doc. No. 6, Ex. F at 6).

1. The Court adopts Judge Nardacci’s sound reasoning. This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, no amount of pleading can cure the defect, and Debtor’s amendments are futile. Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
2. Having determined that Debtor’s Complaint cannot be amended, the Court turns to US Bank’s and Selene’s (together “Movants”) Motion to Dismiss (Doc. No. 6).
   1. Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is made applicable in adversary proceedings by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7012(b).
   2. Rule 12(b)(6) empowers the bankruptcy court to dismiss a complaint that

“fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6).
28. When considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must accept all
factual allegations as true and draw all inferences in favor of the plaintiff.
Glob. Network Commc'ns, Inc. v. City of New York, 458 F.3d 150, 154 (2d Cir.
2006).

1. A Complaint should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) if “the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of h[er] claim which would entitle h[er] to relief.” Id. (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957)). Violations of the FARA

2. Construed liberally, Count One of Debtor’s Complaint alleges that Movants
   violated FARA by failing to register as a foreign agent. (Docket No. 1 at 16–
   17).

3. Debtor’s FARA claim lacks any chance of success as there is no private right
   of action to enforce a FARA violation. Gong v. Sarnoff, No. 23-CV-343 (LJL), 2023 WL 5372473, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2023) (“[E]very court to have
   considered the issue, in this Circuit and elsewhere, has held that no private
   right of action can be implied in FARA.”); Henry v. Washington, No. 3:22-CV-
   5673-DGE, 2022 WL 9491957, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 16, 2022), report and
   recommendation adopted, No. 3:22-CV-05673-DGE, 2022 WL 9372175 (W.D.
   Wash. Oct. 14, 2022) (“[T]here is no private cause of action provided for in the
   act such that Plaintiff could sue for a violation of it.”); Weican Meng v.

Xinhuanet Co., No. 16 CIV. 6127 (ER), 2017 WL 3175609, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July
25, 2017) (“[N]o language in [the] statute or its legislative history suggests that
Congress intended to establish cause of action in any entity other than Federal
Government.”).
32. As such, Count One of Debtor’s Complaint must be dismissed as to Movants.
Violations of the FDCPA

1. Count Two of Debtor’s Complaint alleges violations of the FDCPA.

2. While the Complaint is not clear as to what conduct Movants are alleged to
   have done, the Complaint does state that “[t]he Bank Defendants . . . willfully
   commenced a foreclosure debt collection action in the State Court by[] relying
   on improper paperwork when the foreclosure case was commenced as well as
   through the life of the case and ignored various attempts to bring the debt
   current.” (Docket No. 1 at 22).

3. The Complaint goes on to state: “Defendants stole my property with their
   illegal Foreclosure.”5 (Id.)

4. Thus, it seems clear that Debtor is seeking to prosecute violations of the
   FDCPA occurring before and during the foreclosure action. Id. 5 The Court notes that Debtor was not a signatory on the note or mortgage nor a Defendant in the Foreclosure action.
   (Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C). Debtor’s late husband, Yiannakis C. Ioannides, was executed the note and mortgage and
   was the sole Defendant in the Foreclosure action. Id.

5. “Claims under the FDCPA are subject to a one-year statute of limitations from
   the date a violation occurs.” Costello v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA, No. 22-1528-CV, 2023 WL 6380061, at *2 (2d Cir. Oct. 2, 2023).

6. The foreclosure action on the Property began on February 12, 2012. (Docket
   No. 9, Ex. B). A decision and order granting a judgment of foreclosure and sale
   was entered on January 23, 2018. (Id.) The Property was ultimately
   transferred to U.S. Bank, on December 5, 2023. (Id., Ex. C)

7. Thus, based upon the allegations set forth in the Complaint, the latest that a
   FDCPA violation could have occurred in connection with the foreclosure is

December 2023. For a claim to have been timely under the FDCPA, it must
have been brought no later than December 2024. As this adversary proceeding
was filed on November 3, 2025, any claim for a violation under the FDCPA
arising out of the foreclosure sale is time barred.
40. Debtor also alleges that “continuing to pursue eviction proceedings when a full
accounting per GAAP has not been provided is a violation of the FDCPA ....”
(Docket No. 1 at 10).

