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March 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

The City of Scranton v. T. Coyne, a/k/a T. Coyne & AFG Media

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1670 C.D. 2024
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Leavitt

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (30.1K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by [Mary Hannah Leavitt](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8210/mary-hannah-leavitt/)

IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The City of Scranton :
:
v. : No. 1670 C.D. 2024
: Submitted: February 4, 2026
Thomas Coyne, a/k/a Tom :
Coyne & AFG Media, :
Appellant :

BEFORE: HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge
HONORABLE LORI A. DUMAS, Judge
HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION
BY SENIOR JUDGE LEAVITT FILED: March 24, 2026

Thomas Coyne, pro se, appeals an order of the Court of Common Pleas
of Lackawanna County (trial court) permanently enjoining Coyne and his company,
AFG Media, from disclosing any information contained in certain personnel files of
the City of Scranton (City). On appeal, Coyne challenges the validity of the
injunction, asserting that because the personnel files had been placed outside City
Hall for recycling, they ceased to have any privacy protections. Further, the City
lacked standing to vindicate the privacy interests of the third parties who are named
in those personnel files. For the following reasons, we affirm.
Background
The facts in this case are not in dispute. On or about April 24, 2024,
following a City Council meeting, Coyne discovered boxes of personnel records
labeled “Shred 2033,” that had been placed outside the rear entrance of City Hall.
The boxes contained the personnel files of former employees that included their
names, dates of birth, social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers and other
personal information. Coyne took pictures of the contents of the personnel files and
made a video to document his discovery. After Coyne contacted the police, he and
an officer carried the boxes into City Hall.
At the April 30, 2024, City Council meeting, Coyne informed
councilmembers that there had been a data breach by the City. That same day, the
City Solicitor sent Coyne a letter instructing him not to disclose any information
obtained from the personnel files and to destroy all photographs of the file contents.
At a City Council meeting of October 8, 2024, Coyne disclosed the
name of one former City employee from the personnel files. He further stated that
he would continue to name the other former employees until the City notified all of
them that their personnel records had been subject to “exposure.” Coyne Brief at 6-
7.
On October 15, 2024, the City filed a complaint seeking injunctive
relief. The complaint alleged that Coyne had examined and photographed property
belonging to the City that had been mistakenly placed outside for recycling pickup.
Original Record (O.R.), Complaint ¶¶7-8; Item No. 1. The City property consisted
of boxes of personnel files of former City employees, containing their names, social
security numbers, personal contact information, dates of birth, health information,
and disciplinary actions. The boxes had been marked with a date for record
destruction of 2033. Id. ¶10.
The complaint asserted that Coyne violated a City ordinance, which
states as follows:
All recyclables as defined by this article and placed for collection
by the City under the provisions of this article and any other City
regulations shall, from time of placement at the curb, become the
property of the City. This article forbids scavenging of
recyclables once they are placed at the curb and are the property

2
of the City. Any scavenging of recyclables can be subject to the
penalties and fines included in this article.

CITY CODE §400-30 (emphasis added).1 The complaint alleged that Coyne “admitted
and acknowledged his conduct publicly and to the City.” Complaint ¶11. Further,
the City’s video surveillance footage showed Coyne “rifling through the box and its
contents, removing various files from the box and taking photographs of various
documents with his cell phone.” Id. ¶12.
On October 15, 2024, the trial court entered a preliminary injunction
ordering Coyne “a/k/a Tom Coyne & ‘AFG Media’” to refrain from “disseminating,
divulging and/or disclosing personal information obtained from the City of
Scranton’s recycling bins on or about April 24, 2024 including but not limited to
identities, social security numbers, personal contact information, dates of birth,
health information, disciplinary proceedings, information protected by applicable
privileges, privacy laws and [Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996 (HIPAA)2].” Trial Court Order, 10/15/2024; O.R., Item No. 4. The trial court
scheduled a hearing for October 18, 2024, on the request to make the preliminary
injunction permanent.
Coyne responded with a motion to strike the City’s complaint under the
“Anti-Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP) and the Uniform
Public Expression Protection Act.”3 Coyne Motion to Strike at 1; O.R., Item No. 5.

1
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF THE CITY OF SCRANTON, LACKAWANNA COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA,
(September 26, 1979), as amended (City Code).
2
Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and
42 U.S.C.).
3
42 Pa. C.S. §§8340.11-8340.18 (Expression Protection Act). The associated Uniform Law
Comment explains:
Although “SLAPP”--an acronym for “Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation”--does not appear in the Act’s title, the Uniform Public Expression
3
The motion asserted that the City’s complaint sought to “chill the expression of his
first amendment rights.” Id. The motion asserted that because the files had been left
outside for more than five hours with other trash and recyclables, any privacy rights
that could otherwise be asserted had been destroyed. The boxes lacked any covers
and were placed 40 feet from the rear entrance to City Hall, along a public sidewalk.
Thus, the files were exposed to the public. In any case, the City, itself, had no privacy
interest at stake. Finally, the motion alleged that Coyne did not release any protected,
personal information but only the names of former City employees, which is public
information.
At the hearing on October 18, 2024, the City introduced three videos:
(1) the video made by Coyne of the boxes in the recycling bin; (2) the video of Coyne
relating his discovery of the boxes to City Council; and (3) the video of Coyne’s
appearance at the City Council meeting divulging the name of one employee whose
personnel file had been placed outside in a box left for recycling.
On behalf of the City, Jessica Eskra, the City Solicitor, testified that the
personnel records contained financial information, dates of birth, social security
numbers, addresses, names of children, tax information, potential medical
information, and disciplinary records. Notes of Testimony, 10/18/2024, at 14-15

Protection Act should be considered an anti-SLAPP act. Although “[t]he paradigm
SLAPP is a suit filed by a large developer against environmental activists or a
neighborhood association intended to chill the defendants’ continued political or
legal opposition to the developers’ plans,” SLAPPs “are by no means limited to
environmental issues, nor are the defendants necessarily local organizations with
limited resources.” Hupp v. Freedom Comm[unications, Inc.], 163 Cal. Rptr. 3d
919, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). “[W]hile SLAPP suits ‘masquerade as ordinary
lawsuits’ the conceptual features which reveal them as SLAPP’s are that they are
generally meritless suits brought by large private interests to deter common citizens
from exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so.” Id.
42 Pa. C.S. §8340.11, Uniform Law Comment.
4
(N.T. __). The records were placed outside for recycling in error. After she viewed
video footage showing Coyne going through the boxes, the City consulted with
“breach counsel” and engaged a third-party investigator. N.T. 13. The third-party
investigator made recommendations on record handling, which the City has adopted.
Eskra testified that the City desired to protect the confidentiality of the
personnel records copied by Coyne. She explained that the City’s ordinance
“prohibits and forbids the scavenging of recyclables placed on the curb.” N.T. 23.
Further, the ordinance makes any items placed outside for recycling the property of
the City.
Eskra testified that, on April 30, 2024, her office notified Coyne by
letter that he may not disclose any of the information found in the files; he did not
acknowledge receiving the letter. N.T. 24-25, 32. Once Coyne disclosed the identity
of one former employee at the City Council meeting, the City filed its action to
prevent any further disclosures. She explained that the City did not seek to prevent
Coyne from publicly discussing the incident or his feelings about it.
Coyne presented no testimony or evidence. In his closing argument,
Coyne asserted that the United States Supreme Court has established that the trash
and recyclables placed out for collection are stripped of any privacy rights, and, thus,
the City’s ordinance protecting recyclables cannot “supersede the powers of the
United States Supreme Court.” N.T. 44. Coyne argued that under the plain view
doctrine, “anything open and exposed to the public has no privacy protections,”
which applied to the boxes in question. N.T. 45. In any case, the City has no privacy
interest at stake. Because Coyne and his media company are not covered by HIPAA,
its privacy requirements had no application. Finally, he argued that the names of
employees, current or former, are public information.

5
Coyne explained that his motion to strike the City’s complaint was
based upon the Expression Protection Act, which protects First Amendment rights.
The injunction was intended to hush him from speaking at a City Council meeting.
As a member of the press, Coyne argued that he is allowed to report on the matter.
In any case, the disclosure of the names of public employees is not a disclosure of
personal and protected information. N.T. 46.
In its closing argument, the City acknowledged that the personnel
records were inadvertently placed outside for recycling. After Coyne informed City
Council that it was his intention to continue to release the names contained in the
personnel files, the City sought an injunction to prevent further disclosure of any
information in files, including names.
Concluding that the City had made its case, the trial court entered a
permanent injunction. As to Coyne’s motion to strike, the trial court explained that
the Expression Protection Act was inapposite because it excludes claims
(1) Against a government unit or an employee or agent of a
government unit acting in an official capacity.
(2) By a government unit or an employee or agent of a
government unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a
law, regulation or ordinance.
....

