Reed v. Sandoval - Civil Rights Statute of Limitations Dismissal

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March 26, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Matthew Blake Reed v. Stephanie Sandoval, Joseph Regalado, and Carly Rey-Hayes

District Court, D. Colorado

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:24-cv-03564

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (30)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Judge Philip A. Brimmer

Civil Action No. 24-cv-03564-PAB-CYC

MATTHEW BLAKE REED,

Plaintiff,                                                           

v.

STEPHANIE SANDOVAL,

JOSEPH REGALADO, and

CARLY REY-HAYES,

Defendants.                                                          

                        ORDER                                        

This matter comes before the Court on the Recommendation of United States 

Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 69]. The recommendation addresses Defendants’ Motion
to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6)
[Docket No. 26]. Plaintiff filed an objection. Docket No. 70. Defendants filed a
response, Docket No. 72, and Plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 73. The Court has
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts are set forth in the magistrate judge’s recommendation, Docket No. 69
at 1-3, and the Court adopts them for purposes of ruling on the objection. To the extent
that plaintiff disputes how the magistrate judge construed certain facts, the Court
considers and resolves those arguments below.

On December 23, 2024, plaintiff filed this case. Docket No. 1. The operative
complaint is the Second Amended Complaint, which brings claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 against defendants. Docket No. 9 at 4-6. Plaintiff’s claims against defendant
Sandoval and defendant Regalado arise from them allegedly using excessive force
against him after plaintiff was involved in an altercation with another inmate. Id. at 4-5.

Plaintiff’s claim against defendant Rey-Hayes arises out of her alleged deliberate
indifference to his medical care after the incident. Id. at 5-6. Plaintiff states that he did
not receive medical care for eleven hours following the incident and instead was
confined in unsanitary conditions. Id. Plaintiff also states that Ms. Rey-Hayes failed to

provide him with appropriate medical tests and reports. Id. at 6.

On May 19, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss, arguing, among other
things, that plaintiff’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations. Docket No. 26.

On December 30, 2025, Magistrate Judge Cyrus Y. Chung issued a recommendation to
grant the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 69. On January 12, 2026, plaintiff filed a timely
objection. Docket No. 70. On January 26, 2026, defendants filed a response. Docket
No. 72. On February 10, 2026, plaintiff filed a reply. Docket No. 73.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

A. Objections to the Magistrate Judge Recommendation

The Court must “determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge’s disposition
that has been properly objected to.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3). An objection is “proper” if

it is both timely and specific. United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop. Known as 2121
E. 30th St., 73 F.3d 1057, 1059 (10th Cir. 1996) (“One Parcel”). A specific objection
“enables the district judge to focus attention on those issues – factual and legal – that
are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Id. In the absence of an objection, the district court may review a magistrate judge’s
recommendation under any standard it deems appropriate. See Summers v. Utah, 927
F.2d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) (“It
does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate’s
factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party
objects to those findings.”). The Court therefore reviews the non-objected to portions of
a recommendation to confirm there is “no clear error on the face of the record.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory Committee Notes. This standard of review is something less
than a “clearly erroneous” or “contrary to law” standard of review, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a),

which in turn is less than a de novo review. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). Because plaintiff is
proceeding pro se, the Court will construe his objections and pleadings liberally without
serving as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
B. Rule 12(b)(6)

To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, a complaint must allege enough factual matter that, taken as true, makes
the plaintiff’s “claim to relief . . . plausible on its face.” Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671
F.3d 1188, 1190 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The ‘plausibility’ standard requires that relief must plausibly follow from the
facts alleged, not that the facts themselves be plausible.” RE/MAX, LLC v. Quicken
Loans Inc., 295 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1168 (D. Colo. 2018) (citing Bryson v. Gonzales, [534

F.3d 1282, 1286](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/171023/bryson-v-gonzales/#1286) (10th Cir. 2008)). Generally, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the
statement need only ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds
upon which it rests.’” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (per curiam)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (alterations omitted). A court, however, does not
need to accept conclusory allegations. See, e.g., Hackford v. Babbit, 14 F.3d 1457,
1465 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[W]e are not bound by conclusory allegations, unwarranted
inferences, or legal conclusions.”).

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the
mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not shown—that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009) (quotations
and alterations omitted); see also Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1190 (“A plaintiff must nudge [his]
claims across the line from conceivable to plausible in order to survive a motion to

dismiss.” (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). If a complaint’s allegations are “so
general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then
plaintiff has not stated a plausible claim. Khalik, 671 F.3d at 1191 (quotations omitted).

Thus, even though modern rules of pleading are somewhat forgiving, “a complaint still
must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements
necessary to sustain a recovery under some viable legal theory.” Bryson, 534 F.3d at
1286 (alterations omitted).

“Typically, facts must be developed to support dismissing a case based on the
statute of limitations.” Herrera v. City of Espanola, 32 F.4th 980, 991 (10th Cir. 2022)
(citation omitted). “But ‘[a] statute of limitations defense may be appropriately resolved

on a Rule 12(b) motion when the dates given in the complaint make clear that the right
sued upon has been extinguished.’” Id. (quoting Sierra Club v. Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 816 F.3d 666, 671 (10th Cir. 2016)). “If from the complaint, ‘the dates on which the
pertinent acts occurred are not in dispute, [then] the date a statute of limitations accrues
is . . . a question of law’ suitable for resolution at the motion to dismiss stage.” Id. (quoting Edwards v. Int’l Union, United Plant Guard Workers of Am., 46 F.3d 1047,
1050 (10th Cir. 1995)).

III. ANALYSIS

The magistrate judge recommends granting the motion to dismiss on the grounds
that plaintiff’s claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Docket No. 69 at 1. The
magistrate judge finds that plaintiff’s causes of action accrued on November 25, 2022
and ran for two years, until November 25, 2024. Id. at 4-5. Thus, the complaint—which
was filed on December 23, 2024—was untimely. Id. at 5. The magistrate judge notes
that, while plaintiff did not explicitly raise an equitable tolling argument, his response
could be construed as raising such an argument.1 Id. Therefore, the magistrate judge

analyzes whether plaintiff’s claims should be equitably tolled, but ultimately determines
that equitable tolling is inappropriate. Id. at 5-8.

The Court construes plaintiff as making five objections. See Docket No. 70 at 1-
7.

A. Objection One

The recommendation finds that Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102 (g) sets a two-year
statute of limitations period for plaintiff’s § 1983 claims. Docket No. 69 at 4. The
recommendation determines that plaintiff’s claims accrued on November 25, 2022
because that was when “Sandoval authorized excessive force and failed to supervise
the plaintiff’s medical care, when Regalado shot the plaintiff, and when Rey-Heyes

provided inadequate medical care.” Id. at 4-5. Plaintiff does not object to the
recommendation’s finding that there is a two-year statute of limitations period, but does

1 Defendants argue that plaintiff’s objections based on tolling are not entitled to 

de novo review because they are brought for the first time in his objection. Docket No.
72 at 2. However, the magistrate judge construes plaintiff’s response to the motion to
dismiss as bringing tolling arguments. Docket No. 69 at 5-6. Thus, plaintiff is not
bringing tolling arguments for the first time in his objection.

object to the finding that his claims accrued on November 25, 2022. Docket No. 70 at
1-3. Specifically, plaintiff argues that he is “still discovering the full extent of the
neurological, neuropsychological, and mental health problems which were not
immediately known” and that he did not discover the “full extent of damage to him” until
months after the injuries had occurred. Id. at 2-3.

“Federal law governs when a § 1983 claim accrues.” Delaney v. Thompson, 812
F. App’x 779, 780 (10th Cir. 2020) (unpublished). Section 1983 claims accrue when

“facts that would support a cause of action are or should be apparent.” Fratus v.
DeLand, 49 F.3d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted). Here, plaintiff alleges that
defendant Sandoval ordered the excessive use of force while plaintiff was in a fistfight
with another inmate. Docket No. 9 at 4. During this incident, defendant Regalado shot
plaintiff multiple times with less lethal rounds. Id. at 5, Docket No. 9-1 at 20. The
incident report that plaintiff attaches to his complaint indicates that the fistfight and the
subsequent use of force occurred on November 25, 2022. See Docket No. 9-1 at 20.

Thus, the Court agrees with the recommendation that plaintiff knew or should have
known that the alleged use of excessive force occurred on November 25, 2022.

As for the deliberate indifference claim, such claims accrue when a plaintiff knew

or had reason to know that the defendant “acted with deliberate indifference to a known
risk to [plaintiff’s] medical needs, and that his or her deliberate indifference resulted in a
delay in treatment that caused [plaintiff] substantial harm.” Vasquez v. Davis, 882 F.3d
1270, 1276 (10th Cir. 2018) (citation omitted). Plaintiff alleges that, after being injured,
he was placed in an unsanitary observation cell for eleven hours before receiving
medical care. Docket No. 9 at 5-6. Plaintiff also alleges that, when he did receive care,
Ms. Rey-Hayes failed to provide him with necessary medical tests and reports. Id. at 6.

Plaintiff states that this failure caused him to experience multiple debilitating ailments.

