AOP v Secretary of State Home Department - Modern Slavery Act Reasonable Grounds Decision 2026

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AOP, R (On the Application Of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWHC 971 (Admin) (24 April 2026)
URL: https://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWHC/Admin/2026/971.html
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[2026] EWHC 971 (Admin) |
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| Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWHC 971 (Admin) |
| Case No: AC-2025-MAN-000452 |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
KING'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT

| Civil Justice Centre
1 Bridge Street West
Manchester M60 9DJ |
| 24/04/2026 |
B e f o r e :

KAREN RIDGE
SITTING AS A DEPUTY HIGH COURT JUDGE

Between:
| | THE KING
On the application of
AOP | Claimant |
| | - and - | |
| | SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | Defendant |

**Brenda Efurhievwe (instructed by Bhatia Best Solicitors) for the Claimant
Matthew Howarth (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Defendant

Hearing date: 5 March 2026**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

1. Deputy High Court Judge Karen Ridge:
3. Introduction
4. The Claimant applies to renew his application for permission to judicially review the Defendant's Reasonable Grounds decision (the Decision) under the Modern Slavery Act 2015.  The reasonable grounds decision was issued on 29 July 2025 and maintained on reconsideration by decision dated 6 August 2025.
6. The Claimant is an Indian national who, when in India, was promised employment by Peter Chimanga, the manager or director of a company known as 24/7 Flex Care Limited.  The Claimant was induced to pay £10,000 to this company which was explained as covering the Home Office fees, the Indian agency's fees and fees for 24/7 Flex Care.  He travelled to the UK in April 2023 on a work visa sponsored by 24/7 Flex Care and he attended a one-day training course and thereafter waited to be allocated employment.  He did not receive any request to work or offer of employment and after 12 months the Claimant was notified by the Defendant that his sponsorship visa had been cancelled.
8. Given that Mr Chimanga had not answered his calls, the Claimant then attended the Flex Care Offices to ask about employment. He was told that he needed to pay £15,000 to enable Mr Chimanga to find him another sponsor. When the Claimant said that he would have to get solicitors involved he was threatened by Mr Chimanga who said that he would report the Claimant to the immigration authorities and he would be deported.
10. In April 2024 the Claimant then contacted another person, Jaydip Bhai, who offered to help the Claimant with EU settled status. He required payment of a fee of £3000 to secure an 18-month work share code.  He was told he would have to pay another £15,000 to Mr Bhai to secure sponsorship for a skilled worker visa.  The Claimant paid £3000 but the new share code expired after 3 months and his attempts to contact Mr Bhai were to no avail.
12. The Claimant then contacted the Salvation Army who advised him to speak to the police, and he was subsequently referred to the National Referral Mechanism.  That referral led to the impugned decision which was maintained at reconsideration.  The Decision accepts that the Claimant met two of the three components of human trafficking in relation to the events involving 24/7 Flex Care but did not satisfy the third element relating to exploitation.
14. Procedural history
15. The claim was issued and permission was refused on the papers by HHJ Bird, sitting as a High Court Judge, on the basis that no arguable public law error had been shown. The Claimant seeks renewal on all 3 grounds: breach of the guidance, irrationality and unlawful fettering of the Defendant's discretion regarding the interpretation of the exploitation element of the trafficking definition.
17. The Legal Framework
18. The applicable law is not controversial.  The definition of trafficking originates from the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings.  Article 4(a) sets out the definition of trafficking and includes 3 specific elements. Trafficking involves the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons by means of the threat, or use, of force or other forms of coercion, of fraud, of deception or the abuse of power of a person in a position of vulnerability for the purpose of exploitation. The Convention defines exploitation as including " at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs."
20. Section 3 Modern Slavery Act 2015 provides the definition of exploitation:
22. " *Meaning of exploitation***
23. (1) For the purposes of section 2 a person is exploited only if one or more of the following subsections apply in relation to the person.
24. Slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour
25. (2) The person is the victim of behaviour—
26. > (a) which involves the commission of an offence under section 1, or
27. > (b) which would involve the commission of an offence under that section if it took place in England and Wales.
28. …
29. Securing services etc by force, threats or deception
30. (5) The person is subjected to force, threats or deception designed to induce him or her—
31. > (a) to provide services of any kind,
32. > (b) to provide another person with benefits of any kind, or
33. > (c) to enable another person to acquire benefits of any kind. (…)"
34. Relevant Guidance is within the Modern Slavery Guidance (Version 4.0) dated 16 July 2025 which states:
36. "2.4. Human trafficking consists of 3 basic components: action, means and purpose of exploitation.
37. 2.5. As noted in the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) guidelines on international protection:
38. 'An important aspect of this definition is an understanding of trafficking as a process comprising a number of interrelated actions rather than a single act at a given point in time. Once initial control is secured, victims are generally moved to a place where there is a market for their services, often where they lack language skills and other basic knowledge that would enable them to seek help. While these actions can all take place within one country's borders, they can also take place across borders with the recruitment taking place in one country and the act of receiving the victim and the exploitation taking place in another. Whether or not an international border is crossed, the intention to exploit the individual concerned underpins the entire process.'