42 Pa. C.S. §8340.14(b) (emphasis added). Here, the City was acting in its official
capacity to enforce an ordinance that prohibits and forbids the scavenging of
recyclables placed on the curb. CITY ORDINANCE §400-30.4

4
Pennsylvania’s anti-SLAPP statute, i.e., the Expression Protection Act, authorizes a pre-trial
motion to dismiss a cause of action based upon a claim of public expression immunity. However,
that provision of the statute was not in effect at the time and, thus, did not support the motion to
strike. Trial Court Op., 11/7/2024, at 5.
6
The trial court rejected Coyne’s contention that the City is trying to
“hush” him at City Council meetings because the injunction had no impact on
Coyne’s appearance at City Council meetings, where he was free to “comment about
the City’s ineptitude and harangue the City over its handling of confidential
personnel information as if it was old newspapers and magazines.” Trial Court Op.,
11/7/2024 at 6.
Finally, the trial court rejected Coyne’s argument that personnel files
had been abandoned, noting that the City’s ordinance established the ownership
status of recycling materials. In any case, the affected employees did not abandon
their privacy interests in their respective personnel files.
Coyne appealed the trial court’s order to this Court.
Appeal
On appeal,5 Coyne raises seven issues:
1. Whether the [trial court] erred in holding a local ordinance
valid when there is a contrary U.S. Supreme Court decision[.]
2. Whether the [trial court] erred in holding that the Plain View
Doctrine does not remove expectations of privacy[.]
3. Whether the [trial court] erred in holding that the ANTI-
SLAPP law was invalid citing protections on Claims related
to government immunity[.]
4. Whether the [trial court] erred in holding that the names of
public employees or former, devoid of any other protected
information, standing alone, is protected information.
5. Whether the [trial court] erred in holding that the City [] had
standing to pursue a claim of privacy, when [it was] not the

5
When reviewing the grant of a permanent injunction, our review determines whether the trial
court committed an error of law, and as such, “our standard of review is de novo, and our scope of
review is plenary.” City of Philadelphia v. Armstrong, 271 A.3d 555, 560-61 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2022)
(quoting Kuznik v. Westmoreland County Board of Commissioners, 902 A.2d 476, 489 (Pa. 2006)).
7
part[y] exposed, but the part[y] who exposed the information
by negligence[.]
6. Whether the [trial court] erred in holding that the press should
not be able to use a name of a public employee (past or
present) in relation to a story of public interest, under
permanent injunction, because it may cause
“embarrassment”[.]
7. Whether the [trial court] erred in not allowing [Coyne’s]
request for discovery.

Coyne Brief at 7-8. For purposes of this opinion, we will combine issues four and
six and restate the issues on appeal as follows:
1. Whether the City’s recycling ordinance is void because it is
superseded by the United States Constitution and decisions
interpreting the Constitution.
2. Whether any expectation of privacy exists in the contents of
an uncovered box on a public sidewalk.
3. Whether the City’s request for injunction is a SLAPP suit.
4. Whether the names of the City’s former employees are private
information.
5. Whether the City has standing to pursue a privacy claim in
the personnel files.
6. Whether discovery should have been conducted prior to the
trial court deciding the City’s motion for permanent
injunction.

Applicable Law
“An injunction is a court order that can prohibit or command virtually
any type of action.” Big Bass Lake Community Association v. Warren, 950 A.2d
1137, 1144 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2008). “It is an extraordinary remedy that should be issued
with caution and ‘only where the rights and equity of the plaintiff are clear and free
from doubt, and where the harm to be remedied is great and irreparable.’” Id.
(quoting 15 STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2d, §83:2 (2005)). The required

8
elements of injunctive relief are: (1) a clear right to relief; (2) the need to avoid an
injury that cannot be compensated in damages; and (3) a finding that greater injury
will result from refusing, rather than granting, the relief requested. Big Bass Lake
Community Association, 950 A.2d at 1144. A court may issue a final injunction “if
such relief is necessary to prevent a legal wrong for which there is no adequate
redress at law.” City of Philadelphia, 271 A.3d at 560 (quoting Buffalo Township v.
Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 663-64 (Pa. 2003)). Even where the essential prerequisites of
an injunction are satisfied, the court must narrowly tailor its remedy to abate the
injury. Big Bass Lake Community Association, 950 A.2d at 1144-45.
Analysis
I. Supremacy Clause
In his first issue, Coyne argues that the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution supersedes the City’s recycling ordinance, which purported to
preserve the City’s property interest in recycled materials. The City responds that
Coyne did not challenge the validity of the ordinance enacted by the City at the
hearing before the trial court.
A party waives an issue by failing to raise it at the earliest possible
opportunity. See Dehus v. Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 545 A.2d
434, 436 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1988). “Issues not raised in the trial court are waived and
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.” Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). In its Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) opinion, the trial court stated that Coyne “did not challenge the validity of
the ordinance enacted by the City [], thus, there was no issue presented regarding the
validity of the ordinance.” Trial Court Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Op. at 2. Coyne eventually
raised the validity of the ordinance in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)6 statement, but that did
not preserve the issue. As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has stated:

