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March 30, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Maurice Holt v. Gary Boughton

Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-3346

• Judges: Kirsch

• Opinion

• Authorities (28)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (41.6K)

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Combined Opinion

                        by Kirsch

In the

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit

---

No. 24-3346
MAURICE J. HOLT,
Petitioner-Appellee,
v.

GARY BOUGHTON,
Respondent-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Western District of Wisconsin.
No. 21-cv-84-wmc — William M. Conley, Judge.

---

ARGUED NOVEMBER 12, 2025 — DECIDED MARCH 30, 2026

---

Before BRENNAN, Chief Judge, and ST. EVE and KIRSCH,
Circuit Judges.
KIRSCH, Circuit Judge. Three men entered an apartment
and took property at gunpoint. A jury found that Maurice
Holt was one of them and convicted him of armed robbery
and other crimes. After exhausting his state appeals, Holt
sought habeas relief in federal court. The district court
granted his petition, reasoning that Holt should have been
given the chance to present two photographs to the jury and
2 No. 24-3346

that his defense was undermined by his attorney’s poor per-
formance. Because the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasona-
bly applied Supreme Court precedent, we disagree on both
points and reverse.
I
A
Two friends shared an apartment in a town north of Mad-
ison, Wisconsin, called Plover. Bored on a Friday night, they
invited an acquaintance—Lyndell Dale—to join them. Dale
brought three others with him, including Raevonne Gosha.
The next evening, the roommates and Dale arranged to hang
out a second time. Dale, Archie Biddell, and a third man were
invited into the apartment, but this wasn’t a social call. The
three men displayed a gun, punched and kicked the room-
mates, threatened to kill them, and robbed them of electronics
and guitars.
The victims quickly identified two of the robbers—Dale
and Biddell—who were caught a few hours later and admit-
ted to participating in the robbery, telling police that Maurice
Holt, Gosha’s uncle, had been the third robber. Both victims
initially told police that the third robber had been Gosha, but
two days later they weren’t so sure—they said that the third
man hadn’t been at their apartment previously and that no
one said Gosha’s name during the robbery. One of the room-
mates described the third robber as Black, six feet tall, and
200-210 pounds.
Two days after the robbery, Holt sold guitars taken from
the apartment to a music store, giving his real name and ad-
dress as part of the transaction. Police later obtained and exe-
cuted a search warrant for Holt’s Wausau residence (where
No. 24-3346 3

Gosha was also living temporarily). Inside the house, officers
found more stolen property taken in the robbery. During a
police interview, Holt said that he bought the guitars from a
woman on the street, and that he lived on the east side of
Madison but had been staying in Wausau with his girlfriend.
Wausau is a 40-minute drive directly north of Plover. He de-
nied participating in the robbery and said that he had been in
Wausau all weekend.
B
The state charged Holt with armed robbery, battery, in-
timidation, false imprisonment, and theft. He pleaded not
guilty, and the case proceeded to trial. The prosecution cen-
tered on (1) Holt’s sale of the guitars and possession of other
stolen property; (2) Dale’s and Biddell’s pre-trial identifica-
tions of Holt as the third man; and (3) circumstantial evidence,
including one of the victim’s testimony that Holt looked like
the third assailant; that Holt had lied to police about how he
acquired the stolen property; that Holt generally matched the
physical description the victims gave of the third robber; and
trial testimony that both Holt and the third robber were from
the east side of Madison.
Both victims testified that they had been mistaken that
Gosha was with Biddell and Dale on the night of the robbery.
One of the victims testified that the third man wore a black
hoodie and was about six feet tall, described the robbers’ gun
as black and silver, and said that the third robber and Gosha
didn’t have the same build. The other victim recalled hearing
the third man say that he was from the east side of Madison.
The victims testified that the third man had not previously
been to their apartment. But neither could positively identify
Holt as one of the men who robbed them.
4 No. 24-3346

