Rodheim Taylor v. English - Prisoner Mental Health Due Process Complaint Dismissed Under Section 1915A Screening

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April 7, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Rodheim Taylor v. English, Centurion Medical Group LLC, Angle, Kuenzli, Kim Meyers, Leanne Iverus, Fairchild

District Court, N.D. Indiana

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:26-cv-00421

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (44)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (1.2K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA
SOUTH BEND DIVISION

RODHEIM TAYLOR,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:26-CV-421-PPS-JEM

ENGLISH, CENTURION MEDICAL
GROUP LLC, ANGLE, KUENZLI, KIM
MEYERS, LEANNE IVERUS,
FAIRCHILD,

Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER
Rodheim Taylor, a prisoner without a lawyer, filed a complaint. ECF 2. Under 28
U.S.C. § 1915A, I must screen a prisoner’s complaint and dismiss it if the action is
frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seeks
monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. To proceed
beyond the pleading stage, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter to “state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,
570 (2007). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that
allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Because Taylor is
proceeding without counsel, his allegations must be given liberal construction. Erickson
v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007).
Taylor, who is currently incarcerated at the Miami Correctional Facility (MCF),
alleges he was placed in administrative segregation for protective custody purposes on

October 4, 2025. He claims he was previously diagnosed with a serious mental illness
(SMI), but he doesn’t provide a specific diagnosis or details about his symptoms/needs.
He states that the “Centurion Medical Staff” are not providing him with “adequate
treatment for my mental health” and that “administrative staff” at MCF are not
following Indiana Department of Correction (IDOC) policies because he has been held
in administrative segregation for more than thirty consecutive days despite his SMI.

ECF 2 at 3. But he is seen weekly by Mrs. Fairchild, whom he describes as the “mental
health lady.” Id. at 9.
Taylor has written “several grievances, request for Interviews, and Medical
request forms, as well as been informing Medical Professionals and Mental health staff”
about the policy violation. Id. at 11. Specifically, he states, “Warden Mr. English, The

Unit team manager of Administrative Segregation Mr. Angle and the Mental health
psychologist have Clear knowledge that the Plaintiff is diagnosed with a (serious
Mental Illness) and continues to keep him in Administrative segregation” despite his
request for a transfer to a new facility. Id. Here is how he describes the happenings
inside the administrative segregation unit:

Inmates in administrative segregation sporadically kick on there (sic)
assigned cell doors because Correctional Officers who work on unit fail to
answer the button in the inmates cell. Inmates set fires frequently which
causes extreme chaos from other inmates yelling. This causes the Plaintiff
to have heighten Anexity (sic) and spurts of chronic depression because he
feels hopeless and helpless at the fact he has been in here over the
extended Period of time Policies states.
Id. at 12.
Taylor has sued Centurion Medical Group, LLC, Unit Team Manager Mr. Angle,
Medical Director Mr. Kuenzli, Assistant Medical Director Kim Meyers, Health Services
Administrator Leanne Iverus, Mental Health Professional Mrs. Fairchild, and Warden
English for monetary damages. He also seeks “to be transferred to a facility that will

Provide better treatment for my (Serious Mental Illness) classification.” Id. at 16.
The focus of Taylor’s complaint is that he has been held in administrative
segregation for more than thirty consecutive days, which allegedly violates IDOC
policy. As an initial matter, I note that, while it may be helpful evidence, a violation of
IDOC policy alone isn’t a constitutional claim. Scott v. Edinburg, 346 F.3d 752, 760 (7th

Cir. 2003) (observing that “42 U.S.C. § 1983 protects plaintiffs from constitutional
violations, not violations of state laws or . . . departmental regulations”); Conner v.
Hoem, 768 F. App’x 560, 564 (7th Cir. 2019) (“In any case, the Constitution does not
require state actors to enforce their own policies and regulations.”) (citing Garcia v.
Kankakee Cnty. Hous. Auth., 279 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 2002)).

I will construe his allegations about his classification under the Fourteenth
Amendment which provides that state officials shall not “deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law . . ..” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Due
process is only required when punishment extends the duration of confinement or
imposes an “atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary

incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). In other words,
“disciplinary segregation can trigger due process protections depending on the duration
and conditions of segregation.” Jackson v. Anastasio, 150 F.4th 851, 858 (7th Cir. 2025)

(quoting Marion v. Columbia Correction Inst., 559 F.3d 693, 697 (7th Cir. 2009) (emphasis
in original)). Both the duration and the severity of the conditions themselves must be
considered when determining whether the prisoner’s placement in solitary confinement
triggers due process protections—the length of time must be “substantial” and the
conditions must be “unusually harsh.” Id. Similarly, while inmates don’t generally have a liberty interest in “avoiding

transfer to discretionary segregation—that is, segregation imposed for administrative,
protective, or investigative purposes[,]” Townsend v. Fuchs, 522 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir.
2008) (emphasis added) (citing Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 608–09 & 608 n.4 (7th Cir.
2005)), the same analysis applies with regard to duration and the harshness of the
conditions. See e.g., Isby v. Brown, 856 F.3d 508, 524 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Prisoners do not

have a constitutional right to remain in the general population, . . . but both the
duration and the conditions of the segregation must be considered in determining
whether due process is implicated.”) (internal quotation marks, parenthesis, and
citations omitted; emphasis in original); Marion, 559 F.3d at 697 -98 & nn.2–3 (collecting
cases that held segregation of two to ninety days does not trigger due process concerns

and stating, “In a number of other cases, we have explained that a liberty interest may
arise if the length of segregated confinement is substantial and the record reveals that
the conditions of confinement are unusually harsh.”) (emphasis added); Lekas, 405 F.3d
at 612 (finding that up to ninety days in segregation does not affect liberty); see also
Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224 (2005) (recognizing “duration” is a component that
plays a part in determining whether a liberty interest exists).

But once an inmate shows a particular placement implicates a liberty interest, he
has a right to a meaningful review, which periodically “evaluates the prisoner’s current
circumstances and future prospects, and, considering the reason(s) for his confinement
to the program, determines whether that placement remains warranted.’” Isby, 856 F.3d
at 527 (quoting Toevs v. Reid, 685 F.3d 903, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2012)).
Taylor has been held in administrative segregation for approximately six

months, which may trigger due process concerns if the conditions are sufficiently harsh.
See Marion, 559 F.3d at 697; see also Jackson, 150 F.4th at 859–60 (discussing duration and
collecting cases suggesting that “solitary confinement of up to one year, standing alone,
is not sufficient to implicate a liberty interest”). The problem with Taylor’s complaint is
that it doesn’t sufficiently allege such conditions. The only description he provides is

that inmates “sporadically” kick on their cell doors because officers don’t answer call
buttons and that they set fires “frequently” which causes yelling and chaos. Taylor
claims these actions by the other inmates trigger his anxiety and create “spurts” of
depression, but he doesn’t provide details about the fires or suggest they have caused
any physical damage. Thus, these vague allegations fall short of suggesting the

conditions were/are atypically harsh. See, e.g., Jackson, 150 F.4th at 860 (distinguishing
between “disgusting” conditions and those that were simply restrictive and
unpleasant). Therefore, I find that Taylor hasn’t stated any plausible Fourteenth
Amendment due process claims.
I must also consider whether the conditions of Taylor’s confinement violate the
Eighth Amendment.1 The Eighth Amendment prohibits conditions of confinement that

deny inmates “the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Townsend, 522 F.3d at
773 (citations omitted). An officer can violate the Constitution if he or she exhibits
deliberate indifference to hazardous conditions that may seriously harm an inmate.
Thomas v. Blackard, 2 F.4th 716, 719 (7th Cir. 2021). Deliberate indifference encompasses
both objective and subjective components:
A prisoner challenging conditions of confinement must first show that the
conditions were sufficiently serious as an objective matter, meaning that
they denied the inmate the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities,
creating an excessive risk to the inmate’s health and safety. Second, in
covering the subjective component of the inquiry, the inmate must prove
that prison officials acted with deliberate indifference—that they knew of
and disregarded this excessive risk of harm to the inmate.

Thomas, 2 F.4th at 719–20 (internal quotation marks, citations, and brackets omitted). Put
another way, an inmate can state a viable claim for deliberate indifference if he alleges
the defendant “deliberately ignored a prison condition that presented an objectively,
sufficiently serious risk of harm.” Pyles v. Fahim, 771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014)
(citation omitted).
“Generally speaking, challenges to conditions of confinement cannot be
aggregated and considered in combination unless ‘they have a mutually enforcing effect
that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable need such as food, warmth, or
exercise—for example, a low cell temperature at night combined with a failure to issue

