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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Shawn Barnett v. Brooklyn Barnett

Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: CL-2025-0748

• Judges: Edwards, J.

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (68.9K)

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Combined Opinion

Rel: March 20, 2026

Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.

ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2025-2026

---

CL-2025-0748

---

Shawn Barnett

v.

Brooklyn Barnett

Appeal from Winston Circuit Court
(DR-25-14)

EDWARDS, Judge.

In June 2025, Brooklyn Barnett filed in the Winston Circuit Court

("the trial court") a petition pursuant to Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-1 et seq.

("the PFA statute"), seeking a protection-from-abuse ("PFA") order

against her father, Shawn Barnett. In her petition, Brooklyn alleged that
CL-2025-0748

Shawn had charged at her from more than 50 yards away, had

threatened to beat her to death, and had threatened to burn down her

house. She further alleged that Shawn had kept "showing up" and

threatening to kick her out. She described him as a "substance abuser

that is very aggressive." Brooklyn also checked boxes on the form petition

indicating that Shawn had "recklessly engaged in conduct which risked

serious injury to the plaintiff" and that he had "made [her] afraid that

[she] would be seriously injured." She also checked the box on the form

petition indicating that he had trespassed on her property; however, she

also checked a box on the form petition indicating that she and Shawn

were joint owners of the property. Brooklyn indicated that Shawn's

behavior had begun in November 2024, over six months before she filed

the PFA petition. In addition to seeking a PFA order restraining Shawn

from harassing her, she indicated that Theresa Haynes also required

protection from Shawn.

The trial court entered an ex parte PFA order on June 26, 2025.1

Shawn was served with the ex parte PFA order and petition on June 29,

1. On July 7, 2025, Shawn, appearing through his attorney,

1That order did not include Haynes as a protected person.

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requested a hearing on the PFA petition. The trial court set a trial to be

held on July 18, 2025.

After the conclusion of the trial, the trial court, on July 22, 2025,

entered an order concluding that Brooklyn was entitled to a PFA order

against Shawn and made that order effective for one year. The trial court

found that Shawn had committed an act of domestic violence against

Brooklyn but did not elaborate on the details of the domestic violence.

The July 22, 2025, order incorporated the terms of the ex parte PFA

order, which the trial court modified to include the following restraining

order: "Shawn … is restrained, prohibited and enforced from committing

or attempting to commit any act of abuse against Brooklyn …." The

provisions of the ex parte PFA order prohibited "physical or violent

contact" between Shawn and Brooklyn and excluded Shawn from

Brooklyn's residence, regardless of his partial ownership of that

residence.

Shawn filed a postjudgment motion directed at the PFA order. In

that postjudgment motion, Shawn challenged the order based on what he

claimed were due-process violations committed by the trial-court judge

during the trial on the PFA action. Specifically, Shawn complained that

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the trial-court judge had admitted at the trial to having had ex parte

communications with Brooklyn at the time she filed the PFA petition;

that the trial-court judge had improperly required Shawn to present his

defense before requiring Brooklyn to present evidence supporting her

PFA petition; that, despite having invoked the rule of sequestration, the

trial-court judge had allowed Brooklyn to call Haynes as the final witness

although she had remained in the courtroom during the entirety of the

trial; and that the trial-court judge had allowed Brooklyn to present

evidence of incidents that had not been pleaded in the PFA petition.

Shawn also challenged the sufficiency of the evidence in his

postjudgment motion. He requested that the PFA order be set aside and

that he be granted a new trial before a different judge.

The trial court held a hearing on the postjudgment motion, after

which the trial court entered a detailed order denying that motion. The

postjudgment order states, in its entirety:

"When a person seeks a Protection From Abuse (PFA)
Order in Winston County, they first go to the Clerk's office to
pick up the necessary paperwork. Once the paperwork is filled
out, they are instructed by the Clerk's office to go to the
Judge's office. The Clerk's office contacts the Judge's office to
find out if the judge is available to speak to the Plaintiff.
When the Plaintiff arrives at the judge's office, the judge's
assistant reviews the paperwork to make sure it is complete.

