Prisoner Nerve Pain Treatment Case Screening Order

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April 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Michael L. Deweese v. Whittney Moore, Casey Jacobs-Campbell, Dr. Middaugh, Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC

District Court, S.D. Indiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 2:25-cv-00503

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (9)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (6.6K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
TERRE HAUTE DIVISION

MICHAEL L. DEWEESE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) No. 2:25-cv-00503-JPH-MG
)
WHITTNEY MOORE, )
CASEY JACOBS-CAMPBELL, )
DR. MIDDAUGH, )
CENTURION HEALTH OF INDIANA, LLC, )
)
Defendants. )

ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING
FURTHER PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff Michael Deweese is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Wabash
Valley Correctional Facility. He filed this civil action alleging he has received
inadequate treatment for nerve pain caused by an injury sustained during a
tooth extraction. Mr. Deweese filed an amended complaint, which is now the
operative complaint. Dkt. 7. Because Mr. Deweese is incarcerated, this Court
must screen the amended complaint before service on the defendants. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915A(a), (c).
I. Screening Standard
When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief
against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). To
determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same
standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).
Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content
that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable
for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The
Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent
standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).
II. The Amended Complaint
Mr. Deweese's factual allegations are accepted as true at the pleading

stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). Mr. Deweese
names the following defendants: (1) Indiana Statewide Dental Service Director
Dr. Whittney Moore, (2) Nurse Practitioner Casey Jacobs-Campbell, (3) Dentist
Dr. Middaugh, and (4) Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC.
Mr. Deweese provides a very comprehensive account of the treatment he
has been provided in his amended complaint. To summarize, Mr. Deweese
experienced nerve damage after a wisdom tooth extraction in April 2024. The
oral surgeon recommended Gabapentin/Neurontin on several occasions as the

best medication to treat nerve damage. NP Jacobs-Campbell submitted requests
for Neurontin, but those requests were repeatedly denied by Dr. Moore. Other
medications proved ineffective to treat Mr. Deweese's nerve pain. At some point,
NP Jacobs-Campbell said that she could do nothing more to help with the issue
and that it should be handled by Dr. Middaugh and others in the dental
department, while the dental department said it was a medical issue.
Dr. Moore repeatedly rejected requests for Neurontin, telling Mr. Deweese

that he could not expect to be pain-free. Dr. Moore also rejected a
recommendation by the oral surgeon that Mr. Deweese be seen by a neurologist.
Mr. Deweese believes that some of Dr. Moore's treatment decisions were in
retaliation for him filing a grievance against her.
Eventually, Dr. Middaugh's dental assistant told Mr. Deweese that, after
consulting with Dr. Moore, the dental team had concluded that there was "no
reason to clinically intervene" but they would monitor Mr. Deweese's case. Dkt.
7 at 13.

Mr. Deweese attributes his poor medical care to several Centurion
practices or policies: (1) saving money by prescribing other medications in place
of Neurontin, (2) ignoring specialists' recommendation to prescribe Neurontin
under the pretext that inmates will abuse it, without an individualized
assessment of whether the inmate is likely to abuse it; (3) avoiding providing
proper care by shifting blame and responsibility amongst medical departments;
and (4) a practice of having a dental assistant make medical decisions on behalf
of Dr. Middaugh who "often looks lost or unsure as to what he is supposed to do

in many situations" while the dental assistant speaks over him. Id. at 17.
Mr. Deweese states that the lack of proper treatment for his pain has
decreased the quality of his life and caused mental health issues. He seeks
compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief.
III. Discussion of Claims
Although a plaintiff need not plead legal theories in a complaint, see Fed.
R. Civ. P. 8(a), Mr. Deweese has identified the theories he wishes to use—Eighth

Amendment deliberate indifference, First Amendment retaliation, policy-or-
practice claims under Monell v. Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), and
a state-law intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Where a pro se
litigant has expressly stated the legal theory he wishes to pursue, the district
court is not required to analyze whether the allegations in the complaint might
state a claim under a different legal theory. See Larry v. Goldsmith, 799 F. App'x
413, 416 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Clancy v. Office of Foreign Assets Control of U.S.
Dep't of Treasury, 559 F.3d 595, 606-07 (7th Cir. 2009)). Thus, the Court

analyzes Mr. Deweese's claims only under the theories he has identified.
Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the
complaint, certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as
submitted.
First, Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claims shall proceed
against Dr. Moore, NP Jacobs-Campbell, and Dr. Middaugh on the theory that
they have been deliberately indifferent to Mr. Deweese's ongoing nerve pain by
persisting in ineffective courses of treatment. Intentional infliction of emotional

distress claims shall proceed against the individual defendants.
A First Amendment retaliation claim shall proceed against Dr. Moore on
the theory that she provided poor medical care in retaliation for Mr. Deweese's
grievance activity.
Monell claims shall proceed against Centurion based on Mr. Deweese's
allegations that they had a policy or practice of not prescribing Neurontin to save
money, that they ignore specialists' recommendations, and that they have a

practice of relinquishing responsibility by shifting blame through various
departments. The claim related to Dr. Middaugh looking lost or deferring to his
dental assistant is dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted. While these facts may support an inference that Dr. Middaugh
was deliberately indifferent by failing to exercise his medical judgment,
Centurion cannot be held liable under a theory of "respondeat superior liability
for an employee's constitutional violations." Howell v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 653 (7th Cir. 2021).

Mr. Deweese's claim for injunctive relief shall proceed against Centurion.
See Gonzalez v. Feinerman, 663 F.3d 311, 315 (7th Cir. 2011) (noting that the
proper defendant in an injunctive relief action is the official "who would be
responsible for ensuring that any injunctive relief is carried out.").
This summary of claims includes all of the viable claims identified by the
Court. All other claims have been dismissed. If the plaintiff believes that
additional claims were alleged in the complaint, but not identified by the Court,
he shall have through May 18, 2026, in which to file a motion to reconsider the

screening order.
IV. Conclusion and Service of Process
The following claims are proceeding in this action: Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference and state law intentional infliction of emotional distress
claims against Dr. Moore, NP Jacobs-Campbell, and Dr. Middaugh, Eighth
Amendment Monellclaims against Centurion, and a First Amendment retaliation
claim against Dr. Moore. All other claims have been dismissed.
The clerk is directed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) to issue process
to defendants (1) Indiana Statewide Dental Service Director Dr. Whittney Moore,
(2) Nurse Practitioner Casey Jacobs-Campbell, (3) Dentist Dr. Middaugh, and (4)
Centurion Health of Indiana, LLC, in the manner specified by Rule 4(d). Process
shall consist of the amended complaint, dkt. [7], applicable forms (Notice of
Lawsuit and Request for Waiver of Service of Summons and Waiver of Service of
Summons), and this Order.
The clerk is directed to serve the Centurion employees electronically.
The individual defendants are identified as employees of Centurion. A copy
of this Order and the process documents shall also be served on Centurion
electronically. Centurion is ORDERED to provide the full name and last known
home address of any defendant who does not waive service if they have such
information. This information shall be filed ex parte.
Nothing in this Order prohibits the filing of a proper motion pursuant to
Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
SO ORDERED.

Date: 4/20/2026 Sjamnu Patrick \bawlove
James Patrick Hanlon
United States District Judge
Southern District of Indiana

Distribution:

MICHAEL L. DEWEESE
250134
WABASH VALLEY - CF
Wabash Valley Correctional Facility
Electronic Service Participant – Court Only

Electronic service to Centurion
Dr. Whittney Moore
NP Casey Jacobs-Campbell
Dr. Middaugh