1 See Townsend, 522 F.3d at 772-73 (“The issue of cell conditions in TLU is best analyzed as a claim
brought under the Eighth Amendment.”).
blankets.’” Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 904 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304 (1991)). Allegations of vague “overall conditions” aren’t sufficient. Id. Regarding state of mind, “[d]eliberate indifference occupies a space slightly below
intent and poses a ‘high hurdle and an exacting standard’ requiring ‘something
approaching a total unconcern for the prisoner’s welfare in the face of serious risks.’”
Stockton v. Milwaukee Cnty., 44 F.4th 605, 615 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Donald v. Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 458 (7th Cir. 2020)); see also Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th
703, 710 (7th Cir. 2022) (stating that deliberate-indifference claims will fail absent

evidence of “callous disregard” for inmate wellbeing). “Negligence, or even objective
recklessness, is insufficient to satisfy deliberate indifference.” Stockton, 44 F.4th at 615.
Again, Taylor’s vague allegations about inmates kicking on their cell doors and
setting fires aren’t sufficient to show the conditions subjected Taylor to an excessive risk
to his health or safety. For example, he doesn’t explain when the fires occurred, where

they were located in relation to his cell, or whether he was affected by smoke or other
physical dangers. Nor does he allege that he, personally, had to kick on his cell door
because of a lack of attention from staff about any specific issue. See generally Thomas, 2
F.4th at 719–22 (describing the types of conditions that rise to the level of a violation);
Isby, 856 F.3d at 522–23 (same); see also Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 403 (7th

Cir. 2010) (“[A] plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on paper that, in the
hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has happened to her that
might be redressed by the law.”) (emphasis in original); Bissessur v. Indiana Univ. Bd. of
Trs., 581 F.3d 599, 602 (7th Cir. 2009) (claim must be plausible on its face). Moreover,
Taylor doesn’t plausibly allege that any of the named defendants participated in or
were aware of, yet turned a blind eye to, those specific issues. Rather, his allegations are

generalized and focus almost solely on the fact that he was held in segregation longer
than IDOC policy allows. Overseeing prison operations and being copied on grievances
isn’t sufficient to state a claim. See Moderson v. City of Neenah, 137 F.4th 611, 617 (7th Cir.
2025) (“A defendant cannot be held liable for a constitutional violation if she did not
cause or participate in the alleged violation.”) (citation omitted)); Aguilar v. Gaston-
Camara, 861 F.3d 626, 633 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[T]he division of labor is critical to the

efficient functioning of the [prison] organization.”); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2009) (There is no general respondeat superior liability under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.); see also Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 894–95 (7th Cir. 2024) (finding that the
officers responsible for the decision to place plaintiff in department-wide restrictive
housing didn’t violate the Eighth Amendment because they didn’t create the conditions,

make them worse, or have responsibility or the authority to change them).
I must, however, also assess Taylor’s allegations in light of his mental health
issues. Inmates are entitled to constitutionally adequate medical care for serious
medical conditions. Thomas, 2 F.4th at 722. To establish liability under the Eighth
Amendment, a prisoner must show: (1) his medical need was objectively serious; and

(2) the defendant acted with deliberate indifference to that need. Farmer v. Brennan, 511
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). For a medical professional to be held liable for deliberate
indifference to an inmate’s medical needs, he or she must make a decision that
represents “such a substantial departure from accepted professional judgment, practice,
or standards, as to demonstrate that the person responsible actually did not base the
decision on such a judgment.” Jackson v. Kotter, 541 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2008). As the

Seventh Circuit has explained:
[M]edical professionals are not required to provide proper medical treatment to
prisoners, but rather they must provide medical treatment that reflects
professional judgment, practice, or standards. There is not one proper way to
practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses based on
prevailing standards in the field. A medical professional’s treatment decisions
will be accorded deference unless no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances. Id. at 697-98. Put another way, inmates are “not entitled to demand specific care,”
Walker v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 940 F.3d 954, 965 (7th Cir. 2019), nor are they
entitled to “the best care possible.” Forbes v. Edgar, 112 F.3d 262, 267 (7th Cir. 1997); see
also Johnson v. Doughty, 433 F.3d 1001, 1013 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Eighth Amendment
does not require that prisoners receive unqualified access to health care.”).
Accordingly, deference must be given “to medical professionals’ treatment
decisions unless there is evidence that no minimally competent professional would
have so responded under those circumstances.” Walker, 940 F.3d at 965 (citation and
quotation marks omitted). This standard “reflects the reality that there is no single
‘proper’ way to practice medicine in a prison, but rather a range of acceptable courses
based on prevailing standards in the field.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1024 (7th
Cir. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, it is not enough
that a medical professional be mistaken in his or her judgment. As noted above, the
deliberate indifference standard requires a something “akin to criminal recklessness,”
Thomas, 2 F.4th at 722, rather than “negligence, gross negligence, or even recklessness.”
Hildreth v. Butler, 960 F.3d 420, 425–26 (7th Cir. 2020). Ignoring an inmate’s complaints
of pain or delaying necessary treatment can amount to deliberate indifference,
particularly where the delay “exacerbates an inmate’s medical condition or