6
It states:
9
[I]n general, a [Pa.R.A.P.] 1925(b) statement cannot resurrect an
otherwise untimely claim or objection. See Commonwealth v.
DeLoach, 714 A.2d 483, 486 n.8 (Pa. [Cmwlth.] 1998) (holding
that issues not raised at trial cannot be raised in a 1925(b)
statement); Rutledge v. Depart[ment] of Trans[portation], [] 508
A.2d 1306, 1306–07 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1986) (same). Because
issues not raised in the lower court are waived and cannot be
raised for the first time on appeal, a 1925(b) statement can
therefore never be used to raise a claim in the first instance.
Pa.R.A.P. 302.[]

Steiner v. Markel, 968 A.2d 1253, 1257 (Pa. 2009) (footnote omitted).
Even so, Coyne’s argument lacks merit. The Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution protects individuals from unreasonable searches and
seizures by the government that violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.7 The Fourth Amendment generally requires a warrant before
police can conduct a search of a person’s property. Commonwealth v. Williams, 342
A.3d 742, 765 (Pa. Super. 2025). To be sure, the Fourth Amendment “allows officers
to conduct warrantless searches and seizures of garbage discarded in areas subject
to public inspection” because there is no reasonable expectation of privacy in trash
left for collection by the owner of that property. Id. at 766.

If the judge entering the order giving rise to the notice of appeal (“judge”) desires
clarification of the errors complained of on appeal, the judge may enter an order
directing the appellant to file of record in the trial court and serve on the judge a
concise statement of the errors complained of on appeal (“Statement”).
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).
7
It states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
10
However, Coyne is neither an officer of the law nor an individual with
a property interest in the personnel files. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment has
no application. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 209 A.3d 957, 971 (Pa. 2019) (holding
that the prohibitions of the Fourth Amendment do not apply to searches and seizures
conducted by private individuals).
We reject Coyne’s first issue on appeal as waived.
II. Plain View Doctrine
In his second issue, Coyne invokes the plain view doctrine, which
provides “[i]f an object is left open and exposed in a public or even a non[-]public
area that is visible from a public area or easement, the items exposed have no
expectation of privacy.” Coyne Brief at 14. Coyne argues that the owner of the
uncovered box placed next to a public sidewalk has “no expectation of privacy.” Id.
at 15. The City responds that the plain view doctrine pertains to the Fourth
Amendment, which is inapplicable in this case because Coyne is not a law
enforcement officer. City Brief at 10. We agree.
As already explained, the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 8 of the Pennsylvania Constitution8 guarantee
individuals freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the government.
Commonwealth v. Hightower, 340 A.3d 1015, 1023 (Pa. Super. 2025). The plain
view doctrine allows police to seize property without a warrant where “(1) the police

8
PA. CONST. art. I, §8. It states:
The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions from
unreasonable searches and seizures, and no warrant to search any place or to seize
any person or things shall issue without describing them as nearly as may be, nor
without probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation subscribed to by the
affiant.
Id.
11
view the item from a lawful vantage point; (2) the incriminating nature of the item
is immediately apparent; and (3) the police have a lawful right of access to the item.”
Commonwealth v. Saunders, 326 A.3d 888, 897 (Pa. 2024).
Coyne is not a police officer, and the plain view doctrine did not allow
Coyne to scavenge the City’s property in violation of the City’s ordinance.
III. Anti-SLAPP Prohibition
In his third issue, Coyne argues that the City’s action was a “SLAPP”
lawsuit prohibited by Pennsylvania law. The City responds that it is seeking to
enforce a City ordinance prohibiting the scavenging of recyclables, to which the
Expression Protection Act is inapplicable. Further, the City argues that it is “not
attempting to silence [Coyne] from speaking out on matters of public interest or
concern[;]” it is seeking to “prevent [Coyne] from further divulging or disseminating
confidential personnel information of former employees[.]” City Brief at 12.
By way of background, anti-SLAPP laws are:
generally designed to lower or eliminate the costs and other
burdens of defending against SLAPPs, including, for example,
by providing mechanisms to obtain dismissal of meritless
lawsuits at the earliest stages of litigation, automatically staying
discovery, permitting defendants to immediately appeal a trial
court’s denial of an anti-SLAPP motion, and permitting
defendants who win their anti-SLAPP motions to recover
attorney fees and costs.

