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March 30, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ryan Milbeck v. Allison George

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: 25-1061

• Opinion

• Authorities (35)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (38.9K)

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Combined Opinion

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

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No. 25-1061
RYAN W. MILBECK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

ALLISON GEORGE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 3:23-cv-00525-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.

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SUBMITTED FEBRUARY 2, 2026 * — DECIDED MARCH 30, 2026

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Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and KIRSCH,
Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM. Ryan Milbeck sued the Village of Rothschild,
Wisconsin, and Kenosha County, Wisconsin, as well as a

• We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because

the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments,
and oral argument would not significantly aid the court. See Fed. R. App.
P. 34(a)(2)(C).
2 No. 25-1061

prosecutor and several law-enforcement officers in those
jurisdictions. Invoking 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Milbeck alleges that
the defendants violated his federal constitutional rights by
entering his home and arresting him without a warrant or
probable cause and that the defendants then maliciously
prosecuted him. The district court dismissed all claims on the
pleadings because the officers had probable cause to arrest
Milbeck and the prosecutor was absolutely immune from suit.
We agree with the district court’s determinations as to
both probable cause and prosecutorial immunity. But
probable cause is not, without more, a defense to a claim of
unlawful warrantless entry. Milbeck has plausibly alleged
that officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment
by entering his property and arresting him on the basis of
what Wisconsin officials call a “temporary felony want”—a
document issued by a law enforcement officer rather than by
a judicial officer. We therefore affirm in part, vacate in part,
and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
We review de novo a grant of a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings, and we accept all factual allegations in the
complaint as true, reading them in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff. Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 994 (7th Cir.
2020). We may also consider documents attached to the
complaint if the plaintiff refers to them and relies upon them.
See Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(c); Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432,
435–36 (7th Cir. 2013).
According to documents attached to Milbeck’s complaint,
in July 2020, Milbeck’s ex-wife Kendra told the Kenosha
County Sheriff’s Department that Milbeck was violating a
No. 25-1061 3

restraining order against him. Kendra told Detective Allison
George that Milbeck had hacked into her email and social-
media accounts. She provided log-in records showing that a
phone at the location of Milbeck’s home in the Village of
Rothschild (more than 200 miles away in Marathon County)
had made several attempts (some successful) to access her
accounts. It appeared that, after logging in, Milbeck read her
emails, searched her contacts, and tried to change her
passwords. Kendra explained that before their separation,
Milbeck had threatened to kill her if she left him, so she feared
that he was trying to find out where she lived.
Detective George contacted police officers in Rothschild
and asked them to speak with Milbeck at his home. When
they did so, he denied trying to access Kendra’s accounts.
Detective George then requested that charges be filed
against Milbeck for violating the restraining order and
stalking. She again contacted officers in Rothschild. They told
her they would need a warrant to arrest him. According to
Detective George’s report, she then “placed a temporary
felony warrant” (emphasis added) for Milbeck and told
officers in Rothschild that she had done so.
A Wisconsin “temporary felony want” is a database alert
that officers in one jurisdiction believe a suspect has
committed a felony and that there is “information sufficient
to support an arrest warrant, but that no arrest warrant ha[s]
yet been issued.” State v. Subdiaz-Osorio, 849 N.W.2d 748, 755
n.8 (Wis. 2014). The “want” is intended to help officers
promptly apprehend suspects who may flee across
jurisdictional boundaries. Id. at 755 n.10. And though it is
essentially an electronic “wanted” poster or all-points
bulletin, law-enforcement officers in Wisconsin have
4 No. 25-1061

interchangeably referred to this sort of document as both a
“temporary felony want” and a “temporary felony warrant.”
See, e.g., Henderson v. Goldbeck, No. 23-cv-1067, slip op. at *3
(E.D. Wis. March 21, 2025) (referring to “temporary felony
warrant” but noting document is not actually a warrant); State
v. Collins, 363 N.W.2d 229, 230 n.1 (Wis. App. 1984) (noting
use of both terms).
According to Milbeck, Rothschild Police Department
Officers Matthew Loveless and Andrew Schroeder arrived at
his home and entered without his consent, claiming they had
a “warrant” for his arrest. Milbeck also alleges the officers
claimed that Jeremy Hunt, the chief of the Rothschild Police
Department, verified the warrant and that the officers
arrested him and transported him to Kenosha County.
Milbeck was charged with stalking, but the prosecutor later
voluntarily dismissed the charges at the preliminary hearing.
Milbeck alleges that he later requested a copy of the
warrant for his arrest from the Kenosha County Sheriff’s
Department, but the department’s representative told him
that no warrant ever existed.
Milbeck then filed this suit under § 1983 alleging the
defendants violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment.
He alleged that the officers arrested him with a defective
warrant (claim 1), unlawfully entered his home (claim 2),
falsely arrested him (claim 3), and falsely imprisoned him
(claim 4). He sued supervisors at both police departments
under a theory of supervisory liability (claims 6 and 7) and
both Kenosha County and the Village of Rothschild under a
theory of municipal liability for failing to train their officers
(claim 9). He also sued all defendants for malicious
prosecution (claim 5). And he asserted a claim under 42 U.S.C.
No. 25-1061 5

§§ 1985 and 1986 alleging that several officers conspired to
violate his rights and/or neglected to prevent the violations of
his rights (claim 8).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), the district court dismissed all claims
for failure to state a claim. The court treated Milbeck’s
theories of defective warrant, unlawful entry, false arrest, and
false imprisonment as one consolidated claim for false arrest
and imprisonment in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
The court then concluded that Milbeck’s arrest was supported
by probable cause, which is an absolute bar to false arrest
claims arising under § 1983, and dismissed all claims relating
to his arrest. The court dismissed the malicious prosecution
claim because Milbeck could not show that he was charged
without probable cause. The court also dismissed the
supervisory liability claims because Milbeck failed to allege
that any supervisor played a personal role in his arrest. The
court dismissed the claims under §§ 1985 and 1986 because
Milbeck failed to allege any factual details of any conspiracy
to deprive him of equal protection of the laws. And though
the prosecutor did not appear or file a response to Milbeck’s
complaint, the court dismissed the claims against her because
prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity from civil suit for
initiating charges or presenting a case on behalf of the state.
Finally, the court reasoned that because Milbeck failed to state
a claim against any individual defendant, he could not
establish municipal liability for failure to train under § 1983.
II. Discussion
We granted Milbeck’s motion for leave to proceed on
appeal in forma pauperis, noting that his claim that the police
unlawfully entered his home under the auspices of the
temporary felony “want” was potentially viable. Milbeck
6 No. 25-1061

presses that issue, arguing that the temporary felony “want”
was not a valid warrant and that the district court improperly
dismissed his unlawful entry and unlawful arrest claims. We
agree in part.
A possible source of confusion was the district court’s
decision to treat as duplicative Milbeck’s claims alleging that
officers secured a defective warrant (claim 1), unlawfully
entered his property (claim 2), unlawfully arrested him (claim
3), and falsely imprisoned him (claim 4). The district court
explained that it did so because the claims “stem from the
same operative facts and allege the same injury.” That’s true,
but an unlawful entry pursuant to a defective or non-existent
warrant is an actionable wrong distinct from an allegedly
unlawful arrest. “Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful
entry [and] unlawful arrest or detention … are separate
claims that focus on different points in a law enforcement
officer’s interaction with the plaintiff.” Dukes v. Sheriff of Levy
County, 155 F.4th 1291, 1300 (11th Cir. 2025). We therefore
analyze claims challenging the legality of the home entry
separately from those alleging unlawful arrest and detention.
See, e.g., Muhammad v. Pearson, 900 F.3d 898, 904, 907 (7th Cir.
2018).
A. Unlawful Entry Claims
The Fourth Amendment guarantees the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures, and the “sanctity of
a person’s living space” stands at the core of the Fourth
Amendment. Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 303 (2021).
“[P]hysical entry of the home is the chief evil against which
… the Fourth Amendment is directed,” and “the warrant
procedure minimizes the danger of needless intrusions of that
No. 25-1061 7

