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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

C.S. Pukanecz v. Bureau of Driver Licensing

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1660 C.D. 2023
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Dumas

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by Dumas

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles S. Pukanecz,
Petitioner :
: No. 1660 C.D. 2023
v. :
: Submitted: February 4, 2026
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Transportation, :
Bureau of Driver Licensing, :
Respondent :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY
JUDGE DUMAS FILED: March 24, 2026

Charles S. Pukanecz (Petitioner), pro se, has petitioned this Court to
review an order issued on November 13, 2023, by a hearing officer on behalf of the
Department of Transportation (Department), Bureau of Driver Licensing (Bureau).
Upon review, Petitioner failed to appeal this order to the Department for final
adjudication. Therefore, we dismiss the petition because Petitioner failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies.
I. BACKGROUND1
Petitioner is a resident of Pennsylvania. Based on his driving record,
Petitioner’s operating privilege is currently suspended, and it appears that his
operating privilege has been suspended continuously and for various reasons since
September 2021. At some point, Petitioner sought an occupational limited license
(OLL), but his application for an OLL was denied by the Department on July 19,
2023, because Petitioner had incurred disqualifying violations per Section 1553(d)
of the Vehicle Code.2
On August 31, 2023, Petitioner requested a hearing, which was initially
granted and scheduled for November 17, 2023.3 According to Petitioner, the denial

1
Unless otherwise stated, we derive this background from the findings issued by the hearing
officer, which were admitted by Petitioner, as well as the agency record certified to this Court on
appeal. See Adjudication & Order, 11/13/2023; see generally C.R.
2
See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 101-9805. In relevant part, Section 1553(d) of the Vehicle Code provides:
(d) Unauthorized issuance.--The [D]epartment shall prohibit issuance of an
occupational limited license to:
...
(15) Any person whose operating privilege has been suspended for a
conviction of section 1543 [related to driving will operating privilege is
suspended or revoked] unless department records show that the suspension
for a conviction of section 1543 occurred only as a result of:
(i) a suspension for failure to respond to a citation imposed under
the authority of section 1533 or 6146;
(ii) a suspension for failure to undergo a special examination
imposed under the authority of section 1538(a); or
(iii) a suspension for failure to attend a departmental hearing
imposed under the authority of section 1538(b).
....
75 Pa.C.S. § 1553(d).
3
Petitioner untimely requested an administrative hearing. See 67 Pa. Code § 491.3 (b)(1)
(providing that “every request for a hearing shall be filed within 30 days of the Department’s

2
of his OLL was legally incorrect because he was not currently serving a suspension
for a disqualifying violation; additionally, Petitioner asserted that the Department’s
decision violated the letter and spirit of Section 1553, violated his right to equal
protection, and, if not remedied, would violate the Interstate Commerce Clause.4 See
Pet’r’s Appeal & Req. for Hr’g, 8/31/23.
On October 23, 2023, the Department filed a motion to dismiss,
asserting, in relevant part, that Petitioner had incurred a suspension of his operating
privilege for a conviction of Section 1543 (related to driving while operating
privilege is suspended or revoked) and that this suspension did not qualify for any
exception enumerated in Section 1553. For this and other reasons, the Department
maintained that Petitioner had failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact or state
a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Relevantly, in response, Petitioner admitted that his operating privilege
had been suspended for a violation of Section 1543. Petitioner argued, however,
that the Department must consider that his operating privilege had been suspended
initially for his failure to respond to a registration violation, which is an exception
to Section 1553(d)(15). See, supra, n.2 (recognizing an exception for violations of
Section 1533 (suspension for failure to respond to citation)); see also 75 Pa.C.S. §
1311 (Registration card requirements). In other words, according to Petitioner,

determination that gives rise to the appeal”). However, Petitioner’s untimely request did not
deprive the hearing officer of jurisdiction. Muma v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, Division of Nursing Care
Facilities, 223 A.3d 742, 750-53 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019) (finding that an untimely request for an initial
hearing is not equivalent to an untimely appeal and “more akin to a nonjurisdictional claim-
processing rule”) (cleaned up); see also 67 Pa. Code § 491.3 (c) (affording the hearing officer
discretion to determine whether a request is insufficient or improper).
4
See U.S. Const. art. I § 8. Although not entirely clear, it appears that Petitioner may have
been cited for a violation of the Vehicle Code while traveling from New Jersey back into
Pennsylvania. See Pet’r’s Appeal & Req. for Hr’g, 8/31/23, at 4.