Id. Under this set of facts, the Court agrees with the recommendation that plaintiff knew
or should have known that the eleven-hour delay in treatment on November 25, 2022
and the failure to conduct tests was a product of deliberate indifference, even if he did
not realize the full extent of the damages until a later date. Accordingly, the Court will
overrule plaintiff’s first objection.

B. Objection Two

Plaintiff objects that the recommendation improperly resolves factual disputes

against him on the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 70 at 3. However, plaintiff fails to
identify any factual disputes the magistrate judge resolved against him, nor are any
apparent to the Court. To the contrary, the Court finds that the recommendation
focuses on the sufficiency of plaintiff’s allegations and does not resolve any factual
disputes.

After stating objections related to equitable tolling, plaintiff argues that “factual
issues remain unresolved and that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is inappropriate.” Id.
at 7. But “the applicability of equitable tolling may be decided on a motion to dismiss
based on the allegations alone.” Williamson v. Wyo. Dep’t of Corr. Wyo. State
Penitentiary Warden, 2025 WL 209880, at *5 (10th Cir. Jan 16 2025) (unpublished)

(citation omitted). Accordingly, the Court will overrule plaintiff’s second objection.
C. Objection Three

Plaintiff objects to the recommendation’s finding that he is not under legal
disability. Docket No. 70 at 2. Plaintiff argues that he is suffering from a “legal
disability,” and is thus entitled to equitable tolling. Id. Specifically, plaintiff argues that,
due to the head injuries he received, he is “rendered ‘under disability’” and that he
“would be identified as such if he were under the competent care of non CDOC
providers and medical staff.” Id. The recommendation finds that plaintiff is not a
“person under other legal disability” as defined in Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81-101. Docket
No. 69 at 6.

In Colorado, the statute of limitations is tolled “when the person is a minor under
eighteen years of age, a mental incompetent, or a person under other legal disability.”

Mwangi v. Norman, No. 16–cv–00002–CMA–NYW, 2016 WL 7223270, at *7 (D. Colo.

Dec. 13, 2016), report and recommendation adopted, 2017 WL 11917464 (D. Colo. Jan.
4, 2017) (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-81 -
101(3). “The party alleging the disability bears the burden to prove that the condition
existed.” Robinson v. City, Cnty. of Denver, 16 F. App’x 862, 863 (10th Cir. 2001)
(unpublished) (citing Overheiser v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 814 P.2d 12, 13 (Colo. App.
1991)).

As the recommendation notes, plaintiff did not contend that he had a legal
disability in response to the motion to dismiss. Docket No. 69 at 6; see also Docket No.
39. “Issues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation are deemed waived.” Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th

Cir. 1996); see also Maurer v. Idaho Dep't of Corr., 799 F. App’x 612, 614 n.1 (10th Cir.
2020) (unpublished). Thus, plaintiff has waived this issue. Even if the Court were to
consider this objection, it would find that plaintiff has not met his burden to prove that he
has a legal disability. Plaintiff’s argument is that he would be identified as having a legal
disability if he were under the care of other providers. Such an unsupported assertion
does not plausibly establish that plaintiff has a legal disability. Accordingly, the Court
will overrule plaintiff’s third objection.

D. Objection Four

Plaintiff objects to the recommendation’s finding that there are not extraordinary
circumstances entitling him to equitable tolling. Docket No. 70 at 3-6. Specifically, the
recommendation finds that plaintiff has not argued that this case presents the sort of
extraordinary circumstances that warrant tolling, that defendants did not impede plaintiff
from filing this lawsuit, and that plaintiff has not diligently pursued his claim. Id. Plaintiff
argues that caselaw supports the assertion that his injuries, his lack of legal assistance,
his restricted law-library access, and his incarceration represent extraordinary

circumstances which justify equitable tolling. Id. at 3-4. Plaintiff further asserts that
defendants impeded his ability to file a lawsuit by denying him access to medical
records and grievance forms. Id. at 4-5. Finally, plaintiff argues that he diligently
pursued his claim. Id. Equitable tolling “suspend[s] a statute of limitations period when ‘flexibility is
required to accomplish the goals of justice.’” Morrison v. Goff, 91 P.3d 1050, 1053 (Colo. 2004) (quoting Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Hartman, 911 P.2d 1094, 1096 (Colo. 1996)). “Tolling is typically available when ‘defendants’ wrongful conduct
prevented’ timely filing or in other ‘extraordinary circumstances.’” Whitefield v. Exec.
Dir. of Colo. Dep’t of Corr., 2024 WL 4212320, at *2 (10th Cir. Sept. 17, 2024)

(unpublished) (quoting Dean Witter, 911 P.2d at 1096-97). “Critically, in either instance,
a plaintiff seeking to benefit from equitable tolling must ‘make[ ] good[ ]faith efforts to
pursue the claims when possible.’” Id. (quoting Dean Witter, 911 P.2d at 1097).

