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March 17, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

United States v. Johanna Michely Garcia

Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 24-14110
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Nature of Suit: NEW

• Opinion

• Authorities (8)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (19.2K)

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Combined Opinion

USCA11 Case: 24-14110 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 1 of 10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit

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No. 24-14110
Non-Argument Calendar

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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus

JOHANNA MICHELY GARCIA,
Defendant- Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:23-cr-20350-JEM-1

---

Before LUCK, LAGOA, and BRASHER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Johanna Garcia appeals her 240-month sentence for conspir-
acy to commit wire and mail fraud in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1349.
She argues that the district court miscalculated her Sentencing
USCA11 Case: 24-14110 Document: 43-1 Date Filed: 03/17/2026 Page: 2 of 10

2 Opinion of the Court 24-14110

Guidelines range by including both substantial hardship and vul-
nerable victim enhancements. See United States Sentencing Guide-
lines § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) (Nov. 2024); U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b). She also ar-
gues that the district court imposed a substantively unreasonable
sentence by failing to consider the need to avoid unwarranted sen-
tencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(6). We affirm.
I.

This is a case about a $200 million Ponzi scheme. According
to the parties’ factual proffer, Garcia operated three related compa-
nies—MJ Capital, MJ Taxes and More, and MJ Enterprise Inc.—os-
tensibly for the purpose of providing merchant cash advances to
small businesses. Garcia solicited money from investors to fund
MCAs by promising significant returns. In reality, Garcia and her
co-conspirator employees were running a classic Ponzi scheme.
They paid prior investors with new investor funds and diverted the
rest of the money for their personal use.
During this time, Garcia was manager, president, and CEO
of MJ Capital and its related entities. In these roles, she was respon-
sible for the “day to day operations” of her companies. She was an
authorized signer for all bank accounts and controlled receipt and
disbursement of much of the money raised during the scheme. She
was not alone, however. Garcia also received significant support
from her co-conspirator Pavel Ruiz, who joined the conspiracy
nine months after it began. Ruiz assisted Garcia in managing the
various MJ entities and oversaw a group of fifty subordinates. He
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24-14110 Opinion of the Court 3

was described as Garcia’s “right-hand-man.” Presentence Investiga-
tion Report ¶ 55.
After receiving a complaint filed by a victim investor, the FBI
and SEC investigated and closed MJ Capital. Undeterred, Garcia
began operating a new venture, appropriately named New Begin-
ning Global Funding LLC. Garcia and others raised at least $3 mil-
lion from about twenty individuals, including an 84-year-old victim
who allegedly suffered from dementia. Garcia repeatedly coaxed
the victim into transferring his savings to her. She ultimately ob-
tained over $1.2 million of the victim’s money.
The government charged Garcia with, inter alia, conspiracy
to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
1349. The charge carries a maximum penalty of 240 months in
prison. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343. While in custody, Garcia directed
her co-conspirators to pressure the 84-year-old victim and his
daughter to alter their testimony in advance of the criminal trial.
She also directed her co-conspirators to access frozen assets and
continue conducting the fraud.
Garcia pleaded guilty to the conspiracy charge. In return, the
government agreed to seek dismissal of the remaining counts in the
indictment, which the district court accepted. While the parties
prepared for sentencing, Ruiz pleaded guilty to fraudulently ob-
taining approximately $43 million from investors and was sen-
tenced to 110 months in prison.
Before sentencing, the Probation Office prepared a presen-
tence report in which it calculated Garcia’s offense level. Based on
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4 Opinion of the Court 24-14110

an SEC accountant’s analysis, the report concluded that Garcia and
her co-conspirators had fraudulently obtained approximately $196
million. Subtracting the money paid back to investors, Garcia was
responsible for an actual loss of about $86 million. The report con-
cluded that the fraud “resulted in a substantial hardship to 25 or
more victims,” meriting a 6-point offense-level increase under
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C). Presentence Investigation Report ¶ 109.
The report also increased Garcia’s offense level by 2 points under
U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1(b)(1) because she “knew or should have known
that a victim of the offense was a vulnerable victim.” Id. ¶ 112. Gar-
cia’s total offense level was 48 and her criminal history category
was I. Because the maximum offense level in the Sentencing Guide-
lines sentencing table is 43, her offense level was treated as 43,
which mandates life in prison. See U.S.S.G. Ch. 5, Pt. A, cmt. n.2.
But where, as here, the statutorily authorized maximum sentence
is less than the minimum of the applicable guidelines range, the
statutorily authorized maximum sentence is the guideline sen-
tence. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1. Thus, Garcia’s guideline sentence was 240
months.
Garcia filed objections to the report and sentencing calcula-
tions. Relevant here, she argued that the correct loss amount was
$86 million rather than $196 million. She also objected to the sub-
stantial hardship and vulnerable victim enhancements, arguing
that they were factually unsupported. The government filed its re-
sponse, which included victim impact letters and a spreadsheet de-
tailing the amount of loss suffered by thirty-five of Garcia’s victims.
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24-14110 Opinion of the Court 5

At sentencing, the government agreed to adopt the $86 mil-
lion figure, which reduced Garcia’s offense level from 48 to 46. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(1)(M). This had no effect on her guideline sen-
tence. Following colloquy with Garcia’s attorneys, the district
court denied each of her objections. The district court then permit-
ted three of Garcia’s victims to testify to the substantial financial
impact the fraud had on them.
The district court then turned to the 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (a) sen-
tencing factors. Garcia asserted that she had taken responsibility
and apologized for her wrongdoing. She requested a sentence in
line with Ruiz’s, arguing that their conduct was comparable and
that the court was obligated to avoid “unwarranted sentence dis-
parities” among similarly situated defendants. The district court
disagreed, concluding that Garcia’s relative level of involvement in
the scheme was “substantially different.” D.E. 86 at 58. Having con-
sidered the parties’ filings, the presentence report, and the section
3553(a) factors, particularly the need for deterrence, the court sen-
tenced Garcia to the statutory maximum: 240 months.
Garcia timely appealed.
II.

