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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Stacey Sheridan, V. James Sheridan

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87948-1

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (13)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.9K)

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Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In re the Matter of the Marriage of
No. 87948-1-I
STACEY JANETTE SHERIDAN,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.

JAMES MCHUGH SHERIDAN,

Appellant.

DÍAZ, J. — A superior court judge entered a domestic violence protection

order (DVPO) protecting Stacey Sheridan from James Sheridan. 1 James now

avers the judge failed to make a number of necessary findings. He also contends

that there is no substantial evidence in support of the findings the court did make

and that those findings do not meet any of the statutory definitions of domestic

violence. Disagreeing, we affirm and grant Stacey’s request for reasonable fees.

I. BACKGROUND

In September 2024, Stacey petitioned the court to restrain James from

contacting her and their two minor children. James opposed the petition and filed

1 Because they share a last name, we refer to the parties by their first names with

no disrespect intended.
No. 87948-1-I/2

a motion to terminate a temporary order that had been put in place. Both parties

filed supporting declarations in the matter as the litigation proceeded.

After hearing argument and sworn testimony from Stacey in November

2024, a commissioner denied her petition because they found she had not credibly

alleged acts which constituted domestic violence. Stacey moved for a superior

court judge to revise the commissioner’s order. The judge granted Stacey’s motion

after reviewing the pleadings and the transcript of the hearing de novo and it

entered a DVPO.

James then moved the court to reconsider its order. He argued no evidence

demonstrated domestic violence and the court had failed to provide any findings

of fact as the basis for its legal conclusion.

The court granted James’ reconsideration motion in part, agreeing to make

more specific findings, but it denied the motion on the merits. Accordingly, it

entered an amended order which added further factual findings based on its review

of the documentary and testimonial evidence. However, the judge again granted

Stacey’s motion for revision because it again found that she had established she

was subjected to domestic violence. James timely appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Sufficiency of the Judge’s Findings

James claims the court erred because it did not make several required

findings. Specifically, he claims the court failed to identify which statutory definition

of “domestic violence” applied under RCW 7.105.010, failed to find he acted with

intent, and failed to make express credibility findings where there may have been

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No. 87948-1-I/3

conflicting accounts. In short, he asserts the order was “conclusory and

insufficient.”

As a general matter, under Washington’s superior court civil rules, a court

must “find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law” where an

action is tried without a jury. CR 52(a)(1). Our Supreme Court has explained that

a court’s findings of fact “are not rendered invalid if they are sufficiently specific to

permit meaningful review.” In re Dependency of K.R., 128 Wn.2d 129, 143, 904

P.2d 1132 (1995).

To satisfy that standard, the court’s findings must be “sufficient to suggest

the factual basis for the ultimate conclusions.” Lawrence v. Lawrence, 105 Wn.

App. 683, 686, 20 P.3d 972 (2001). Thus, we may remand for additional findings

of fact if we are unable to “discern the reasoning or underlying facts supporting [a

trial court’s] decision,” but we are not required to do so where the record indicates

it undertook proper statutory analysis. See Noll v. Special Elec. Co., Inc., 9 Wn.

App. 2d 317, 319, 444 P.3d 33 (2019).

The civil rules also dictate that findings and conclusions are necessary “as

specifically required by statute.” CR 52(2)(C). As relevant here, we have held the

statute governing the issuance of protection orders requires a court to expressly

state the reasons for its decision only when it declines to issue a protection order.

Matter of Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d 670, 683, 574 P.3d 127 (2025). By contrast,

the statute contains no similar requirement to provide particular reasons for a

decision to grant a DVPO. See i.d.; RCW 7.105.225(6).

Here, as in Timaeus, “the commissioner granted [her] petition for a DVPO.

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No. 87948-1-I/4

Therefore, the commissioner was not required to state in writing the particular

reasons for their decision. [He] provides no authority to the contrary. And as

evidenced [below], ample evidence supports the commissioner’s findings.” Id.

As to James’ claim regarding intent, in Timaeus, we refused to read an

intent requirement into the protection order statute where its language does not

specify one. Id. at 684. 2 Specifically, RCW 7.105.010 does not require a petitioner

to show a certain level of intent with regard to assault or the infliction of fear as

possible forms of domestic violence.

In short, James has not established that the court’s findings were insufficient

under our statute or our case law. Nor, more generally, has he shown they prevent

meaningful appellate review. K.R., 128 Wn.2d at 143. We can discern a proper

basis for the court’s ultimate decision from its findings. Noll, 9 Wn. App. 2d at 319.

B. Substantial Evidence

James next claims the court’s factual findings are not supported by

substantial evidence and avers they do not meet any of RCW 7.105.010’s

definitions for domestic violence. We disagree.

RCW 7.105.010 defines domestic violence as any of the following: “Physical

harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of physical harm, bodily injury,

or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or nonconsensual sexual penetration;

coercive control; unlawful harassment; or stalking of one intimate partner by

2 Our Supreme Court has held that “where the legislature intends to include a mens

rea requirement, it does so. For instance, protection orders based on conduct that
would be innocent but for the respondent’s mental state specify the requisite mens
rea.” DeSean v. Sanger, 2 Wn.3d 329, 337-38, 536 P.3d 191 (2023). Otherwise,
it concluded we “presume that the omission of intent . . . is deliberate.” Id.
4
No. 87948-1-I/5

another intimate partner.” (emphasis added). Washington law defines “assault,”

inter alia, as “putting another in apprehension of harm whether or not the actor

intends to inflict or is capable of inflicting that harm.” State v. Wilson, 125 Wn.2d

212, 218, 883 P.2d 320 (1994).

We review a court’s decision to grant a DVPO for abuse of discretion.

Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 590, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). A trial court

abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly unreasonable or based on

untenable grounds or reasons. State v. Powell, 126 Wn.2d 244, 258, 893 P.2d

615 (1995). A court’s decision is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings

are unsupported by the record. In re Marriage of Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940

P.2d 1362 (1997).

In turn, we assess whether “substantial evidence” supports a court’s

findings of fact. State v. Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d 106, 116, 456 P.3d 806 (2020).

That standard is met where the record contains a sufficient quantity of evidence to

persuade a fair-minded, rational person of the truth of the finding. Id.

Importantly, when reviewing a record for substantial evidence, we do not

reweigh the evidence or disturb a trial court’s determination regarding its

persuasiveness or the credibility of witnesses. Shrauner v. Olsen, 16 Wn. App. 2d

384, 402, 483 P.3d 815 (2020). It is the party challenging findings of fact who

bears the burden to demonstrate substantial evidence does not exist. In re

Marriage of Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. 1, 9, 57 P.3d 1166 (2002).

In addition, though we review factual findings for substantial evidence, we

review de novo whether a court’s factual findings support its conclusions of law.

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No. 87948-1-I/6

Id. We may affirm on any ground supported by the record. LK Operating, LLC v.

Collection Grp., LLC, 181 Wn.2d 48, 73, 331 P.3d 1147 (2014).

We hold that there is substantial evidence for the court’s factual findings

and they do meet at least two of the requisite statutory definitions for domestic

violence. We find it necessary to review the evidence for its findings only as to

three incidents, as we conclude these alone provide grounds to affirm entry of the

DVPO. Id.

First, the court found that in August 2024, James initiated physical contact

with Stacey even though she had requested he refrain from doing so. Leaving

matters of credibility undisturbed, a fair-minded rational person could find this act

occurred, given that Stacey swore under penalty of perjury that he “came up

behind [her] and hugged [her] following repeated requests that [he] not touch [her].”

Olsen, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 402; Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 116.

Second, the court found that soon after, James caused Stacey to be afraid

when he again physically touched her. Leaving matters of credibility undisturbed,

a fair-minded rational person could find this truly occurred, given that she swore

under penalty of perjury that “he came inside angrily” and “grabbed [her] wrist” and

that afterward, she left the house with her children and slept at a hotel because

she felt “fear of imminent danger.” Olsen, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 402; Delbosque, 195

Wn.2d at 116. Stacey also testified this interaction was “scary” for her and he had

“towered over [her]” and “grabbed [her] wrist.”

Third, the court found James had pushed a door into Stacey in anger

several years earlier. Leaving matters of credibility undisturbed, a fair-minded

6
No. 87948-1-I/7

rational person could likewise find this truly occurred given that she swore under

penalty of perjury that, “[a]round 2020 [he] pushed a door into Stacey aggressively

in anger due to feeling disrespected earlier in the day where he knew she would

be hurt.” Olsen, 16 Wn. App. 2d at 402; Delbosque, 195 Wn.2d at 116. 3

In short, deferring to determinations of credibility and persuasiveness as we

must, substantial evidence in the record supports the court’s factual findings such

that James has not established it abused its discretion. Littlefield, 133 Wn.2d at

47; Grigsby, 112 Wn. App. at 9.

In response, James appears to misapprehend the substantial evidence

standard. For instance, in a challenge to Stacey’s accounts, he states “the

evidence supports a different narrative.” And he avers the record does not support

that his conduct placed her in a state of fear “when considered in light of the parties’

history, relationship dynamics, and the nature of the August incidents.” These

assertions ignore that we do not reweigh the evidence and that our role is to

determine whether a fair-minded, rational person could conclude his actions, e.g.,

led Stacey to fear him.

That said, we consider de novo whether the court’s factual findings support

its conclusion of law. We hold that the facts do meet at least two of RCW

7.105.010’s definitions for domestic violence, so it did not err.

Specifically, we conclude the facts satisfy the portion of the statute which

3 The court also found Stacey filed a declaration stating she was fearful of James

and for the safety of their children in general, and it noted she confirmed her
assertions were truthful at the hearing. This testimony also shows there is
substantial evidence for the court’s factual findings James acted in ways which
caused Stacey to fear him.
7
No. 87948-1-I/8

defines domestic violence as “assault” under Washington common law and the

portion of the statute which defines domestic violence as the “infliction of fear of

physical harm, bodily injury, or assault.” The factual findings the court made—

namely, that Stacey feared James due to at least three physical incidents—support

the conclusion he committed domestic violence against her because they

demonstrate he either assaulted her by putting her in apprehension of bodily harm

or he inflicted fear of such harm.

In response, James simply does not provide any authority to support his

claim that these factual findings fall short of either definition of domestic violence

set by RCW 7.105.010 as a matter of law. Thus, his argument fails.

C. Fees

Stacey requests attorney fees on appeal, citing to RCW 7.105.310.

RAP 18.1 permits a party to request attorney fees on appeal where

applicable law grants them that right. We may award attorney fees where allowed

by statute, rule, or contract. Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 506, 387 P.3d 680

(2017). And “if attorney fees are allowable at trial, the prevailing party may recover

fees on appeal.” Id.

Under RCW 7.105.310(1)(j), courts have discretion to “reimburse the

petitioner for costs incurred in bringing the [DVPO] action, including reasonable

attorneys’ fees.” Therefore, we grant Stacey’s request, and we need not reach

any other possible basis. See Timaeus, 34 Wn. App. 2d at 685-86.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm and grant Stacey’s request for fees, which she may perfect by

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No. 87948-1-I/9

following the procedure set forth in RAP 18.1(f)-(h).

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WE CONCUR:

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