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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Kings-men Construction Inc., V. Maria Hunt

Court of Appeals of Washington

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 87807-7

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

KINGS-MEN CONSTRUCTION INC., a
Washington corporation, No. 87807-7-I

Respondent, DIVISION ONE

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

LYLE P. SCHLACKS,

Appellant,

and

MARIA R. HUNT, and all occupants of
40409 State Route 20, Oak Harbor,
Washington,

Defendants.

HAZELRIGG, C.J. — Lyle Schlacks appeals pro se from the final judgment

and order entered following a bench trial between Kings-Men Construction Inc. and

Maria Hunt. On appeal, Schlacks asserts that the court erred when it declared that

a certain easement against real property owned by Hunt was valid. Because

Schlacks has not established that he has standing to contest the portion of the final

judgment designated on appeal, we hold that his appeal must be dismissed.

FACTS

In May 2023, Kings-Men Construction Inc. filed a complaint in Island County

Superior Court that identified as defendants Maria Hunt, the owner of certain real
No. 87807-7-I/2

property, and unnamed defendants occupying that property. In its complaint,

Kings-Men alleged that since 1996 it had an easement over Hunt’s property

granting it the right to access and install certain septic field infrastructure thereon

and, since 2023, the defendants had engaged in conduct interfering with its rights

under that easement. The construction company sought, among other things,

declaratory relief that the easement was valid, injunctive relief forbidding the

interfering conduct, and $10,000 in damages.

A process server affixed service of process to the front door of a residence

on Hunt’s property and personally accomplished service of process on an

individual identified as Lyle Schlacks, who confirmed that he was occupying that

residence. One month later, in June 2023, Kings-Men amended its complaint to

name Schlacks as a defendant and allege that he was a current occupant of the

property. 1 Kings-Men then accomplished service of process on Schlacks by mail.

Hunt appeared in the proceedings represented by counsel, but Schlacks

did not appear or file an answer. In December 2023, six months after it filed its

amended complaint and mailed service of process, Kings-Men moved for an order

of default and default judgment to be entered against Schlacks. The court later

entered a corresponding order and judgment, ruling,

Schlacks is barred from contesting that the reservation of rights
contained within Island County Auditor File No. 96021534 for the
access to and installation of drainfield, lines and other necessary
appurtenances for the off-site septic fields are valid and transferable
by Kings-Men Construction Inc. 2

1 Kings-Men also alleged that Schlacks was a prior owner of the real property in question.
2 Island County Auditor File No. 96021534 is a file containing the easement in question.

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No. 87807-7-I/3

Eleven months later, in November 2024, a two-day bench trial between Kings-Men

and Hunt was conducted, with each presenting opening statements, witness

testimony, exhibits, and closing argument. Schlacks did not appear at trial. The

following day, the court issued an oral ruling that granted, in relevant part, Kings-

Men’s request for a declaration that the easement in question was valid.

The court instructed Kings-Men’s counsel to draft written orders to

memorialize its oral rulings, and two months later, in January 2025, the court held

a presentation hearing on those orders. At that posttrial hearing, Schlacks

appeared in court for the first time in this case. The court provided him with the

opportunity to speak to identify himself and explain the role that he thought he had

in the hearing.

After being sworn in, he indicated that he was formally known as Lyle

Schlacks but he had changed his name, 3 argued that he “just found out about this,”

and attempted to offer an affidavit into evidence. 4 The court indicated that it was

not accepting his evidence, instructed him to talk to the clerk about filing

documents, and, based on his representations to the court, determined that he did

not have a further speaking role in that hearing. 5 The court later entered orders

setting forth its written findings of fact, conclusions of law, and final judgment.

Schlacks timely appealed.

3 Despite this assertion in the trial court and his offer of certain evidence in support,
Schlacks submitted his briefing to this court using only the name “Lyle P. Schlacks.” Accordingly,
we refer to him in the same manner in this opinion.
4 Schlacks indicated to the court that he had in his possession a document that showed he

had legally changed his name to “Lyle-Perry Kinzey-Schlacks.”
5 The record designated on appeal does not reflect that Schlacks filed further

documentation in this case on this topic.

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No. 87807-7-I/4

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Schlacks challenges only the first paragraph of the trial court’s

final judgment ruling that the easement in question is valid. Because he fails to

contest the default judgment that precludes him from bringing such a challenge or

adequately reference the trial court record in his briefing, Schlacks has not

established that he has standing to bring this appeal.

