Jump To

Top Caption Disposition Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 27, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Syed Ahmed v. Aig Private Client Group

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2025-CA-0746
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential
• Judges: Thompson

• Disposition: OPINION AFFIRMING

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.5K)

• PDF

Disposition

OPINION AFFIRMING

Combined Opinion

                        by [Kelly Thompson](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/7345/kelly-thompson/)

RENDERED: MARCH 27, 2026; 10:00 A.M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky
Court of Appeals
NO. 2025-CA-0746-MR

SYED AHMED APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT
v. HONORABLE JESSICA E. GREEN, JUDGE
ACTION NO. 20-CI-006604

AIG PRIVATE CLIENT GROUP AND
AIG PROPERTY CASUALTY CO. APPELLEES

OPINION
AFFIRMING

---

BEFORE: THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE; ACREE AND MCNEILL, JUDGES.

THOMPSON, CHIEF JUDGE: Syed Ahmed appeals from a jury verdict and an

order denying his motion for a new trial on this issue of damages. Appellant

argues that the damages award was inadequate based on the evidence and the

jury’s verdict on the issue of liability. He also argues that the trial court erred in
not allowing him to put on certain evidence regarding certain expenses. We find

no error and affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On November 26, 2018, a FedEx truck collided with a porte-cochère1

on Appellant’s property. The collision occurred because the truck was too tall to

fit through the archway at the front of the porte-cochère. The collision caused

considerable damage to the brick archway. Appellant attempted to settle the matter

with FedEx, but was unsuccessful. Appellant eventually contacted his

homeowner’s insurance company, AIG, to facilitate the repair.

AIG then began the search for bricks that would match those already

existing in the archway; however, due to the bricks being over twenty years old,

AIG had trouble finding exact duplicates of the existing bricks. AIG contacted the

original brick manufacturer, which was a company in New York. That company

had bricks that AIG deemed to be of like kind and quality; however, Appellant

believed the bricks were different in size, color, and texture. Over the course of

about one year, the following repair options were suggested: (1) remove bricks

from a hidden part of a retaining wall on Appellant’s property, use those bricks to

repair the archway, and then repair the retaining wall with the nonconforming

1
This is a covered archway structure which allows vehicles to drive through it in order to reach
the garages of Appellant’s home.

-2-
bricks from New York; (2) rebrick the entire house with the new bricks so that

there would be no discrepancy in the bricks used; and (3) remove bricks from other

archways on the house, use those bricks to repair the damaged archway, and then

replace the removed bricks with limestone accents. Ultimately AIG chose to only

pay for option 1. Based on estimates from a local stonemason, the cost of option 1

was to be $95,913.78. AIG sent Appellant a check for $85,913.78. This

represented the cost of option 1 minus Appellant’s $10,000 deductible. Appellant

did not cash the check and brought the underlying lawsuit.

A jury trial was held in January of 2025. During trial, experts testified

about the costs of the three options: option 1, replacing the archway bricks with

those from a retaining wall, would cost $95,913.78; option 2, rebricking the entire

house with new bricks, would cost between $985,342.62 and $1,638,240.14; and

option 3, using bricks from other archways and replacing those with limestone

accents, would cost between $351,290.00 and $839,535.64.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury was given the following

instructions:

Interrogatory No. 1:

Are you satisfied from the evidence that Defendants have
failed to fulfill their duty to replace and rebuild Plaintiff’s
home “with materials of like kind and quality” by
offering to pay for the cost to remove bricks from the
existing retaining wall at Plaintiff’s residence in order to

-3-
rebuild the subject archway and the retaining wall for a
total payment of $85,913.78?

Interrogatory No. 2:

If you answered “YES” to Interrogatory No. 1, then you
should award to Plaintiff such sum in damages you
believe represents an appropriate amount to replace and
rebuild Plaintiff’s home “with materials of like kind and
quality” for the damage that occurred on November 26,
2018.

The jury answered “yes” to interrogatory one and awarded Appellant $100,301.00

under interrogatory two.

Appellant then made a motion for a new trial pursuant to Kentucky

Rules of Civil Procedure (CR) 59.01(d), (e), and (f). CR 59.01 states:

A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and
on all or part of the issues for any of the following
causes:

(a) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury or
prevailing party, or an order of the court, or abuse of
discretion, by which the party was prevented from having
a fair trial.

(b) Misconduct of the jury, of the prevailing party, or of
his attorney.

(c) Accident or surprise which ordinary prudence could
not have guarded against.

(d) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have
been given under the influence of passion or prejudice or
in disregard of the evidence or the instructions of the
court.

-4-
(e) Error in the assessment of the amount of recovery
whether too large or too small.

(f) That the verdict is not sustained by sufficient
evidence, or is contrary to law.

(g) Newly discovered evidence, material for the party
applying, which he could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial.

(h) Errors of law occurring at the trial and objected to by
the party under the provisions of these rules.

Appellant argued that the jury award was inadequate because the jury found that

the replacing of bricks using bricks from the retaining wall was an unsuitable

repair option; therefore, they should have awarded an amount consistent with

repair options 2 or 3. AIG argued that the jury instructions allowed the jury to find

that replacing the archway bricks with retaining wall bricks was an appropriate

repair option, but the amount offered by AIG to make said repair was too low.

Further, AIG argued that the evidence presented at trial indicated that the costs of

the original option 1 estimate had increased by twenty to twenty-five percent and

this would account for the jury increasing the option 1 award from $85,913.78 to

$100,301.00. The court agreed with AIG and declined to grant a new trial. This

appeal followed.

