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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Mohammed CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B343784

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (4)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Mohammed CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B343784
(Super. Ct. No. 1455141)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Babara County)

v.

ALI ABDUL MOHAMMED,

Defendant and Appellant.

Ali Abdul Mohammed appeals a post-judgment order
denying his Penal Code section 1172.6 petition to vacate his 2018
first degree murder conviction, which was based on a felony-
murder theory.1 Section 1172.6 provides in relevant part, “A
person convicted of felony murder . . . may file a petition . . . to
have the petitioner’s murder . . . conviction vacated and to be
resentenced on any remaining counts” when certain conditions
apply.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
The jury found true a special circumstance allegation that
appellant had committed the murder during the commission of
an attempted robbery. He was sentenced to prison for life
without the possibility of parole. We affirmed the judgment in an
unpublished opinion. (People v. White & Mohammed (Apr. 9,
2021, B293313), 2021 WL 1326760, 2021 Cal.App. Unpub. LEXIS
2309 (White I).) Lavell White was appellant’s accomplice and was
jointly tried with appellant.
Appellant contends he is eligible for section 1172.6 relief
because the trial court did not instruct the jury sua sponte on the
Banks/Clark factors concerning the meaning of “reckless
indifference to human life.” (People v. Banks (2015) 61 Cal.4th
788; People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522.) At the prima facie
stage of the section 1172.6 proceeding, the superior court initially
accepted appellant’s contention and issued an order to show
cause. (§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) This normally would have been
followed by an evidentiary hearing. (Id., subd. (d).) But the court
subsequently denied the petition without conducting an
evidentiary hearing because counsel for both parties agreed that
it was “bound by [our] holding” in People v. Superior Court
(White) (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1268 (White II), review granted
March 26, 2025, S289395.
The superior court did not err in determining that it was
bound by our decision in White II. We reaffirm the validity of our
conclusions in that decision. Accordingly, we affirm.
Prima Facie Showing Requirement and Standard of Review
“Petitioners seeking relief under section 1172.6 must, first,
file a facially valid petition that states the statutory
requirements for relief [citation], and second, make a ‘prima facie

2
showing’ [of eligibility for relief] [citation], before a court must
issue an order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing on
the ultimate question of resentencing . . . .” (People v. Patton
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549, 556.) “The trial court’s denial of a
resentencing petition at the prima facie stage ‘“is a purely legal
conclusion,”’ which appellate courts review de novo.” (People v.
Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 276.)
Factual Background
Except for the last paragraph, we summarize below the
relevant facts as stated by this court in White II, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 1273, rev. gr. The last paragraph of our
summary is a direct quotation from White I, supra, 2021 WL
1326760, at *3.2
“White, [appellant], and G.O. conspired to commit an
armed robbery of R.D., a ‘street’ marijuana dealer. This was the
plan: They would arrange to purchase marijuana from R.D. at a
location in Santa Maria. When R.D. arrived in his car with the
marijuana, [appellant] would enter the car with a handgun and
‘get the keys . . . so the dude can't peel off.’ White would stand
outside the vehicle and would display a replica ‘AK-47 BB gun.’
[Appellant] would take whatever property was available and then
get out of the vehicle.
“At about midnight, R.D. drove his car to the location
where the purchase was supposed to occur. R.D.’s friend, Terence
Richardson, was seated in the right front seat. [Appellant]
entered the car and sat in the middle of the back seat. R.D.

2 The factual summary is provided for background purposes

only. We do not rely on the summary in resolving disputed
issues.

3
showed him the marijuana. [Appellant] ‘reach[ed] over,’ leading
R.D. to believe that he ‘was grabbing to get the marijuana.’
Instead, [appellant] ‘took out [the] keys from the ignition, placed
them . . . in the [center] console, . . . pulled out a gun and told
[R.D.] to give him everything in the car.’
“R.D. ‘felt something touch the side of [his] head.’ He
looked to his left through an open window and saw White ‘outside
of the driver's side window holding what appeared to be an
assault rifle.’ G.O. saw White standing ‘[r]ight outside the
driver[’s] door.’ White was pointing the replica AK-47 at the
driver.
“R.D. grabbed the car keys from the center console, started
the engine, and drove away. Richardson ‘was turned around
swinging, swinging on the guy with the gun, so [R.D.] also started
swinging on [him] telling him to get out.’
“R.D. ‘heard a loud shot or bang.’ [Appellant] told him ‘to
pull over.’ R.D. pulled over and [appellant] got out of the car
without taking any of the victims’ property.
“Richardson told R.D. that he had been shot. The hollow-
point bullet entered his torso, and he bled to death.” (White II,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 1273, rev. gr.)
“After the shooting, [appellant] told G.O. that he shot
someone. [Appellant] said he ‘had no choice, he had to’ fire the
handgun.” (White I, supra, 2021 WL 1326760, at *3.)
We Cannot Assume Appellant Was the Actual Killer
If, as indicated in the above factual summary, appellant
were the actual killer of Richardson, as a matter of law he would
be ineligible for section 1172.6 relief. (People v. Strong (2022) 13
Cal.5th 698, 707-708 (Strong); People v. Cortes (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 198, 204.) In White I we concluded that the evidence

