Weeden v. Mindi Nurse Prisoner Eighth Amendment Claims

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April 24, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Ronald Weeden v. Mindi Nurse, et al.

District Court, C.D. Illinois

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 1:25-cv-01452

• Precedential Status: Unknown Status

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Trial Court Document

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
PEORIA DIVISION

RONALD WEEDEN, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v. ) 25-1452
)
MINDI NURSE, et al. )
)
Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se and presently incarcerated at Menard Correctional Center,
was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The case is now before the Court for a merit
review of Plaintiff’s claims. The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s complaint, and through such
process to identify and dismiss any legally insufficient claim, or the entire action if warranted. 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a
claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is
immune from such relief.” Id.
The Court accepts the factual allegations as true, liberally construing them in the
plaintiff's favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). Conclusory statements
and labels are insufficient—the facts alleged must “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its
face.” Alexander v. U.S., 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Plaintiff alleges events that occurred during his incarcerated at Pontiac Correctional
Center. Plaintiff alleges that around June 2023 he filed an emergency grievance alleging that
inmates in the Behavior Modification Unit (BMU)/Residential Treatment Unit (RTU) were in
danger. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Nurse granted his request for expedited review, and that
he relayed the same concerns to Defendants Lewis and John Doe IA lieutenant during the
ensuing Internal Affairs review of his grievance.
Plaintiff alleges that another inmate attacked him with a knife on the prison yard on
December 25, 2023, after Defendants Shelton, Gish, John Doe Lieutenant allowed him and other
inmates into the yard without conducting searches the prison rules require. He alleges he was

stabbed in the eyelid, slashed across the forehead, stabbed in the hand three times, and suffered a
“busted” nose and two black eyes.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ashley told him on the day of the attack that his injuries
were not serious, that Defendants Rambo and Davis would not allow her to send Plaintiff to the
hospital, and that Plaintiff would see a doctor in a couple of days. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
John or Jane Doe Head Medical Director unnecessarily delayed outside treatment for his eye,
and that Defendants Davis, Rambo, Gish, and Shelton prevented him from receiving medication
for the injuries as prescribed.
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Paul and Worster knew about his safety and medical

issues, but they did nothing.
Plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against Defendants Nurse,
Lewis, John Doe Internal Affairs Lieutenant, Shelton, Gish, and John Doe Lieutenant, and an
Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need against
Defendants Ashley, Rambo, Davis, John or Jane Doe Medical Director, Gish, and Shelton. Each
claim proceeds against the respective defendants in their individual capacities. Gevas v.
McLaughlin, 798 F.3d 475, 480-81 (7th Cir. 2015); Petties v. Carter, 836 F.3d 722, 729-30 (7th
Cir. 2016) (en banc).
Plaintiff’s allegations against Defendants Paul and Worster do not permit a plausible
inference that they had the ability to act on Plaintiff’s situation. The Court finds that Plaintiff
fails to state a claim against these defendants. Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir.
2009) (“[N]o prisoner is entitled to insist that one employee do another’s job.”).
Plaintiff’s Motion to Request Counsel (Doc. 5)

Plaintiff has no constitutional or statutory right to counsel in this case. In considering the
Plaintiff’s motion, the court asks: (1) has the indigent Plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to
obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if so, (2) given the difficulty of
the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself? Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647,
654-55 (7th Cir. 2007).
Plaintiff satisfied the first prong. Plaintiff indicates that he is a high school graduate.
Plaintiff has personal knowledge of the facts, he has been able to adequately communicate them
to the Court, and he should be able to obtain relevant documents via the discovery process. This
case does not appear overly complex at this time, nor does it appear that it will require expert

