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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

T.W. v. Morgan County Department of Human Resources

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CL-2025-0674

• Judges: Bowden, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (2)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (18.1K)

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Combined Opinion

Rel: March 20, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CL-2025-0674 and CL-2025-0675

---

T.W.

v.

Morgan County Department of Human Resources

Appeals from Morgan Juvenile Court
(JU-22-1032.02 and JU-22-1034.02)

BOWDEN, Judge.

T.W. ("the mother") appeals from judgments of the Morgan Juvenile

Court ("the juvenile court") terminating her parental rights to R.L.W. and

L.N.W. ("the children"). The judgments also terminated the parental

rights of R.W. ("the father"). The father has not appealed.
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

The mother argues on appeal that the juvenile court exceeded its

discretion by denying her motion to continue the June 25, 2025,

termination-of-parental-rights trial and that there was insufficient

evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that there are no viable

alternatives to the termination of her parental rights. However, we need

not reach the merits of the mother's arguments; the record does not

contain sufficient evidence from which this court can determine whether

the juvenile court acquired subject-matter jurisdiction over the

underlying actions under Alabama's version of the Uniform Child

Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("the UCCJEA"), codified at

Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-101 et seq. Therefore, we reverse the judgments

of the juvenile court and remand the causes for the juvenile court to

determine whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction under Alabama's

version of the UCCJEA.

Background

The children were born in Indiana.1 The children lived there with

the mother until an Indiana court awarded custody of the children to the

father on January 28, 2021. A copy of that judgment is not included in

1R.L.W. was born on September 1, 2015. L.N.W. was born on August

12, 2016.
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CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

the record. The children thereafter moved to Alabama with the father,

but the mother continued to live in Indiana.

Testimony indicated that an Indiana court had ordered phone

visitation between the mother and the children in March 2021. A copy of

that judgment is not included in the record.

The father testified that the mother had not physically been in the

children's presence since the Indiana court entered the January 28, 2021,

judgment awarding him custody of the children. The father also testified

that the mother had not spoken to the children since February 2022. The

father testified that he had been unable to facilitate the mother's phone

visitation with the children because of his work schedule. The father also

testified that the mother did not call him and did not answer when he

tried calling her.

In August 2022, the Morgan County Department of Human

Resources ("DHR") received a report that the children were living in

deplorable conditions. At that time, the father and the children were

living in Decatur with K.C. (the father's then-paramour), three other

children, K.C.'s stepmother, K.C.'s stepmother's boyfriend, and K.C.'s

grandmother. The children remained in the home while DHR provided

3
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

in-home services to the father and K.C. The children were placed in the

custody and care of DHR on June 9, 2023, following a shelter-care

hearing.

DHR filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of the mother

and the father on August 12, 2024.2 DHR alleged in its petition that the

mother's current address was unknown and that it had had no contact

with the mother since becoming involved with the children in August

2022.

Around September 2024, the father sent the mother a picture of

R.L.W. that had been posted on the social-media site Facebook. The

picture had the name of the children's foster mother. The mother

contacted the foster mother who in turn directed the mother to contact

DHR. Up to that point, DHR had been unable to locate the mother based

on the records that it had obtained from Indiana, and the father had

previously told DHR that he did not know how to find the mother. One of

DHR's caseworkers testified that the mother had told her that the mother

2The record reflects that the same petition and documents filed in

the matter regarding R.L.W. were filed in the separate matter regarding
L.N.W. For simplicity, we refer to the same documents filed in the
respective matters in the singular tense when practicable.

4
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

did not know that the children had been removed from the father's

custody and wanted to reestablish phone visitation with the children.

On June 18, 2025, the mother filed a motion to continue the

termination-of-parental-rights trial that had been reset for June 25,

1. DHR objected to the mother's motion to continue. The juvenile

court entered an order on June 24, 2025, denying the mother's motion.

The next day, June 25, 2025, the juvenile court held the

termination-of-parental-rights trial. The mother did not appear but was

represented by appointed counsel. The juvenile court noted at the outset

of the trial that the trial had been continued on multiple occasions and

that "[the mother]'s reasoning in her motion [to continue] was that she

didn't have a ride down here [from Indiana], and I just feel like it needs

to be more substantial than that." The mother's appointed counsel

renewed the motion to continue after DHR rested its case. The juvenile

court denied the mother's renewed motion to continue and allowed the

trial to proceed.