“We hold a pro se litigant to the same standard as an attorney.” In re Est.

of Little, 9 Wn. App. 2d 262, 274 n.4, 444 P.3d 23 (2019). “Standing” is defined as

a “party’s right to make a legal claim or seek judicial enforcement of a duty or right

based on the party’s having a sufficient interest in a justiciable controversy.”

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1700 (12th ed. 2024). For the purpose of standing on

appeal, we have recognized that

“[o]nly an aggrieved party may seek review by the appellate
court.” RAP 3.1. “While RAP 3.1 does not itself define the term
‘aggrieved,’ Washington courts have long held that ‘[f]or a party to be
aggrieved, the decision must adversely affect that party’s property or
pecuniary rights, or a personal right, or impose on a party a burden
or obligation.’” Randy Reynolds & Assocs. v. Harmon, 193 Wn.2d
143, 150, 437 P.3d 677 (2019) (quoting In re Parentage of X.T.L.,
No. 31335-2-III, slip op. at 17 (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 2014)
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/313352.unp.pdf.
In other words, the decision must operate prejudicially and directly
on the party’s rights or interests; “‘the right invaded must be
immediate, not merely some possible, remote consequence.’”
Sheets v. Benevolent & Protective Ord. of Keglers, 34 Wn.2d 851,
855, 210 P.2d 690 (1949) (quoting 4 C.J.S. Appeal and Error §
183(b)(1), at 356 (1937)).

Hays Elliott Props., LLC v. Horner, 25 Wn. App. 2d 868, 872, 528 P.3d 827 (2023)

(some alteration in original). The remedy for lack of appellate standing is dismissal

of the appeal. See id. at 872.

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No. 87807-7-I/5

RAP 10.3(a)(5) sets forth that “[r]eference to the record must be included

for each factual statement” in an appellate brief’s “Statement of the Case” section.

(Emphasis added.) Additionally, RAP 10.3(a)(6) provides that an appellate brief’s

“Argument” section must include the “argument in support of the issues presented

for review, together with citations to legal authority and references to relevant parts

of the record.” (Emphasis added.) The purpose of the foregoing rules is, in

pertinent part, to “enable the court and opposing counsel . . . to review the accuracy

of the factual statements made in the briefs.” Litho Color, Inc. v. Pac. Emp’rs Ins.

Co., 98 Wn. App. 286, 305-06, 991 P.2d 638 (1999).

Here, as mentioned supra, when Schlacks did not appear in court or file an

answer to Kings-Men’s complaints, the trial court entered default judgment against

him and ruled that

Schlacks [wa]s barred from contesting that the reservation of rights
contained within Island County Auditor File No. 96021534 for the
access to and installation of drainfield, lines and other necessary
appurtenances for the off-site septic fields are valid and transferable
by Kings-Men Construction Inc.

On appeal, Schlacks did not designate the court’s default judgment entered

against him but, rather, designated the court’s order containing its final judgment

entered in this matter. 6 In his notice of appeal, he expressly stated, “Lyle P.

Schlacks, defendant, seeks review by the designated appellate court of the

‘Judgment and Order’, []Paragraph 1,” attached both the findings of fact and

conclusions of law and final judgment entered by the trial court on January 6, 2025,

6 Hunt did not file a notice of appeal.

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No. 87807-7-I/6

and signed the notice in his individual capacity as a pro se litigant. 7 The challenged

paragraph of the trial court’s “Judgment and Order” reads as follows:

Defendant Maria Hunt’s request to dismiss Kings-Men’s claims
based upon the Agreement Reserving Easements For Off-Site
Septic Drainfield Facilities filed on July 31, 1996 under Island County
Auditor’s File No. 96013427 being re-recorded on December 19,
1996 under Island County Auditor’s File No. 96021534 to correct a
legal description is DENIED. The “Agreement Reserving Easements
For Off-Site Septic Drainfield Facilities” is valid.

(Emphasis added.) Notably, in his opening appellate brief, the sections setting

forth his “Statement of the Case” and “Argument” do not contain any citation or

reference to the clerk’s papers or verbatim report of proceedings from the bench

trial in this case.

