Darryl Crenshaw v. Tawana Furtick, et al — Prisoner §1983 Medical Deliberate Indifference Claims Proceed

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Darryl Crenshaw v. Tawana Furtick, et al

District Court, D. Connecticut

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 3:25-cv-01726

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (23)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (2K)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF CONNECTICUT
--------------------------------------------------------------- x
DARRYL CRENSHAW, :
:
Plaintiff, :
:
v. : 3:25-CV-1726 (SFR)
:
TAWANA FURTICK, et al, :
:
Defendants. :
--------------------------------------------------------------- x

INITIAL REVIEW ORDER

Plaintiff Darryl Crenshaw, a man serving a sentence of incarceration in the custody of
the Connecticut Department of Correction (“DOC”), has filed a Complaint under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and Connecticut state law.1 Crenshaw contends that correctional medical staff at
MacDougall-Walker Correctional Center (“MacDougall”), failed to provide appropriate
treatment for his respiratory illness and knee injuries. Crenshaw claims damages and seeks
injunctive relief from DOC employees Tawana Furtick, Jennifer Cruz, Vivianne Martel, J.
Jackson, Jasmine Rivera, Dr. Estime, and Colleen Gallagher (collectively “Defendants”), in
their individual and official capacities.
For the reasons that follow, Crenshaw’s claims of Eighth Amendment deliberate
indifference to serious medical needs related to his respiratory illness and knee pain may
proceed against Defendants Dr. Estime and Vivianne Martel in their individual capacities.
Crenshaw’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference claim related to his knee injury may

1 I take judicial notice of the Department of Correction’s public records, which disclose that
Crenshaw has been imprisoned since January 2009 and was sentenced in April 2015. See Costa v.
Kocaqi, No. 3:24-CV-01586 (KAD), 2025 WL 1207538, at *2 n.3 (D. Conn. Apr. 25, 2025).
proceed against Dr. Estime in his individual capacity. Crenshaw’s official capacity claims may
proceed against Cruz, Martel, Dr. Estime, and Gallagher. Crenshaw’s state-law medical
malpractice claim related to his respiratory illness may also proceed against Dr. Estime. All

other claims are dismissed, and all other defendants are terminated.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Although I do not set forth all the facts asserted in Crenshaw’s complaint, I will
summarize his basic factual contentions here to give context to my ruling below. Because
Crenshaw’s claims involve largely unrelated events, I will summarize Crenshaw’s assertions
regarding his respiratory illness first and then summarize his assertions regarding his knee
injuries next.

A. Respiratory Illness
In early January 2025, Crenshaw reported to prison officials that he was “suffering from
a violent, painful cough” that affected his “ability to breath[e]” and “caused headaches and
vomiting.” Compl. ¶ 12, ECF No. 1. Crenshaw requested a “sick call” visit in mid-January but
received no response. Id. ¶ 13. Crenshaw again requested a sick call visit in late January,
describing “what he thought may be long[-]term covid symptoms.” Id. ¶ 14. Prison officials
told Crenshaw that they would place him on a list to be seen at sick call. Id. Multiple sick call
dates came and went without medical staff seeing Crenshaw. Id. ¶ 15.

Medical staff saw Crenshaw for the first time in mid-February after a correctional
officer requested an emergency visit. Id. ¶ 16. Sometime after this visit, Crenshaw saw Dr.
Estime, who prescribed Crenshaw Mucinex but refused to attempt to diagnose Crenshaw. Id.
¶ 17. The Mucinex had no effect on Crenshaw’s cough. Id. ¶ 18. Crenshaw approached prison
officials about his cough during a “wellness check” in mid-March. Id. ¶ 19. Prison officials
told Crenshaw to write sick call. Id. Crenshaw thereafter filed an inmate request related to the lack of care he received at

the wellness check. Id. The inmate request went unanswered. Id. Crenshaw filed a Level 1
health services grievance related to the inmate request. Id. The Level 1 health services
grievance went unanswered. Id. Crenshaw filed a Level 2 health services grievance. Id. Prison
officials rejected the Level 2 health services grievance. Id. After meeting with prison officials,
however, prison officials upheld the Level 1 health services grievance and scheduled a meeting
with “R.C.O.O. Cruz.” Id. This meeting with Cruz never occurred, and prison officials did not
resolve the subject of the Level 1 health services grievance. Id. The day after the wellness check, Crenshaw’s coughing became severe enough that he
vomited. Id. ¶ 20. A correctional officer thought Crenshaw was overdosing on drugs. Id. After
Crenshaw explained to the officer why he was vomiting, another correctional officer contacted
the medical department to tell them that Crenshaw had a severe cough and was having
difficulty breathing. Id. Vivianne Martel, the Correctional Head Nurse, id. ¶ 6, told the officer
to “wait until [Crenshaw] falls out[,] and call a code white,” which Crenshaw describes as a