3
because his seminal violation qualified as an exception to the prohibitions set forth
in Section 1553, all subsequent violations that extended the initial suspension of his
operating privilege also qualified as exceptions.
The hearing officer rejected Petitioner’s argument, noting the lack of
any legal support for such an interpretation. Finding no issues of material fact, the
hearing officer cancelled the hearing and affirmed the denial of Petitioner’s OLL.5
Petitioner did not appeal to the Secretary of the Department but promptly sought
review in the Lehigh County Court of Common Pleas (trial court), which
appropriately transferred the matter to this Court. See Trial Ct. Order, 4/5/24.
II. ISSUES
Petitioner contends that the hearing officer’s interpretation of Section
1553 of the Vehicle Code was flawed, essentially renewing his argument that his
ongoing suspensions all stem from an initial violation that would not prohibit an
OLL. See Pet’r’s Br. at 15-16. Petitioner also criticizes what he views as shifting
justifications for the Department’s denial of his OLL. See id. Finally, Petitioner
asserts that the Commonwealth’s “expansive” Vehicle Code is “inherently unfair”
and, as applied to him, violates his rights to equal protection and due process.6 Id.
at 16-17.

5
The hearing officer expressly affirmed the denial but did not expressly rule on the
Department’s motion to dismiss. See Adjudication & Order at 7-8.
6
In light of these purported violations, Petitioner questions whether a facial constitutional
challenge is also warranted. See Pet’r’s Br. at 17; see also, e.g., id. at 57 (“And a look at how the
statute applies more broadly, perhaps even to the level of a facial challenge, is suggested.”).
Nevertheless, in sum, we interpret Petitioner’s arguments to be an “as-applied” challenge. See id.
at 52 (“That core understanding [of equal protection] is qualified under standards that differ for
constiutional [sic] challenges that are “facial” and those that are “as applied.” In this case,
[Petitioner] had his constitutional rights violated by the application of the statute in his particular
set of circumstances as outlined herein.”). Also, Petitioner has abandoned his Commerce Clause
claim. See generally id.

4
In response, the Department asserts that Petitioner has waived all issues
because he failed to appeal from the hearing officer’s order to the Secretary of the
Department. Resp’t’s Br. at 4, 5-8. Absent waiver, according to the Department,
the hearing officer properly determined that Petitioner has committed multiple
violations of the Vehicle Code that preclude the issuance of an OLL. See id. at 4, 8-
9. The Department also rejects Petitioner’s constitutional arguments as vague and
ultimately without merit. See id. at 4, 9-11.
III. DISCUSSION7
It is well settled that, under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies, a person aggrieved by a decision of a Commonwealth agency must
exhaust all available administrative remedies before that person may proceed to
judicial review. St. Clair v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 493 A.2d 146, 151 (Pa.
Cmwlth. 1985). The primary purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that claims are
heard, in the first instance, “by the body having expertise in the area.” Id. at 152.
“In addition, the exhaustion doctrine provides the agency with the opportunity to
correct its own mistakes and to moot judicial controversies.”8 Id.

7
Our review is limited to determining whether constitutional rights were violated, an error of
law was committed, or findings of fact were unsupported by substantial evidence. Gutman v. Dep’t
of Transp., 16 A.3d 566, 569 n.1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011).
8
The exhaustion doctrine is also recognized implicitly by Section 703(a) of the Administrative
Agency Law, which provides:
(a) General rule.--A party who proceeded before a Commonwealth agency under
the terms of a particular statute shall not be precluded from questioning the validity
of the statute in the appeal, but such party may not raise upon appeal any other
question not raised before the agency (notwithstanding the fact that the agency may
not be competent to resolve such question) unless allowed by the court upon due
cause shown.
2 Pa.C.S. § 703(a); see also Pa.R.A.P. 1551 (similarly limiting this Court’s scope of review).