We conclude that Schlacks has not established that he is an aggrieved party

for the portion of the final judgment that he appealed. In order for him to show that

he is an aggrieved party, he must establish that he has a right or interest in the

order designated on appeal; specifically, a right implicated by the court’s

determination that the easement in question is valid. However, his opening brief

presents no citation to the record supporting that he possesses such a right or

interest. 8 Therefore, he has not presented adequate evidence to establish that he

is an aggrieved party on appeal.

7 Despite including the findings and conclusions with his notice of appeal, Schlacks does

not present any assignment of error to that order. Accordingly, he has abandoned any challenge
to the trial court’s findings or conclusions.
8 We note, for example, that he is not named in the final judgment and order from which he

appeals. Further, while his reply brief contains a single sentence that includes a citation to over
300 pages of the record, this still falls far short of his obligation to adequately and accurately inform
this court of a qualifying right or interest on appeal. Separately, since it is referenced for the first
time in his reply brief, it also does not have the effect of fairly informing opposing counsel of the
factual basis of his challenge on appeal. See City of Spokane v. White, 102 Wn. App. 955, 963,
10 P.3d 1095 (2000) (“A reply brief is generally not the proper forum to address new issues because
the respondent does not get an opportunity to address the newly raised issues.”).

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No. 87807-7-I/7

Furthermore, even if he did refer to the record and present references in

support of the existence of the required right or interest, the default judgment

resulting from his failure to properly and timely appear in the trial court precludes

him from challenging this aspect of the trial court’s final judgment. As a preliminary

matter, he did not designate for appellate review the default judgment entered

against him, assign error to that default judgment, or present argument or authority

in support of alleged error therein on appeal. Therefore, the court’s default

judgment is unchallenged on appeal. This is significant because, although

Schlacks endeavors to contest the validity of the easement in question, he is

specifically barred from doing so as set forth in the default judgment entered

against him. Given this, he is precluded from establishing a right or interest as to

the validity of the easement on appeal. 9

9 To the extent that Schlacks seeks to challenge the portion of the court’s ruling that denied

Hunt’s motion to dismiss, we reject this challenge for the same reasons as discussed herein.

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No. 87807-7-I/8

Thus, Schlacks fails to demonstrate that he has a requisite right or interest

to seek review of the judgment appealed. 10 Accordingly, he has not established

that he has standing to appeal this matter. 11

Dismissed.

WE CONCUR:

10 We also note that Schlacks’ reply brief purports to have been filed on behalf of himself

as well as Hunt and her husband. However, critical to this point, we have recognized that
[a] person “may appear and act in any court as his own attorney without threat of
sanction for unauthorized practice.” Wash. State Bar Ass’n v. Great W. Union Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d 48, 56, 586 P.2d 870 (1978). But a layperson’s right
of self-representation applies “only if the layperson is acting solely on his own
behalf” with respect to his own legal rights and obligations. Bar Ass’n, 91 Wn.2d
at 57.
Dutch Vill. Mall, LLC v. Pelletti, 162 Wn. App. 531, 536, 256 P.3d 1251 (2011) (emphasis added).
Consistent with this rule, Schlacks expressly identifies himself as “Lyle P. Schlacks, pro se” on the
cover of both his opening and reply briefs. (Emphasis added.) Black’s Law Dictionary defines “pro
se” as a Latin phrase that means “for oneself.” BLACK’S, supra, at 1478.
“‘Washington law, with limited exception, requires individuals appearing before the court
on behalf of another party to be licensed in the practice of law.’” Dutch Vill. Mall, 162 Wn. App. at
535 (quoting Lloyd Enters., Inc. v. Longview Plumbing & Heating Co., 91 Wn. App. 697, 701, 958
P.2d 1035 (1998)). Schlacks asserts through his self-identification that he is a pro se appellant and
has not otherwise demonstrated that he is licensed in the practice of law or that the limited
exception to that requirement applies to the matter before us. Thus, to the extent that he seeks to
assert the rights and interests of Hunt and her husband in his appeal, we decline to consider such
an assertion.
Finally, while Schlacks’ reply brief appears to be signed by “Maria Hunt, pro se” and “Oliver
C. Hunt, pro se,” neither filed a notice of appeal in this case and, as such, they are not parties to
this appeal.
11 Kings-Men requests that we impose sanctions against Schlacks on the basis that his

appeal in this matter is frivolous. We deny Kings-Men’s request. While Schlacks does not have
standing to appeal the final judgment entered against Hunt, we decline to hold that his appeal
was frivolous.

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