“medical emergency on the radio.” Id. ¶ 22.
Prison staff made “multiple emergency third party referrals to sick call” later that day.
See id. ¶ 25. A “concerned nurse” contacted a medical provider, who prescribed Crenshaw a
steroid. Id. Two days after the provider prescribed the steroid, Crenshaw “was skipped for
med-line.” Id. ¶ 26. A nurse refused to open Crenshaw’s cell door after Crenshaw explained
his need for the medication. Id. Crenshaw did not receive the medication. Id. A correctional
officer made another emergency referral to sick call after Crenshaw failed to receive his
medication. See id. ¶ 27. Crenshaw then saw a medical provider named Eva, who “incorrectly”
diagnosed Crenshaw as having bronchitis. Id. Eva provided an antibiotic and breathing
treatment to be used with the steroid. Id. ¶ 28. Crenshaw’s cough persisted despite the

treatment prescribed. Id. ¶ 29.
Crenshaw later went through the administrative remedy process described above,
receiving the same results. See id. ¶ 24. Crenshaw and his then-fiancé also wrote Colleen
Gallager, the Health Services Director in DOC’s central office. Id. ¶¶ 10, 30-31. Gallagher
responded to Crenshaw’s fiancé and forwarded Crenshaw’s complaint to Cruz. Id. ¶ 32.
Crenshaw’s fiancé then contacted Cruz, who responded to Crenshaw’s fiancé by email. Id.
¶ 33. Gallagher wrote Crenshaw in mid-May to tell Crenshaw that “there may be a processing

or mail system error” and that Cruz would investigate. Id. ¶ 34. J. Jackson, the Health Services
Administrative Remedy Coordinator, also wrote to Crenshaw to tell him that there had been a
delay in processing health services grievances “due to unforeseen circumstances.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 35.
Crenshaw filed other inmate request forms about his cough in mid-June and mid-July. Id. ¶¶ 36-37. Crenshaw filed his request in July after coughing so hard that he “possibly
suffered a herniated belly button.” Id. ¶ 37. Crenshaw “could actually feel his insides

protruding out of his belly button.” Id. Dr. Estime saw Crenshaw in mid-August. Id. ¶ 38.
Crenshaw was mainly concerned with obtaining a diagnosis during that visit. Id. ¶ 39. Dr.
Estime opined that Crenshaw did not have bronchitis, but Dr. Estime’s priority was treating
Crenshaw’s symptoms, not providing a diagnosis. Id. Dr. Estime was nevertheless
“concern[ed]” with how long Crenshaw’s cough had persisted and indicated that a pulmonary
specialist would need to see Crenshaw. Id. ¶ 40. Dr. Estime also “re-prescribed” the same
medication regimen that Eva had prescribed, adding only an inhaler. Id. ¶ 41.
Three days passed without Crenshaw receiving the medications Dr. Estime prescribed.
See id. ¶ 44. A nurse called Dr. Estime to confirm Crenshaw’s prescriptions. Id. Dr. Estime
had not filled the prescriptions or set up an appointment with a pulmonary specialist. Id. ¶ 45.

