JL v Secretary of State for the Home Department - Burden of Proof on Refugee Status Cessation

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JL v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2026] EWCA Civ 498 (24 April 2026)
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[2026] EWCA Civ 498 |
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| Neutral Citation Number: [2026] EWCA Civ 498 |
| Case No: CA-2023-002550 |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL, IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Upper Tribunal Judge Hanson
[2023] UKUT (IAC)

| Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
| 24 April 2026 |
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE ARNOLD
LADY JUSTICE ELISABETH LAING
and
LORD JUSTICE MILES

Between:
| | JL | Appellant |
| | - and - | |
| | SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT | Respondent |

**Shazia Khan (instructed by Parker Rhodes Hickmotts) for the Appellant
Jack Anderson (instructed by Government Legal Department) for the Respondent

Hearing date : 30 March 2026**

HTML VERSION OF APPROVED JUDGMENT ____________________

Crown Copyright ©

3. This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30am on 24 April 2026 by circulation to the parties or their representatives by e-mail and by release to the National Archives.
5. .............................
9. Lord Justice Arnold:
11. Introduction
12. This is an appeal against a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (Upper Tribunal Judge Hanson) promulgated on 24 October 2023 to dismiss appeals by the Appellant against decisions of the Secretary of State (i) to revoke the Appellant's refugee status and (ii) to refuse the Appellant's human rights claim against deportation following the Appellant's conviction of a criminal offence for which he was sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment. The appeal concerns the revocation decision. It raises this issue of law: where a person has previously been granted refugee status for one reason ("Reason 1"), which is no longer applicable, and that person relies upon a second reason in order to resist cessation (i.e. revocation) of their refugee status ("Reason 2"), who bears the burden of proof with respect to Reason 2?
14. It is worth recording that, when the Appellant's application for permission to appeal came before me on paper, I directed that, if the Secretary of State wished to oppose the grant of permission, she should file a statement under Practice Direction 52C paragraph 19. The Secretary of State did not do so. In the absence of any reasoned opposition from the Secretary of State, I concluded that the criteria for a second appeal were satisfied.
16. I should also explain that the determination of the appeal has regrettably been delayed by the fact that the hearing had to be postponed three times for adventitious reasons.
18. Neither party suggested that it made any difference whether the Appellant's claim is properly regarded as one for asylum in the strict sense or for international protection under principles stemming from Council Directive 2004/83/EC of 29 April 2004 on minimum for the qualification and status of third persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection and the content of the protection granted ("the Qualification Directive") which are now assimilated law. For convenience I will continue to use the language of asylum in this judgment.
20. A final preliminary point to note is that similar considerations may arise with respect to Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights ("ECHR"), which explains the references to Article 3 below; but the issue on this appeal concerns asylum.
22. Factual background
23. The Appellant is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo ("the DRC"). He was born on 5 October 1994. On 19 October 2010 he arrived in the UK as an unaccompanied minor. On 4 November 2010 he claimed asylum.
25. The Appellant's account of his circumstances was given in the course of an asylum screening interview on 4 November 2010, a witness statement dated 18 January 2011 and a substantive asylum interview on 27 January 2011. In summary, he claimed as follows. His father was a soldier, and a captain. In around Easter 2009 his mother took him and his siblings to visit her parents in Kasiki. His father stayed behind. On 17 April 2009 rebels attacked the village and set fire to his grandparents' house, killing his grandmother and his two brothers. His grandfather was shot dead. He believed that the rebels were Rwandan. The rebels detained him and his mother, and took them to their camp. The rebels treated him roughly, and made him carry artillery and ammunition. In February 2010 the rebels started to treat him and his mother better, and said that his father was receiving government money and would soon be joining them. He and his mother were released over a month later, and his father came to collect them and took them to Masisi. Two weeks later he and his mother were both admitted to hospital. His mother died. Soldiers came to the hospital to question him, but his father did not let them talk to him. His father was arrested on 30 June 2010 for "having military money" and being in contact with the rebels to gain his and his mother's release. On 16 October 2010 his father was released, and the Appellant saw his father coming towards their house in a black jeep with two other men. They then travelled together to Uganda in the jeep. On 18 October 2010 his father took him to the airport, and introduced him to a lady he was to call his mother. His father was stopped and was not allowed to travel further. The Appellant then flew with the lady to the UK. He entered the UK using a forged passport.
27. On 25 February 2011 the Secretary of State refused the Appellant's claim for asylum, but granted him discretionary leave to remain until 4 May 2012. In refusing the claim, the Secretary of State accepted that the Appellant was a national of the DRC and from the area of North Kivu. The Secretary of State considered that his claim that his father was a soldier in the DRC army with the rank of captain was unsubstantiated. The Secretary of State accepted there had been an attack by the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda ("FDLR") on his grandparents' village on 17 April 2009. The Secretary of State did not accept that the Appellant was in the village at the time, nor that members of his family died, nor that he was subsequently held in an FDLR camp for 11 months. The Secretary of State considered that the claim that his father had been arrested was unsubstantiated.
29. In response to the Appellant's claim that he would be at risk on return to the DRC because he had been in the rebels' camp and the Government might consider that he was a rebel, the Secretary of State did not accept that there was objective evidence to support his claim that former rebel soldiers were arrested. Having referred to a number of sources of evidence, the Secretary of State's decision said:
31. "… The above objective information states that the Government's policy with regards to former Congolese combatants is to reintegrate them. Furthermore, the Government is offering financial support. Furthermore, even if your claim that you were taken by the rebels and that your father had been subsequently arrested and released were accepted (which it is not) it is noted that the authorities did not arrest you either at the hospital or later when your father returned after his release. Consequently, it is considered that you do not have any profile with the authorities in DRC or that you would be of any interest to them if you were to return. It is therefore considered that you would not be at any risk from the authorities on return to Democratic Republic of Congo."
32. Under the heading "humanitarian protection", the decision stated:
34. "… For the reasons set out above, it is considered that you have not demonstrated a real risk of torture or of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment on return to DRC.
35. Consideration has also been given to the general country situation in DRC and specifically North Kivu where you lived prior to leaving …
36. [Objective information shows that there has been fighting in eastern DRC.] However, this situation is geographically limited and the general security situation is considerably more stable throughout other areas of DRC, particularly Kinshasa. Therefore it is considered that you would not face a breach of Article 3 of the ECHR if you were to return to the Kinshasa area. It is noted that you have previously resided there and you continue to have family there. It is therefore considered that with the support of your family you could return to this area."
37. On 24 March 2011 the Appellant lodged an appeal against this decision. In a witness statement dated 15 April 2011 made in support of his appeal, a copy of which was not included in our bundles but which is referred to in the Secretary of State's decision letter of 14 May 2012 mentioned below, the Appellant gave further details of his claim, including a claim that he was raped by members of the FDLR while in captivity. He said that he had not mentioned this previously because he was ashamed.
39. On 1 June 2011 the Secretary of State agreed to withdraw the decision to refuse asylum and to reconsider the case. On 1 May 2012 the Appellant applied for further leave to remain. During this period attempts were made to locate the Appellant's father in the DRC via the Red Cross, but these were unsuccessful.
41. On 14 May 2012 the Secretary of State granted the Appellant refugee status with leave to remain until 14 May 2017. In the decision the Secretary of State reconsidered aspects of the Appellant's claim which had previously not been accepted. The Secretary of State now accepted the Appellant's claim to have been captured by the FDLR, and that his father was a member of the DRC army and had been arrested and released following a corruption/embezzlement investigation. This was not the reason for the grant of refugee status, however.
43. The Secretary of State accepted that the Appellant had lost contact with his father and that he would be returning to the DRC as a lone child. The Secretary of State considered that, given the Appellant's profile, he would be especially vulnerable to abuse if returned. Accordingly, the Secretary of State decided to grant the Appellant refugee status for the following reasons:
45. "Having taken into account the prevailing conditions for unaccompanied children in the DRC and the applicant's own profile it is considered that there is a reasonable likelihood that if returned to the DRC he would be at real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. As his vulnerability to such treatment arises from his age and lack of support it is considered that he falls into a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC (see LQ Afghanistan). Therefore it is considered that the applicant qualifies for a grant of Asylum."
46. Since September 2013 the Appellant has been in a relationship with MLW. They now have two children. In October 2015 he got a job with Sheffield City Council.
48. On 13 April 2017 the Appellant applied for settlement in the UK.
50. On 15 February 2018 the Appellant was convicted of inflicting grievous bodily harm. On 11 April 2018 the Appellant was sentenced to 23½ months' imprisonment.
52. On 30 April 2018 the Secretary of State served notice of a decision to deport the Appellant. On 10 and 30 May 2018 the Appellant made representations as to why he should not be deported to the DRC, including a claim for asylum. On 20 July 2018 the Appellant made a further witness statement in support of his claims in which he said that he continued to believe that he would be at risk of serious harm if returned to the DRC because the DRC government had accused his family of helping rebel groups.
54. On 26 July 2018 the Court of Appeal reduced the Appellant's sentence to 15 months.
56. On 15 October 2018 the Secretary of State notified the Appellant of an intention to cease (revoke) his refugee status. The Secretary of State noted that the Appellant had been granted asylum because he "fell into a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC". The notification letter then said:
58. "… You were 16 when you entered the United Kingdom and you are now 24 years of age. In view of your age when you arrived in the UK it is considered that you will be familiar with the language and culture of your country of origin. Since your arrival in the UK you have obtained the skills to enable you to gain employment from Sheffield City Council and it is therefore considered that you will be able to find employment on return to the DRC. It is considered that you no longer remain especially vulnerable to abuse as was the case when you were recognised as a member of a particular social group namely street children in the DRC."
59. The notification letter went on to consider the situation in the DRC. The Secretary of State accepted that the FDLR remained active in North Kivu province and that ethnic rivalries continued to result in violence. However, it was not considered that the level of violence was such as to meet the threshold for a breach of Article 3 ECHR or that all civilians were at real risk of harm solely due to presence in the province. Thus it was considered that the Appellant could return to North Kivu without facing a real risk of harm due to the conflict in the area. Furthermore, as an adult male who spoke both French and English and had a level of education that would enable him to find employment in the DRC, he could relocate within the DRC should he not wish to return to North Kivu.
61. The notification letter went on:
63. "In your statement dated 20 February [sic – this should be July] 2018 you declare that you still fear the authorities of the DRC as your family was accused of helping rebel groups. However, as noted above you were granted refugee status as a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC. It is also noted that you have provided no account of persecution from the DRC authorities and that you were able to leave the DRC unhindered. There is currently no evidence that you are personally of adverse interest to the DRC authorities or face a real risk of harm from them."
64. On 24 October 2018 the Appellant responded to the Secretary of State's notification of intention to cease refugee status. He maintained that the DRC authorities would still perceive him to be a rebel and that he would be at risk of serious harm from state security forces if returned. He also made representations based on Article 8 ECHR, with particular reference to his relationship with MLW and their first (and at that time only) child.