The state called the detective on the case, who testified
that, during an interview, Holt told the detective that he lived
on the east side of Madison. The detective also testified that
Dale’s Facebook page showed images of Dale, Biddell, and
Gosha together and that Dale referred to this trio as the “Ven-
detta Squad.” The detective said that a picture of Gosha and
Dale displaying firearms was taken close in time to the rob-
bery and that another image—from the night before the rob-
bery—showed Gosha, Dale, and the victims together, with
Gosha wearing a black jacket, possibly with a hood.
Dale and Biddell both pleaded guilty to participating in
the robbery. They testified at Holt’s trial and admitted their
role in the crime. Biddle acknowledged having previously
implicated Holt, but on the witness stand he testified that he
did not know Holt and that he had only said Holt was
involved to improve a plea deal. Dale alternated between
confirming that Holt had participated in the robbery and
denying that he was involved. Dale generally refused to
answer questions about that night—he would not provide
responsive answers, pleaded the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination, remained silent, and said that he
wasn’t going to talk.
Holt’s attorney moved to cross-examine Dale with pic-
tures found on Dale’s Facebook page (reproduced below—we
refer to these as the masked persons photographs). Defense
counsel explained that the masked persons photographs were
taken some five to seven hours before the robbery, and that—
while the pictures showed masked individuals—Dale could
testify that it was Gosha pictured holding a gun alongside
Dale. Holt’s attorney argued that the images tended to show
that Gosha—not Holt—was the third robber. The court
No. 24-3346 5

denied the motion, finding that the masked persons photo-
graphs were dark and hard to see, lacked probative value, and
were irrelevant.
6 No. 24-3346

The defense offered two primary theories: that Gosha was
the third robber and that Holt had an alibi. Holt’s girlfriend
testified that the day after the robbery, Gosha came to her
apartment (where Holt and Gosha were staying) carrying gar-
bage bags with things inside. Holt testified that he wasn’t in-
volved in the robbery and that he bought stolen items from
his nephew, Gosha. Contradicting his earlier statement to po-
lice that he’d been at his girlfriend’s house, Holt and two
friends testified that he had been with them the entire week-
end.
During deliberations, the jury asked for Holt’s height and
weight, but those facts were not in evidence. The jury con-
victed Holt on all counts. The state court sentenced him to 12
years’ imprisonment.
C
Holt filed a post-conviction motion seeking a new trial
based primarily on the state court’s exclusion of the masked
persons photographs and his attorney’s failure to present ev-
idence. The post-conviction court held an evidentiary hearing
on the motion, at which witnesses and Holt’s trial attorney
testified.
Holt’s friend, Britney Quade, testified that on the night of
the robbery, Holt had been asleep on a couch in her house.
Quade said that she had possibly been using methampheta-
mine, but also testified that it was Gosha in the masked per-
sons photographs, which were taken in her house, and that
Dale, Biddell, and Gosha left her apartment on the night in
question, returned later with electronics, and discussed the
crime.
No. 24-3346 7

Holt’s trial counsel also testified. He acknowledged the
defense’s two-pronged strategy (that Gosha was the third
man and that Holt had an alibi) and said that, while he in-
tended to call Quade as a trial witness, he unsuccessfully at-
tempted to serve her with a subpoena one day before trial.
Holt’s attorney also testified that he had no strategic rea-
son for not calling another witness—Michael Hays—who told
police that he had been with Gosha shortly after the robbery
in a vehicle later found to contain stolen goods. Hays said that
on the night in question he had been using methamphetamine
and ecstasy and hadn’t slept in three to four days. Hays also
told police that (1) Dale said that he and Gosha were going to
a party in Stevens Point (just north of Plover), (2) Gosha and
Dale picked up Hays early on the morning after the crime,
and (3) that Hays, Gosha, and Dale drove to an apartment to-
gether. Dale and Biddell were later arrested after a high-speed
chase involving the same vehicle.
Holt’s trial counsel acknowledged other non-strategic
choices, including: (1) failing to impeach one of the victims
using his prior statement that Gosha had been casing the
apartment the night before the robbery, (2) failing to intro-
duce evidence about Holt’s and Gosha’s heights and weights,
(3) failing to elicit testimony that Holt’s DNA wasn’t found at
the crime scene, and (4) failing to introduce a letter from Dale
to Gosha that may have referenced both Holt and the robbery.
The post-conviction court denied Holt’s motions, and the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed. The Wisconsin Su-
preme Court denied Holt’s petition for review, and so Holt
turned to federal court, filing the habeas petition at issue here.
The district court granted the writ, and Wisconsin appealed.
8 No. 24-3346