Crenshaw saw Dr. Estime again in late August. Id. ¶ 46. Crenshaw told Dr. Estime that the
medications he received were ineffective and that Crenshaw had not received an inhaler or
breathing treatment. Id. Dr. Estime again prescribed the same medication regimen as he had
before and expressed the need for Crenshaw to see a pulmonary specialist. Id. ¶ 47. However,
Dr. Estime again failed to fill the prescription for the inhaler and breathing treatment or
schedule an appointment with a pulmonary specialist. Id. ¶ 48.
Crenshaw saw Dr. Estime again in early April 2025. Id. ¶ 49. Dr. Estime had not made

the appointment with the pulmonary specialist, though he had filled the prescription for the
inhaler. Id. Dr. Estime told Crenshaw that he would have to see how the inhaler worked before
scheduling an appointment with a pulmonary specialist. Id. ¶ 50. After “ongoing settlement
negotiations” with an Assistant Attorney General, Dr. Estime “supposedly” made an
appointment for Crenshaw to see a pulmonary specialist. Id. ¶ 51 (internal quotation marks
omitted). To date, Crenshaw has not seen a pulmonary specialist and he continues to suffer

from a “violent and painful cough.” Id. ¶ 52.
B. Knee Injuries
Crenshaw also has two surgically repaired knees that cause him “severe knee pain and
numbness.” Id. ¶ 53. Crenshaw began writing inmate requests complaining of knee pain in
April 2025. Id. ¶ 54. He wrote an inmate request in May 2025 seeking treatment for what
seemed to be ligament damage in both knees. Id. ¶ 55. In response, medical staff administered
“5 or 6” X-rays on Crenshaw’s knees. Id. ¶ 56. Medical staff did not discuss the results of the
X-rays with Crenshaw. Id. ¶ 57.
Crenshaw met with Dr. Estime in August 2025 to discuss Crenshaw’s knee pain. Id. ¶

1. Dr. Estime ordered more X-rays despite having access to the X-rays already administered and Crenshaw’s concern that ligament damage could not be seen on X-rays. Id. ¶ 59. Dr. Estime also stated he would obtain Crenshaw’s post-surgery MRIs taken over ten years ago. Id. ¶ 60. Dr. Estime did not physically examine Crenshaw’s knees or discuss existing X-rays with Crenshaw. Id. ¶ 61. Crenshaw met with Dr. Estime approximately two weeks later to continue discussing Crenshaw’s knee injuries. Id. ¶ 63. Dr. Estime had forgotten to obtain Crenshaw’s post-surgery

MRIs and attempted to order the X-rays that Dr. Estime purportedly ordered at Crenshaw’s
last visit. Id. ¶ 64. Dr. Estime did not physically examine Crenshaw’s knees or discuss the
existing X-rays at this appointment, either. Id. ¶ 65.
Crenshaw met with Dr. Estime again in September 2025 to discuss Crenshaw’s knee
pain. Id. ¶ 66. Crenshaw sought an MRI on both knees. Id. Dr. Estime had not obtained
Crenshaw’s post-surgical MRIs, did not physically examine Crenshaw’s knees, and did not

discuss existing X-rays with Crenshaw. Id. Crenshaw was eventually able to negotiate an appointment with an orthopedic doctor
through the Attorney General’s office. Id. ¶ 67. The orthopedic doctor discussed Crenshaw’s
X-ray results at that appointment. Id. ¶ 68. The orthopedic doctor told Crenshaw that he had
“highly visible and prominent large bone ossicles” that were large enough to interfere with the
movement in Crenshaw’s knees and cause him pain. Id. ¶ 69 (capitalization modified). The
orthopedic doctor conducted a physical examination of Crenshaw’s knees, during which the
doctor determined that Crenshaw’s left knee required surgery. Id. ¶ 70. The orthopedic doctor
also ordered MRIs for both knees because the right knee was “all but guaranteed” to need
surgery, too. Id. ¶ 71.

As of the date of filing his complaint, Crenshaw continued to suffer pain and numbness
in his knees and was not receiving any medical care for his knee injuries. Id. ¶ 72.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, courts must review civil complaints in which a prisoner
seeks redress from a governmental entity and dismiss any portion that “(1) is frivolous,
malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary
relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)-(2).

Although highly detailed allegations are not required, the complaint must “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This plausibility standard is not a “probability
requirement” but imposes a standard higher than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted

unlawfully.” Id. In undertaking this analysis, the court must “draw all reasonable inferences in [a
plaintiff’s] favor, assume all well-pleaded factual allegations to be true, and determine whether
they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Faber v. Metro Life Ins. Co., 648 F.3d 98,
104 (2d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). But the court is not “bound to accept
conclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions,” id., and “a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
With respect to pro se litigants, it is well-established that “[p]ro se submissions are

reviewed with special solicitude, and ‘must be construed liberally and interpreted to raise the
strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Matheson v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 706 F.
App’x 24, 26 (2d Cir. 2017) (summary order) (quoting Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam)).
III. DISCUSSION
The Complaint asserts two separate claims of deliberate medical indifference in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Compl. 6, 16, 21. The first claim relates to Crenshaw’s

respiratory illness. The second claim relates to his knee pain. As I explain below, both claims—
together with a Connecticut state-law claim of medical malpractice—may proceed to service.
A. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs Standard
The Supreme Court has held that deliberate indifference by prison officials to an
incarcerated person’s serious medical needs constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in
violation of the Eighth Amendment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976). There is a
subjective and an objective component to an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate
indifference. See Salahuddin v. Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279-80 (2d Cir. 2006).

To establish the objective component of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim, the alleged deprivation of medical care must be “sufficiently serious.” Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). This objective showing in turn requires a court to make two
inquiries. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279. First, I must determine whether the plaintiff was
“actually deprived of adequate medical care.” Id. A “prison official’s duty is only to provide
reasonable care,” so “prison officials who act reasonably in response to an inmate-health risk
cannot be found liable under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.” Id. at 279-80 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted; alteration adopted). Second, I must determine

“whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious,” which requires examining
“how the offending conduct is inadequate and what harm, if any, the inadequacy has caused
or will likely cause the [plaintiff].” Id. at 280. This will differ based on whether the issue is
failure to provide any medical treatment, inadequate treatment, or delayed treatment. See Smith
v. Carpenter, 316 F.3d 178, 184-86 (2d Cir. 2003). This inquiry is “necessarily contextual,”
“fact-specific,” and “must be tailored to the specific circumstances of each case.” Id. at 185 (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted).

“[I]f the unreasonable medical care is a failure to provide any treatment for an inmate’s
medical condition, courts examine whether the inmate’s medical condition is sufficiently
serious.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280 (citing Smith, 316 F.3d at 185-86). Deciding whether a
condition is sufficiently serious requires courts to consider whether “a reasonable doctor or
patient would find it important and worthy of comment, whether the condition significantly
affects an individual’s daily activities, and whether it causes chronic and substantial pain.” Id. (quoting Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal quotation marks and
brackets omitted). A medical condition may not initially be serious, but may become serious
because it is degenerative and, if left untreated or neglected for a long period of time, will
“result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Harrison
v. Barkley, 219 F.3d 132, 136-37 (2d Cir. 2000).
If treatment is given but the plaintiff alleges it is inadequate, “the seriousness inquiry
is narrower.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. I then focus on the “inadequacy itself.” Valdiviezo
v. Boyer, 752 F. App’x 29, 32 (2d Cir. 2018) (summary order) (citing Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at
280 (citation omitted)). If “the basis for a prisoner’s Eighth Amendment claim is a temporary
delay or interruption in the provision of otherwise adequate medical treatment, it is appropriate

to focus on the challenged delay or interruption . . . rather than the prisoner’s underlying
medical condition alone” to determine whether the deprivation satisfies the objective
requirement. Smith, 316 F.3d at 185 (emphasis in original).
To satisfy the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference
claim, a defendant must have “act[ed] or fail[ed] to act while actually aware of a substantial
risk that serious inmate harm will result.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. Deliberate indifference
is more than mere negligence—it is equivalent to “criminal recklessness,” where an individual

“disregards a risk of harm of which he is aware.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837, 840 (1994). In general, medical malpractice does not equate to deliberate indifference. Estelle, 429
U.S. at 106. Medical malpractice, may, however, rise to deliberate indifference if it “involves
culpable recklessness, i.e., an act or a failure to act by the prison doctor that evinces ‘a
conscious disregard of a substantial risk of serious harm.’” Chance, 143 F.3d at 703 (quoting
Hathaway v. Coughlin, 99 F.3d 550, 553 (2d Cir. 1996)). “The reckless official need not desire

to cause such harm or be aware that such harm will surely or almost certainly result. Rather,
proof of awareness of a substantial risk of the harm suffices.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280.
1. Respiratory Illness Claim for Damages
I must first decide whether any defendant actually “deprived [Crenshaw] of adequate
medical care” in connection with his respiratory illness. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 281. This
initial requirement of the objective prong is satisfied because the Complaint alleges that
Defendants (1) provided ineffective medical attention and (2) failed to schedule an
appointment with a pulmonary specialist.
I must next consider “whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious,”

Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280, which turns on whether Defendants failed to provide any medical
treatment, rendered inadequate treatment, or improperly delayed treatment. See Smith, 316
F.3d at 184-86. Because medical staff provided some treatment (however inadequate), I must
focus on the “inadequacy itself,” Valdiviezo, 752 F. App’x at 32, instead of “whether the
inmate’s medical condition is sufficiently serious.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. Here,
Crenshaw repeatedly told medical staff about a cough so violent that “he could actually feel
his insides protruding out of his belly button.” Compl. ¶ 37. The cough was serious enough to

cause Crenshaw to vomit to the point that correctional officers thought he was overdosing on
drugs. Id. ¶ 20. Yet, according to the Complaint, the medical staff responded—when Crenshaw
eventually obtained an appointment only after going to great lengths to do so—by prescribing
drugs and treatments that were either ineffective or not actually given to Crenshaw. See id. ¶¶
25-26, 41, 46-48. These allegations are sufficient to satisfy the objective component for
purposes of initial review. See, e.g., Chance, 143 F.3d at 702 (observing that objective

component was satisfied where “the failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further
significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain”) (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
Having concluded that the Complaint satisfies the objective requirement of an Eighth
Amendment claim, I turn next to the subjective prong. I begin by addressing the personal
involvement of each Defendant named in the caption of the Complaint. See Mastroianni v.
Reilly, 602 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that “[t]he subjective prong of the
two[-]step analysis requires personal involvement of the prison official”); accord Wright v.
Smith, 21 F.3d 496, 501 (2d Cir. 1994). I conclude that the Complaint adequately states a claim
only as to Dr. Estime and Vivianne Martel.2

“The Second Circuit has defined ‘personal involvement’ to mean direct participation,
such as ‘personal participation by one who has knowledge of the facts that rendered the
conduct illegal,’ or indirect participation, such as ‘ordering or helping others to do the unlawful
acts.’” Rivera v. Viger, No. 3:21-cv-00470 (VAB), 2021 WL 3269095, at *3 (D. Conn. July
30, 2021) (quoting Provost v. City of Newburgh, 262 F.3d 146, 155 (2d Cir. 2001)). When a
defendant is a supervisory official, as many are here, “a plaintiff must plead and prove the
elements of the underlying constitutional violation directly against the official without relying

on a special test for supervisory liability.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 620 (2d Cir.
2020). A plaintiff may not sue a defendant for a constitutional violation committed by another
defendant solely based on his or her “high position of authority in the prison system.” Wright, 21 F.3d at 501.
Crenshaw describes Martel as telling an officer to “wait until [Crenshaw] falls out[,]
and call a code white” after the officer told Martel that Crenshaw had a severe cough and was

having trouble breathing. Compl. ¶ 21. And Crenshaw describes Dr. Estime as failing to fill
prescriptions or schedule his promised referral to a specialist despite Dr. Estime’s awareness
of Crenshaw’s condition. See id. ¶ 45. These assertions are sufficient to show Martel and Dr.
Estime’s personal involvement and thus satisfy the subjective element for purposes of initial

2 As I explained in the Introduction, the Complaint asserts claims against Tawana Furtick, Jennifer
Cruz, Vivianne Martel, J. Jackson, Jasmine Rivera, Dr. Estime, and Colleen Galagher. Compl. ¶¶
4-10.
review. See Crispin v. Dougherty, No. 3:25-CV-00428 (SVN), 2025 WL 2223893, at *9 (D.
Conn. Aug. 5, 2025) (plaintiff’s allegation that medical staff denied medical care to plaintiff
when he arrived at medical department and “after he returned to it feeling weak, light-headed,

dizzy, and struggling to breathe” satisfied subjective component); Collymore v. Comm’r of
D.O.C., No. 3:21-CV-303 (SVN), 2024 WL 4008238, at *3-4 (D. Conn. Aug. 30, 2024)
(concluding that subjective requirement was satisfied because “Plaintiff’s well-pleaded facts
show that it is at least plausible that Defendant knew of and consciously disregarded an
excessive risk to inmate health or safety by ignoring Plaintiff’s complaints about how his
prescription failed to alleviate his serious symptoms”) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted).

In contrast, the Complaint fails to state a claim as to Defendants Furtick, Cruz, Jackson,
Rivera, and Gallagher. See Compl. ¶¶ 4-10. Crenshaw does not mention Furtick or Rivera in
the body of the complaint. Accordingly, I cannot consider Furtick or Rivera personally
involved. See Schlosser v. Droughn, No. 3:19-CV-1445 (SRU), 2020 WL 59942, at *3 (D.
Conn. Jan. 6, 2020) (dismissing claims against defendant whom plaintiff “d[id] not mention .
. . in his statement of facts” for lack of personal involvement).

Crenshaw describes Cruz as receiving complaints from Crenshaw’s fiancé. Compl. ¶¶
32-33. Crenshaw describes Jackson as writing a letter to Crenshaw explaining that there had
been a delay in processing health services grievances. See Compl. ¶ 35. But these allegations
against Cruz and Jackson, standing alone, do not plausibly suggest deliberate indifference.
Lastly, Crenshaw states that he wrote Gallagher “in an effort to bring attention to his
situation,” and that Crenshaw’s fiancé “relayed his and her concerns directly” to Gallagher.
Compl. ¶¶ 30-31. Gallagher “acknowledged and responded” to Crenshaw’s fiancé and
forwarded Crenshaw’s complaints to Cruz. Id. ¶ 32. Gallagher then wrote a letter to Crenshaw
indicating that “there may be a processing or mail system error” and that Cruz “can
investigate.” Id. ¶ 34 (internal quotation marks omitted). Some courts have recognized that

“when a supervisory prison official receives a particular grievance, personally reviews it, and
responds and/or takes action in response, such conduct may constitute sufficient ‘personal
involvement’ to establish individual liability for the alleged constitutional violation.” Young v.
Choinski, 15 F. Supp. 3d 172, 191 (D. Conn. 2014).
But in reviewing Gallagher’s letter (attached to Crenshaw’s complaint), Gallagher did
not respond to a “grievance” regarding Crenshaw’s deficient medical care. See Compl. 40. She
responded to Crenshaw’s “alleg[ation] that ‘MacDougall CI is intentionally interfering with

the 9601 and 8901 filing process.’” Id. As such, Gallagher’s letter addressed the grievance
process, not deficient medical care. See id. Accordingly, nothing in Gallagher’s response
would suggest that she “act[ed] or fail[ed] to act while actually aware of a substantial risk that
serious inmate harm will result” from the actions or inactions of medical staff. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. The Complaint therefore fails to state a viable Eighth Amendment claim
against Gallagher.

Crenshaw may pursue his Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs claim related to his respiratory illness only against Martel and Dr. Estime. But
this claim is dismissed without prejudice as to all other Defendants.
2. Knee Injuries Claim for Damages
I must next decide whether Dr. Estime “actually deprived [Crenshaw] of adequate
medical care” in connection with his knee injuries. Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 279. Because the
Complaint alleges that Dr. Estime failed to physically examine Crenshaw’s knees, discuss
existing X-rays with Crenshaw, or obtain Crenshaw’s post-operative MRIs, Compl. ¶¶ 61, 65,
66, I conclude for purposes of initial review that Dr. Estime actually deprived Crenshaw of
medical care.

I must then consider “whether the inadequacy in medical care is sufficiently serious,”
Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. The Second Circuit has identified several non-exhaustive factors
relevant to the inquiry into the seriousness of a medical condition: “an injury that a reasonable
doctor or patient would find important and worthy of comment or treatment; the presence of a
medical condition that significantly affects an individual’s daily activities; or the existence of
chronic and substantial pain.” Chance v. Armstrong, 143 F.3d 698, 702 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). The Complaint alleges that Crenshaw’s medical

providers later detected “highly visible and prominent large bone ossicles” in his knees.
Compl. ¶ 69 (cleaned up). Crenshaw’s left knee required surgery, and his right knee was “all
but guaranteed” to require surgery, too. Id. ¶¶ 70-71. For purposes of initial review, I assume
that knee injuries requiring surgery are “sufficiently serious.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280; see
also Rodriguez v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, No. 9:10-CV-1013 LEK/TWD, 2012 WL 6965109,
at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2012) (objective component satisfied where “[t]wo orthopedic

surgeons found the condition of Plaintiff’s knee not only worthy of treatment but in need of
surgery”), report and recommendation adopted, 2013 WL 375537 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 30, 2013).
I turn next to the subjective requirement. “To satisfy the subjective component of the
Eighth Amendment’s deliberate indifference standard, a defendant must have been aware of a
substantial risk that the incarcerated individual would suffer serious harm because of his or her
actions or inactions.” Torres v. Reis, No. 22-CV-1008 (SFR), 2025 WL 2374003, at *10 (D.
Conn. Aug. 14, 2025) (citing Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280). “Although Farmer requires that a
plaintiff prove actual knowledge of a risk, evidence that the risk was obvious or otherwise
must have been known to a defendant is sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that the
defendant was actually aware of it.” Brock v. Wright, 315 F.3d 158, 164 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing

Farmer, 511 U.S. at 842). “Deliberate indifference may also be inferred where treatment was
cursory or evidenced apathy.” Bardo v. Wright, No. 3:17-CV-1430 (JBA), 2019 WL 5864820,
at *6 (D. Conn. Nov. 8, 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The Complaint alleges that Crenshaw began submitting inmate requests to Defendants
in April 2025 that described “growing pain in both of his knees.” Compl. ¶ 54. Crenshaw later
alerted Defendants that he believed he was experiencing ligament damage in both of his knees. Id. ¶ 55. In August 2025, Crenshaw met with Dr. Estime and “discussed with the doctor his

knee pain and prior surgeries.” Id. ¶ 58. Dr. Estime nonetheless declined to physically examine
Crenshaw. Id. ¶ 61. Instead, Dr. Estime committed to ordering X-ray testing and said he would
request Crenshaw’s MRIs from ten years ago. See id. ¶¶ 59-60. But when Crenshaw met with
Dr. Estime again on August 24, 2025, the Complaint alleges that Dr. Estime had still not
reviewed the MRIs. Id. ¶ 63. During this visit, Dr. Estime again declined to conduct a physical
examination. Id. In September 2025, as a result of Crenshaw’s “ongoing negotiations with the

Assistant Attorney General” assigned to another of his cases, Crenshaw received an
appointment with an outside orthopedic doctor. Id. ¶ 67. In that outside visit with an outside
provider at UConn Health, the outside doctor reviewed Crenshaw’s X-rays, conducted a
physical examination of Crenshaw, id. ¶ 68, and “determine[d] that the Plaintiff’s left knee
required surgery to repair the failed results of his prior surgery,” id. ¶ 70.
These allegations plausibly support the inference that Dr. Estime evinced apathy in
response to Crenshaw’s numerous reports of serious knee pain and offered only cursory
treatment during his three visits with Crenshaw in August 2025. The Complaint also
adequately alleges that Dr. Estime ignored an obvious risk to Crenshaw’s health by delaying
a referral to an outside specialist, who “immediately” determined that Crenshaw required

surgery. Id. ¶ 70. Crenshaw may therefore proceed with an Eighth Amendment claim of
deliberate medical indifference related to his knee pain against Dr. Estime.
3. Official Capacity Claims
Crenshaw sues Defendants in their official capacities. To the extent he asserts official
capacity claims for monetary damages against Defendants (all state employees), such claims
are dismissed as barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169 (1985).

Crenshaw may proceed for injunctive or declaratory relief against a defendant in his or
her official capacity only to the extent he alleges an ongoing constitutional violation. See Va.
Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 563 U.S. 247, 254-55 (2011) (citing Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). “In the prison context, a request for injunctive relief must always be
viewed with great caution so as not to immerse the federal judiciary in the management of state
prisons.” Fisher v. Goord, 981 F. Supp. 140, 167 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (citing Farmer, [511 U.S.