66. On 15 November 2018 the Secretary of State notified the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") of the intention to cease the Appellant's refugee status. On 24 January 2019 UNHCR responded. The UNHCR did not consider that the circumstances were such as to warrant the application of the cessation clauses (as to which, see below).
68. By letter dated 29 January 2019 the Secretary of State revoked the Appellant's refugee status pursuant to paragraph 339A(v) of the Immigration Rules. The letter again noted that the Appellant had been granted asylum "due to your membership of a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC". Having referred to objective evidence of the changed political situation in the DRC, the letter went on:
70. "… the conclusion is the same as that reached within the letter of 15 October 2018 that in the intervening years since your grant of refugee status, the security landscape of the of the DRC had improved fundamentally and durably. Therefore, your circumstances upon return to the DRC in respect of your protection concerns would not be such as to place you in need of humanitarian protection or engage your rights under the 1951 Refugee Convention or Articles 2 and 3 of the ECHR."
71. On 29 February 2019 the Appellant made further representations to the Home Office.
73. By letter dated 1 May 2020 the Respondent refused the Appellant's Article 8 claim.
75. The Appellant appealed against the decisions to revoke his refugee status and to refuse his Article 8 claim to the First-Tier Tribunal ("the FTT"). The Appellant's appeal was heard by the FTT (Tribunal Judge Hillis) on 31 May 2022. The FTT's decision refers to a witness statement made by the Appellant on 16 June 2021, but we have not seen that statement. The FTT also heard oral evidence from the Appellant and MLW, but it appears from the FTT's summary that this was directed to the Appellant's Article 8 claim.
77. In a decision promulgated on 8 July 2022 the FTT allowed the Appellant's appeal against both the decision to revoke the Appellant's refugee status and the decision to refuse the Appellant's Article 8 claim. The FTT understood that the Appellant's claim for asylum was based on a claim that he had fled the DRC at the age of six as his father and family were accused of being supporters of rebels in the DRC. The FTT noted that the Appellant's account was that he and his father had been detained as rebel supporters and that he had been granted refugee status, and therefore concluded that he had had a political profile in the DRC when he fled in 2010. The FTT further considered that the Appellant remained at risk of persecution and/or ill-treatment on return.
79. The FTT granted the Secretary of State permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal ("the UT"). The appeal was heard on 16 December 2022. In a decision promulgated on 24 February 2023 the UT concluded that the FTT's decision was vitiated by errors of law. In summary:
81. i) the FTT had proceeded on the basis of a mistaken understanding as to the basis on which the Appellant had been granted refugee status; and
82. ii) the FTT had failed to consider the Article 8 claim on the basis of the structured assessment required under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
83. The UT set aside the FTT's decision. The UT preserved the FTT's finding that Article 8 was engaged on the basis of family life, and the Appellant's criminal and immigration history. The UT made directions for it to re-determine the appeal. The re-determination was delayed to await the promulgation of new country guidance in PO (DRC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department (DRC - Post 2018 elections CG) [2023] UKUT 117 (IAC).
85. The decision under appeal
86. Following a hearing on 4 September 2023, the UT dismissed the Appellant's appeal in a decision promulgated on 24 October 2023.
88. Having quoted the head note to PO, the UT said at [28]:
90. "The key issue which arises from the examination of country evidence in PO is that a person needs to demonstrate an actual or perceived political opinion contrary to the current President and/or to have a profile of significant and active opposition to that person before they can establish a real risk on return. That is not the position of the appellant on the facts of this appeal."
91. The UT went on:
93. "29. As found in PO, risk that an individual is exposed to will continue to depend upon the person's political affiliations, profile, actions and attitude towards the government, taking into account as the Upper Tribunal has previously observed at [51 (iii)] in AB and DM Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2005] UKAIT 118 that risk 'fluctuates in accordance with the political situation'.
94. 30. The appellant is from North Kivu but will be returned to Kinshasa, the capital, which has not been identified as an area where there is any ongoing risk or to which it would be unreasonable to expect the appellant to relocate, to if needed. He has not provided adequate evidence to establish this fact, or to show he could not return to his home area.
95. 31. My primary finding is that there has been a durable change within the DRC following the elections held on 30 December 2018 and that although some may continue to be at risk on return that is dependent upon their profile which is a fact sensitive assessment. I do not find it made out that the appellant, even taking at its highest what it claims occurred to him in the DRC as a child, is of interest to anybody within his home state and in particular has failed to establish he will face a real risk on return of persecution for a Convention reason or ill-treatment sufficient to engage an entitlement to international protection on any other basis. I find the reason the appellant was granted status initially was as a result of his being an unaccompanied minor not on the basis of an adverse political opinion. I find that the Secretary of State has established material change in the DRC of a sustainable nature such that the cessation decision is in accordance with the law and the facts of this appeal and is sustainable.
96. 32. I do not find the appellant has established an entitlement to be recognised as a refugee at the date of this appeal or to be entitled to a grant of Humanitarian protection or leave pursuant to Article 2 or 3 ECHR if returned to his home area on the basis of his previous activities and current presentation in relation to political issues."
97. The UT proceeded to reject the Appellant's Article 8 claim.
99. Grounds of appeal
100. The Appellant appeals on two grounds. Ground 1 is that the UT erred in law in its approach to cessation by wrongly placing the burden of proof on the Appellant. Ground 2 is that the UT erred in law in finding that the Secretary of State had shown a relevant durable change in the DRC, because the election in 2018 was not relevant to the Appellant's claim.
104. Legal framework
105. The Refugee Convention
106. Article 1 of the Convention on the Status of Refugees adopted in Geneva on 28 July 1951 ("the Refugee Convention"), as amended by the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees of 31 January 1967, provides, so far as relevant:
108. " Definition of the term 'refugee'
109. A. For the purposes of the present Convention, the term 'refugee' shall apply to any person who:
110. …
111. (2) Owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.
112. …
113. C. This Convention shall cease to apply to any person falling under the terms of section A if:
114. …
115. (5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his nationality; …"
116. Article 33(1) of the Refugee Convention provides:
118. " Prohibition of expulsion or return ('refoulement')
119. No Contracting State shall expel or return ('refouler') a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion."
120. UNHCR Guidelines
121. Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee Status under Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (the "Ceased Circumstances" Clauses) were issued by UNHCR on 10 February 2003. The Guidelines state, among other things:
123. "A. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
124. …
125. 6. When interpreting the cessation clauses, it is important to bear in mind the broad durable solutions context of refugee protection informing the object and purpose of these clauses. … Accordingly, cessation practices should be developed in a manner consistent with the goal of durable solutions. Cessation should not therefore result in persons residing in a host State with an uncertain status … conditions within the country of original must have changed in a profound and enduring manner before cessation can be applied.
126. 7. Cessation under Article 1C(5) and 1C(6) does not require the consent of or a voluntary act by the refugee. Cessation of refugee status terminates rights that accompany that status. It may bring about the return of the person to the country of origin and may thus break ties to family, social networks and employment in the community in which the refugee has become established. As a result, a premature or insufficiently grounded application of the ceased circumstances clauses can have serious consequences. It is therefore appropriate to interpret the clauses strictly and to ensure that procedures for determining general cessation are fair, clear, and transparent.
127. B. ASSESSMENT OF CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE COUNTRY OF ORIGIN
128. …
129. Restoration of protection
130. 15. In determining whether circumstances have changed so as to justify cessation under Article 1C(5) or (6), another crucial question is whether the refugee can effectively re-avail him- or herself of the protection of his or her own country. Such protection must therefore be effective and available. It requires more than mere physical security or safety. It needs to include the existence of a functioning government and basic administrative structures, as evidenced for instance through a functioning system of law and justice, as well as the existence of adequate infrastructure to enable residents to exercise their rights, including their right to a basic livelihood.
131. …
132. D. INDIVIDUAL CESSATION
133. 18. A strict interpretation of Article 1C(5) and (6) would allow their application on an individual basis. … Yet Article 1C(5) and (6) have rarely been invoked in individual cases. States have not generally undertaken periodic reviews of individual cases on the basis of fundamental changes in the country of origin. These practices acknowledge that a refugee's sense of stability should be preserved as much as possible. They are also consistent with Article 34 of the 1951 Convention, which urges States 'as far as possible [to] facilitate the assimilation and naturalization of refugees'. Where the cessation clauses are applied on an individual basis, it should not be done for the purposes of a re-hearing de novo.
134. E. EXCEPTIONS TO CESSATION
135. Continued international protection needs
136. 19. Even when circumstances have generally changed to such an extent that refugee status would no longer be necessary, there may always be the specific circumstances of individual cases that may warrant continued international protection. It has therefore been a general principle that all refugees affected by general cessation must have the possibility, upon request, to have such application in their cases reconsidered on international protection grounds relevant to their individual case."
137. The Immigration Rules
138. Paragraph 339A of the Immigration Rules, which gives effect to Article 1C(5) and (6) of the Refugee Convention, provides, so far as relevant:
140. " Refugee Convention ceases to apply (cessation)
141. This paragraph applies when the Secretary of State is satisfied that one or more of the following applies:
142. …
143. (v) they can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with which they have been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist, continue to refuse to avail themselves of the protection of the country of nationality;
144. …
145. In considering (v) …, the Secretary of State shall have regard to whether the change of circumstances is of such a significant and non-temporary nature that the refugee's fear of persecution can no longer be regarded as well-founded."
146. Ground 1
147. It is common ground that, where a person has been granted refugee status by the UK on a particular ground, the burden lies on the Secretary of State to show that "the circumstances in connection with which [the person] has been recognised as a refugee have ceased to exist" so that Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention applies. As noted above, this is reflected in paragraph 339A(v) of the Immigration Rules.
149. In this case the Appellant was granted refugee status on the ground that, having regard to the prevailing conditions for unaccompanied children in the DRC and the Appellant's own profile, there was a reasonable likelihood that, if returned to the DRC, he would be at real risk of ill-treatment since he would fall into a particular social group, namely street children in the DRC. There is no dispute that this reason for granting refugee status (Reason 1) no longer applies to the Appellant. The Appellant contends, however, that his refugee status should not be revoked because he would be at risk of ill-treatment if returned to the DRC because he would be perceived as being connected with Rwandan rebels (even though, on his account, he was forcibly recruited) (Reason 2).
151. This contention gives rise to the issue of law identified in paragraph 1 above. The Appellant contends that the answer to the question of law is that the burden rests with the State throughout the cessation process, and therefore the burden of proof with respect to Reason 2 lies on the Secretary of State. The Appellant further submits that it can be seen from the UT's decision, in particular at [30] and [32], that the UT erroneously placed the burden of proof on the Appellant.
153. The Secretary of State contends that the answer to the question of law is that, once it is accepted that Reason 1 no longer applies, the burden of proof with respect to Reason 2 lies upon the person claiming refugee status, here the Appellant. The Secretary of State also argues that the UT's decision did not turn upon the allocation of the burden of proof.
155. It is common ground that none of the existing authorities supplies a clear answer to the question of law that I have identified. A number of authorities were cited which bear on the question. I shall consider these in chronological order.