II
The path to habeas relief is difficult. A federal court may
disturb a state-court conviction only in narrow, defined cir-
cumstances. While we technically hear this appeal from the
district court de novo, our focus is on the decision of the last
state court to rule on the merits of Holt’s claims (here, that’s
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals). See Jewell v. Boughton, 90
F.4th 1199, 1202 (7th Cir. 2024). The Antiterrorism and Effec-
tive Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) requires us to give
substantial deference to that state-court adjudication. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d); Scott v. Hepp, 62 F.4th 343, 346 (7th Cir. 2023).
When a claim has been decided on the merits, AEDPA bars
federal habeas relief unless the state court’s ruling “resulted
in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasona-
ble application of, clearly established” Supreme Court prece-
dent or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unrea-
sonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence pre-
sented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1) &
(2). We defer to the state court’s factual findings, which we
presume to be correct unless the petitioner rebuts the pre-
sumption by clear and convincing evidence. Id. § 2254(e)(1).
But even if a petitioner prevails under AEDPA, he still must
show that any error “had a substantial and injurious effect or
influence” on the verdict. Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,
637 (1993) (citation modified); Brown v. Davenport, 596 U.S.
118, 135–38 (2022).
Holt’s arguments center on § 2254(d)(1). He argues that
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably applied the
United States Supreme Court’s precedents in two ways: first
by concluding that the trial court’s exclusion of the masked
persons photographs wasn’t a harmful violation of his
No. 24-3346 9

Confrontation Clause and due process rights, and second by
finding that his trial counsel’s performance was adequate un-
der Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). We consider
each of these arguments in turn.
A
Considering Holt’s first claim for relief, the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals held that “exclusion of the photographs did
not deny Holt his right to present a defense.” The Wisconsin
Court of Appeals assumed that the trial court erred in pre-
venting the introduction of the masked persons photographs
(which could have been relevant evidence), but held that any
error was harmless because “the probative value of the
[masked persons photographs] was substantially outweighed
by” the cumulative nature of the photographs, noting that a
detective had already testified that there were images of an
unmasked Gosha and Dale together, holding guns, close in
time to the robbery. Of Holt’s constitutional argument, the
court wrote that “we have explained that the trial court had a
valid basis to exclude the evidence, based in part on its cumu-
lative nature, and there could be no constitutional dimension
to an evidentiary argument that we reject on that ground.”
Because the state appellate court assumed that excluding
the photographs was error, Holt argues that it did not decide
his constitutional claim on the merits. That matters because a
merits ruling triggers the deferential standards of AEDPA. 28
U.S.C. § 2254 (d); see Wilson v. Neal, 108 F.4th 938, 947 (7th Cir.
2024) (noting that if “no state court has squarely addressed
the merits of a habeas claim,” our review is de novo). In this
case, Holt’s claim involves both state evidence law and the
federal Constitution. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals sepa-
rately decided both aspects of the claim. The court assumed
10 No. 24-3346

an error of state evidence law, because the masked persons
photographs were potentially relevant, contrary to the trial
court’s conclusion. But the court also found no constitutional
error. Holt adequately presented his constitutional claim, and
the court decided that the exclusion of the evidence “did not
deny Holt his right to present a defense” because the evidence
was cumulative, and so the trial court’s decision did not im-
plicate Holt’s constitutional rights. See Harrington v. Richter,
562 U.S. 86, 99 (2011) (“When a federal claim has been pre-
sented to a state court and the state court has denied relief, it
may be presumed that the state court adjudicated the claim
on the merits in the absence of any indication or state-law pro-
cedural principles to the contrary.”). Since the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals decided Holt’s constitutional claim on the
merits, the AEDPA standards apply to this claim.
Like Holt, the district court misread the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals’s opinion (the district court thought that the state
court had found constitutional error) and so considered
whether the state court applied the correct test for harmless
error. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967) (discuss-
ing the harmlessness standard for constitutional error in a
criminal case). But because the court didn’t find constitutional
error, the right question to ask is different. We need to decide
whether the state court’s rejection of Holt’s constitutional
claim was contrary to or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of clearly established federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court. See Scott, 62 F.4th at 346; 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (d)(1).
The Sixth Amendment, as incorporated through the
Fourteenth Amendment, guarantees the right of an accused
to confront the witnesses against him. Hemphill v. New York,
No. 24-3346 11

