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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

F Family South, LLC v. Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc.

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CL-2025-1091

• Judges: Edwards, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (25)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (41.6K)

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Combined Opinion

Rel: March 20, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CL-2025-1091

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F Family South, LLC

v.

Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc.

Appeal from Baldwin Circuit Court
(CV-19-901602.80)

EDWARDS, Judge.

F Family South, LLC ("FFS"), appeals from a judgment entered by

the Baldwin Circuit Court ("the trial court") determining that the

Property Owners Association of Ono Island, Inc. ("the POA"), could,

pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, §§ 40-10-82 and 40-10-83, redeem a parcel of
CL-2025-1091

real property that had been purchased by Duong Hoang at a 1995 tax

sale, which parcel had subsequently been transferred to FFS. This is the

second appeal arising from the underlying proceedings. See F Family

South, LLC v. Property Owners Ass'n of Ono Island, Inc., 403 So. 3d 812,

814 (Ala. 2024). The facts and procedural history were set out in our

supreme court's opinion:

"Ono Island is a natural barrier island in Baldwin
County. In 1969, Ono Development Company, Inc. ('Ono
Development'), began developing Ono Island into a single-
family residential subdivision. In September 1970, it filed a
'Declaration of General Covenants and Restrictions
Applicable to Ono Island Subdivision' ('the general
covenants'). The general covenants expressed both Ono
Development's intention to create 'a community with ... canals
... and other common areas and common facilities for the
benefit of [the Ono Island] community' and its desire 'to
provide for the preservation of the values and amenities ...
and for the maintenance of said ... canals ... and other common
areas and common facilities.' The general covenants further
explained that Ono Development had formed the POA 'for the
... preservation of the values and amenities in said
community.' The general covenants defined '[t]he Properties'
to which they were intended to apply as including 'all those
parts of Ono Island ... of which a plat of subdivision, duly
recorded has been executed by Ono Development ... or to
which Ono Development ... has given its approval ... and such
additions thereto.' They excluded from that definition '[l]ands
not included within the perimeter boundaries of a recorded
plat executed or approved by Ono Development ... unless and
until the same are annexed.' The general covenants further
created an Architectural Control Committee ('the ACC') and
granted it the power to permit or approve construction and

2
CL-2025-1091

maintenance of all structures upon the properties subject to
the general covenants and/or adjacent waters. Finally, the
general covenants explained that portions of Ono Island,
following future development, could also be subject to
additional '[l]ocal [c]ovenants and [r]estrictions.'

"In 1981, Ono Development secured a permit from the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers ('the Corps') authorizing its
construction of a series of inland canals on Ono Island
intended to provide water access to interior lots that would
front on the canals and were slated for development. It is
undisputed that the subsequent canal excavation resulted in
the creation of, among others, [the parcel of real estate at
issue in this case,] an unnamed, undeveloped 'intertidal
mound' or island ('the island') at the intersection of two of the
planned canals designated as 'Canal B' and 'Canal B-1.'1 The
nature and current ownership of the island is at the heart of
the parties' dispute. According to the POA, the island, as an
intertidal mound, was intentionally 'planned and constructed
near the center of said canals' as 'an essential component of
the Ono Island Canal System,' which, it maintains, was
permitted for construction by the Corps and was expected to
continue in use contingent upon perpetual monitoring and
maintenance of water quality and stability.

"….