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Once the paperwork is complete the judge meets with the
Plaintiff to determine if an order is warranted and to explain
to the Plaintiff what will happen from that point forward. No
ex parte communications have occurred between the Court
and [Brooklyn] other than the conversation that took place
the day [Brooklyn] filed the PFA petition.

"On the day of the hearing, [Brooklyn] contacted the
Judge's assistant and stated that she was afraid to go into the
Courtroom while [Shawn] was in the courtroom. The Court's
assistant instructed [Brooklyn] to wait in a room outside the
courtroom until the hearing. [Brooklyn's] concern for her
safety and the instructions given to her [by the Judge's
assistant] were passed on to the Judge.

"Because [Brooklyn] was representing herself and
afraid, the Court gave two concessions to [her]. First, the
Court started the hearing by asking [Shawn] questions to
allow [Brooklyn] some time to settle down and second, the
Court allowed [Brooklyn] to call a witness that had been
sitting in the courtroom while other witnesses testified even
though the rule had been invoked. The Court does not believe
[Brooklyn] understood the Court's instruction [regarding the
rule]. [Brooklyn's] witness[, Haynes,] had been listed in the
PFA Petition as person that needed protection from [Shawn]
in addition to [Brooklyn]. [Shawn] was given the opportunity
to call witnesses and offer exhibits as well as the opportunity
to confront and cross examine witnesses. The order of
presentation had no adverse impact on [Shawn's] case.
[Shawn] was not denied due process.

"Ore tenus testimony was taken. The Court made its
ruling based on the oral testimony as well as the behavior and
demeanor of the witnesses. [Brooklyn's] testimony and the
testimony of [Haynes, Brooklyn's] aunt, who is also [Shawn's]
sister, was much more persuasive and believable than that of
[Shawn's] testimony [sic] and the testimony of his two
witnesses."

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CL-2025-0748

Shawn timely appealed the PFA order. In his brief on appeal,

Shawn argues that the PFA order should be reversed because, he

contends, the trial-court judge denied him due process by engaging in ex

parte communications with Brooklyn; by having Shawn present evidence

in his defense before requiring Brooklyn to establish proof supporting

issuance of a PFA order; and by permitting Haynes to testify, despite the

fact that, in violation of the invocation of the rule requiring sequestration

of witnesses, she had been present during the entirety of the trial. Shawn

also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the PFA order.

To better address Shawn's arguments, an understanding of the

conduct of the trial is necessary. When the trial began, the trial-court

judge stated: "I have heard from [Brooklyn] in the case, so I think we will

start with [Shawn]." After the trial-court judge swore the parties and

required the witnesses to be sequestered pursuant to Rule 615, Ala. R.

Evid., the trial-court judge began to examine Shawn.2 Counsel for Shawn

2Rule 615, Ala. R. Evid., provides, in pertinent part, that "[a]t the

request of a party the court may order witnesses excluded so that they
cannot hear the testimony of other witnesses and it may make the order
of its own motion."
6
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interrupted, and the following exchange between counsel for Shawn and

the trial-court judge occurred:

"[Counsel for Shawn]: Judge, before we start, am I going to
have an opportunity to cross-examine and ask questions of my
own, or are you going to be asking the questions?

"THE COURT: A little of both.

"[Counsel for Shawn]: And you want to start with [Shawn]?

"THE COURT: I'm going to start.

"[Counsel for Shawn]: And are you just basically saying that
you have heard from [Brooklyn] just based on what's been
filed?

"THE COURT: Right, since I've heard her side of it, and she
can testify and be cross-examined, but we're going to start
with him.

"[Counsel for Shawn]: Are you saying, I'm asking, like, you
spoke privately with her, or is this based upon the filing of the
petition?

"THE COURT: It wasn't private, it was -- well, I guess I did
speak privately, it was her. I don't know if anyone else was in
the office or not, probably my assistant was in the next office.

"[Counsel for Shawn]: Okay, sir, thank you."

Counsel for Shawn did not lodge any objection or make an oral request

at that time that the trial-court judge recuse himself.

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After the trial-court judge concluded his questioning of Shawn, the

trial-court judge stated:

"[THE COURT]: ... And I guess probably what we will do
instead of me trying to remember everything she told me, we'll
let her testify and speak for herself, but I've heard her story,
and I don't want to go back through that, but I wanted to hear
what you had to say.

