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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Woodfield Greens Condominium Assn v. Soho Land Development Inc

Michigan Court of Appeals

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 371067
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Disposition: Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

• Opinion

• Authorities (3)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (451)

• PDF

Disposition

Lower Court Judgment/Order Affirmed

Lead Opinion

If this opinion indicates that it is “FOR PUBLICATION,” it is subject to
revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports.

STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

WOODFIELD GREENS CONDOMINIUM UNPUBLISHED
ASSOCIATION, March 16, 2026
9:49 AM
Plaintiff/Counterdefendant-Appellee,

V No. 371067
Oakland Circuit Court
SOHO LAND DEVELOPMENT, INC., LC No. 2023-201075-CH

Defendant,

and

MICHAEL MCGRATH,

Defendant/Counterplaintiff-Appellant,

and

LARRY C. MULLINS, BARBARA J. MULLINS,
FOUR J, LLC, DAVID PARIS, MARLENE PARIS,
MICHAEL SIMONETTI, ELLEN SIMONETTI,
DANI WEST, BERNARD KOTARSKI,
ELIZABETH KOTARSKI, RUTH DEWALT,
ELYSE SAKUTA, LESLEY MATUSZAK,
JESSICA SAMPSON, JOHN STRONG III, JULEE
STRONG, DERRICK JONES, SCOTT BOLDMAN,
LISA BOLDMAN, TODD WALSH, SHANNON
WALSH, HARDMAN REVOCABLE TRUST
DATED JUNE 23, 2020, LINDA HARDMAN,
SHELLY A. PREVETT REVOCABLE TRUST
DATED APRIL 12, 2021, PHILLIP HOLMBLADE,
PAMA HOLMBLADE, PETER HOMMEN, JANET
HOMMEN, COLON BROWN, LISA BROWN,
ELIZABETH LOVSE, MICHELLE
GOLDWORTHY, IDA SWIRLES, GRANT W.
YOUNG LIVING TRUST DATED JULY 15, 2021,

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GRANT YOUNG, MICHAEL MARSH, and
GLORIA MARSH,

Counterdefendants-Appellees.

Before: RIORDAN, P.J., and O’BRIEN and YOUNG, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Defendant/counterplaintiff, Michael McGrath, appeals as of right the trial court’s order
granting summary disposition in favor of plaintiff/counterdefendant, Woodfield Greens
Condominium Association.1 We affirm.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Woodfield Greens Condominium was created as a condominium project under the
Michigan condominium act, MCL 559.101 et seq., when the initial developer recorded the master
deed on July 20, 2005. The master deed created 50 units and defined Units 1 through 4 as “must
be built.” A subdivision plan attached to the master deed clarified that “all remaining units and
their appurtenant structures and improvements ‘need not be built’.”

MCL 559.167(3), as amended by 2002 PA 283, provided, in relevant part:

Notwithstanding section 33, if the developer has not completed
development and construction of units or improvements in the condominium
project that are identified as “need not be built” during a period ending 10 years
after the date of commencement of construction by the developer of the project, the
developer, its successors, or assigns have the right to withdraw from the project all
undeveloped portions of the project not identified as “must be built” without the
prior consent of any co-owners, mortgagees of units in the project, or any other
party having an interest in the project. . . . If the developer does not withdraw the
undeveloped portions of the project from the project before expiration of the time
periods, those undeveloped lands shall remain part of the project as general
common elements and all rights to construct units upon that land shall cease.[2]

1
The same order granted a default judgment against defendant Soho Land Development, Inc., and
dismissed without prejudice the individually named counterdefendants (the co-owners of the
condominium units that were a part of the association.) None of these other parties are parties to
this appeal.
2
This is the version of the statute that was in effect at the relevant time of this case, and any
reference to MCL 559.167 in this opinion is to this version of the statute. MCL 559.167 was
amended effective September 21, 2016, see MCL 559.167, as amended by 2016 PA 233, but those

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Article VIII, Section 6 of the master deed had similarly required that the developer complete
construction “of the entire Project, including proposed improvements whether identified as ‘Must
be Built’ or ‘Need not be Built,’ ” within 10 years from the date of commencement of construction.
The master deed went on to state that if the developer, its successors, or assigns failed to withdraw
any undeveloped portion from the project before the expiration period, then those undeveloped
portions would remain part of the condominium project as general common elements, and all rights
to construct units on that land would cease.