at 846-47](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/1087956/farmer-v-brennan/#846)).
The Complaint alleges that Crenshaw continues to seek treatment for his painful cough
and knee pain. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 72. I therefore conclude that the Complaint supports a finding
that Crenshaw is experiencing an actual and imminent violation of his constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d 468, 482 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating that “it is the alleged
violation of a constitutional right that triggers a finding of irreparable harm”). Defendants
Jennifer Cruz (Regional Chief Operating Officer), Vivianne Martel (Correctional Head Nurse
at MacDougall), Dr. Estime (a provider at MacDougall), and Colleen Gallagher (Health
Services Director at DOC’s Central Office) all appear to be involved in controlling Crenshaw’s
access to medical care. Compl. ¶¶ 5-10. Accordingly, Crenshaw may proceed on an official

capacity claim against Cruz, Martel, Estime, and Gallagher.
B. State-Law Medical Malpractice Claim
Crenshaw also brings a medical practice claim under state law. See Compl. 21. Because
I have permitted Crenshaw’s deliberate indifference claim related to his respiratory illness to
proceed to service, I will exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Crenshaw’s state-law medical
malpractice claim and permit that claim (as it relates to the respiratory illness only) to proceed
to service against Dr. Estime. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a); Bibiloni v. Doe, No. 24-CV-1583

(VDO), 2024 WL 4744662, at *4 (D. Conn. Nov. 12, 2024) (permitting state law claims of
medical malpractice and negligence to proceed to service where court permitted factually
related deliberate indifference claim to proceed to service); Blaine v. UConn Health Care, No.
3:18-CV-359 (MPS), 2018 WL 1368909, at *3 (D. Conn. Mar. 16, 2018) (same).
IV. CONCLUSION
I enter the following orders:

(1) Crenshaw’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim for damages related to his respiratory illness may proceed against Martel and Dr. Estime
in their individual capacities for further development of the record.
(2) Crenshaw’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim for damages related to his knee pain may proceed against Dr. Estime in his individual
capacity for further development of the record.
(3) Crenshaw’s Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference to serious medical needs
claim for injunctive relief related to his respiratory illness and knee pain may proceed against
Cruz, Martel, Estime, and Gallagher in their official capacities.

(4) Crenshaw’s state-law medical malpractice claim may also proceed against Dr.
Estime for further development of the record.
(3) All other claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE under 28 U.S.C. §
1915A(b)(1). All other defendants are terminated.
(4) On or before May 15, 2026, the Clerk shall verify the current work address of Martel
and Dr. Estime, and mail a copy of the complaint, this order, and a waiver of service of process
request packet to Martel and Dr. Estime in their individual capacities at their confirmed

address. On the thirty-fifth (35th) day after mailing, the Clerk shall report to the Court on the
status of each request. If Martel and Dr. Estime fail to return the waiver request, the Clerk shall
arrange for in-person service by the U.S. Marshals Service and Martel and Dr. Estime shall be
required to pay the costs of such service in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
4(d).
(5) The Clerk is instructed to prepare a summons form and send an official capacity

service packet to the U.S. Marshal Service. The U.S. Marshal Service is directed to effect
service of the Complaint and this Order on Defendants Cruz, Martel, Estime, and Gallagher in
their official capacity at the Office of the Attorney General, 165 Capitol Avenue, Hartford, CT
06106, on or before May 29, 2026, and to file a return of service on or before June 12, 2026.
(6) The Clerk shall send a courtesy copy of the Complaint and this Order to the
Connecticut Attorney General and the DOC Legal Affairs Unit.
(7) If Crenshaw changes his address at any time during the litigation of this case, Local
Court Rule 83.1(c)2 provides that he MUST notify the court. Failure to do so can result in the
dismissal of the case. Crenshaw must give notice of a new address even if he is incarcerated.

He should write “PLEASE NOTE MY NEW ADDRESS” on the notice. It is not enough to
just put the new address on a letter without indicating that it is a new address. Crenshaw should
also notify Defendants or defense counsel of his new address.
(8) While incarcerated, Crenshaw shall use the Prisoner Electronic Filing Program
when filing documents with the court. Crenshaw is advised that the Program may be used only
to file documents with the court. Local rules provide that discovery requests are not filed with
the court. D. Conn. L. Civ. R 5(f). Therefore, discovery requests must be served on

Defendants’ counsel by regular mail.
SO ORDERED.

New Haven, Connecticut
April 24, 2026

/s/Sarah F. Russell
SARAH F. RUSSELL
United States District Judge