"THE COURT: Brooklyn, we're going to need to put, you
know, what you told me the other day on the record.

"[Brooklyn]: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: But I was kind of curious as to what he would
say without hearing what you said.

"[Brooklyn]: Yeah.

"THE COURT: So I've got his side of that one incident, and
there are some question I have for him, but I think it would
be better if I just let -- if we let you ask any questions that you
might have of him. Anything you want to ask him at this point
and we'll probably come back to this again later in the
hearing but ….

"[Brooklyn]: I currently do not have any questions.

"THE COURT: Okay.

"[Counsel for Shawn]: Judge, will I be provided an opportunity
to ask my client questions?

"THE COURT: Yeah, you will, and as we're working through
this, typically on PFAs, they're not -- this is actually the first
one I had any side that's represented [by counsel].

8
CL-2025-0748

"….

"THE COURT: I think some of the questions that [I] have are
going to relate to Brooklyn's testimony, so now that I've heard
from Shawn, I'm going to ask Brooklyn to step up and testify
… and we'll come back to you, [Shawn]."

The examination of Brooklyn began by the trial-court judge urging

Brooklyn to "tell [the court] what you told me the other day." The trial-

court judge then asked: "[S]o, if I remember correctly, didn't you tell me

that he has either a substance or alcohol problem?" Brooklyn responded:

"That's correct." The trial-court judge's examination continued with the

question: "[D]id you tell me that he gets violent sometimes and he's

abusive when he is under the influence -- is it just alcohol or other things

as far as you know?" Brooklyn answered: "I can confirm alcohol abuse,

but I'm uncertain of anything else." The trial-court judge next invited

Brooklyn to tell the court about the incident giving rise to the PFA

petition and any background she wanted the court to know.

Counsel for Shawn cross-examined Brooklyn and then asked the

trial-court judge if he had a preference on the next witness, to which the

trial court replied: "Just whoever you want to call." Counsel for Shawn

presented two character witnesses and then recalled Shawn. Brooklyn

declined to cross-examine Shawn, but the trial-court judge questioned

9
CL-2025-0748

Shawn again. After the conclusion of the trial-court judge's second

examination of Shawn, the trial-court judge asked whether there was

"anything else from the defense," after which counsel for Shawn replied:

"No, Your Honor."

The trial-court judge then invited Brooklyn to state anything she

wanted to say on the record or to call any witnesses she would like to call.

Brooklyn indicated that she desired to call Haynes, who had been sitting

in the courtroom during the entire trial. Counsel for Shawn objected to

Haynes's being allowed to testify based on her failure to comply with the

sequestration rule. The trial-court judge overruled that objection,

stating: "I didn't realize she was going to be a witness. I'm going to allow

it. I want to hear what she's going to say."

Shortly after Brooklyn began questioning Haynes, counsel for

Shawn made the following objection: "I just want to make an objection

just for the record of the procedural order. This wasn't -- I haven't -- I

won't be able to present a defense to any of this stuff just from procedural

format of this trial." The trial-court judge stated: "Sure." The trial

concluded after the conclusion of Haynes's testimony. As previously

noted, the trial court entered the PFA order, and Shawn filed a

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CL-2025-0748

postjudgment motion, in which he requested that the trial court vacate

the PFA order and grant him a new trial with a different judge, but that

motion was denied.

A majority of Shawn's brief presents argument that the trial-court

judge's conduct, in total, deprived him of due process and evidences an

appearance of impropriety such that the PFA order should be reversed

and a new trial before a different judge should be ordered. Certainly, as

Shawn contends, a trial court is required to provide due process to a

defendant in a PFA action. See Ex parte C.C., 385 So. 3d 1013, 1016

(Ala. Civ. App. 2023) (explaining that Ala. Code 1975, "§ 30-5-6(a)[,] was

designed to protect the due-process rights of defendants in PFA actions").

Generally, due process requires that litigants be permitted the

opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine the witness against

them at a trial before an impartial judge. Ex parte James, 713 So. 2d

869, 874 (Ala. 1997) (quoting Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 242

(1980)) (" 'Due [p]rocess ... entitles a person to an impartial and

disinterested tribunal in both civil and criminal cases.' "); Crews v.