1. The FDCPA applies only to “debt collectors.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 2016), aff’d, 582 U.S. 79, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017). Movants are not “debt collectors” as defined by the FDCPA because there is no “debt” owed to them by the Debtor.6

6 Additionally, “when [an] entity acts to collect its own debts [as opposed to collecting debts on behalf of another], it
is acting as a creditor, not a debt collector.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA, Inc., 817 F.3d 131, 140 (4th Cir.
2016), aff'd, 582 U.S. 79, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017).
42. Debtor was never a party to the note and mortgage at issue in this case. Even
if she were, the Property has belonged to US Bank since December 5, 2023.
(Doc. No. 6, Ex. C).

1. The Supreme Court has stated that in order for the FDCPA to apply, a debt must be “currently due at the time of collection and not a debt that was due only in some previous period.” Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 84, 137 S. Ct. 1718, 1722, 198 L. Ed. 2d 177 (2017).

2. As such, Count Two of the Complaint must be dismissed as to Movants.
   Declaratory Relief seeking to quiet title and/or invalidate U.S. Bank’s
   lien

3. Count Two asks the Court to “quiet title” and “have the lien removed and the
   sale that took place set aside,” while Count Four asks that
   the Invalid Lien . . . be removed from the property, along with any rights
   alleged by Third Party.” (Docket No. 1 at 23–24).

4. Movants no longer hold a lien against the Property. US Bank owns the
   Property. (Doc. No. 6, Ex. C).

5. A Judgment of Foreclosure and Sale in favor of U.S. Bank was entered on
   January 23, 2018, and a Referee’s Deed conveyed the Property to U.S. Bank on
   December 5, 2023. (Docket No. 9, Exs. A–C).

6. However, even if one of the Movants were a lienholder, “Second Circuit law is

clear that a federal court, other than the Supreme Court, may not review a
state court judgment even when the federal court litigant argues that the state
court judgment is void.” Buckskin Realty Inc. v. Windmont Homeowners Ass’n
(In re Buckskin Realty Inc.), No. 1-13-40083-NHL, 2016 WL 5360750, at *4
(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2016).
49. While Debtor argues that Rooker-Feldman does not apply to bankruptcy

courts, this Court is bound by the law of the Second Circuit. Vossbrinck v.
Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423, 427 (2d Cir. 2014) (“To the extent
[Plaintiff] asks the federal court to grant him title to his property because the
foreclosure judgment was obtained fraudulently, Rooker–Feldman bars
[Plaintiff’s] claim.”).
50. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, lower federal courts lack subject matter

jurisdiction over a case if the relief requested would result in the reversal or
modification of a state court judgment. Kropelnicki v. Siegel, 290 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 2002) (citing Charchenko v. City of Stillwater, 47 F.3d 981, 983 (8th
Cir. 1995)); see also Holmes v. Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC (In re Holmes), No.
19-23497 (SHL), 2020 WL 4279576, at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020)
(“Rooker–Feldman doctrine . . . precludes federal district courts from exercising
appellate jurisdiction over final state court judgments.”); see also Rooker v. Fid.

Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). It also “bars lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with state court determinations.”
Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 128 (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 482–83 n.16).
51. “[T]here is no fraud exception to the Rooker–Feldman doctrine.” Holmes v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing (In re Holmes), No. 19-23497 (SHL), 2020 WL 4279576,
at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 24, 2020); see also Kropelnicki, 290 F.3d at 128 (2d
Cir. 2002) (“[W]e have never recognized a blanket fraud exception to Rooker–
Feldman.”).

1. Finally, “[a] plaintiff who d[id] not own the property subject to foreclosure does not have standing to challenge that foreclosure.” Jones v. Kaufman, No. 25-CV- 4407 (CS), 2025 WL 1755122, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2025); see also NDF1, LLC v. Cunningham, No. 24-CV-00002 (NCM) (JAM), 2025 WL 3295069, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 26, 2025) (same).
2. Thus, Count Four, and any similar relief requested in Count Two, must also

be dismissed as to Movants.
For the reasons stated above, Debtor’s Motion to Amend (Doc. 39) is DENIED and
Movants’ Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 6) is GRANTED in its entirety.
The Clerk of Court is requested to transmit a copy of this Order to the Debtor by
first class mail, postage prepaid.
###