ANALYSIS

Appellant’s primary argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in

not granting his motion for a new trial on the issue of damages because the

-5-
$100,301.00 award was inadequate based on the evidence.2 Our review of a denial

of a CR 59.01 motion is twofold.

First, the trial court must decide whether one of the
grounds laid out in CR 59.01 exists. This is a finding of
fact and is thus subject to review for clear error. When
reviewing a trial court’s findings under the clear error
standard, the appellant court must determine whether or
not those findings are supported by substantial evidence.
Though [s]ubstantial evidence is more than a scintilla,
and must do more than create a suspicion of the existence
of the fact to be established, it does not mean the
evidence must be absolutely compelling or lead
inescapably to but one conclusion. Rather, substantial
evidence is [e]vidence that a reasonable mind would
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, or evidence
that has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in
the minds of reasonable men[.]

Second, upon a proper finding under CR 59.01, the
trial court must make the discretionary decision whether
to grant the motion. Even if the trial court finds that one
of the grounds exists, it is not bound in every case to
grant a new trial. The issue could be moot, or the
grounds may be off-set by other factors. But we need not
imagine every scenario where a court could find that one
of the CR 59.01 grounds is technically present but still
properly deny a new trial. Suffice it to say, whether to
grant the motion for a new trial is always within the trial
court’s sound discretion and is entitled to a great deal of
deference by an appellate court.

Generally speaking, [t]he test for abuse of
discretion is whether the trial judge's decision was

2
Appellees argue that this issue was not preserved for appeal. We disagree. Bringing a motion
for a new trial pursuant to CR 59.01 is the proper method to preserve an inadequate jury award
issue. Cooper v. Fultz, 812 S.W.2d 497, 499–500 (Ky. 1991).

-6-
arbitrary, unreasonable, unfair, or unsupported by sound
legal principles.

CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64, 72 (Ky. 2010) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

Appellate courts must give a great deal of
deference to a trial court’s decision to grant a new trial
per CR 59.01. In fact, the trial court’s decision whether
to grant a new trial is presumptively correct. . . . This
high level of deference by an appellate court is necessary
because the decision to grant a new trial depends to a
great extent upon factors which may not readily appear in
the appellate record. Indeed, unlike appellate judges, the
trial judge has heard the witnesses firsthand and observed
and viewed their demeanor and . . . has observed the jury
throughout the trial.

It is important to remember that the trial court’s
observations cannot [be] replicate[d] by reviewing a cold
record. Consequently, an appellate court is precluded
from stepping into the shoes of a trial court in reviewing
decisions under CR 59.01.

Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).

With this standard of review in mind, we now examine the jury

instructions and the damages award.

In the civil context, [t]he true test to be applied in
reconciling apparent conflicts between the jury’s answers
is whether the answers may fairly be said to represent a
logical and probable decision on the relevant issue as
submitted. We therefore must attempt to reconcile the
jury’s findings, by exegesis, if necessary . . . before we
are free to disregard the jury’s verdict and remand the
case for a new trial.

-7-
Emberton v. GMRI, Inc., 299 S.W.3d 565, 580–81 (Ky. 2009) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

[T]he amount of damages is a dispute left to the sound
discretion of the jury, and its determination should not be
set aside merely because [the court] would have reached
a different conclusion. Instead, their decision should be
disturbed only in the most egregious circumstances.
Courts must refrain from disturbing the jury’s assessment
of damages [i]f the verdict bears any relationship to the
evidence of loss suffered. And [o]nce the issue [of
excessive or inadequate damages] is squarely presented
to the trial judge, who heard and considered the evidence,
a reviewing court on appeal cannot substitute [its]
judgment on excessiveness for [the trial judge’s] unless
clearly erroneous.

Asbury University v. Powell, 486 S.W.3d 246, 264 (Ky. 2016) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted).

We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that the jury award was

appropriate. The jury instructions could have allowed for the jury to find that

replacing the archway bricks with those of the retaining wall was suitable, but that

Appellant needed additional compensation. Further, we also agree with AIG that

the increased compensation can be accounted for by testimony that the costs of

option 1 have increased since the archway was first damaged. If we ignore

Appellant’s deductible, the original option 1 estimate was $95,913.78. The jury

award of $100,301.00 is not too far removed from that amount and bears a

-8-
resemblance to the loss suffered by Appellant. The trial court’s decision not to

grant the motion for a new trial was not clearly erroneous or an abuse of discretion.

Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in not allowing him to

put on evidence of increased living expenses. During trial, counsel for Appellant

began asking him questions about Appellant’s concerns of increased living

expenses during construction, such as costs incurred due to being displaced from

his home. Counsel for AIG objected and a bench conference ensued. The court

believed the testimony would be inappropriate and did not allow it. The court

reasoned that an expert would need to testify that Appellant would need to vacate

the house and could incur additional expenses. The court would not allow

Appellant to set forth specific amounts he might incur without first providing some

expert testimony.

The proper standard for review of evidentiary rulings is abuse of

discretion. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Thompson, 11 S.W.3d 575, 577 (Ky.

2000). We find no abuse of discretion here. The potential costs Appellant was

wanting to testify to were entirely speculative. Appellant points to no evidence in

the record that he would even have to vacate his home while the porte-cochère was

repaired or that other expenses might be incurred outside of the repair costs.

-9-
CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Appellant was not entitled to a new trial because the jury’s award was reasonably

based on the evidence presented at trial. Further, the court did not err in denying

Appellant the opportunity to testify about speculative costs.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT: BRIEF FOR APPELLEES:

Edward L. Lasley Charles H. Stopher
Kenneth A. Bohnert Bethany A. Breetz
Louisville, Kentucky April M. J. Sain
Louisville, Kentucky

-10-