5
The exhaustion doctrine extends to constitutional claims that challenge
a statute’s application in a particular case. Lehman v. Pa. State Police, 839 A.2d
265, 275 (Pa. 2003). “[C]laims challenging a statute’s application to the facts of a
particular case must be raised before the agency or are waived.” Id. at 276; accord
Funk v. Dep’t of Env’t Prot., 71 A.3d 1097 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013). “To conclude
otherwise, would permit an end-run of the administrative appeal process that the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is designed to prevent.” Keystone
ReLeaf LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Health, 186 A.3d 505, 515 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2018).
Finally, the doctrine is applicable to matters related to the suspension
and restoration of a licensee’s operating privilege. Niles v. Dep’t of Transp., 674
A.2d 739, 740 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (finding waiver because a licensee had not timely
appealed a hearing officer’s decision, which had denied the licensee credit on the
term of his suspension, to the Secretary of Transportation); Ruby v. Dep’t of Transp.,
632 A.2d 635, 637 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (recognizing the Department’s exclusive
authority in licensing and suspension matters). Referencing both general rules of
administrative practice, as well as those procedures specifically adopted by the
Department, this Court has long recognized that a person dissatisfied with a
Department decision must seek relief from a hearing officer and then the Secretary

Section 703(a) and Rule 1551 provide a waiver rule in administrative law cases, which has
been explained as follows:
[T]he administrative law tribunal must be given the opportunity to correct its errors
as early as possible; diligent preparation and effective advocacy before the tribunal
must be encouraged by requiring the parties to develop complete records and
advance all legal theories; and the finality of the lower tribunals’ determinations
must not be eroded by treating each determination as part of a sequence of
piecemeal adjudications.
Wing v. Unemployment Comp. Bd. of Rev., 436 A.2d 179, 181 (Pa. 1981). The Department has
invoked the waiver rule in this case. See Resp’t’s Br. at 5-8.

6
of Transportation before this Court can afford him any relief. Ruby, 632 A.2d at
637-38 (dismissing a petition for review for failure to exhaust administrative
remedies); see Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Cardell, 568 A.2d
999, 1001 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1990) (reversing a decision of the Court of Common Pleas,
which had erred in exercising jurisdiction over a license suspension dispute and
directing the licensee to seek administrative relief from the Department); 1 Pa. Code
§§ 35.1-35.251; 67 Pa. Code §§ 491.1-495.10.9
In this case, Petitioner failed to appeal the hearing officer’s decision to
the Secretary of Transportation. Instead, Petitioner circumvented the normal
administrative review process by filing a petition for judicial review. In so doing,
Petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him and
deprived the Department of an opportunity to address and correct any possible
mistakes. See Lehman, 839 A.2d at 275; Ruby, 632 A.2d at 638.
Accordingly, we dismiss the petition.10

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge

9
Department regulations specifically provide: “Appeal to the Secretary of a hearing officer’s
order. Unless otherwise provided by this chapter, any appeal from an order rendered by the hearing
officer shall be filed with the appropriate docket clerk within 30 days of the date the order is
entered.” 67 Pa. Code § 491.6 (i) (emphasis in original).
10
Petitioner does not address the exhaustion doctrine in his arguments to this Court. See
generally Pet’r’s Br. Additionally, Petitioner did not file a reply brief responding to the
Department’s assertion of waiver. For completeness, we recognize that a petitioner need not raise
facial challenges to a statute’s constitutionality before the administrative agency because “the
determination of the constitutionality of enabling legislation is not a function of the administrative
agencies thus enabled.” Lehman, 839 A.2d at 275; but see also Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc. v. Dep’t
of Transp., 304 A.3d 1067, 1083 (Pa. 2023) (clarifying that “a substantial constitutional or validity
challenge alone is not enough to forgo application of the exhaustion doctrine and that, in asserting
such challenges, a litigant must also demonstrate the absence or inadequacy of an administrative
remedy”). We discern no facial challenge in this case; further, Petitioner has neither asserted nor
demonstrated the inadequacy of an administrative remedy.

7
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Charles S. Pukanecz,
Petitioner :
: No. 1660 C.D. 2023
v. :
:
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :
Department of Transportation, :
Bureau of Driver Licensing, :
Respondent :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2026, the petition for review filed
by Charles S. Pukanecz on December 13, 2023, is DISMISSED.

LORI A. DUMAS, Judge