On July 31, 2025, the juvenile court entered judgments terminating

the parental rights of the mother and the father. The mother filed a

timely postjudgment "motion for new trial" on August 12, 2025. The

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CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

juvenile court entered an order on August 25, 2025, denying the mother's

postjudgment motion. The mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the

judgments to this court.3

Analysis

Although neither the mother nor DHR have addressed whether the

juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate the mother's

parental rights, " ' " '[defects in] subject-matter jurisdiction may not be

waived; a court's lack of subject-matter jurisdiction … may even be raised

by a court ex mero motu.' " ' " M.A.B. v. D.S., 364 So. 3d 994, 996 (Ala. Civ.

App. 2022) (quoting C.H. v. Lamar Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 324 So. 3d

391, 394 (Ala. Civ. App. 2020), quoting in turn J.T. v. A.C., 892 So. 2d

928, 931 (Ala. Civ. App. 2004), quoting in turn C.J.L. v. M.W.B., 868 So.

2d 451, 453 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003)). Furthermore, this court may not

3The mother filed a notice of appeal to this court on August 21, 2025,

or 21 days after the juvenile court entered the judgments. However,
under Rule 4(a), Ala. R. App. P., the mother's postjudgment motion,
which had been timely filed on August 12, 2025, suspended the 14-day
period within which she was required to file a notice of appeal of the
judgments.

The mother's notice of appeal was held in abeyance while her
postjudgment motion was pending and became effective on August 25,
2025, when the juvenile court entered an order denying her postjudgment
motion. Rule 4(a)(5).
6
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

presume that a statutorily created court of limited jurisdiction, such as

the juvenile court, has subject-matter jurisdiction over a matter. Id.

Our trial courts are required to recognize and enforce an out-of-

state court's child-custody determination if that out-of-state court has

exercised jurisdiction in substantial conformity with Alabama's version

of the UCCJEA. Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-303(a); but see M.A.B., 364 So.

3d at 998-99 (recognizing and applying Texas's version of the UCCJEA

to determine whether a Texas court had made a child-custody

determination and had continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the

determination). Thus, if an Indiana court has made a child-custody

determination regarding the children in substantial conformity with

Alabama's version of the UCCJEA, the Indiana court has continuing,

exclusive jurisdiction over the determination, see Ala. Code 1975, § 30-

3B-202, and the juvenile court may terminate the mother's parental

rights only if it has subject-matter jurisdiction under Ala. Code 1975, §

30-3B-203, to modify the Indiana court's child-custody determination.

M.A.B., 364 So. 3d at 998-99 ("[T]he juvenile court could properly modify

the Texas judgment, i.e., rule on the petitioners' petition to terminate

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CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

parental rights, only pursuant to the requirements [of] § 30-3B-203[, Ala.

Code 1975,] of Alabama's version of the UCCJEA.").

Alabama's version of the UCCJEA defines the term "child custody

determination" as "[a] judgment, decree, or other order of a court

providing for the legal custody, physical custody, or visitation with

respect to a child. The term includes a permanent, temporary, initial, and

modification order." Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-102(3). The evidence in the

record indicates that an Indiana court entered a judgment on January

28, 2021, awarding custody of the children to the father. The evidence in

the record also indicates that an Indiana court entered a judgment in

March 2021, awarding phone visitation with the children to the mother.