"In 1987, Ono Development conveyed to Randall L.
Patterson for subdivision and development a parcel of
property that was contiguous to the lots in Unit 14[, a group
of residential lots fronting Canal B or C and B-1,] and joined
the Unit 14 lots at the centerline of Canal B and Canal B-1;
this parcel included the island. The deed specifically
referenced and made applicable to the property conveyed to
Patterson, which, again, included the island, both the
recorded local covenants applicable to Unit 15, [another group
of residential lots,] specifically, and the general covenants. In
1993, Patterson conveyed, again subject to those covenants,

3
CL-2025-1091

the property he had received via the 1987 deed to Ono-St.
John, Inc. ('Ono-St. John'). At or around that time, Ono-St.
John recorded a plat creating the Ono-St. John Subdivision on
the parcel. The legal description on the plat apparently
omitted certain property transferred to Patterson by the 1987
deed -- including the island (i.e., the island does not appear on
the recorded plat). Again, a corresponding 'Declaration of
Local Covenants and Restrictions Applicable to Ono-St. John
Subdivision' recorded at that time reflected that the Ono-St.
John Subdivision was subject to and burdened by the general
covenants and by the local covenants applicable to the Ono-
St. John Subdivision.

"Following the 1987 transfer to Patterson and by at least
1991, the island was, in apparent keeping with the standard
operating procedure of the Baldwin County Revenue
Commissioner, assigned an identifying parcel number for tax
purposes and was to be assessed for ad valorem property
taxes. Ono-St. John was formally dissolved in October 1993.
In 1995, as the result of Ono-St. John's failure to pay the 1994
annual ad valorem taxes on the island, the revenue
commissioner purportedly sold the island to Duong Hoang, a
nonparty to this action. ….

"In 1998, Ono Island Canal Owners Association, Inc.
('the COA'), a nonprofit corporation, was organized for the
primary purposes of 'maintain[ing] and improv[ing] the canal
system in the Ono Island Subdivision.' As defined in the
COA's articles of incorporation, its membership included all
owners possessing fee-simple title to a lot contiguous to one of
the canals within the canal system. Ono Development
subsequently assigned to the COA administration of the
canals and transferred to the COA the assets and
responsibilities of a trust initially created for that purpose.

"Hoang obtained a tax deed to the island in 1998. In
2015, a new entity called 'Ono-St. John, Inc.' ('OSJ') was
formed;2 OSJ purchased the island from Hoang. …

4
CL-2025-1091

"In 2016, OSJ applied to the Corps for a permit to
construct on the island a boat shelter and walkways. In May
2019, OSJ obtained, over the objections of the POA, the COA,
the ACC, and nearby property owners, the requested permit
allowing it to construct 'an incised boat slip and boat shelter'
on the island and then entered into a related construction
contract.3 OSJ then transferred both the island and the
permit to FFS.

"In October 2019, when construction work on the
planned boat shelter ostensibly began, the contractor was
initially approached by and later received a 'Stop Work Order'
from the ACC informing FFS that construction work was not
permitted within the canal system without the prior approval
of the ACC and the COA. As a result, FFS filed in November
2019 a verified complaint against the POA in the Baldwin
Circuit Court seeking, among other remedies, various forms
of injunctive relief. In that complaint, FFS contended that the
POA lacked 'jurisdiction' over the island, that FFS would be
irreparably harmed if the stop-work order was permitted to
stand, that it lacked an adequate legal remedy, and that it
had a reasonable chance of succeeding on the merits.
Accordingly, FFS sought the entry of a temporary restraining
order followed by more permanent injunctive relief. In
addition, FFS's complaint included claims of contractual
interference and negligence, as well as related demands for
compensatory and punitive damages.

"The POA filed an answer and counterclaim.4 The POA
maintained that the island was subject to restrictions,
including the general covenants and/or the local covenants
applicable to Unit 14 and Unit 15. Accordingly, it contended
that no pier or boathouse could be constructed without the
review and approval of the ACC, whose rules provided
building and shoreline specifications applicable to any
proposed boathouse and prohibited building on any of the
intertidal mounds within the canal system. The POA thus

5
CL-2025-1091

asserted a counterclaim alleging that FFS had breached
express and/or implied covenants that, it said, govern all
canal-fronting lots and any intertidal mound located in the
canal system. The POA's counterclaim also separately sought
to void the 1995 tax sale of the island to Hoang and to
invalidate FFS's title on the ground that the sale was invalid
because it allegedly failed to comply with certain statutory
requirements. In response, FFS asserted both that the claims
in the POA's counterclaim were barred by the rule of repose
and that the general covenants specifically excluded the
island from their coverage.