157. In R (Hoxha) v Special Adjudicator [2005] UKHL 19, [2005] 1 WLR 1063 the applicants were ethnic Albanians from Kosovo who came to the UK after suffering persecution at the hands of the Serb army and police. Their applications for asylum were refused after the Serb forces left Kosovo. The appellants relied on Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, but the House of Lords held that it did not assist them.
159. Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, with whom the other members of the panel agreed, noted at [61] that Article 1C(5) "simply has no application … unless and until it is invoked by the State against the refugee in order to deprive him of the refugee status previously accorded to him". He went on to say at [65]:
161. "The reason for applying a 'strict' and 'restrictive' approach to the cessation clauses in general and 1C(5) in particular [as advocated in UNHCR Guidelines published in April 1999] is surely plain. Once an asylum application has been formally determined and refugee status officially granted, with all the benefits both under the Convention and under national law which that carries with it, the refugee has the assurance of a secure future in the host country and a legitimate expectation that he will not henceforth be stripped of this save for demonstrably good and sufficient reason. That assurance and expectation simply does not arise in the earlier period whilst the refugee's claim for asylum is under consideration and before it is granted. Logically, therefore, the approach to the grant of refugee status under 1A(2) does not precisely mirror the approach to its prospective subsequent withdrawal under 1C(5)."
162. This passage is one of a number in these authorities which demonstrate that the Secretary of State is correct to accept that the burden lies upon her to demonstrate that a person has ceased to be entitled to refugee status pursuant to Article 1C(5) in a case concerned with a single ground for claiming a well-founded fear of persecution. It does not address the question which arises in the present case, however.
164. Counsel for the Appellant relied upon Lord Brown's statement in [66] that "where the Secretary of State is contending that a country once plainly unsafe (like, say, Sri Lanka or Kosovo) has now become safe, he should place before the appellate authority sufficient material to satisfy them of that critical fact". As Lord Brown made clear at the beginning of [66], however, that statement was addressed to "the initial determination of an asylum claim under 1A(2)". It was not addressed to Article 1C(5).
166. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs v Quah [2006] HCA 53, (2007) Int J Refugee Law 293 is a decision of the High Court of Australia concerning the position of an Afghan national, who had been granted protection on the ground that he had a well-founded fear of persecution by the Taliban, after the Taliban had fallen from power in 2001. Because Australia adopts an inquisitorial rather than adversarial procedure in the asylum context, the High Court did not analyse the issue of cessation strictly in terms of the burden of proof. Nevertheless it held at 140:
168. "Whether one explains the process as Lord Brown did in Hoxha, that a recognised refugee should not be stripped of that status 'save for demonstrably good and sufficient reason'; or, as UNHCR does, that 'a practical or evidential burden of proof lies with the asylum State authorities'; the outcome is the same. Even if, in Australia, it is not appropriate to speak of a legal 'burden of proof' in this context, what is still required is a rigorous satisfaction of the circumstances warranting the decision-maker's taking a step so potentially serious for the person affected. …."
169. Like the passage I have quoted from Hoxha, this paragraph is considering the cessation of Reason 1, not Reason 2.
171. Joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08 Abdulla v Bundesrepublik Deutschland [2010] ECR I-1493 is a decision of the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union on the interpretation of the Qualification Directive. Questions were referred to the CJEU by the Bundesverwaltungsgericht (German Constitutional Court) in cases concerning Iraqi nationals who had claimed asylum in Germany on the ground that they feared persecution by Saddam Hussein's Baath Party. They were granted refugee status in 2001 and 2002, but that status was revoked in 2005 following the removal of the Baath Party from power in Iraq after the US-led invasion.
173. Question 3 was in the following terms:
175. "In a situation in which the previous circumstances, on the basis of which the person concerned was granted refugee status have ceased to exist, are new, different circumstances founding, persecution to be: (a) measured against the standard of probability applied for recognising refugee status, or is another standard to be applied in favour of the person concerned, and/or (b) assessed having regard to the relaxation of the burden of proof under Article 4(4) of [the Qualification] Directive ...?"
176. I note that this question is about the standard of proof, rather than the burden of proof.
178. The CJEU began its answer to the question with the following preliminary observations:
180. "81. The third question relates to the situation in which it is assumed that a finding has already been made that the circumstances on the basis of which refugee status was granted have ceased to exist.
181. 82. It concerns the conditions under which the competent authorities then verify, if necessary, before finding that that status has ceased to exist, whether there are other circumstances which may give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution on the part of the person concerned.
182. 83. That verification therefore implies an assessment analogous to that carried out during the examination of an initial application for the granting of refugee status."
183. The CJEU then reasoned as follows in relation to question 3(a):
185. "87. … a person who, after having resided for a number of years as a refugee outside of his country of origin, relies on other circumstances to found a fear of persecution does not normally have the same opportunities to assess the risk to which he would be exposed in his country of origin as does an applicant who has recently left his country of origin.
186. 88. By contrast, the standard which must then guide the assessment of the elements present does not vary, either at the stage of the examination of an application for refugee status or at the stage of the examination of the question of whether that status should be maintained, when, after the circumstances which led to the granting of that status have ceased to exist, other circumstances which may have given rise to a well-founded fear of acts of persecution are assessed.
187. 89. At both of those stages of the examination, the assessment relates to the same question of whether or not the established circumstances constitute such a threat that the person concerned may reasonably fear, in the light of his individual situation, that he will in fact be subjected to acts of persecution.
188. 90. That assessment of the extent of the risk must, in all cases, be carried out with vigilance and care, since what are at issue are issues relating to the integrity of the person and to individual liberties, issues which relate to the fundamental values of the Union.