Michael Berry and Kaitlin M. Gurney, Pennsylvania Joins States Enacting Tough
Anti-SLAPP Protections: The New Uniform Public Expression Protection Act, 96
PENNSYLVANIA BAR ASSOCIATION QUARTERLY 1, 2-3 (2025). Pennsylvania enacted
the Expression Protection Act because of “a disturbing increase in lawsuits brought
primarily to chill the valid exercise of protected public expression[,]” and for the
reason that “[i]t is in the public interest to encourage continued participation in

12
matters of public significance[, which] participation should not be chilled through
abuse of the judicial process.” 42 Pa. C.S. §8340.12(1)-(2). The Expression
Protection Act “grants immunity to those groups or parties exercising the rights to
protected public expression” and thus provides that “a cause of action based on
protected public expression” is eligible for immunity from civil liability. 42 Pa. C.S.
§§8340.12(3)(i), 8340.15. However, the Expression Protection Act does not apply
to claims asserted in a civil action “[b]y a government unit or an employee or agent
of the government unit acting in an official capacity to enforce a law, regulation or
ordinance.” 42 Pa. C.S. §8340.14(b)(2).
Here, the City filed an action to enforce its ordinance on recycling,
which prohibits the scavenging of recyclables. Coyne admits that he went through
the boxes, labeled “Shred 2033,” and he took pictures of the files inside these boxes.
The City’s suit seeks only to prevent Coyne from disclosing any information
contained in the personnel files placed in those boxes, which is City property. The
City does not seek to prevent Coyne from attending any City Council meetings or
speaking out about an alleged data breach or on any matters of public interest.
The trial court did not err in denying Coyne’s request to dismiss the
City’s petition.
IV. Disclosure of Former Employee Names
In his fourth issue, Coyne argues that the names and salaries of City
employees constitute public information and, thus, he cannot be restrained from
disclosing a City employee’s name. Coyne further argues that the First Amendment
to the United States Constitution9 protects freedom of the press. Any embarrassment

9
U.S. CONST. amend. I. It states: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
13
to the individuals whose names would be released “does not minimize the protection
afforded” to the press. Coyne Brief at 23 (quoting Salazar v. Golden State Warriors,
No. C-99-4825 (N.D. Cal. February 29, 2000)).10 The City responds that every
former employee has the right “to control access to, or the dissemination of, personal
information about himself or herself.” City Brief at 13 (quoting Governor’s Office
of Administration v. Campbell, 202 A.3d 890, 893 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2019)).
In Pennsylvania, an individual’s right to informational privacy is
guaranteed in article 1, section 1 of our Constitution, which includes “the interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters.” Pennsylvania State Education Association
v. Department of Community and Economic Development, 148 A.3d 142, 150 (Pa.
2016) (quoting In re June 1979 Allegheny County Investigating Grand Jury, 415
A.2d 73, 77 (Pa. 1980)). Similarly, the United States Supreme Court has recognized
“specific rights to informational privacy, including an individual’s ‘interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters’ and an ‘independence in making certain
kinds of important decisions.’” Id. Federal statutes provide specific privacy
protections for certain government records. For example, the Privacy Act prohibits
government agencies from disclosing any record, “except pursuant to a written
request by, or with the prior written consent of, the individual to whom the record
pertains[.]” 5 U.S.C. §552a(b).11