On August 31, 2005, the initial developer recorded a “Notice of Commencement”
indicating that construction work on the condominium project was about to begin.

On December 27, 2010, defendant purchased Units 37 through 50. In February 2014,
defendant’s attorney sent a letter to Cummings Property Management, Inc., the property manager
of Woodfield Greens, stating that defendant “requests that you retain this letter in your permanent
records as confirmation that his units are designated ‘must be built’, and therefore, can remain
undeveloped after the 10 year anniversary date of commencement of construction.” There is no
record evidence of any response to this letter.

Units 17 through 50 (which included defendant’s purchased units) were never built, and no
amendment to the master deed was ever recorded. According to plaintiff, under the condominium
act and the master deed, in 2015—10 years after the commencement of construction by the initial
developer—all rights to build Units 17 through 50 ceased, and all undeveloped land reverted to
the condominium project as general common elements. On November 29, 2022, plaintiff recorded
the first amendment to the master deed, indicating the nonexistence of Units 17 through 50.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On June 23, 2023, plaintiff sued defendant to quiet title to the land on which defendant’s
units were to be built, and it sought a declaratory judgment that these former units no longer existed
and reverted to general common elements. Defendant counterclaimed seeking restitution for the
property taxes that he paid for the land on which the units were to be built.

On January 23, 2024, plaintiff filed two motions for summary disposition—one in which
it sought summary disposition in its favor on the claims alleged in its complaint, and the other in
which it sought summary disposition in its favor on defendant’s counterclaim. Arguing that it was
entitled to summary disposition on the claims alleged in its complaint, plaintiff asserted that,
because the master deed was never amended by recorded instrument, in 2015—10 years after
construction of the condominium complex commenced—defendant’s former units ceased to exist
pursuant to the plain language of MCL 559.167(3) and the terms of the master deed. As for
defendant’s counterclaim, plaintiff argued that defendant could not prove that plaintiff received
any benefit from defendant’s payment of the property taxes, so defendant was not entitled to any
restitution for the property taxes he paid.

amendments do not apply retroactively. See Cove Creek Condo Ass’n v Vistal Land & Home Dev,
LLC, 330 Mich App 679, 697-701; 950 NW2d 502 (2019).

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In response, defendant argued that his written correspondence sufficed to convert his units
from “need not be built” to “must be built,” so those units never converted to general common
elements. He also argued that plaintiff benefitted from his payment of property taxes because it
avoided a tax foreclosure.

The trial court entered an opinion and order granting both of plaintiff’s motions for
summary disposition without oral argument. The court agreed with plaintiff that an amendment
to the master deed, including an amended subdivision plan, was needed to convert “need not be
built” units to “must be built” units, and there was no evidence that defendant recorded either. The
court also agreed with plaintiff that defendant’s payment of taxes on the nonexistent units did not
benefit the association, so defendant was not entitled to any restitution.

This appeal followed.

III. MCL 559.167(3)

Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by concluding that plaintiff was entitled to
judgment as a matter of law on its claim for quiet title of defendant’s undeveloped units.

We review de novo a trial court’s ruling on a motion for summary disposition. Glasker-
Davis v Auvenshine, 333 Mich App 222, 229; 964 NW2d 809 (2020). While the trial court did
not specify whether it was granting plaintiff’s motion for summary disposition under either MCR
2.116(C)(8) and (10), it is clear that the court granted the motion under (C)(10) because it
considered evidence outside the pleadings. See Cuddington v United Health Servs, Inc, 298 Mich
App 264, 270; 826 NW2d 519 (2012). A motion filed under MCR 2.116(C)(10) is properly
granted if, after reviewing all of the documentary evidence in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. See Glasker-Davis, 333 Mich App at 229. “A genuine issue of
material fact exists when the record, giving the benefit of reasonable doubt to the opposing party,
leaves open an issue upon which reasonable minds might differ.” Innovative Adult Foster Care,
Inc v Ragin, 285 Mich App 466, 475; 776 NW2d 398 (2009) (quotation marks and citation
omitted).

Questions of statutory and contract interpretation are reviewed de novo. Elizabeth Trace
Condo Ass’n v American Global Enterprises, Inc, 340 Mich App 435, 439-440; 986 NW2d 412
(2022).