40. 2.6. All three components must be present in an adult trafficking case. (…)
41. 2.25 The action limb of human trafficking set out above (recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring, receipt, transferring or exchanging control over) must be for the purpose of exploitation. Therefore, a person may be subject to forms of abuse and mistreatment on route that are not connected to the purpose of travel. While the person may therefore be a victim of a crime which should be appropriately reported and investigated by the authorities, this does not constitute human trafficking if it is incidental to the purpose of exploitation"
42. In essence there are 3 elements or components of trafficking which must be undertaken  by the trafficker: a relevant action which in this case involves recruitment or transfer or transportation; a relevant means which in this case involves fraud or deception; and finally the action by the means has to be for the purpose of exploitation.  It is the third element of exploitation that the Defendant found was not satisfied in the Claimant's case. The Defendant's decision concluded that there was no exploitation or forced labour and no intention to exploit the individual concerned.
44. Ground 1
45. This ground alleges that the Defendant breached her own Guidance by unlawfully disregarding actions which could constitute exploitation, more particularly financial exploitation. The Decision letter refers to paragraph 2.22 of the Guidance which provides examples of exploitation but is not an exhaustive list given that the word "may" is used:
47. "2.22. To be a victim, someone must have been trafficked for the purpose of 'exploitation' which may take the form of either:
48. • sexual exploitation
49. • forced labour or services
50. • slavery or practices similar to slavery
51. • servitude
52. • forced criminality
53. • removal of organs (also known as organ harvesting)"
54. The Guidance must be read as a whole and the structure and sub-headings of the chapter entitled "What is Modern Slavery" are instructive. The chapter begins with overarching definitions, including the reference to exploitation at paragraph 2.3, exploitation shall include at a minimum… " the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs ". The Guidance then sets out the 3 basic components and examples within the table in paragraph 2.5. At 2.8 the action component is defined and at 2.9 the means component is set out which includes deception at 2.14. Finally, exploitation is set out in detail in paragraph 2.22, with some examples. The list at 2.22 includes servitude, slavery and forced criminality, all of which would involve elements of financial exploitation.
56. At paragraph 23 the Guidance makes clear that trafficking is a process which comprises a number of interrelated actions rather than a single act at a given point in time. In this regard I endorse Mr Howarth's submission that the intention of the alleged trafficker has to form part of the decision-making process, since the Claimant does not need to show that he was exploited but that the prior deception was undertaken for the purpose of subsequent exploitation. I have noted the Claimant's argument that the exploitation involved the initial £10,000 fee and the subsequent demand for a further fee of £15,000. I shall deal with this later.
58. On the facts of this case, it was reasonable to conclude that the Claimant had been recruited by fraudulent means; namely the payment of £10,000 with a false promise of employment. That employment did not materialise. There is no evidence to suggest that once the Claimant had arrived in the UK, the intention of 24/7 Flex Care was to financially exploit him. That is apparent by virtue of the Claimant having been ignored for over 12 months.
60. Section 3(5)(b) and (c) of the Act requires the victim to have been deceived, amongst other things, into providing another person with benefits or to enable that other person to acquire benefits. In this case the £10,000 had been paid as part of the initial deception directly by the Claimant to the fraudster. The Claimant was not being induced to work for no pay or minimal pay or to engage in criminal activity. The decision maker's application of the Guidance to the facts in this case is consistent with the statutory definition of exploitation.
62. The request for more money in the sum of £15,000 was opportunistic and the threats to report the Claimant to immigration services arose after the Claimant had said that he would have to get solicitors involved. Mr Howarth reasonably characterises these as a separate attempt at financial extortion. This request and threats do not appear as part of a process and there is nothing to suggest that the original actions to encourage the Claimant to travel to the UK were undertaken with the intention of financially exploiting him once he arrived. Those threats were only made once the Claimant contacted the fraudulent sponsor and therefore it was reasonable to conclude that they are not evidence of a pre-formed intent to exploit at the time of the initial deception.
64. The reconsideration decision confirms that the assumption that the Claimant may have been exploited had any work been given to him did not meet the threshold for intention to exploit. The decision reasonably concludes that there was no evidence to indicate that there was any intent to force him to work. Indeed, the Decision maker found the contrary, that the Claimant had to chase the sponsor for employment. The Defendant's submission that this was a case of fraudulent enrichment rather than exploitation is logical. The scheme was one of advance fee fraud, designed to extract monies through false promises of employment which was not going to materialise.
66. The Decision specifically references the additional evidence supplied by Causeway in the form of a BBC news article. That piece of evidence was taken into account alongside the Claimant's account of events. It was not sufficient to evidence an intention to exploit in light of the other facts and circumstances.