595 U.S. 140, 150 & n.3 (2022). The Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, Compulsory Process Clause of the Sixth
Amendment, and Fifth Amendment’s privilege against self-
incrimination protect a defendant’s right to testify in his
defense. Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 51–53 (1987). And
“whether rooted directly in the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment or in the Compulsory Process
Clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants a meaningful opportunity to present a
complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 324
(2006) (citation modified). These rights are not absolute,
however. Sarfraz v. Smith, 885 F.3d 1029, 1037 (7th Cir. 2018).
For instance, “state and federal rulemakers have broad
latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding
evidence from criminal trials,” Holmes, 547 U.S. at 324
(citation modified), meaning (among other things) that judges
may exclude repetitive evidence or that which is “only
marginally relevant,” id. at 326–27 (citation modified). See
also Hinkle v. Neal, 51 F.4th 234, 243–44 (7th Cir. 2022)
(exclusion of peripheral or cumulative evidence does not
violate the right to present a complete defense). That said,
“restrictions on a criminal defendant’s right to confront
adverse witnesses and present evidence may not be arbitrary
or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to
serve.” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 151 (1991) (citation
modified).
Like Federal Rule of Evidence 403, Wisconsin has a statute
permitting the exclusion of relevant evidence “if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by … considerations
of … needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Wis.
Stat. § 904.03. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals invoked that
rule in finding that the exclusion of the photographs didn’t
12 No. 24-3346

violate Holt’s constitutional rights. Adopting the trial court’s
reasoning, the Court of Appeals held that “there was little
added value in the jury learning whatever Dale might have
had to say about the low quality images of the two masked
persons,” such that “the probative value of the masked per-
sons evidence was substantially outweighed by the fact that a
detective testified at trial that the detective had viewed pho-
tographs of Dale and [Gosha] displaying what appear to be
firearms, including one photo taken ‘quite near in time to’ the
robbery, with [Gosha] possibly wearing a black hoodie.”
Holt argues that photographs cannot be cumulative of tes-
timony describing the images, and that the masked persons
photographs corroborated a contested fact (the identity of the
third robber). But while the masked persons photographs are
undoubtedly different than the detective’s testimony—and
included additional details, including a weapon that appears
similar to that described by the victims of the robbery—both
the testimony and photographs were probative of the same
fact: that Gosha and Dale had been together with weapons
close in time to the robbery. And that fact was uncontested.
The cases Holt cites don’t disagree or are distinguishable. See
Mosley v. Atchison, 689 F.3d 838, 849–50 (7th Cir. 2012) (ex-
cluded testimony was non-cumulative when it would have
been probative of a contested fact); Arizona v. Fulminante, 499
U.S. 279, 299 (1991) (confessions could have corroborated one
another on a contested issue and so were not cumulative).
Holt argues that the appellate court needed to give special
consideration (beyond the standard evidentiary balancing
test) to his right to present a complete defense. Yet the cases
he cites involved evidence that was central to the defense—
Olden v. Kentucky, 488 U.S. 227, 232–33 (1998); Rhodes v.
No. 24-3346 13

Dittmann, 903 F.3d 646, 656 (7th Cir. 2018); Harris v. Thompson,
698 F.3d 609, 629 (7th Cir. 2012)—and that’s not what we have
here. As the Wisconsin Court of Appeals recognized, the pho-
tographs may have had some relevance (we need not decide
that issue). Perhaps Dale would have testified that it was
Gosha and Dale in the images, and one of the masked men
appears to be holding a gun and wearing clothing consistent
with the victims’ description of the third robber. These facts,
if proven, might have made it more likely that Dale and
Gosha later committed the robbery together. But the images
weren’t clear and the detective had already testified about
Gosha and Dale appearing in a similar image taken around
the same time. As a result, we agree with the Wisconsin Court
of Appeals that the images were of only peripheral im-
portance, such that state evidence law didn’t need to give
way. See Sarfraz, 885 F.3d at 1038 (“Given the extensive evi-
dence [a defendant] was allowed to introduce, the incremen-
tal impact of the excluded evidence would have been slight.”).
And while the Wisconsin Court of Appeals didn’t cite or dis-
cuss federal law on the intersection of the complete defense
right and evidentiary rules, it didn’t need to. See Early v.
Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002). All that matters is that the reason-
ing and result of the state-court decision do not contradict fed-
eral law. See id.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals considered the probative
value of the masked persons photographs and concluded that
the images were cumulative of other evidence, such that their
exclusion did not violate the Constitution. Given the low pro-
bative value of this evidence and the detective’s prior testi-
mony, the exclusion of the photographs wasn’t arbitrary or
disproportionate. See Lucas, 500 U.S. at 151; Holmes, 547 U.S.
at 324; Horton v. Litscher, 427 F.3d 498, 506–08 (7th Cir. 2005)
14 No. 24-3346