If the January 28, 2021, and March 2021 judgments of the Indiana

court constitute a child-custody determination under Alabama's version

of the UCCJEA, the juvenile court could have properly terminated the

mother's parental rights only if it had subject-matter jurisdiction to

modify the Indiana court's determination under § 30-3B-203.4 Under §

4We recognize that the juvenile court may have intended to exercise

temporary emergency jurisdiction over the matters pursuant to § 30-3B-
204, Ala. Code 1975. Alabama's version of the UCCJEA provides for
temporary emergency jurisdiction if a child is present in Alabama and
has been abandoned or there is an emergent situation that necessitates
protecting the child from mistreatment or abuse. § 30-3B-204(a).
8
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

30-3B-203, the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to modify

the Indiana court's determination only if:

(1) the juvenile court had jurisdiction to make an initial child-

custody determination under Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-201; and

(2) either:

(a) the Indiana court has determined that:

However, the judgments of the juvenile court were not temporary orders
that complied with the requirements of § 30-3B-204. The judgments did
not specify an amount of time for DHR to obtain an order regarding the
child-custody determination from the Indiana court. § 30-3B-204(c). Nor
is there any evidence in the record indicating that the juvenile court
"immediately communicate[d]" with the Indiana court upon being
informed that the Indiana court had made a child-custody determination
regarding the children. § 30-3B-204(d). Moreover, Alabama's version of
the UCCJEA does not permit a child-custody determination made under
temporary emergency jurisdiction to become final when a determination
has been made by another state. § 30-3B-204(b). See M.W. v. Calhoun
Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 369 So. 3d 164, 167 (Ala. Civ. App. 2022)
(" 'Unlike a judgment divesting a parent of custody, a judgment
terminating parental rights is immediate, permanent, and irrevocable.' "
(citation omitted)). Thus, if the juvenile court intended to exercise
temporary emergency jurisdiction over the matters, it lacked jurisdiction
under § 30-3B-204 to enter the judgments terminating the mother's
parental rights. See T.R. v. Tuscaloosa Cnty. Dep't of Hum. Res., 419 So.
3d 558, 564 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024) (dismissing appeal with instructions for
the juvenile court to vacate its judgment awarding permanent custody of
a minor child and to revise its earlier orders to a definite and appropriate
period for the father to obtain an order from a Florida court that had
made a previous child-custody determination because the juvenile court
had failed to comply with the procedures set forth in § 30-3B-204 when it
entered its judgment).
9
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

(i) it no longer has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction

under § 30-3B-202, or

(ii) Alabama would be a more convenient forum under

Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-207; or

(b) the juvenile court or the Indiana court has determined that

the children, the father, and the mother do not presently live

in Indiana.

See § 30-3B-203.

It appears that the January 28, 2021, and March 2021 orders of the

Indiana court constitute a child-custody determination under Alabama's

version of the UCCJEA. Accordingly, the juvenile court could have

properly terminated the mother's parental rights only if it had subject-

matter jurisdiction to modify the Indiana court's child-custody

determination pursuant to § 30-3B-203. Under the particular

circumstances of these matters, the juvenile court could have acquired

subject-matter jurisdiction under § 30-3B-203 only if the Indiana court

had determined that it either no longer has continuing, exclusive

jurisdiction over the determination or that Alabama would be a more

10
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

convenient forum for the determination.5 However, there is no evidence

indicating that that the Indiana court has ever made either of those

determinations. Therefore, based on the evidence in the record, we

cannot ascertain whether the juvenile court properly terminated the

mother's parental rights. We conclude that there is insufficient evidence

to establish that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to

modify the Indiana court's child-custody determination regarding the

children by terminating the mother's parental rights.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the judgments of the juvenile

court and remand the causes to the juvenile court to determine, based on

the receipt of additional evidence, if necessary, whether it has subject-

matter jurisdiction to modify the Indiana court's child-custody

determination by terminating the mother's parental rights pursuant to §

30-3B-203. M.A.B., 364 So. 3d at 999. If the juvenile court determines

that it does not have jurisdiction to modify the Indiana court's child-

5The juvenile court could have also acquired subject-matter
jurisdiction under Ala. Code 1975, § 30-3B-203, if it had determined that
the children, the father, and the mother do not presently live in Indiana.
However, we note that there is significant, undisputed evidence in the
record indicating that the mother presently lives in Indiana.
11
CL-2025-0674, CL-2025-0675

custody determination pursuant to § 30-3B-203, we direct the juvenile

court to dismiss the matters.

CL-2025-0674 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

CL-2025-0675 -- REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH

INSTRUCTIONS.

Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.

Moore, P.J., concurs in the result, without opinion.

12