“[W]hether to grant equitable tolling is a discretionary matter for the district court.”

Chance v. Zinke, 898 F.3d 1025, 1034 (10th Cir. 2018). “[T]he plaintiff bears the burden
of establishing equitable tolling.” Geiger v. Chubb Indem. Ins. Co., No. 23-cv-01080-
PAB-KAS, 2024 WL 814539, at *6 (D. Colo. Feb. 27, 2024) (citing Garrett v. Arrowhead
Imp. Ass’n, 826 P.2d 850, 855 (Colo. 1992)).

Plaintiff argues that there are extraordinary circumstances present in his case
which warrant equitable tolling, including, among other things, the nature of his injuries.

Docket No. 70 at 3-5. However, as noted by the magistrate judge, plaintiff indicates in a
letter attached to his original complaint that he “signed [his] original petition2 in early
June 2024.” Docket No. 1-2 at 2; Docket No. 69 at 7-8. The fact that plaintiff had a

complaint drafted in June 2024, months before the November 25, 2024 deadline,
significantly undercuts the argument that extraordinary circumstances prevented plaintiff
from timely filing the complaint. In his letter, plaintiff notes that he sought help from
other inmates and family friends in modifying the complaint, asserting that the injuries
he sustained impeded his ability to properly prepare the complaint. Docket No. 1-2 at 2.

However, plaintiff’s asserted disability did not prevent him from completing a draft of the
complaint by June 2024, which plaintiff could have filed before the deadline. Thus,
neither his disability nor any other circumstance prevented plaintiff from timely filing this
lawsuit.3

2 The Court presumes that plaintiff uses the term “petition” in lieu of complaint. 
3 Plaintiff argues that his “restricted law-library access” justifies equitable tolling.  

Docket No. 70 at 3. “Denial of access to legal materials can provide a basis for
equitable tolling in some circumstances.” United States v. Oakes, 445 F. App’x 88, 94 (10th Cir. 2011) (unpublished) (citation omitted). However, as the magistrate judge
notes, plaintiff only claims that he had restricted access to the law library while
incarcerated at Colorado State Penitentiary (“CSP”). Docket No. 39 at 3; Docket No. 69
at 7. Yet plaintiff’s complaint states he was transferred to Sterling Correctional Facility
(“SCF”), and plaintiff does not allege he lacked access to the law library there. Docket
No. 9 at 6; Docket No. 69 at 7. In fact, in his objection, plaintiff indicates that he was
transferred to SCF only two weeks after the cause of action accrued, giving him
adequate access to a law library. Docket No. 70 at 5. Thus, the Court finds that
plaintiff’s restricted law library access at CSP does not warrant equitable tolling.
Next, plaintiff argues that defendants’ wrongful conduct warrants tolling of the
statute of limitations. Docket No. 70 at 4-5. Specifically, plaintiff argues that defendants
impeded his ability to timely file this suit by denying him access to medical records and
grievance forms. Id. The recommendation notes that, in the letter attached to plaintiff’s
original complaint, plaintiff “attempt[ed] to excuse the tardy filing by referring to recently-
received medical records.” Docket No. 69 at 8. The recommendation states that “it is
not necessary that a claimant know all of the evidence ultimately relied on for the cause

of action to accrue.” Id. (quoting Baker v. Bd. of Regents of State of Kan., 991 F.2d
628, 632 (10th Cir. 1993)). The Court agrees, and finds that plaintiff’s cause of action
accrued regardless of the fact he did not have possession of all relevant documents.

Plaintiff argues that he believed the law required him to have such records at the time
he submitted the complaint. Docket No. 70 at 5. But “[i]gnorance of law does not
excuse a late filing, even for a pro se prisoner.” Dunn v. Workman, 172 F. App’x 238,
241 (10th Cir. 2006) (unpublished) (citation omitted).

Because the Court has determined that there are no extraordinary circumstances

warranting equitable tolling and that defendants did not prevent plaintiff from timely filing
his complaint, it is unnecessary to determine whether plaintiff diligently pursued his

claims. The recommendation notes that plaintiff “offers no evidence of his diligence
other than a general statement that he did not act in bad faith. . . . That will not do.”

Docket No. 69 at 7. The Court agrees that plaintiff has failed to show diligence and has
otherwise failed to carry his burden to show he is entitled to equitable tolling.