(finding that exclusion of evidence as cumulative did not vio-
late constitutional rights). The court’s denial of Holt’s consti-
tutional claim was not contrary to or an unreasonable appli-
cation of federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1).
Failure to show error is fatal to Holt’s claim. See Scott, 62
F.4th at 346. Even if we found that exclusion of the photo-
graphs violated Holt’s complete defense right, however, he
would face a further hurdle: the need to show that the exclu-
sion resulted in prejudice, meaning that the trial court’s evi-
dentiary ruling had a “substantial and injurious effect or in-
fluence” on the verdict. Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (citation modi-
fied). To find prejudice, there must be “more than a reasona-
ble probability that the error was harmful,” because a state is
“not to be put to the arduous task of retrying a defendant
based on mere speculation.” Davis v. Ayala, 576 U.S. 257, 268
(2015) (citation modified). Habeas relief is only appropriate if
we have “grave doubt” about the outcome. Brown, 596 U.S. at
135–36.
Each court to have reviewed this case has acknowledged
that the evidence against Holt wasn’t overwhelming. But
given the murky photographs at issue, Dale’s general refusal
to answer questions on the stand, and the uncontested testi-
mony from a detective about Gosha’s contacts with Dale, we
do not have grave doubt about the outcome based on this ev-
identiary ruling. The addition of these images to Holt’s de-
fense would not have created a reasonable probability that the
jury would have gone the other way. Either because Holt can-
not show that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably
applied Supreme Court precedent or because any error
wasn’t prejudicial, Holt cannot secure habeas relief on this ba-
sis.
No. 24-3346 15

B
Holt’s other claim is for ineffective assistance of counsel.
To succeed, he must show (1) that his counsel’s performance
was deficient, and (2) that this deficient performance preju-
diced the defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). Deficient performance falls below an objective stand-
ard of reasonableness. See id. at 688. Prejudice means “a rea-
sonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional er-
rors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 189 (2011) (citation modi-
fied). A court considering a Strickland claim need not “address
both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an in-
sufficient showing on one.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals dealt with Holt’s ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel claim on the merits, which means
AEDPA standards apply. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d); Carter v.
Tegels, 135 F.4th 534, 541 (7th Cir. 2025). We confine ourselves
to this question: was the state court’s conclusion that Holt’s
defense was not prejudiced by his attorney’s deficient perfor-
mance contrary to or an unreasonable application of Strick-
land? 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d)(1). Even if the state court is wrong in
some way, that’s not enough: to secure habeas relief, the de-
cision must be “so lacking in justification that there was an
error well understood and comprehended in existing law be-
yond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter,
562 U.S. at 103.
Holt’s claim presents somewhat unusual circumstances.
During the post-conviction proceeding, his attorney admitted
to a series of non-strategic choices and mistakes. In general,
our review of an attorney’s performance is deferential. To
minimize “the distorting effects of hindsight” we take “a
16 No. 24-3346

strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the
wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689. But that approach applies only to strategic
choices, and the “consequences of inattention … are not enti-
tled to the presumption of reasonableness.” Mosley, 689 F.3d
at 848. Courts “may not indulge in post hoc rationalization for
counsel’s decisionmaking that contradicts the available evi-
dence of counsel’s actions,” but the overarching analysis is
objective—Strickland “calls for an inquiry into the objective
reasonableness of counsel’s performance, not counsel’s sub-
jective state of mind.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 109–10 (citation
modified). Inadvertent mistakes do not make relief automatic,
Yarborough v. Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003), and neither does a
trial attorney’s acknowledgement of errors, see Bryant v.
Brown, 873 F.3d 988, 998 (7th Cir. 2017).
In his state-court appeal, Holt argued that his counsel’s
performance was deficient in 13 different ways. The Wiscon-
sin Court of Appeals rejected those arguments either because
Holt failed to show deficient performance, prejudice, or both.
The district court found ineffective counsel based on five ar-
eas of prejudicial deficient performance, concluding that
Holt’s attorney failed to: (1) call Britney Quade, (2) call Mi-
chael Hays, (3) introduce evidence on the absence of DNA, (4)
introduce height and weight evidence, and (5) introduce a vic-
tim statement that Gosha had been casing the apartment the
night before the robbery. Before us, Holt argues that his coun-
sel fell short in the five ways the district court identified to-
gether with one addition: failure to introduce a letter from
Dale to Gosha. We consider each of these potential bases for
ineffective assistance in turn and then decide whether coun-
sel’s errors cumulatively add up to prejudice.
No. 24-3346 17