sort.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585–86 (1980) (citations
omitted).
Warrantless searches and seizures inside a home,
including arrests, are therefore presumed to be unreasonable.
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971); Gaetjens
v. City of Loves Park, 4 F.4th 487, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2021)
(citations omitted). “[P]olice officers may not constitutionally
enter a home without a warrant to effectuate an arrest, absent
consent or exigent circumstances, even if they have probable
cause.” Sparing v. Village of Olympia Fields, 266 F.3d 684, 688
(7th Cir. 2001), citing Payton, 445 U.S. at 585–90;
see also Hawkins v. Mitchell, 756 F.3d 983, 991–92 (7th Cir.
2014). When there is time to secure a valid warrant, then,
officers who choose not to do so risk violating constitutional
rights. Sparing, 266 F.3d at 691.
A fundamental principle of Fourth Amendment law is that
a valid warrant may be issued only by a “neutral and
detached magistrate” upon a showing of probable cause, not
by an “officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime.” Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14
(1948); accord, e.g., United States v. Hueston, 90 F.4th 897, 902
(7th Cir. 2024); United States v. Harris, 464 F.3d 733, 737–38
(7th Cir. 2006). Allowing the police to issue warrants to
themselves would “reduce the [Fourth] Amendment to a
nullity.” Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14. That would be the effect of
treating “temporary felony wants” as if they were warrants.
Milbeck has plausibly alleged that his Fourth Amendment
rights were violated when the officers entered his home
without a valid warrant. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678
(2009); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Milbeck alleged that Detective
George secured a document that she told other officers was a
8 No. 25-1061

“temporary warrant,” but that document was not an arrest
warrant issued by a judicial officer and thus was facially
defective. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest warrant
may be issued only by a neutral and detached magistrate,
Johnson, 333 U.S. at 14, upon an affidavit describing
information sufficient to establish probable cause, Whiteley v.
Warden, Wyoming State Penitentiary, 401 U.S. 560, 564–65
(1971), and particularly describing the person to be arrested,
Powe v. City of Chicago, 664 F.2d 639, 645 (7th Cir. 1981). See
also Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485–86 (1958)
(warrant requirement applies equally to arrests and searches).
A temporary felony “want” may name the person to be
arrested, but it fails the other two requirements: it is issued by
an investigating officer rather than a neutral magistrate, and
it lacks a statement describing the facts establishing probable
cause. Even if the latter omission might be correctable, the
difference between a judge-issued warrant and a police-
issued “want” can be cured only by obtaining a warrant from
a judge.
Milbeck alleges that Officers Schroeder and Loveless
entered his home pursuant to that facially defective “want,”
without exigent circumstances or consent. No allegations in
the complaint indicate that a valid warrant for Milbeck’s
arrest actually existed. To the contrary, Milbeck alleged that a
representative of the Kenosha County Sheriff’s Department
told him that no warrant ever existed, and the use of a
temporary felony “want” implies that no valid warrant has
yet issued. Collins, 363 N.W.2d at 230 n.1. Milbeck has
plausibly alleged that the officers’ entry into his home to make
a routine arrest without a valid warrant, consent, or exigent
circumstances violated his rights under the Fourth
Amendment. Id. at 231–32 (suspect’s arrest in his home
No. 25-1061 9

pursuant to temporary felony “want” and without exigent
circumstances violated Fourth Amendment); see also State v.
Burrows, 925 N.W. 2d 789 (table), 2018 WL 6788157 at *5 (Wis.
App. Dec. 26, 2018) (noting arrest pursuant to a “want” is
constitutional so long as it is not used to enter a defendant’s
property); State v. Ott, 870 N.W. 2d 247 (table), 2015 WL
4633358 at *1–2 (Wis. App. Aug. 5, 2015) (noting that trial court
concluded that “warrant” was a “misnomer” in this context).
The defendants offer two arguments in response. First,
relying on facts in Officer Schroeder’s police report, which
Milbeck attached to his notice identifying the arresting
officers, they argue that the officers did not need a warrant
because upon a valid arrest outside a home, officers are
entitled to enter the home with the arrestee to gather the
arrestee’s personal belongings. See Washington v. Chrisman,
455 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1982). Second, the defendants claim the
individual officers are entitled to qualified immunity because
it is not clearly established that a temporary felony “want” is
insufficient to allow police to enter a suspect’s home.
Defendants have failed to preserve either argument for
this appeal because they did not present either to the district
court. See Bradley v. Village of University Park, 59 F.4th 887, 897–
98 (7th Cir. 2023) (appellees may waive arguments by not
raising them in the district court); Henry v. Hulett, 969 F.3d
769, 786–87 (7th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (defense of qualified
immunity not preserved for appeal when party failed to raise
it before the district court). Nor do the defendants advance
any defense they raised before the district court or defend the
district court’s reasoning. See Bowman v. Korte, 962 F.3d 995,
998 (7th Cir. 2020). Thus, they have provided no factual or
legal basis to convince us that Milbeck’s allegations—which
10 No. 25-1061