"The POA later amended its counterclaim to further add
that it had, on February 1, 2020, obtained, by means of a
quitclaim deed from Ono-St. John,5 title to the island and to
assert a corresponding claim of its purported legal right of
'Redemption From Tax Sale' pursuant to § 40-10-83, Ala. Code
1975, in the event that the trial court declined to invalidate
the tax sale pursuant to which FFS had obtained title. …

"FFS also later amended its complaint to add, among
other additional counts, a request that the trial court
'remov[e] all clouds on' its title to the island and quiet title to
the island in its name. In that amended complaint, FFS
further contended that any purported right of redemption
asserted by the POA was barred by both the doctrine of laches
and the rule of repose.

"The case proceeded to an initial bench trial on the
parties' equitable claims. ...

"….

"After trial, the trial court subsequently entered a 'Final
Judgment' disposing of all pending claims in the POA's favor.7
In particular, the trial court invalidated, based on the
identified procedural deficiencies, the 1995 tax sale pursuant

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CL-2025-1091

to which FFS had obtained ownership of the island and
declared the POA as the island's owner.
"__________________________

"1Various intertidal mounds are depicted on and
specifically contemplated by the canal permit issued to Ono
Development as 'filter mounds ... to reduce sheet flow into the
canals.'

"2OSJ was apparently formed for the sole purpose of
acquiring title to the island. It used the same name as the
earlier, dissolved corporation mentioned above despite an
apparent lack of any affiliation with that dissolved
corporation.

"3OSJ did not seek a permit from the POA or the COA.

"4The COA and nine individuals owning property
fronting the affected canals and located near the island also
later successfully intervened in the action. Their claims,
however, were not individually addressed below; instead, the
trial court treated them as having been 'rendered moot' by its
later judgment in favor of the POA. (Capitalization omitted.)

"5As noted above, the record indicates that Ono-St. John
was dissolved in 1993. It is unclear how the POA obtained the
referenced deed, which was executed in February 2020 by the
former 'Secretary/Treasurer' of Ono-St. John.

"….

"7The trial court's judgment explained that it also
resolved all of the parties' equitable claims and mooted the
reserved legal claims."

F Family South, 403 So. 3d at 814-23.

7
CL-2025-1091

In its opinion, our supreme court reversed, in part, the trial court's

previous judgment in this case because, it determined, the POA's claim

requesting that the 1995 tax deed be set aside was barred by the rule of

repose. F Family South, 403 So. 3d at 825 ("The POA's challenge to the

validity of the tax sale was extinguished by the rule of repose.").

However, because the trial court had not considered whether the POA

had the right to redeem the island pursuant to §§ 40-10-82 and 40-10-83

as it had requested, our supreme court declined to address that issue. Id.

Upon remand from our supreme court, the trial court directed the

parties to file briefs on the issue of judicial redemption. After those briefs

were submitted and considered, the trial court, on March 24, 2025,

entered a judgment concluding that the POA was "entitled to effect a

judicial redemption of the [island] from the [1995] tax sale," finding that

the POA had tendered the amount required to redeem the island,

divesting FFS of any right, title, or interest in the island, and declaring

that the POA was the owner of the island.1 The trial court amended its

judgment on April 22, 2025, to correctly reflect the amount required for

1The trial court also denied any remaining claims asserted by FFS

and declared that the claims of the intervenors had been mooted by the
judgment in favor of the POA.
8
CL-2025-1091

redemption of the island. On May 1, 2025, FFS appealed the March 25,

2025, judgment, as amended, to our supreme court; on December 31,

2025, that court transferred the appeal to this court based on its

determination that the appeal is within this court's original appellate

jurisdiction. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-10; Coprich v. Jones, 406 So. 3d

58, 63 (Ala. 2024).