189. 91. The answer to Question 3(a) is therefore that, when the circumstances which resulted in the granting of refugee status have ceased to exist and the competent authorities of the Member State verify that there are no other circumstances which could justify a fear of persecution on the part of the person concerned either for the same reason as that initially at issue or for one of the other reasons set out in Article 2(c) of the Directive, the standard of probability used to assess the risk stemming from those other circumstances is the same as that applied when refugee status was granted."
190. Although counsel for the Appellant relied upon the passage I have just quoted, and in particular [87], it does not seem to me that it sheds any light on the answer to the question which confronts us. Unsurprisingly given the nature of the question it was answering, the CJEU's reasoning in this passage is concerned with the standard of proof, not the burden. As counsel for the Secretary of State submitted, the CJEU's laconic statement at [83] is more pertinent, because it recognises that there is no logical distinction between an initial claim for asylum based on Reason 1 and a later claim for asylum based on Reason 2, and therefore the incidence of the burden of proof should be the same in both cases. The fact that the claimant was granted refugee status on the basis of Reason 1 does not affect this if Reason 1 has ceased to exist. The point the CJEU makes in [87] is a different one, namely that the fact that the claimant has resided for a number of years outside their country of origin is relevant to the standard of proof that may be demanded of them in relation to Reason 2.
192. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v MM (Zimbabwe) [2017] EWCA Civ 797, [2017] 4 WLR 132 MM was granted refugee status on the ground that he faced persecution due to his opposition to the ruling regime. The Secretary of State decided to revoke that status on the ground that improved circumstances in Zimbabwe meant that MM no longer faced a real risk of ill-treatment on return. An appeal to this Court by the Secretary of State against a decision by the UT in favour of MM was allowed.
194. The leading judgment was given by Sales LJ (as he then was), with whom Henderson and Black LJJ agreed. He observed at [24]:
196. "… The circumstances in connection with which a person has been recognised as a refugee are likely to be a combination of the general political conditions in that person's home country and some aspect of that person's personal characteristics. Accordingly, a relevant change in circumstances for the purposes of article 1C(5) might in a particular case also arise from a combination of changes in the general political conditions in the home country and in the individual's personal characteristics, or even just from a change in the individual's personal characteristics, if that change means that he now falls outside a group likely to be persecuted by the authorities of the home state. The relevant change must in each case be durable in nature."
197. He went on:
199. "36. In my view … it is correct to say that for the purposes of article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention, the onus is on the Secretary of State to show, in relation to a person previously recognised by her as a 'refugee' under article 1A, that there has been a relevant change in circumstances such that the Refugee Convention ceases to apply to them. Moreover, that interpretation of the Refugee Convention is reinforced by article 14(2) of the EU Qualification Directive. …
200. 37. However, in practice this difference may … have little impact since it will usually be appropriate to expect an individual to call attention in his evidence or representations to any aspect of his particular circumstances which would tend to show that he would be subject to a real risk of ill-treatment if deported (as article 4(1) of the Qualification Directive also confirms) and to draw adverse inferences on the facts if he does not."
201. In my judgment it is clear that, when Sales LJ referred to "a relevant change of circumstances" in [36], he was referring to a change of the kind described in [24]. Again, this passage confirms that the Secretary of State is correct to accept that the burden of proof with regard to cessation lies on her with respect to Reason 1. Even in that context, what Sales LJ says at [37] shows that it may be legitimate to draw an adverse inference from a failure to produce evidence which the claimant could be expected to produce. As a matter of logic, the position must be a fortiori if the claimant is relying upon Reason 2 after Reason 1 has ceased to exist.
203. In MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 994, [2019] 1 WLR 241 MA was a Somali national who had been granted refugee status because he belonged to a minority claim and had a well-founded fear of persecution if returned. The Secretary of State revoked his refugee status after conditions improved in Somalia. This Court allowed the Secretary of State's appeal against decisions favourable to MA by the FTT and UT.
205. The leading judgment was given by Arden LJ, with whom Peter Jackson LJ agreed. She noted that Abdulla had not been cited in MM (Zimbabwe). She summarised her conclusion at [2]:
207. "For the reasons given below, and in the light of the careful submissions that we have had on the important decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union … in Abdulla v Bundesrepublik Deutschland …., I have concluded that: (1) a cessation decision is the mirror image of a decision determining refugee status. By that I mean that the grounds for cessation do not go beyond verifying whether the grounds for recognition of refugee status continue to exist. Thus, the relevant question is whether there has been a significant and non-temporary change in circumstances so that the circumstances which caused the person to be a refugee have ceased to apply and there is no other basis on which he would be held to be a refugee. The recognising state does not in addition have to be satisfied that the country of origin has a system of government or an effective legal system for protecting basic human rights, though the absence of such systems may of course lead to the conclusion that a significant and non-temporary change in circumstances has not occurred."
208. As she went on to explain:
210. "47. I accept that it would be inconsistent with the purposes of refugee status, whether under the Refugee Convention or the QD, if protection could be too easily ceased while a person was still in need of international protection or it was not reasonably clear that the need for it had gone. That would hardly solve the problem of persecution and displacement which those instruments are intended to address. Equally, as it seems to me, there is no necessary reason why refugee status should be continued beyond the time when the refugee is subject to the persecution which entitled him to refugee status or any other persecution which would result in him being a refugee, or why he should be entitled to further protection. There should simply be a requirement for symmetry between the grant and cessation of refugee status.
211. …
212. 49. Another way of putting the point is that the Refugee Convention and the QD are not measures for ensuring political and judicial reform in the countries of origin of refugees. The risks which entitle individuals to protection are risks which affect them personally and individually. It is an individualised approach. Just as it is no answer to an asylum claim that there is a legal system which might in theory be able to protect them, so conversely the absence of such a system is not an answer to a cessation decision if it is shown that the refugee has sufficient, lasting protection in other ways or that the fear which gave rise to the need for protection has in any event been superseded and disappeared."
213. Again, this decision is concerned with Reason 1. Again, it is consistent with the Secretary of State's acceptance that she bears the burden of proof with respect to cessation of Reason 1. Again, the logic of the analysis is that the claimant should bear the burden of proof with respect to Reason 2. It is not for the State to prove a negative.
215. MS (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 705, [2020] QB 364 was a similar case to MA (Somalia). The leading judgment was given by Hamblen LJ (as he then was), with whom Newey and Underhill LJJ agreed. He observed:
217. "47. In my judgment, this court should follow the mirror image approach endorsed in MA (Somalia), if and in so far as it is not bound so to do. It should do so for the reasons set out in MA (Somalia) and, in particular, because it reflects the language of article 1C(5) of the Convention and article 11 of the Qualification Directive, which link cessation with the continued existence of the circumstances which led to the recognition of refugee status. It is also consistent with the approach of the CJEU in Abdulla.
218. 48. As the House of Lords made clear in Hoxha, the mirror image approach is subject to the qualification that the requisite 'strict' and 'restrictive' approach to cessation clauses means that it must be shown that the change in circumstances is fundamental and durable in the equivalent wording of the Qualification Directive, 'significant' and 'non-temporary'. In addition, the burden of proof on all issues will be on the SSHD.
219. 49. In summary, in a case in which refugee status has been granted because the person cannot reasonably be expected to relocate, a cessation decision may be made if circumstances change, so as to mean that that person could reasonably be expected to relocate, provided that the change in circumstances is, in the language of the Qualification Directive, 'significant and non-temporary'. …"
220. Counsel for the Appellant particularly relied on Hamblen LJ's statement at the end of [48] that "the burden of proof on all issues will be on the SSHD". That statement must be read in context, however. In context, it is plain that Hamblen LJ was referring to issues relevant to cessation. Again, this is a case concerning Reason 1. It again confirms the correctness of the Secretary of State's concession with regard to cessation of Reason 1, but it does not show that the burden of proof lies upon the Secretary of State with respect to Reason 2.
222. In KN (DRC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1665 KN was a national of the DRC. His father was granted refugee status in 1989. In 1991 they were joined in the UK by KN, his mother and siblings, all of whom were automatically granted refugee status in 1994 under the policy then in place. In 2016 the Secretary of State revoked KN's refugee status on the ground that circumstances had changed in the DRC. The UT held that, because KN's parents had been recognised as refugees, political changes in the DRC had no bearing on the circumstances in connection with which he had been recognised as a refugee. This Court allowed the Secretary of State's appeal, holding that the UT had interpreted Article 1C(5) of the Refugee Convention and paragraph 339A(v) of the Immigration Rules too narrowly.
224. The leading judgment was given by Baker LJ, with whom Leggatt LJ (as he then was) and McCombe LJ agreed. He said at [36]:
226. "As this court made clear in MM (Zimbabwe), given that the respondent has been granted refugee status, the onus of proving that the circumstances in connection with which he was recognised as refugee have ceased to exist lies on the Secretary of State. He must show that, if there were any circumstances which in 1994 would have justified the respondent fearing persecution in DRC, those circumstances have now ceased to exist and that there are no other circumstances which would now give rise to a fear of persecution for reasons covered by the Refugee Convention. As stated by Sales LJ in MM (Zimbabwe), the circumstances under consideration are likely to be a combination of the general political conditions in the individual's home country and some aspect of his personal characteristics. What is clear from that decision … is that the focus of the investigation must be on the current circumstances of the individual and conditions in his home country."
227. Counsel for the Appellant relied on Baker LJ's statement that the Secretary of State "must show that … there are no other circumstances which would now give rise to a fear of persecution", but that statement must be read in context. Once again, this is a case about whether Reason 1 has ceased to exist.
229. MM (Zimbabwe) and KN (DRC) were followed in JS (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1670, [2020] 1 WLR 43 at [164] and 166, but this authority sheds no further light on the present question.
231. The final authority to which I should refer is PS (Zimbabwe) v Secrtary of State for the Home Department (Cessation principles) [2021] UKUT 283 (IAC), [2022] Imm AR 49, a decision of the UT (Lane J and Upper Tribunal Judge Plimmer). This states that, to quote from paragraph 2 of the headnote, "[i]t is … for the SSHD to demonstrate that the circumstances which justified the grant of refugee status have ceased to exist and that there are no other circumstances which would now give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for reasons covered by the Refugee Convention". As can be seen from [26], the principles stated in the headnote were agreed. It appears that the words I have quoted were based on Baker LJ's statement in KN (DRC) discussed above.
233. In addition to the authorities discussed above, counsel for the Appellant relied upon the following passage in the Secretary of State's own guidance for her caseworkers Revocation of protection status (version 2.0, published on 24 January 2025):
235. " Considering representations submitted
236. Where the individual submits evidence in response to the notification of intention to revoke protection status, you must give careful consideration to all the points raised as well as the initial information that led to the decision to consider revocation. It is important to keep in mind that the burden of proof rests on the Home Office when making a decision to revoke protection status and, as with first instance decisions, the relevant standard of proof is a relatively low one. See Assessing credibility and Refugee Status and Humanitarian protection for further details on the standard and burden of proof requirements.