68. The Claimant relies upon an email from the Defendant's Technical Specialist Team which post-dated the Decision and which was sent in response to an enquiry from the Claimant's legal advisors. That response is not inconsistent with the Guidance or with the Decision. It is not arguable that, in either the impugned Decision or the email of 15 August 2025, the Defendant unlawfully limited the meaning of exploitation.
70. The Decision applied the statutory definition and the Guidance when asking whether the Claimant had been exploited. It did not solely consider the question of forced labour but instead looked at the sequence of events in their entirety to ascertain whether there had been exploitation as described in the Act and the Guidance. The specific reference to there being nothing to indicate that there was any intention to force the Claimant to work was in direct response to the representations which had been made by Causeway in their request for reconsideration.
72. Paragraphs of the Modern Slavery Statutory Guidance that refer to "financial exploitation" must be read in context and consistently with the statutory definitions. The Guidance does not convert every fraud or extortion into trafficking where the statutory elements are absent. It is not arguable that the Defendant wrongly applied her own Guidance on the question of a finding in relation to this third element.
74. Ground 2
75. Ms Efurhievwe submits that this ground alleges that the decision was irrational in two senses. Firstly, that the Decision fell outside the range of reasonable responses open to the Defendant and secondly that the Decision contained serious logical and methodological errors. The test for irrationality requires Ms Efurhievwe to satisfy me that it is arguable that the Decision was one which no reasonable decision maker could have come to or that it was demonstrably flawed.
77. The decision applies the Guidance as a whole. Paragraph 2.5 was read in context with paragraph 2.22 and the rest of the Guidance. The application of the Guidance was consistent with the statutory definition of exploitation. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the decision maker approached the assessment leading to the decision on a rational basis. It is not arguable that the legislation or the Guidance were incorrectly applied. The three components of trafficking were separately considered; two components were found but the decision maker concluded that there was no intention to exploit on the facts.
79. The claim further alleges that the decision process contained serious logical and methodological errors. The Decision considered all of the facts put forward by the Claimant. The referral letter from the police contains a summary of the same facts together with the police officer's views as to those facts. Those views do not constitute findings regarding the application of the legislation and Guidance; that was the reason for the referral to an expert decision maker.
81. The claim does not arguably disclose any methodological failings. It was incumbent upon the decision maker to consider the facts as presented by the Claimant, not to discount all other possible forms of exploitation referred to in the Guidance. Neither is there anything to support the Claimant's contention that the Defendant was, or is, operating a "secret policy" beyond the contents of the Guidance.
83. The Claimant paid the initial monies on the basis of a false promise. Having travelled to the UK, he was ignored by the company and had to chase them hoping to be allocated some work. The threats made subsequently were opportunistic attempts at extortion when the Claimant chased the company and threatened to involve solicitors. Given the evidence, it was open to the decision-maker to conclude that the conduct amounted to fraud and a separate extortion attempt rather than trafficking for the purpose of exploitation. The Claimant has not identified a logical gap, omission, or perversity in the reasoning that would render the decision irrational. Permission for Ground 2 is refused.
85. Ground 3
86. This ground alleges that the Defendant unlawfully fettered her discretion by limiting her definition of exploitation. The definition of exploitation in section 3 contains a discretion as to this component of trafficking. It is not arguable that the Decision and the email of 15 August 2025 served to further restrict the definition in section 3. The claim in relation to trafficking was considered by reference to the definition in the Guidance and the examples in paragraph 2.22.
88. The further explanation provided by the email of 15 August 2025 in relation to financial exploitation did not restrict the Guidance but instead explains the reference to financial exploitation within the Guidance.
90. The second paragraph of the email as referenced by the Claimant does not restrict exploitation to criminal activities. I say this because the final sentence of the second paragraph refers to " control, coercion, deception or abuse of vulnerability for the purpose of criminal or financial gain in a way that aligns with the statutory definitions of trafficking ". The deception (in this case) could have been for financial gain as opposed to criminal gain. The explanation was given by specific reference to the circumstances in the Claimant's case. Moreover, as the final sentence makes clear, the application of the definitions involved had to "align with the statutory definition of trafficking and exploitation".
92. In short, for reasons given previously I am satisfied that the email was not inconsistent with the Guidance or statutory definition of exploitation. It was an email designed to assist with understanding the application of that Guidance to the particular circumstances of the Claimant.
94. The material relied on by the Claimant does not demonstrate that the Defendant applied a rigid or narrow approach to her own policy or failed to exercise discretion. The decision-maker assessed the Claimant's account against the statutory test and Guidance; that assessment does not amount to fettering.
96. The renewed application for permission is therefore refused. I would ask Counsel to draw up an appropriate Order to reflect this judgment and appropriate provisions in relation to costs.

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