Accordingly, the Court will overrule plaintiff’s fourth objection.

E. Objection Five

Finally, plaintiff appears to object to the magistrate judge’s failure to apply the
prison mailbox prison rule. Docket No. 70 at 6. Specifically, plaintiff notes that the
recommendation “places the burden on Plaintiff to establish [the mailbox rule’s]
application without affording him the opportunity to do so through discovery or
evidentiary submissions.” Id. Plaintiff, however, also states that he “admits and
concurs that the Mailbox Rule is moot for the initial and revised submission.” Id. The
recommendation states that, while there is an applicable prison mailbox rule, “it is the

plaintiff’s obligation to establish timely filing under the rule and the plaintiff provides
nothing indicating how it ought to apply here.” Docket No. 69 at 8.

“Under the prison mailbox rule, a court filing by a pro se prisoner is considered to
have been filed when the filing is given to prison officials for mailing, regardless of when
the court receives the documents.” United States v. Gonzalez-Arenas, No. 14-cv-
02824-REB, 2016 WL 10859436, at *2 n.2 (D. Colo. Apr. 22, 2016). Thus, the only
pertinent information regarding the prison mailbox rule is when plaintiff gave his
complaint to prison officials for mailing. Plaintiff does not explain why discovery on this
issue would be necessary when plaintiff presumably already has this information. See
Docket No. 70 at 6. Plaintiff does not state when he handed the complaint to prison

officials for filing, but does state that the “Mailbox Rule is moot.” Id. Thus, the Court
finds that plaintiff has not shown his filing was timely under the prison mailbox rule.

Accordingly, the Court will overrule plaintiff’s fifth objection.

F. Leave to Amend

Plaintiff argues that, due to his status as a pro se plaintiff, he should be granted
leave to amend to plead additional facts regarding equitable tolling. “Although the
Federal Rules permit and require liberal construction and amendment of pleadings, the
Rules do not grant the parties unlimited rights of amendment.” Whitington v. Steinbeck,
No. 07-cv-00663-LTB-KMT, 2010 WL 251561, at *1 (D. Colo. Jan. 21, 2010). Plaintiff
has already been given two opportunities to amend his complaint, and does not state
what additional facts he would allege to establish that he is entitled to equitable tolling.
Moreover, pursuant to the Local Rules, a “motion shall not be included in a
response or reply to the original motion. A motion shall be filed as a separate

document.” D.C.COLO.LCivR 7.1(d). The Local Rules also require a party seeking to
file an amended pleading to attach the proposed amended pleading. D.C.COLO.LCivR
15.1(b). Plaintiff did not do so. The Tenth Circuit recognizes “the importance of Fed. R.
Civ. P. 7(b) and ha[s] held that normally a court need not grant leave to amend when a
party fails to file a formal motion.” Calderon v. Kan. Dep’t of Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 181
F.3d 1180, 1186 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Barnett v. Hall, Estill, Hardwick, Gable,
Golden & Nelson, P.C., 956 F.3d 1228, 1236 (10th Cir. 2020) (“[C]ases are not to be
litigated piecemeal. The court should not have to address repeated ‘improvements’ to
the complaint.”); Johnson v. Spencer, 950 F.3d 680, 721 (10th Cir. 2020) (“A district
court may deny leave to amend when a plaintiff fails to file a written motion and instead

merely suggest[s] she should be allowed to amend if the court conclude[s] her
pleadings [a]re infirm.” (quotations omitted); Albers v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 771 F.3d
697, 706 (10th Cir. 2014) (affirming prejudicial dismissal and denial of request to amend
made in response to motion to dismiss without formal motion); Burnett v. Mortg. Elec.
Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1238 n.4 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Where a plaintiff
does not move for permission to amend the complaint, the district court commits no
error by not granting such leave.”). Accordingly, the Court will not grant leave to amend.
G. Non-Objected to Portions of the Recommendation
The Court has reviewed the rest of the recommendation to satisfy itself that there
are “no clear error[s] on the face of the record.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b), Advisory
Committee Notes. Based on this review, the Court has concluded that the
recommendation is a correct application of the facts and the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, it is
ORDERED that Plaintiff's Response to the Recommendation of the United States
Magistrate Judge [Docket No. 70] is OVERRULED. It is further
ORDERED that the Recommendation of United States Magistrate Judge [Docket
No. 69] is ACCEPTED. It is further
ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amended
Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(B)(6) is GRANTED. It is further
ORDERED that the claims against defendants are DISMISSED without
prejudice. It is further
ORDERED that this case is closed.
DATED March 26, 2026.
BY THE COURT:
<2 Le fo
PHILIP A. BRIMMER
United States District Judge

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