testimony. The Court does not have sufficient information to determine how Plaintiff’s mental
health issues affect his ability to litigate. The Court finds that Plaintiff is capable of representing
himself at this time. Plaintiff’s motion is denied with leave to renew.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED:
1. Pursuant to its merit review of the Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the
court finds that the plaintiff states an Eighth Amendment failure-to-protect claim against
Defendants Nurse, Lewis, John Doe Internal Affairs Lieutenant, Shelton, Gish, and John
Doe Lieutenant, and an Eighth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to a serious
medical need against Defendants Ashley, Rambo, Davis, John or Jane Doe Medical
Director, Gish, and Shelton. Each claim proceeds against the respective defendants in their
individual capacities. Any additional claims shall not be included in the case, except at the
court’s discretion on motion by a party for good cause shown or pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 15.
2. This case is now in the process of service. The plaintiff is advised to wait until
counsel has appeared for the defendants before filing any motions, in order to give notice to
the defendants and an opportunity to respond to those motions. Motions filed before
defendants' counsel has filed an appearance will generally be denied as premature. The
plaintiff need not submit any evidence to the court at this time, unless otherwise directed by
the court.
3. The court will attempt service on the defendants by mailing each defendant a
waiver of service. The defendants have 60 days from the date the waiver is sent to file an
answer. If the defendants have not filed answers or appeared through counsel within 90
days of the entry of this order, the plaintiff may file a motion requesting the status of
service. After the defendants have been served, the court will enter an order setting
discovery and dispositive motion deadlines.
4. With respect to a defendant who no longer works at the address provided by
the plaintiff, the entity for whom that defendant worked while at that address shall provide
to the clerk said defendant's current work address, or, if not known, said defendant's
forwarding address. This information shall be used only for effectuating service.
Documentation of forwarding addresses shall be retained only by the clerk and shall not be
maintained in the public docket nor disclosed by the clerk.
5. The defendants shall file an answer within 60 days of the date the waiver is
sent by the clerk. A motion to dismiss is not an answer. The answer should include all
defenses appropriate under the Federal Rules. The answer and subsequent pleadings shall
be to the issues and claims stated in this opinion. In general, an answer sets forth the
defendants' positions. The court does not rule on the merits of those positions unless and
until a motion is filed by the defendants. Therefore, no response to the answer is necessary
or will be considered.
6. This district uses electronic filing, which means that, after defense counsel
has filed an appearance, defense counsel will automatically receive electronic notice of any
motion or other paper filed by the plaintiff with the clerk. The plaintiff does not need to
mail to defense counsel copies of motions and other papers that the plaintiff has filed with
the clerk. However, this does not apply to discovery requests and responses. Discovery
requests and responses are not filed with the clerk. The plaintiff must mail his discovery
requests and responses directly to defendants' counsel. Discovery requests or responses
sent to the clerk will be returned unfiled, unless they are attached to and the subject of a
motion to compel. Discovery does not begin until defense counsel has filed an appearance
and the court has entered a scheduling order, which will explain the discovery process in
more detail.
7. Counsel for the defendants is hereby granted leave to depose the plaintiff at
his place of confinement. Counsel for the defendants shall arrange the time for the
deposition.
8. The plaintiff shall immediately notify the court, in writing, of any change in
his mailing address and telephone number. The plaintiff's failure to notify the court of a
change in mailing address or phone number will result in dismissal of this lawsuit, with
prejudice.
9. If a defendant fails to sign and return a waiver of service to the clerk within
30 days after the waiver is sent, the court will take appropriate steps to effect formal
service through the U.S. Marshals service on that defendant and will require that
defendant to pay the full costs of formal service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(d)(2).
10. The clerk is directed to enter the standard qualified protective order
pursuant to the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.
11. The clerk is directed to terminate Samantha Worster, Paul, John Doe Head
of Tac Team, John Doe IA, and John Doe Correctional Officer as defendants.
12. The clerk is directed to attempt service on Defendants Nurse, Lewis, Shelton,
Gish, Ashley, Rambo, and Davis pursuant to the standard procedures.
13. Plaintiff’s Motion [5] is DENIED with leave to renew.
Entered this 24th day of April, 2026.

s/Sara Darrow
SARA DARROW
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE