Boykin v. Catalent Pharma Solutions - Title VII Retaliation Claim Proceeds

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April 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Jawuan Crystal Boykin v. Catalent Pharma Solutions

District Court, S.D. Indiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 4:25-cv-00157

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (12)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (23.6K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
NEW ALBANY DIVISION

JAWUAN CRYSTAL BOYKIN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 4:25-cv-00157-TWP-KMB
)
CATALENT PHARMA SOLUTIONS, )
)
Defendant. )

ORDER ON PENDING MOTIONS
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Catalent Pharma Solutions' ("Catalent")
Motion to Dismiss filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 19) and pro se
Plaintiff Jawuan Crystal Boykin's ("Ms. Boykin") Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 33) and
Motion to Compel Responsive Pleading (Dkt. 37). Ms. Boykin initiated this lawsuit after she was
terminated from her position at Catalent, alleging harassment, retaliation, and negligence. For the
following reasons, Ms. Boykin's Motions are denied, Catalent's Motion to Dismiss is granted in
part and denied in part. Ms. Boykin's harassment and negligence claims are dismissed. Her
retaliation claim shall proceed, and Catalent has fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order in
which to file its answer to only the retaliation claim.
I. BACKGROUND
The following facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required when reviewing a
motion to dismiss, the Court accepts as true all factual allegations in the Complaint and draws all
inferences in favor of Ms. Boykin as the non-moving party. See Bielanski v. County of Kane, 550
F.3d 632, 633 (7th Cir. 2008).
Ms. Boykin was hired through a Job Center to work at Catalent (Dkt. 18 ¶ 14). One day,
an unnamed team lead at Catalent told another employee to "get [Ms. Boykin]," and the employee
proceeded to harass her. Id. ¶ 1. Another employee then spoke to Ms. Boykin "with a mouth full
of spit" to annoy her. Id. Ms. Boykin reported the harassment and asked to change departments,
but in response to the report, a team lead named Erin intimidated Ms. Boykin by referring to a non-
public incident at Ms. Boykin's daughter's school and a golf cart accident in Ms. Boykin's

neighborhood ¶¶ 3–5. Prior to these incidents, Ms. Boykin had complained to the school district
about racial discrimination against her daughter. Id. ¶ 3. Ms. Boykin reported Erin's alleged
intimidation to Catalent management. Ms. Boykin also notified the Job Center and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation ("FBI"). Id. ¶¶ 7–8.
Ms. Boykin did not attend work while the harassment was first being investigated. After a
week, she was notified that she should return to work, but she was not given the status or findings
of the harassment investigation. Id. ¶ 9. When Ms. Boykin returned to work, she was approached
by a Catalent manager and told that she was being terminated for attendance violations. The Job
Center would not state the reason for the termination but told Ms. Boykin that her termination was
not related to attendance. Id. ¶ 10. While the manager escorted Ms. Boykin off Catalent's property,

he laughed with another coworker and said that "Eric"—the superintendent of Boykin's daughter's
school district—was "cleaning house." Id. ¶¶ 12–13.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move to dismiss a complaint
that has failed to "state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). When
deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court accepts as true all factual allegations
in the complaint and draws all inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 633.
However, courts "are not obliged to accept as true legal conclusions or unsupported conclusions
of fact." Hickey v. O'Bannon, 287 F.3d 656, 658 (7th Cir. 2002).
The complaint must contain a "short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, the Supreme
Court explained that the complaint must allege facts that are "enough to raise a right to relief above
the speculative level." 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Although "detailed factual allegations" are not

required, mere "labels," "conclusions," or "formulaic recitation[s] of the elements of a cause of

action" are insufficient. Id.; see also Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 603 (7thCir.
2009) ("it is not enough to give a threadbare recitation of the elements of a claim without factual
support"). The allegations must "give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the
grounds upon which it rests." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Stated differently, the complaint must
include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Hecker v. Deere & Co., 556 F.3d 575, 580 (7th Cir. 2009) (citation modified). To be facially plausible, the complaint must
allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
III. DISCUSSION
The Court will first briefly address Ms. Boykin's Motion for Default Judgment and Motion
to Compel Responsive Pleading before discussing Catalent's Motion to Dismiss.
A. Ms. Boykin's Motions
In both her Motion for Default Judgment and Motion to Compel Responsive Pleading, Ms.
Boykins points out that her claims have survived screening and she contends the Defendant has
failed to plead or otherwise defend this action. This is not true. Ms. Boykin filed her Amended
Complaint on September 20, 2025 (Dkt. 18) and on October 1, 2025, Catalent timely filed a motion
to dismiss all claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) (Dkt. 19). Catalent is
not required to file a responsive pleading until and unless the Court denies the Motion to Dismiss.
Accordingly, the Motion for Default Judgment and Motion to Compel Responsive Pleadings are
denied. In December 2025, the Court denied a previous motion for default judgment for the same
reason (Dkt. 32 at 5). Ms. Boykins is remined that she should refrain from filing repetitive and
duplicative motions.
B. Catalent's Motion to Dismiss
Catalent moves to dismiss Ms. Boykin's Amended Complaint and her claims for

harassment, retaliation, and negligence. The Court will address each claim in turn.
First, Ms. Boykin alleges that she was harassed by her coworkers in violation of Title VII.
Specifically, a manager allegedly instructed a coworker to "get" Ms. Boykin, Erin (a team lead)
referred to Ms. Boykin's private complaints of racial discrimination to her daughter's school, and
another coworker spoke to Ms. Boykin with "a mouth full of spit" to be annoying (Dkt. 18 ¶¶ 1–
3). To state a claim under Title VII for harassment (i.e., hostile work environment), plaintiffs must
show: "(1) they were subject to unwelcome harassment; (2) the harassment was based on their
[protected characteristic]; (3) the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions
of employment and create a hostile or abusive working environment; and (4) there is a basis for
employer liability." Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hosps. Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 900 (7th Cir. 2018)