1
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that Holt failed to
show deficient performance related to Quade’s testimony
“because there was a clear, strong strategic benefit to not call-
ing Quade as a witness”—reasoning that she would have un-
dermined Holt’s alibi defense (Quade said Holt was at her
house the night of the robbery, but Holt and other witnesses
testified that he was elsewhere). Acknowledging that Quade’s
testimony could have been useful to implicate Gosha in the
robbery, the court nonetheless found that, given significant
impeachment problems (methamphetamine use and Quade’s
close relationship with Holt) and the damage her testimony
could have done to the alibi defense, it wasn’t objectively un-
reasonable for defense counsel not to call her.
We need not decide whether the state court was right that
the failure to call Quade wasn’t deficient performance, be-
cause Holt cannot show any related prejudice. See Westray v.
Brookhart, 36 F.4th 737, 749 (7th Cir. 2022). Because the state
court ruled only on deficient performance, we review the prej-
udice extending from this instance of deficient performance
de novo. Nissenbaum v. Jennings, 148 F.4th 548, 553 (7th Cir.
2025). And under that standard we have no trouble conclud-
ing that the failure to call Quade did not prejudice the de-
fense. As the state court explained, Quade would have testi-
fied that Holt was at her house on the night of the robbery, in
direct conflict both with Holt’s statement to police (that he
had been at his girlfriend’s residence on the night of the rob-
bery) and testimony at trial that he had been with other
friends. And Quade had significant credibility problems (her
drug use and close relationship with Holt) that the govern-
ment likely would have exposed on cross-examination. Holt
18 No. 24-3346

cannot show a reasonable probability of a different outcome,
and so there’s no prejudice related to the failure to call Quade.
2
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals assumed without decid-
ing that it was deficient performance that Holt’s attorney
failed to call Hays to testify. But the court further found that
any error was not prejudicial. The court explained that Hays’s
testimony “provided only indirect inferences” about the iden-
tity of the third robber, noted Hays’s credibility problems (his
drug use and lack of sleep), and found that his potential testi-
mony wasn’t necessarily at odds with the state’s case, because
prosecutors did not dispute that Gosha had closely associated
with Dale around the time of the robbery. The court con-
cluded that Hays’s testimony would not “have shed signifi-
cant additional light on facts that mattered.”
While this testimony might have had more importance
than the state court ascribed to it, reasonable minds could dif-
fer as to whether it would have mattered to the outcome.
Finding prejudice requires a “reasonable probability” that the
“result of the proceeding would have been different.” Cullen,
563 U.S. at 189 (citation modified). Noting Hays’s limited
credibility and the indirect nature of his testimony, the state
court reasonably applied Strickland in finding that counsel’s
failure to call Hays was not prejudicial.
3
Holt argues that his attorney was ineffective because he
did not present evidence that Holt’s DNA wasn’t found on a
piece of paper touched by the third robber. While defense
counsel referenced the absence of DNA evidence tying Holt
to the robbery in both his opening and closing statements,
No. 24-3346 19

neither side called a DNA expert to testify and no actual evi-
dence about DNA was presented to the jury.
The state court assumed that defense counsel’s failure to
introduce DNA evidence was deficient performance. But the
court found no related prejudice because “the evidence of
Holt’s primary involvement in the robbery would have been
consistent with him possibly leaving little deducible DNA at
the scene,” and the defense repeatedly invited the jury (with-
out objection) to observe that the prosecution was unable to
present DNA evidence linking Holt to the crime. Without de-
ciding whether counsel’s performance was deficient, we agree
with the state court’s analysis of prejudice. While there was
evidence that the third robber touched a piece of paper at the
scene of the crime, the addition of records or testimony show-
ing that Holt’s DNA was excluded from that object would not
have created a reasonable probability of a change in outcome.
Although the Wisconsin Court of Appeals didn’t consider this
point, Biddle’s and Dale’s DNA wasn’t found at the scene, ei-
ther, suggesting that the absence of Holt’s DNA was not sig-
nificant. While Holt argues and the district court held that the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals unreasonably interpreted the
facts, the state court adequately summarized the record and
wasn’t required to enunciate every detail about this evidence.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1). The bottom line is that the state
court reasonably concluded that the prosecution could have
easily explained the absence of a DNA link to Holt, such that
he cannot show prejudice on this basis.
4
Holt next argues that his counsel was ineffective because
he failed to present evidence that he and Gosha were different
in height and build. Had it been introduced, evidence could
20 No. 24-3346

have shown that Holt was 5’9” and around 200 pounds, while
his nephew was six feet and around the same weight. Holt
argues that this evidence was significant because the victims
testified that the third robber was about six feet tall. The state
court found that Holt could not show prejudice. The court
reasoned that the difference in height between Holt and his
nephew was not significant because “a reasonable juror
would understand that, at least in circumstances like this, per-
ceived heights are at best rough estimates.”
Holt and the district court make much of the fact that the
jury asked for Holt’s height and weight during deliberations.
But the fact that the jury was interested in how closely Holt
matched the victims’ descriptions of the third robber does not
mean that the narrow difference between the two men, if in-
troduced, would have created a reasonable probability of a
change in outcome. As the state court correctly noted, the
height difference between Holt and Gosha was so small that
it likely would not have mattered. The Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals reasonably applied Strickland in considering the height
and weight evidence.
5
During a police interview, one of the victims said that
Gosha and Dale had been casing the apartment on the night
before the robbery. Holt’s attorney failed to elicit that
statement or impeach the victim with it, and (at the post-
conviction hearing) said that his failure to do so was a mistake
and not a choice. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals found that
the statement would have been cumulative of other testimony
showing that the victims had initially identified Gosha as the
third assailant and (as a result) concluded that Holt could
No. 24-3346 21

show neither deficient performance nor prejudice based on
his counsel’s failure to elicit this additional evidence.
As a technical matter, we agree with the district court that
a statement that Gosha had been casing the apartment the
night before the robbery is not cumulative of statements that
Gosha was the third robber. But the Wisconsin Court of Ap-
peals’s analysis was not “so lacking in justification that there
was an error … beyond any possibility for fairminded disa-
greement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Even if we were to agree
with the district court that the failure to introduce this evi-
dence was deficient performance, we have no trouble con-
cluding that Holt cannot show related prejudice. Given that
the victims had initially identified Gosha as the third assailant
and retracted that identification, it was not unreasonable for
the Wisconsin Court of Appeals to conclude that an addi-
tional statement made to police that Gosha had been casing
the apartment would not have created a reasonable probabil-
ity of a different outcome.
6
Holt’s last basis for his Strickland claim is his counsel’s fail-
ure to question Dale about a letter from Dale to Gosha. The
letter was written in slang or code, but, according to Holt’s
attorney, it would have shown that Dale was coaching Gosha
to implicate Holt in the crime. Holt’s attorney said he in-
tended to impeach Dale with the letter and could not recall a
strategic reason for failing to do so.
We agree with the state court that Holt cannot show prej-
udice based on the failure to introduce this evidence. That
Holt’s attorney didn’t have a strategic reason for his failure
doesn’t mean that this mistake was automatically prejudicial.
22 No. 24-3346

Dale testified that Holt was not the third robber, and that he
had falsely told police that Holt was involved in the crime.
The letter could easily have implicated Holt—according to
Holt’s translated version, Dale wrote that Holt had a gun on
the night of the robbery. Because this evidence was inconclu-
sive and ambiguous, there’s no reasonable probability that,
but for counsel’s failure to introduce its contents, the outcome
would have been different. The state court did not unreason-
ably apply Strickland on this basis.
7
Thus far, we have considered whether Holt was preju-
diced by his counsel’s errors considered on an individual ba-
sis. But if the record shows multiple instances of deficient per-
formance, Strickland also mandates a cumulative assessment.
See Myers v. Neal, 975 F.3d 611, 623 (7th Cir. 2020). The Wis-
consin Court of Appeals conducted that analysis. While not-
ing that the state’s case wasn’t overwhelming, the court iden-
tified the significant evidence introduced against Holt includ-
ing: that he sold stolen property shortly after the robbery, ev-
idence that both Holt and the third robber were from the east
side of Madison, and Biddell’s and Dale’s pretrial identifica-
tions of Holt as the third assailant. The court also explained
the ways in which both Holt’s alibi defense and the argument
that it was Gosha, not Holt, who was the third robber, were
undermined by the prosecution’s case and by Holt’s pre-trial
statements. Considering the record as a whole, the state’s case
was not so weak that defense counsel’s errors—individually
or together—caused a substantial likelihood of a different re-
sult.
REVERSED