unnecessarily prolongs suffering.” Goodloe v. Sood, 947 F.3d 1026, 1031 (7th Cir. 2020)
(citations and quotation marks omitted).
With regard to non-medical prison officials, they generally don’t violate the
Constitution it they “reasonably relied on the judgment of medical personnel.” Eagan v.
Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667, 694 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake, 900 F.3d 335,
343 (7th Cir. 2018)). While prison officials are “presumptively entitled to defer to the

professional judgment of the facility’s medical officials on questions of prisoners’
medical care[,]” they may not ignore a prisoner’s complaints entirely or refuse to act if
they know the medical staff is failing to treat the prisoner. Id. (internal quotation marks
and citations omitted). That said, “[a]n official’s ‘mere negligence in failing to detect and
prevent subordinates’ misconduct is not sufficient.’” Id. (quoting Arnett v. Webster, [658

F.3d 742, 755](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/613467/arnett-v-webster/#755) (7th Cir. 2011)).
Here, Taylor repeatedly insists he isn’t being provided with adequate mental
health treatment. However, he provides very few factual assertions to support that
position. He claims he was diagnosed with a SMI, but he doesn’t provide any details
about that diagnosis. As for how the conditions have affected him, he states only that he

has heightened anxiety and “spurts” of depression. Without additional information, I
can’t determine whether his medical issue as it relates to the conditions of his
confinement was/is objectively serious. Moreover, Taylor hasn’t identified a defendant
who acted with deliberate indifference to his needs. Regarding the medical
professionals, he admits he is seen weekly by a “mental health lady” named Mrs.
Fairchild, so it’s clear he is receiving at least some care for his SMI.2 He doesn’t provide

any other details about the treatment he actually did receive, why it was allegedly
deficient, or whether he is being medicated. He further claims that Medical Director
Keunzli and Assistant Medical Meyers, and HSA Iverus have been negligent because
they know he has a SMI, is being held in administrative segregation, and hasn’t been
provided with adequate treatment. Absent more details, however, this amounts to little
more than a legal conclusion. See Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403; Bissessur, 581 F.3d at 602.3

As to the non-medical professionals, Taylor’s claims are similarly vague. He
believes UTM Angle and Warden English have violated his constitutional rights
because he is being held in administrative segregation “without a transfer” for longer
than IDOC policy allows despite his SMI. He says he has filed grievances about the
matter stating the same thing and noting that he isn’t being provided with adequate

mental health treatment, but, again, those complaints are described only in the most
general terms. Without more, it’s not reasonable to infer either of these defendants have
been deliberately indifferent to his needs, especially considering Taylor admits he is
being seen weekly by a mental health professional. See, e.g., Eagan, 987 F.3d at 694 2 See also ECF 9 (grievance dated March 13, 2026, stating, “I talk to mental health every week
because of my SMI status.”).
3 Taylor has also sued Centurion Medical Group, LLC, but there is no respondeat superior liability
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983—a private company can’t be held liable for damages simply because it employed a
medical professional who engaged in wrongdoing. J.K.J. v. Polk Cnty., 960 F.3d 367, 377 (7th Cir. 2020).
Nor has Taylor stated a plausible claim under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
(prison officials may defer to the judgment of the facility’s medical professionals).
Conclusory allegations that he has been denied adequate mental health treatment aren’t

sufficient.
In sum, the complaint is short on facts, dates, and specifics about his precise
issues and the mental health treatment he has received. Based on what it does say, it’s
not plausible to infer that he is not receiving constitutionally adequate medical care. See
Swanson, 614 F.3d at 403 (“[A] plaintiff must do better than putting a few words on
paper that, in the hands of an imaginative reader, might suggest that something has

happened to her that might be redressed by the law.”) (emphasis in original)); see also
Sanders v. Moss, 153 F.4th 557, 560–71 (7th Cir. 2025) (noting that case of inmate with
SMI who was forced to spend eight years in segregation was a “tragic one” but finding
no Eighth Amendment violation); Johnson v. Prentice, 29 F.4th 895, 901–05 (7th Cir. 2022)
(prisoner who suffered from SMI was held in segregation for approximately three years