(citing Alamo v. Bliss, 864 F.3d 541, 549 (7th Cir. 2017)). Catalent argues that this claim must be
dismissed for several reasons. The Court addresses only one of those reasons, which is that Ms.
Boykin fails to allege that the alleged harassment was based on a characteristic protected by Title
VII (race, color, sex, national origin, religion). Ms. Boykin does not allege that she was harassed
on the basis of her sex, race, or any other characteristic. Because Ms. Boykin fails to draw any
connection between the alleged harassment and a protected characteristic, her Title VII harassment
claim is dismissed.
Second, Ms. Boykin alleges that her termination was retaliatory in violation of Title VII.
To allege a retaliation claim under Title VII, a plaintiff must show "that she engaged in statutorily
protected activity and was subjected to adverse employment action as a result of that activity."
Leuvano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 722 F.3d 1014, 1029 (7th Cir. 2013). Catalent argues that Ms.
Boykin fails to identify any protected activity or causal connection between the activity and an
adverse employment action (Dkt. 20 at 6–7). Ms. Boykin responds that her Amended Complaint

alleges that she was terminated because she complained of racial discrimination at her daughter's
school (Dkt. 21 at 2). Supporting this claim are Ms. Boykin's factual allegations that Erin
mentioned non-public knowledge about the incident at her daughter's school, that she was given
conflicting reasons for her termination, and that a Catalent manager told Ms. Boykin that "Eric
[the superintendent] was cleaning house." (Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 3–4, 12–13). At this stage, the Court must
accept Ms. Boykin's allegations as true. See Bielanski, 550 F.3d at 633. Moreover, pro se
complaints are construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers. See Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d 742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Ms. Boykin's
Amended Complaint alleges enough detail to "present a story that holds together." Bilek v. Fed.
Ins. Co., 8 F.4th 581, 586 (7th Cir. 2021). Accordingly, Ms. Boykin's Title VII retaliation claim

survives the pleadings stage and shall proceed. It remains to be seen whether this claim will
survive summary judgment, if this action is not settled before that stage.
Third, Ms. Boykin alleges that Catalent was negligent. To assert a claim for negligence
under Indiana law, a plaintiff must show: (1) a duty owed to the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) the
defendant's breach of the duty by failing to meet the appropriate standard of care; and (3) injury to
the plaintiff caused by the defendant's failure to perform its duty. See Iglesias v. Wells, 441 N.E.2d
1017, 1019 (Ind. App. Ct. 1982) (citing Miller v. Griesel, 308 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind. 1974)).
Catalent argues that it did not owe any duty to Ms. Boykin (so it did not breach any duty) and that
the Amended Complaint fails to allege any damages caused by a breach of any duty (Dkt. 20 at 7–
8). In response, Ms. Boykin argues that Catalent "had a duty to investigate and provide a safe work
environment after [she] reported retaliation," breached that duty by upholding her retaliatory
termination, and caused her to suffer lost wages (Dkt. 21 at 3). However, Ms. Boykin cites no
authority showing that Indiana common law imposes a general duty on employers to prevent all
workplace harassment and retaliation. Ms. Boykin's negligence claim is therefore dismissed.
To summarize, Ms. Boykin's Title VII harassment claim and her negligence claim are
dismissed. Her sole remaining Title VII retaliation claim shall proceed. Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(a)(4)(A), Catalent has fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file
its responsive pleading to the retaliation claim only.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Ms. Boykin's Motion for Default Judgment (Dkt. 33) and
Motion to Compel Responsive Pleading (Dkt. 37) are DENIED, and Catalent’s Motion to Dismiss
(Dkt. 19) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Ms. Boykin's harassment and negligence
claims are DISMISSED. Her Title VII retaliation claim only SHALL PROCEED.
This case will proceed in the following manner. Catalent has until May 5, 2026 to file its
responsive pleading to the retaliation claim, which has survived the motion to dismiss. Thereafter,
the Magistrate Judge will schedule and hold an initial conference with the parties. Ms. Boykin is
ORDERED not to file any further pleadings, motions, or other submissions until AFTER Catalent
has filed its responsive pleading and the parties have attended an initial conference with the
Magistrate Judge.
SO ORDERED.
Date: _ 4/20/2026 ange th oath
Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Judge
United States District Court
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

JAWUAN CRYSTAL BOYKIN
708 Buena Vista Ave
Aurora, IN 47001
jcrystalboykin@gmail.com

Claire Elise Bailey
Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP
cbailey@taftlaw.com

Melissa A. Macchia
TAFT STETTINIUS & HOLLISTER LLP (Indianapolis)
mmacchia@taftlaw.com