Houston Cnty. Dep't of Pensions & Sec., 358 So. 2d 451, 455 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1978) ("[P]rocedural due process contemplates the basic

11
CL-2025-0748

requirements of a fair proceeding including an impartial hearing before

a legally constituted court; an opportunity to present evidence and

arguments; information regarding the claims of the opposing party; a

reasonable opportunity to controvert the opposition's claims; and

representation by counsel if it is desired."). As Shawn contends, the trial

court's postjudgment order contains admissions indicating that the

procedure in Winston County for the institution of a PFA action by a pro

se litigant appears to contravene Ala. Code 1975, § 30-5-5(b), which

states, in pertinent part, that "[t]he circuit clerk shall not provide

assistance to persons in completing the forms or in presenting their case

to the court." The fact that the judicial assistant to the judge provides

such assistance does not make the conduct permissible. Moreover, Ala.

Code 1975, § 30-5-7(a), provides that an ex parte protection order is to be

based on the information contained in the petition, see Ex parte C.C., 385

So. 3d at 1016 (observing that "an ex parte PFA order … is [typically]

entered solely on the sworn allegations of the plaintiff"), not on ex parte

12
CL-2025-0748

communications between the petitioner and the judge who might or will

preside over the PFA action.3

In addition, Canon 3.A.(4), Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics,

states that "[a] judge should accord to every person who is legally

interested in a proceeding, or his lawyer, full right to be heard according

to law, and, except as authorized by law, neither initiate nor consider ex

parte communications concerning a pending or impending proceeding."

Canon 3.C.(1) requires a judge to disqualify himself or herself "in a

proceeding in which … his [or her] impartiality might reasonably be

questioned." This court has explained that

"[t]he test [for disqualification] under that canon is: ' "Would
a person of ordinary prudence in the judge's position knowing
all of the facts known to the judge find that there is a
reasonable basis for questioning the judge's impartiality?" ' In
the Matter of Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 356 (Ala. 1984)
(citation omitted)."

3This is not to say that a trial court may not hold an ex parte
hearing, which would be recorded and at which the PFA petitioner would
be sworn as a witness, before entering an ex parte PFA order. See, e.g.,
Ex parte J.C., 165 So. 3d 623, 625 (Ala. Civ. App. 2014) (indicating that
an ex parte order was entered "after an ex parte hearing"). However, the
record in the present case indicates that the trial-court judge held an
informal discussion with Brooklyn in chambers; nothing indicates that
Brooklyn was sworn in or that the discussion was recorded.
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Bryars v. Bryars, 485 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Ala. Civ. App. 1986).4

A party seeking reversal must establish that the errors of which he

or she complains "ha[ve] probably injuriously affected substantial rights

of [that party]." Rule 45, Ala. R. App. P. Although the trial court has

much discretion over the conduct of trials and the calling of witnesses,

see generally Christiansen v. Hall, 567 So. 2d 1338, 1341 (Ala. 1990); Drs.

Lane, Bryant, Eubanks & Dulaney v. Otts, 412 So. 2d 254, 259 (Ala.

1982), we share Shawn's concern that the trial court's requiring that he,

as the defendant, present the entirety of his defense before Brooklyn

presented her entire case could have effected a shift in the burden of

proof, which burden was squarely placed on Brooklyn by the PFA statute.

See Wu v. Wu, 37 So. 3d 792, 797 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (explaining that

"[Ala. Code 1975, §] 30-5-6(a)[,] requires the petitioner [in a PFA action]

to 'prove the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence' ").

This concern is heightened by the trial court's stated desire to hear from

Shawn before Brooklyn established a prima facie case under the PFA

4In any event, because the admitted practice of the Winston Circuit

Court appears to violate both statutory law and the Canons of Judicial
Ethics, which prohibit ex parte communications, this procedure should
be discontinued.
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statute. See Black v. Ford Motor Co., 600 So. 2d 1029, 1033 (Ala. Civ.