but no Eighth Amendment violation because conditions weren’t sufficiently serious and
his SMI was “regularly monitored” by mental health professionals). As it stands, Taylor
has failed to state any plausible Eighth Amendment claims.
The current complaint does not state a claim for which relief can be granted. If
Taylor believes he can state a claim based on (and consistent with) the events described

in this complaint, he may file an amended complaint because “[t]he usual standard in
civil cases is to allow defective pleadings to be corrected, especially in early stages, at
least where amendment would not be futile.” Abu-Shawish v. United States, 898 F.3d 726,
738 (7th Cir. 2018). To file an amended complaint, he needs to write this cause number
on a Pro Se 14 (INND Rev. 2/20) Prisoner Complaint form which is available from his
law library. He needs to write the word “Amended” on the first page above the title

“Prisoner Complaint” and send it to the court after he properly completes the form.
As a final matter, Taylor has filed a separate motion for preliminary injunctive
relief. ECF 4. A preliminary injunction is a “very far-reaching power, never to be
indulged in except in a case clearly demanding it.” Cassell v. Snyders, 990 F.3d 539, 544 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Orr v. Shicker, 953 F.3d 490, 501 (7th Cir. 2020)). To obtain a
preliminary injunction, a movant “must make a threshold showing that: (1) absent

preliminary injunctive relief, he will suffer irreparable harm in the interim prior to a
final resolution; (2) there is no adequate remedy at law; and (3) he has a reasonable
likelihood of success on the merits.” Tully v. Okeson, 977 F.3d 608, 612-13 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quoting Turnell v. CentiMark Corp., 796 F.3d 656, 662 (7th Cir. 2015)); see also Winter v.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).

As to the merits, “the applicant need not show that it definitely will win the
case.” Illinois Republican Party v. Pritzker, 973 F.3d 760, 763 (7th Cir. 2020). However, “a
mere possibility of success is not enough.” Id. at 762. “A strong showing . . . normally
includes a demonstration of how the applicant proposes to prove the key elements of its
case.” Id. at 763 (quotation marks omitted). In assessing the merits, I need not simply

“accept [the plaintiff’s] allegations as true” or “give him the benefit of all reasonable
inferences in his favor, as would be the case in evaluating a motion to dismiss on the
pleadings.” Doe v. Univ. of S. Ind., 43 F.4th 784, 791 (7th Cir. 2022). Instead, the merits
must be assessed as “they are likely to be decided after more complete discovery and
litigation.” Id. at 792.4 With regard to irreparable harm, “[i]ssuing a preliminary
injunction based only on a possibility of irreparable harm is inconsistent with . . .

injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear
showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter, 555 U.S. at 22. If the movant
meets all the threshold requirements, I may then “consider the balance of harms
between the parties and the effect of granting or denying a preliminary injunction on
the public interest.” Tully, 977 F.3d at 613 (quotation marks omitted).
“Mandatory preliminary injunctions” requiring the defendant to take affirmative

acts—such as transferring an inmate to another prison—are viewed with particular
caution and are “sparingly issued[.]” Mays v. Dart, 974 F.3d 810, 818 (7th Cir. 2020)
(quotation marks omitted). Additionally, in the prison context, my ability to grant
injunctive relief is significantly circumscribed; any remedial injunctive relief “must be
narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to remedy the constitutional

violation, and use the least intrusive means to correct the violation of the federal right.”
Westefer v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 681 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
Here, Taylor asks to be transferred to a different facility and placed into the
general population there. However, he has no chance of success on the merits of such an

4 The Seventh Circuit has recognized this step is “often decisive,” and a court need not analyze
the remaining elements when that is the case. Univ. of S. Ind., 43 F.4th at 791.
injunctive relief claim because—as described in detail above—his complaint fails to
state any plausible claims.5

Accordingly:
(1) The motion for preliminary injunctive relief (ECF 4) is DENIED;
(2) Rodheim Taylor is GRANTED until May 12, 2026, to file an amended
complaint; and
(3) Rodheim Taylor is CAUTIONED that if he doesn’t do so by the deadline, this
case will be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A without further notice because the

current complaint does not state any claims for which relief can be granted.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
ENTERED: April 7, 2026.
/s/ Philip P. Simon
PHILIP P. SIMON, JUDGE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 I also note that in a grievance dated March 13, 2026, which he has attached to his motion, Taylor
acknowledges that he “talk[s] to mental health every week because of my SMI status.” ECF 4-1. Thus, he
is currently receiving at least some care.