we must accept as true at this stage of the case—fail to state a
plausible claim. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
B. Monell Claims
For these reasons, we must also conclude that Milbeck has
plausibly alleged that Kenosha County and the Village of
Rothschild could be liable for failing to train officers on the
difference between a temporary felony “want” and a valid
warrant (claim 9).
Municipalities are not vicariously liable for the torts of
their employees or agents, but a plaintiff can establish
municipal liability under § 1983 when the “execution of a
government’s policy or custom” caused a violation of the
plaintiff’s rights. Monell v. Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658,
691–94 (1978). Such a claim has three elements: municipal
policy or custom, municipal fault, and causation. Bohanon v.
City of Indianapolis, 46 F.4th 669, 676 (7th Cir. 2022). In some
circumstances, a municipality’s failure “to train certain
employees about their legal duty to avoid violating citizens’
rights may rise to the level of an official government policy for
purposes of § 1983.” Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51, 61
(2011). A municipality may be held liable for such a failure to
train if the plaintiff shows that the municipality was
deliberately indifferent to his constitutional rights. Bohanon,
46 F.4th at 675 (citations omitted).
Establishing deliberate indifference ordinarily requires
the municipality to be on notice of constitutional violations,
but the Supreme Court has explained that the consequences
of failing to train employees “could be so patently obvious
that a city could be liable under § 1983 without proof of a pre-
existing pattern of violations.” Connick, 563 U.S. at 64;
No. 25-1061 11

see also J.K.J. v. Polk County, 960 F.3d 367, 380–85 (7th Cir.
2020) (en banc). A plaintiff must also show a causal link
between the policy or custom and the violation. Bohanon, 46
F.4th at 675–76 (citations omitted).
Milbeck has plausibly alleged Monell claims against both
the Village of Rothschild and Kenosha County for the
arresting officers’ allegedly unlawful entry into his home. He
contends that the Village and County each maintained what
amounts, for purposes of Monell, to a policy of failing to train
officers adequately on the constitutional limits of home entry,
including the components of a lawful warrant and the critical
constitutional difference between a judge-issued warrant and
a police-issued temporary felony “want.” The municipalities
might be at fault for such inadequate training when, as may
be the case here, it would have been obvious that it could lead
to violations of constitutional rights (namely unlawful entries
into suspects’ homes). See Connick, 563 U.S. at 64; City of
Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 (1989); J.K.J., 960 F.3d
at 380–85; Gibson v. City of Chicago, 910 F.2d 1510, 1521
(7th Cir. 1990). Milbeck has alleged that the inadequate
training caused the officers to violate his rights by unlawfully
entering his home to arrest him.
The record bolsters the plausibility of his allegations. After
local officers requested an arrest warrant, Detective George
wrote that she “placed” a warrant, and Officers Schroeder and
Loveless told Milbeck that they had a warrant for his arrest.
Yet Detective George was not empowered to issue a warrant
and, according to a representative of the Kenosha County
Sheriff’s Department, no warrant for Milbeck’s arrest existed.
What’s more, the temporary felony “warrant” states at the top
of the page: “This entry requires knowledge by law
12 No. 25-1061