press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” Id.
10
In Salazar, the plaintiff was terminated due to alleged drug use. The employer’s private
investigator videotaped the plaintiff in the parking lot at a wedding reception and arriving and
leaving his home. The plaintiff filed suit against the employer, alleging that the employer invaded
his privacy by videotaping him. The court held that an invasion of the plaintiff’s privacy did not
occur because he was photographed only while in public view.
11
The term “record” is defined as
14
Pennsylvania’s Right-to-Know Law12 creates access to certain public
records, such as the names of government employees. Coyne, however, did not
obtain the names of the former City employees through a Right-to-Know Law
request or other lawful means. Rather, he obtained the names by scavenging through
boxes placed outside for recycling, in violation of the City’s ordinance. Coyne was
not entitled to view the information inside personnel files, any more than he was
entitled to walk into the City’s personnel office and demand to see personnel records.
See generally Act of November 26, 1978, P.L. 1212, as amended, 43 P.S. §§1321-
1324 (known as the “Inspection of Employment Records Law”).13
Coyne claims, however, that as a member of the press, he is entitled to
disclose information of interest to the public, even if illegally obtained. In support,
he cites New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per curiam)
(New York Times).
In that case, the United States sought to enjoin two newspapers from
publishing classified information that had been “leaked” to the press. Affirming the
judgment of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in United
States v. Washington Post Company, 446 F.2d 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1971), the Supreme
Court held that the government did not meet its burden of proof. Notably, the Court

any item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that contains
his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular
assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a photograph[.]
5 U.S.C. §552a(a)(4) (emphasis added).
12
Act of February 14, 2008, P.L. 6, 65 P.S. §§67.101-67.3104.
13
This law “protect[s] employment records by creating an expectation that only those who have a
legitimate need, or those explicitly authorized by an employee, will access the employee’s
records[.]” Campbell, 202 A.3d at 895.
15
of Appeals observed that the information had already been published in several
newspapers, which raised “substantial doubt that effective relief of the kind sought
by the government can be provided by the judiciary.” Id. at 1329. New York Times
does not stand for the broad proposition that illegally obtained information can be
disclosed by the press.
Even so, New York Times does not support Coyne. First, the City
ordinance forbids persons scavenging through the recyclables, and Coyne did not
challenge the validity of the ordinance. Second, the information subject to the trial
court injunction has not been widely disseminated, rendering injunctive relief futile,
as in New York Times. Third, Coyne is not in any way restrained from alerting the
public to a matter of public interest, i.e., the City’s negligent handling of its personnel
files. New York Times is inapposite.
The injunction prevents Coyne from revealing any information he
obtained illegally. To allow Coyne to reveal some information, such as names and
salaries, would be unworkable. It would create the opportunity for lapses that could
lead to disclosures that even Coyne acknowledges to be confidential, such as social
security numbers. We reject this issue on appeal.
V. City’s Standing
In his fifth issue, Coyne argues that the City lacked standing to seek an
injunction because it does not have a substantial, direct and immediate interest in the
personal information of its former employees. The City responds that Coyne did not
raise the issue of standing before the trial court and, thus, it is waived.
Standing is a threshold requirement that must be established to a
judicial disposition of a dispute. Previte v. Erie County Board of Elections, 320 A.3d
908, 912 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2024). Standing requires a party to have an interest “that is

16
substantial, direct, and immediate.” Id. A challenge to a party’s standing to sue is a
“‘prudential’ concern that can be waived in the event an opposing party does not
raise it at the earliest possible juncture.” Id. at 913 (citation omitted).
Coyne did not raise the issue of the City’s standing until he filed the
appeal. Because Coyne did not raise this issue at the earliest possible point, i.e.,
before the trial court, Coyne waived his ability to challenge the City’s standing.
VI. Discovery
Finally, Coyne argues that the trial court erred in holding the hearing on
a permanent injunction without first allowing discovery. Coyne sought the records
of statements made by Eskra; the video surveillance of the rear of the City Hall
building; and information on the City’s handling of personnel files.
A trial court’s discovery ruling will not be disturbed on appeal, absent
a clear abuse of discretion. Young v. Estate of Young, 138 A.3d 78, 86 (Pa. Cmwlth.
2016) (“A trial court’s decision to grant or deny pre-trial discovery falls within the
trial court’s discretion.”). The City sought to enjoin the disclosure of information
from personnel files that were the property of the City, and on this matter there were
no facts in dispute. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
Coyne’s discovery requests.
Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm the permanent injunction,
enjoining Coyne and his media company from disseminating, divulging and/or
disclosing personal information that he obtained, unlawfully, from the City’s
recycling bins in April of 2024.

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MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita

17
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

The City of Scranton :
:
v. : No. 1670 C.D. 2024
:
Thomas Coyne, a/k/a Tom :
Coyne & AFG Media, :
Appellant :

ORDER

AND NOW, this 24th day of March, 2026, the order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, dated November 7, 2024, is AFFIRMED.

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MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge Emerita