237. You must consider if:
238. • the individual has a reasonable explanation which directly addresses the proposal to revoke protection status
239. • there are any compassionate reasons as to why protection status should not be revoked
240. • it is necessary to contact the individual for further details
241. • the individual has raised any other protection-based grounds, such that it would be appropriate to allow the individual to retain protection status
242. Where it is accepted that someone still needs protection after having reviewed the case, even if the reasons differ from those which gave rise to the original grant of protection status, revocation action should not normally be pursued on cessation grounds. This includes where you decide that there are grounds to revoke refugee status but identify that the individual would qualify for humanitarian protection, or vice versa. In this circumstance, revocation on cessation grounds is not usually required."
243. Leaving aside the fact that this is merely guidance, it does not seem to me that the passage assists the Appellant. On the one hand, it recognises that the burden lies on the Secretary of State when deciding to revoke refugee status. On the other hand, it also recognises that the individual may raise other protection-based grounds, and that where it is accepted that they still need protection then revocation should not normally be pursued. Furthermore, it refers to other guidance on the burden and standard of proof.
245. In conclusion, I would dismiss ground 1 because the answer to the question of law identified in paragraph 1 above is that the burden of proving Reason 2 lies on the claimant, not on the State. It follows that the UT did not err in law.
247. I should make it clear, however, that I do not accept the Secretary of State's argument that the UT's decision did not turn on the allocation of the burden of proof. As I read the decision, in particular at [30] and [32], the UT held that the Appellant had not satisfied the burden of proof upon him. It is fair to say that the UT refers in [31] to the Secretary of State having established a material change in the DRC of a sustainable nature, but in my view that does not demonstrate that the UT did not resort to the burden of proof.
249. Ground 2
250. As I have explained, the Appellant's case is that he is at risk of ill-treatment if returned to the DRC because he would be perceived by the DRC authorities to be connected with Rwandan rebels.
252. The Appellant relies upon the country guidance in AB and DM v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Risk categories reviewed - Tutsis added DRC CG) [2005] UKIAT 118, in which the UT identified the following risk categories at [51]:
254. "(i) We confirm as continuing to be a risk category those with a nationality or perceived nationality of a state regarded as hostile to the DRC and in particular those who have or presumed to have Rwandan connections or are of Rwandan origins.
255. (ii) We consider that in light of recent developments there is now a risk category consisting of those who are Tutsi (or Banyamulenge) or are perceived to be Tutsi (or Banyamulenge). … We accept that in practice there is considerable overlap with (i) since, as a result of the events of 2004 'Rwandan' and 'Tutsi' are more often regarded as the same by the DRC authorities and civilian population and as a result Tutsis and those perceived as such face higher risks than before. However, they are distinct categories, one nationality based, the other ethnicity-based.
256. (iii) We also confirm as an existing risk category those having or being perceived to have a military or political profile in opposition to the government. The risk fluctuates in accordance with the political situation. …"
257. Although the country guidance was updated in PO (cited above), there was no relevant change with respect to risk category (i). The Appellant claims that he falls within that category, and in particular "those … presumed to have Rwandan connections".
259. The Appellant contends that the UT erred because, as can be seen in particular from [29], the UT misunderstood the Appellant's claim to be that he was in risk category (iii). The Appellant does not challenge the UT's finding that there has been a durable change in the political situation in the DRC following the 2018 election, as reflected in PO, but submits that this is irrelevant to his claim. It might well be relevant if he were claiming to be in risk category (iii), but it is not relevant to his claim to be in risk category (i).
261. The Secretary of State accepts that the Appellant did raise an argument based on risk category (i) in oral submissions (albeit not in writing) before the UT. The Secretary of State submits that, to the extent that the UT erred in law by failing to distinguish between the two risk categories, the error was not a material one because the Appellant's claim based on risk category (i) has no merit. I accept this submission for the following reasons.
263. Although the burden of proof lies on the Appellant for the reasons discussed above, the standard of proof in this context is what is often referred to as the "lower" standard of proof. As Singh LJ explained in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216, [2023] Imm AR 713 at [49]-[67], with the agreement of King and Warby LLJ, this can be more accurately described as an assessment of risk. In assessing the claimant's credibility, it is important to keep this in mind, as well as the well-known requirement for the "most anxious scrutiny".
265. Applying that approach in the present case, I consider that it is appropriate to regard the Appellant's claims as to what happened to him in 2009-2010 (summarised in paragraph 7 above) as credible. Although the Secretary of State originally did not accept key parts of the Appellant's account in the decision dated 25 February 2011 (paragraphs 8-10 above), upon reconsideration the Secretary of State went some way towards accepting that account in the decision dated 14 May 2012 (paragraph 13 above).
267. Nevertheless, there is simply no reason to think that the Appellant would be perceived by the DRC authorities to have Rwandan connections if he were to be returned to the DRC. The Appellant has benefitted from anonymity during the course of these proceedings. No one in the DRC authorities will know that, when the Appellant was a teenager, he was held in the FDLR camp in 2009-2010. Nor will they know about the allegations against his father, with whom the Appellant has had no contact since October 2010. This is particularly so given that, as the UT noted, the Appellant would be returned to Kinshasa and not to North Kivu.
269. The Appellant was properly granted refugee status by the UK as a vulnerable minor in 2012, but his leave to remain was limited to five years. The Appellant has long since ceased to be a vulnerable minor. I do not consider that he now has a well-founded fear of ill-treatment if returned to the DRC. Accordingly, the Appellant is no longer entitled to refugee status.
271. Conclusion
272. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss the appeal.
274. Lady Justice Elisabeth Laing:
275. I agree.
277. Lord Justice Miles:
278. I also agree.

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