enforcement that a felony was committed and who the person
was that committed the felony but no warrant has been issued
yet.” (Emphasis added.) Milbeck also attached a Wisconsin
Department of Justice training manual to his complaint. It
explains that, after a temporary felony “want” is issued: “The
entering agency must actively pursue obtaining a warrant
within 48 hours.” And as noted, other courts have observed
that law-enforcement officers in Wisconsin refer to temporary
felony “wants” as “temporary felony warrants.”
To be clear, we offer no opinion on the underlying merits
of Milbeck’s claims. Milbeck may not be able to show that the
officers unlawfully entered his home or that the
municipalities’ training was so inadequate that it constituted
deliberate indifference. But taking his factual allegations as
true, as we must, he must be given the opportunity to conduct
discovery and to offer evidence on these issues.
C. Remaining Claims
Milbeck also maintains that he was arrested without
probable cause, and he argues that the district court wrongly
dismissed his claims alleging unlawful arrest and malicious
prosecution. We agree with the district court that the officers
had probable cause to arrest Milbeck, which is an absolute
defense to any § 1983 claim against a police officer for
unlawful arrest, false imprisonment, and malicious
prosecution. See Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d 578, 587 (7th Cir.
2015); see also Taylor v. Hughes, 26 F.4th 419, 432 (7th Cir.
2022) (unlawful arrest). Milbeck’s apparent repeated attempts
to access Kendra’s accounts, to read private information, and
to change her passwords, coupled with his prior threats, were
sufficient for a reasonable officer to believe that Milbeck was
harassing and stalking his ex-wife.
No. 25-1061 13

Milbeck attacks the officers’ probable cause on the basis
that Kendra may have been untruthful. But that attack misses
the legal target. Detective George was entitled to rely on
Kendra’s assertions and the records she provided to support
those assertions, leaving for prosecutors and courts further
evaluation of Kendra’s credibility or the veracity of her
statements. See Garcia v. Posewitz, 79 F.4th 874, 880 (7th Cir.
2023). In turn, the arresting officers were entitled to rely on
Detective George’s knowledge, which was sufficient to
establish probable cause. See United States v. Howard, 883 F.3d
703, 707 (7th Cir. 2018).
Further, as the district court explained, the prosecutor
who filed charges against Milbeck is absolutely immune from
civil suit under § 1983 for initiating a prosecution and
presenting the state’s case. Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 125–
26 (1997); Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359, 361 (7th Cir. 2022).
Finally, Milbeck argues that if we find that he stated any
claims against the individual officers, we should revive his
claims alleging supervisory liability (claims 6 and 7) and
liability under §§ 1985 and 1986 (claim 8). To hold supervisors
liable under § 1983, the supervisors must be personally
involved in violating the plaintiff’s rights and deliberately
indifferent to those rights. Bostic v. Murray, 160 F.4th 831, 841–
42 (7th Cir. 2025). They cannot be held liable for their
subordinates’ conduct under a theory of vicarious liability. Id.
at 840–41. Milbeck has plausibly alleged that Chief Hunt was
personally involved in his arrest by erroneously verifying for
the arresting officers that a valid warrant had been issued.
Accepting Milbeck’s allegations as true, we must also assume
Chief Hunt had a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Any
reasonable supervisor would have recognized that no valid
14 No. 25-1061

warrant had been issued and would have directed the
arresting officers not to enter Milbeck’s home.
But Milbeck has failed to allege plausibly that Detective
George’s supervisors are liable for violating his rights.
Though he alleges they approved of the temporary felony
“want” Detective George issued, he has not alleged that they
knew she intended to treat the “want” as a substitute for a
valid warrant for an in-home arrest.
Finally, the district court did not err in dismissing
Milbeck’s claims under §§ 1985 and 1986. Milbeck has not
alleged any facts plausibly alleging a conspiracy to deprive
him of equal protection of the laws, as he must to establish
liability under § 1985. See Brokaw v. Mercer County, 235 F.3d
1000, 1024 (7th Cir. 2000). Absent a viable claim under § 1985,
his claim under § 1986 also fails. See Katz-Crank v. Haskett,
843 F.3d 641, 650 (7th Cir. 2016).

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We therefore AFFIRM the district court’s judgment
dismissing claims 3–6 and 8, VACATE the judgment as to
claims 1, 2, 7, and 9, and REMAND for proceedings consistent
with this opinion. We DENY Milbeck’s request that we order
assignment to a different judge on remand.