A condominium project like the one at issue here is governed by the Michigan
condominium act, MCL 559.101 et seq. The version of MCL 559.167(3) that was in effect at all
relevant times provided that if the developer of a project had not completed development and
construction of condominium units identified as “need not be built” within 10 years after the date
of commencement of construction, and if the developer (or its successors or assigns) did not
withdraw the undeveloped portions of the project “before expiration of the time periods,” then
“those undeveloped lands shall remain part of the project as general common elements and all
rights to construct units upon that land shall cease.” That is, under the relevant version of MCL
559.167(3), “[i]f the developer of a condominium project (or its successors or assigns) does not
withdraw the undeveloped ‘need not be built’ units from the project within the specified 10-year

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time period, the land comprising those units becomes part of the project ‘as general common
elements’ and all rights to construction on that land cease.” Elizabeth Trace Condo Ass’n, 340
Mich App at 442.

Construction of the condominium project here began in 2005, so the 10-year period to
develop and construct the “need not be built” units expired in 2015. It is undisputed that defendant
never constructed his unbuilt units. Therefore, after the 10-year period expired in 2015, the unbuilt
units, by operation of law, “remained part of the project as general common elements, and all rights
to construct upon that land ceased.” Id.

Defendant argues that Elizabeth Trace is distinguishable from this case because, in 2014,
defendant provided written notice to plaintiff of his intent to keep his unbuilt units as part of the
condominium project. We agree with the trial court’s conclusion, however, that this
correspondence was insufficient to convert defendant’s units from “need not be built” to “must be
built” to escape the dictates of MCL 559.167(3), requiring that “need not be built” units be
constructed within 10 years of the commencement of construction.

MCL 559.108 defines “Master deed” as “the condominium document recording the
condominium project to which are attached as exhibits and incorporated by reference the bylaws
for the project and the condominium subdivision plan for the project.” MCL 559.166(2)(j) requires
that any proposed structure in a subdivision plan be labeled as “must be built” or “need not be
built,” and section (3) of that statute requires subdivision plans be numbered consecutively “when
recorded by the register of deeds.” Under MCL 559.167(1), “[a] change in a condominium project
shall be reflected in an amendment to the appropriate condominium document,” and under MCL
559.191, “[a]n amendment to the master deed or other recorded condominium document shall not
be effective until the amendment is recorded.”

The master deed only defined Units 1 through 4 as “must be built.” On page 6 of the
subdivision plan, it states, “Units 1 through 4 inclusive and their appurtenant structures and
improvements ‘must be built’. All remaining units and their appurtenant structures and
improvements ‘need not be built’.” There is no evidence of any amendment of the master deed or
subdivision plan to change defendant’s units from “need not be built” to “must be built.” Nor is
there any evidence of any recording of an amendment with the register of deeds until the first
amendment was recorded in 2022. Defendant’s evidence of a unilateral correspondence does not
suffice to establish an amendment of the master deed or subdivision plan, let alone any official
recording of such documents. The trial court therefore properly concluded that, because defendant
did not comply with the requirements of the condominium act, MCL 559.167(3) operated to
extinguish defendant’s rights to the property when the 10-year period expired, and his units
remained unbuilt and not withdrawn.3

3
Defendant also discusses a July 2017 email that plaintiff’s former counsel sent to Cummings in
response to an inquiry about brick color. The email stated, “I presume we are talking about Units
in Woodfield Green that exist on paper (i.e. established by the Master Deed) but have not yet been
built. If so, this purchaser will need to build Units in accordance with the site plan approved by

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IV. DEFENDANT’S COUNTERCLAIM

In his “Statement of Questions Presented,” defendant states that he is also challenging the
trial court’s dismissal of his counterclaim for restitution. In his brief, however, defendant fails to
address this issue. We consider defendant’s failure to substantively address this issue to constitute
an abandonment of his claim. See Berger v Berger, 277 Mich App 700, 712; 747 NW2d 336
(2008) (“A party abandons a claim when it fails to make a meaningful argument in support of its
position.”). We accordingly decline to address whether the trial court properly dismissed
defendant’s counterclaim for restitution.

Affirmed.

/s/ Michael J. Riordan
/s/ Colleen A. O’Brien
/s/ Adrienne N. Young

the municipality.” This email does not even clearly specify that it is discussing defendant’s units,
so it would be speculation to conclude that it is even relevant to his case. Even assuming that this
email was referring to defendant’s undeveloped units, it is still not sufficient to establish that there
was an effective amendment to the master deed or other condominium documents.

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