"[W]here … the controversy involves questions of law for the
court to consider, the court's judgment carries no presumption
of correctness. Beavers v. County of Walker, 645 So. 2d 1365
(Ala. 1994). Because … this appeal focuses on the application
of the law to the facts, no presumption of correctness is
accorded to the trial court's judgment. Therefore, we review
de novo the application of the law to the facts of this case.
Beavers, supra; Lake Forest Property Owners' Ass'n v. Smith,
571 So. 2d 1047 (Ala. 1990)."

Allstate Ins. Co. v. Skelton, 675 So. 2d 377, 379 (Ala. 1996).

FFS first argues that the POA's redemption claim was barred by

the rule of repose.2 As noted, our supreme court applied the rule of repose

2Our supreme court has explained that "[t]he only circumstance
that will stay the running of the 20-year period of repose is a recognition
of the existence of the claimant's right by the party defending against the
claim." Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 1982). In its opinion in
F Family South, our supreme court indicated that the record contained
"no suggestion that the sole recognized exception to the rule of repose …
applies here." 403 So. 3d at 825 n.9. We have also not been directed to
any such suggestion in the record.
9
CL-2025-1091

to the POA's claim seeking to have the 1995 tax sale invalidated. F

Family South, 403 So. 3d at 825. Our supreme court explained the rule

of repose in Boshell v. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 91-92 (Ala. 1982):

"Since McArthur v. Carrie's Admr., 32 Ala. 75 (1858),
this State has followed a rule of repose, or rule of prescription,
of 20 years. This principle of repose or prescription is similar
to a statute of limitations, but not dependent upon one, and
broader in scope. Scott v. Scott, 202 Ala. 244, 80 So. 82 (1918);
Patterson v. Weaver, 216 Ala. 686, 114 So. 301 (1927). It is a
doctrine that operates in addition to laches. Unlike laches,
however, the only element of the rule of repose is time. It is
not affected by the circumstances of the situation, by personal
disabilities, or by whether prejudice has resulted or evidence
obscured. Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 230 Ala. 567, 161 So. 820
(1935); 30A C.J.S., Equity § 113 (1965), at p. 33. It operates
as an absolute bar to claims that are unasserted for 20 years.
Roach v. Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 49 So. 578 (1909). The rationale
for this absolute bar to such actions was set forth in Snodgrass
v. Snodgrass, 176 Ala. 276, 58 So. 201 (1912), as follows:

" 'As a matter of public policy, and for the
repose of society, it has long been the settled policy
of this state, as of others, that antiquated demands
will not be considered by the courts, and that,
without regard to any statute of limitations, there
must be a time beyond which human transactions
will not be inquired into. It is settled that, after a
period of 20 years, without any payment,
settlement, or other recognition of liability,
mortgages and liens will be presumed to have been
paid, settlements will be presumed to have been
made by administrators, trustees, agents, and
other persons occupying fiduciary positions. It is
necessary for the peace and security of society that
there should be an end of litigation, and it is

10
CL-2025-1091

inequitable to allow those who have slept upon
their rights for a period of 20 years, after they
might have demanded an accounting, and after, as
is generally the case, the memory of transactions
has faded and parties and witnesses passed away,
to demand an accounting. The consensus of
opinion in the present day is that such
presumption is conclusive, and the period of 20
years, without some distinct act in recognition of
the trust, a complete bar; and, as said in an early
case, "the presumption rests not only on the want
of diligence in asserting rights, but on the higher
ground that it is necessary to suppress frauds, to
avoid long dormant claims, which, it has been said,
have often more of cruelty than of justice in them,
that it conduces to peace of society and the
happiness of families, 'and relieves courts from the
necessity of adjudicating rights so obscured by the
lapse of time and the accidents of life that the
attainment of truth and justice is next to
impossible.' " Harrison et al. v. Heflin, Adm'r, et
al., 54 Ala. 552, 563, 564 [(1875)]; Greenlees' Adm'r
v. Greenlees et al., 62 Ala. 330 [(1878)]; Nettles v.
Nettles, 67 Ala. 599, 602 [(1880)]; Garrett v.
Garrett, 69 Ala. 429, 430 [(1881)]; Semple v.
Glenn, 91 Ala. 245, 260, 6 South. 46 [(1889)], 9
South. 265, 24 Am. St. Rep. 929 [(1891)]; Roach v.
Cox, 160 Ala. 425, 427, 49 South. 578, 135 Am. St.
Rep. 107 [(1909)].' (Emphasis supplied.)
Snodgrass, at 176 Ala. 280, 281, 58 So. 201.

"The rule of repose or prescription is a defensive matter
similar to, but broader than, a statute of limitation.
Wilkerson, supra; Patterson, supra; 30A C.J.S., Equity § 113,
at p. 33. Thus, it is unlike adverse possession, which
affirmatively establishes title. The rule of repose has been
described as '... a rule of property in this state, [and] tends to

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the repose of society, and the quieting of litigation.' Spencer v.
Hurd, 201 Ala. 269, 270, 77 So. 683, 684 (1918)."

As FFS contends, our supreme court applied the rule of repose to a

claim seeking redemption of real property rights in Edmonson v. Colwell,

504 So. 2d 235 (Ala. 1987). The Edmonson court applied the rule of

repose to bar claims seeking to redeem severed mineral interests more

than 25 years after the sale of the mineral interests in a tax sale, stating:

"We have stated many times that the purpose of [Ala.
Code 1975,] § 40-10-83[,] is to preserve the right of redemption
without a time limit, if the owner of the land seeking to
redeem has retained possession. Stallworth v. First National
Bank of Mobile, 432 So. 2d 1222 (Ala. 1983); Tensaw Land &
Timber Co. v. Rivers, 244 Ala. 657, 15 So. 2d 411 (1943).
However, when the rule of repose or prescription has been
raised in the pleadings (as it was in the instant case), we have
stated:

" 'We think the rule of prescription or repose
is operative notwithstanding statements in
opinions of this court to the effect that the owner
invoking the aid of § 296, Title 51, Code of
Alabama [1940], (see: § 3108, Code of 1923), may
redeem at any time if he brings himself within the
conditions and purview of this statute....

" '....

" 'We do not think that the legislature in
enacting Title 51, § 296, supra, and in the passage
of antecedent statutes of the same import, had any
intention of excluding the doctrine from
application to proceedings under this redemption

12
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statute, nor to disturb its application to belated
proceedings to redeem by authority of this law.
The rule has been applied so many times and has
been the law of this state for so many years, we are
unwilling to say that the legislature intended to
except its application to proceedings here initiated
and to others of like kind without a more definite
expression to that effect.'

"Schwab v. Nonidez, 276 Ala. 308, 310-11, 161 So. 2d 592 (1964).

"The record conclusively establishes that the appellants
did not attempt to redeem the mineral interests for more than
20 years. Therefore, the trial court did not err in barring the
appellants' right to redeem under the rule of repose."

504 So. 2d at 237-38.

The POA argues that the rule of repose does not apply and relies on

the fact that § 40-10-82 was amended in 2009 to explicitly state that

"[t]here shall be no time limit for recovery of real estate by an owner of

land who has retained possession." Former § 40-10-82 provided, in its

entirety:

"No action for the recovery of real estate sold for the
payment of taxes shall lie unless the same is brought within
three years from the date when the purchaser became entitled
to demand a deed therefor; but if the owner of such real estate
was, at the time of such sale, under the age of 19 years or
insane, he, his heirs or legal representatives shall be allowed
one year after such disability is removed to bring an action for
the recovery thereof; but this section shall not apply to any
action brought by the state, nor to cases in which the owner
of the real estate sold had paid the taxes, for the payment of

13
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which such real estate was sold prior to such sale, nor shall
they apply to cases in which the real estate sold was not, at
the time of the assessment or of the sale, subject to taxation."
After the 2009 amendment, § 40-10-82 provides in its entirety:

"No action for the recovery of real estate sold for the
payment of taxes shall lie unless the same is brought within
three years from the date when the purchaser became entitled
to demand a deed therefor; but if the owner of such real estate
was, at the time of such sale, under the age of 19 years or
insane, he or she, his or her heirs, or legal representatives
shall be allowed one year after such disability is removed to
bring an action for the recovery thereof; but this section shall
not apply to any action brought by the state, to cases in which
the owner of the real estate sold had paid the taxes, for the
payment of which such real estate was sold prior to such sale,
or to cases in which the real estate sold was not, at the time
of the assessment or of the sale, subject to taxation. There
shall be no time limit for recovery of real estate by an owner
of land who has retained possession. If the owner of land
seeking to redeem has retained possession, character of
possession need not be actual and peaceful, but may be
constructive and scrambling and, where there is no real
occupancy of land, constructive possession follows title of the
original owner and may only be cut off by adverse possession
of the tax purchaser for three years after the purchaser is
entitled to possession."

As FFS contends, the 2009 amendment merely codified the law as

it had been stated in caselaw for years preceding the amendment. See

Edmonson, 504 So. 2d at 237; Giardina v. Williams, 512 So. 2d 1312, 1314

(Ala. 1987) ("Code 1975, § 40-10-83, has as its purpose the preservation

of the right of redemption in the owner, within a time limit, if the owner

14
CL-2025-1091

has retained possession."); Gulf Land Co. v. Buzzelli, 501 So. 2d 1211,

1213 (Ala. 1987) ("We have stated many times that the purpose of [Ala.

Code 1975,] § 40-10-83[,] is to preserve the right of redemption without a

time limit, if the owner of the land seeking to redeem has retained

possession. This possession may be constructive or scrambling, and,

where there is no real occupancy of the land, constructive possession

follows the title of the original owner and can only be cut off by the

adverse possession of the tax purchaser."); see also O'Connor v. Rabren,

373 So. 2d 302, 306 (Ala. 1979); Moorer v. Chastang, 247 Ala. 676, 26 So.

2d 75 (1946) (applying the same interpretation to the predecessor statute

to § 40-10-83).3 When the legislature enacts a statute and repeats a court

decision's "critical language," the court follows the "history and

precedent" that accompany that language. Merck & Co. v. Reynolds, 559

U.S. 633, 647, 648 (2010). As the supreme court observed in Edmonson,

the law in effect at that time was that, "if the owner of the land seeking

to redeem has retained possession," he or she enjoyed a "right of

redemption without a time limit." 504 So. 2d at 237. Yet the Edmonson

3As FFS asserts, the language added to § 40-10-82 by the 2009
amendment closely mirrors the statement of the applicable law
appearing in Buzzelli.
15
CL-2025-1091

court determined that the rule of repose still operated to bar the

plaintiff's claim for redemption after the passage of 20 years. Id. We are

bound by our supreme court's pronouncement in Edmonson that the rule

of repose operates to bar a claim for redemption that has not been

asserted for 20 years, regardless of the lack of a statute of limitations on

the redemption rights of an owner in possession of property sold at a tax

sale. See Ala. Code 1975, § 12-3-16.

Under the law set out in Edmonson, we conclude that the rule of

repose bars the POA's claim for redemption of the island. Because this

issue is dispositive of the entire action, we need not consider FFS's other

arguments for reversal of the trial court's judgment. See McGee v. Bevill,

111 So. 3d 132, 135 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012) (pretermitting an issue because

of the dispositive nature of the decided issue). Accordingly, we reverse

the judgment of the trial court and remand the case for the entry of a

judgment consistent with this opinion.

REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

16