App. 1992) (citing C. Gamble, McElroy's Alabama Evidence § 433.01 at

978 (4th ed. 1991)) ("The rules of evidence provide that the proceedings

at trial begin with the plaintiff's putting on his case-in-chief followed by

the defendant's case or evidence in defense."). Most certainly, the

conduct of the trial prejudiced Shawn's ability to rebut the testimony

adduced from Haynes.

When we examine the overall conduct of the trial-court judge

during the PFA proceeding, we agree with Shawn that reversal of the

PFA order is warranted. The trial-court judge's decision to grant what

he termed as "concessions" to Brooklyn based on her status as a pro se

litigant and her expressed fear of Shawn is troubling. See Boros v.

Baxley, 621 So. 2d 240, 243 (Ala. 1993) ("Generally, parties acting pro se

should be treated as parties represented by counsel are treated.");

Hubbard v. Montgomery, 372 So. 2d 315, 317 (Ala. 1979) ("The Alabama

Rules of Civil Procedure are to be applied impartially, and are binding on

both members of the bar and parties proceeding pro se."). Although the

trial-court judge's decision to permit Brooklyn to call Haynes as a witness

was a matter within his discretion, that "concession," combined with both

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the trial-court judge's admitted ex parte communication with Brooklyn

and his decision to require Shawn to testify first under examination by

the trial-court judge so that Brooklyn could "settle down" and because the

trial-court judge was, as he stated on the record, "curious as to what

[Shawn] would say without hearing what [Brooklyn] said," raise a serious

question regarding the appearance of impropriety that would necessitate

the trial-court judge's disqualification. The trial-court judge was overly

solicitous of Brooklyn's feelings, which evidenced an apparent belief,

before testimony began, that Brooklyn had been truthful during her ex

parte communication and had a reasonable fear of Shawn, an element

Brooklyn was likely required to prove to establish abuse in the PFA

action.5 The trial-court judge's questioning of Brooklyn was also

problematic; the trial-court judge began his questioning by asking

5See Ala. Code 1975, 30-5-2(1), defining the term "abuse" to include,

among other things, harassment and menacing. See also Ala. Code 1975,
§ 13A-11-8(a)(2) (stating that "harassment shall include a threat, verbal
or nonverbal, made with the intent to carry out the threat, that would
cause a reasonable person who is the target of the threat to fear for his
or her safety"), and Ala. Code 1975, § 13A-6-23(a) (stating that a person
commits the crime of "menacing" "if, by physical action, he intentionally
places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious
physical injury").
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leading questions regarding the statements that Brooklyn apparently

made to him during the ex parte communication in his office.

"As the United States Supreme Court stated in In re
Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942
(1955):

" 'A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process. Fairness of course
requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of
cases. But our system of law has always
endeavored to prevent even the probability of
unfairness.... Such a stringent rule may sometimes
bar trial by judges who have no actual bias and
who would do their very best to weigh the scales of
justice equally between contending parties. But to
perform its high function in the best way "justice
must satisfy the appearance of justice." Offutt v.
United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 [(1954)].'

" ' "An independent and honorable judiciary is
indispensable to justice in our society," and this requires
avoiding all appearance of impropriety, even to the point of
resolving all reasonable doubt in favor of recusal.' In re
Sheffield, 465 So. 2d 350, 357 (Ala. 1984) (quoting Canon 1,
Alabama Canons of Judicial Ethics).

"… 'The question is not whether the judge was impartial
in fact, but whether another person, knowing all of the
circumstances, might reasonably question the judge's
impartiality -- whether there is an appearance of impropriety.'
[Ex parte] Duncan, 638 So. 2d [1332,] 1334 [(Ala. 1994)]."

Ex parte Atchley, 951 So. 2d 764, 768-69 (Ala. Crim. App. 2006).

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We recognize that the trial-court judge indicated that he was basing

his decision on the testimony presented at the trial. However, a

reasonable person could not help but question the trial-court judge's

impartiality based on the information in the record regarding the trial-

court judge's conduct during the initiation and trial of Brooklyn's PFA

action. Id. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court, and

we remand the cause with instructions that a new trial be conducted

before a different judge.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.

Moore, P.J., and Hanson, Fridy, and Bowden, JJ., concur.

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