4
is sufficient to show that appellant was the actual killer. (White
I, supra, 2021 WL 1326760, at *9.) In rejecting appellant’s claim
that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment, we
referred to him as “the actual killer.” (Id., at *14.) Justice
Tangeman’s concurring and dissenting opinion stated, “Because
[appellant] was the actual killer, no relief is available to him.”
(Id., at *15.)
For purposes of section 1172.6, we cannot assume appellant
was the actual killer. The jury found not true an allegation that
appellant had “personally and intentionally discharged a firearm
which proximately caused [Richardson’s] death.” The jury may
have found the allegation not true because it believed that
appellant had unintentionally discharged the firearm, or it may
have believed that appellant had not discharged the firearm.
During the section 1172.6 proceedings, the prosecutor stated,
“[W]e’re assuming [appellant] was not the shooter.” (See People
v. Lee (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1183 [“‘the factual summary in
an appellate opinion is not evidence that may be considered at an
evidentiary hearing to determine a petitioner's eligibility for
resentencing.’ [Citations.] By logical extension, the factual
summary also may not be used to determine a petitioner's
eligibility at the prima facie stage”].)
Felony-Murder Elements for a Defendant Who
Was Not the Actual Killer and Did Not Intend to Kill
“Defendants who were neither actual killers nor acted with
the intent to kill can be held liable for murder [under a felony-
murder theory] only if they were ‘major participant[s] in the
underlying felony and acted with reckless indifference to human
life, as described in subdivision (d) of . . . Section 190.2’ — that is,
the statute defining the felony-murder special circumstance.”

5
(Strong, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 708.) “Banks and Clark both
substantially clarified the law governing findings under
. . . section 190.2, subdivision (d): Banks elucidated what it means
to be a major participant and, to a lesser extent, what it means to
act with reckless indifference to human life, while Clark further
refined the reckless indifference inquiry.” (Id., at pp. 706-707.)
Although appellant was tried after Banks and Clark had been
decided, the jury was not instructed on the Banks/Clark factors.
White II Controls the Present Appeal
White was convicted of first degree felony murder with a
special circumstance finding that the murder had been
committed during an attempted robbery. The superior court
granted White’s section 1172.6 petition because the trial court
had not instructed the jury sua sponte on the Banks/Clark
factors. The superior court vacated White’s murder conviction
and resentenced him to attempted second degree robbery. In
White II we issued a writ of mandate directing the superior court
to reinstate the murder conviction.
White made the same arguments that appellant makes in
the present appeal. In rejecting White’s arguments, we
concluded: (1) “There is no authority requiring that a jury be
instructed sua sponte on the various Clark factors.” (White II,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p.1277, rev. gr.) (2) “The jury was
correctly instructed, ‘A person acts with reckless indifference to
human life when he knowingly engages in criminal activity that
he knows involves a grave risk of death.’” (Id., at p. 1279). (3)
“The jury factually found that White had been a ‘major
participant’ in the underlying felony and had acted with ‘reckless
indifference to human life.’” (Id., at p. 1272.)

6
We noted that our decision in White II is consistent with
People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942, 956. (White II,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1277-1278, rev. gr.) Our decision is
also consistent with another opinion filed after White II: People v.
Whipple (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1177, review granted July 16,
2025, S291312.
Our reasoning in White II applies with equal force to the
arguments of appellant, White’s codefendant. Pursuant to the
doctrine of stare decisis, the superior court was bound to follow
White II. “Courts exercising inferior jurisdiction must accept the
law declared by courts of superior jurisdiction.” (Auto Equity
Sales, Inc. v. Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.) We see
no reason to depart from our analysis and conclusions in White II.
Disposition
The order denying appellant’s section 1172.6 petition is
affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.

We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

7
Pauline Maxwell, Judge

Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

---

Vanessa Place, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.