We review the procedural reasonableness of a sentence, in-
cluding whether the guidelines range was properly calculated, for
abuse of discretion. United States v. Gyetvay, 149 F.4th 1213, 1239
(11th Cir. 2025). We also review the substantive reasonableness of
a sentence for abuse of discretion. United States v. Fox, 926 F.3d
1275, 1278 (11th Cir. 2019). A district court abuses its discretion in
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6 Opinion of the Court 24-14110

sentencing when it (1) fails to afford consideration to relevant fac-
tors that were due significant weight, (2) gives significant weight to
an improper or irrelevant factor, or (3) commits a clear error of
judgment in considering the proper factors. United States v. Howard,
28 F.4th 180, 205 (11th Cir. 2022) (citation modified).
III.

Garcia makes two main arguments. First, she contends that
the district court imposed a procedurally unreasonable sentence by
miscalculating the guidelines range. She believes that the govern-
ment failed to adequately support the substantial financial hardship
and vulnerable victim enhancements the district court applied. Sec-
ond, she argues that the district court committed both procedural
and substantive errors by ignoring section 3553(a)(6)’s requirement
that courts avoid “unwarranted sentence disparities” among simi-
larly situated defendants. We disagree.
Determining whether a sentence is procedurally or substan-
tively unreasonable involves two steps. First, we ask whether the
district court committed any significant procedural errors, such as
improperly calculating the guidelines range. Second, we analyze
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed, consider-
ing the totality of the circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S.
38, 51 (2007).
Garcia’s procedural challenge to her guidelines range calcu-
lation fails because any error is harmless. We need not decide
whether a district court erroneously applied enhancements when
a decision either way will not affect the outcome. United States v.
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24-14110 Opinion of the Court 7

Focia, 869 F.3d 1269, 1287 (11th Cir. 2017). When a defendant’s
guidelines range is the same with or without the enhancement, any
potential error is harmless. United States v. Mathis, 767 F.3d 1264,
1284 (11th Cir. 2014). Here, any error was harmless because, even
without the alleged errors, the lower end of Garcia’s guidelines
range would still have been greater than the statutory maximum.
Garcia’s final offense level was 46. Her financial hardship
and vulnerable victim enhancements were worth 8 points. See
U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2)(C) (6 points for financial hardship); id. §
3A1.1(b)(1) (2 points for vulnerable victim). Although Garcia ar-
gues that her resulting offense level should therefore be 38, she is
missing a step. For financial crimes involving stolen property and
fraud, the Sentencing Guidelines provide for either a 2-level, 4-
level, or 6-level enhancement based off the number of victims and
severity of the crime. See U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(2). Were section
2B1.1(b)(2)(C) not in play, the district court would still have in-
creased her offense level by 2 points under section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A),
which applies instead if the fraud “involved 10 or more victims.”
Garcia concedes in her brief that this enhancement applies. See Blue
Br. at 31. In her factual proffer, she admitted to obtaining fraudu-
lent investments from “at least twenty individuals.” D.E. 45 at 3.
Portions of the presentence report that she did not object to stated
that Garcia’s companies defrauded approximately 15,400 investors.
See United States v. Beckles, 565 F.3d 832, 844 (11th Cir. 2009) (facts
contained in a presentence report are undisputed and deemed to
have been admitted unless a party objects to them before the sen-
tencing court with specificity and clarity).
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8 Opinion of the Court 24-14110

Because her fraud indisputably involved at least 10 victims,
Garcia would have been subject to the 2-point enhancement under
section 2B1.1(b)(2)(A). Thus, her adjusted total offense level would
have been 40. Under the Sentencing Guidelines sentencing table,
her guidelines range would have been 292-365 months. See U.S.S.G.
Ch. 5, Pt. A. Accordingly, her guideline sentence would still have
been her statutory maximum, 240 months. U.S.S.G. § 5G1.1. Be-
cause the range would have been the same no matter what, any
error is harmless. Focia, 869 F.3d at 1287.
Garcia’s other procedural objection—that the district court
ignored section 3553(a)(6)—is easily dispatched. The district court
explicitly considered the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing dis-
parities. The court discussed at length the potential sentencing dis-
parity between Garcia and Ruiz, ultimately determining that Gar-
cia’s relative involvement was “substantially different.” D.E. 86 at
58. In justifying the sentence, the district court also expressly con-
sidered “the statements of all the parties, the presentence report,
which contains the advisory guidelines, and the statutory factors
set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 3553 (a).” Id. at 61. The district court’s
sentencing decision was thus procedurally sound. See Gall, 552 U.S.
at 51 (proper procedure requires district courts to consider the sec-
tion 3553(a) factors and adequately explain the chosen sentence).
Finally, we also reject Garcia’s contention that her sentence
is substantively unreasonable. At the outset, she faces an uphill bat-
tle because her sentence was within the guidelines range. Although
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24-14110 Opinion of the Court 9

we do not formally presume that a within-guidelines-range sen-
tence is reasonable, we “ordinarily expect it to be.” United States v.
Sotelo, 130 F.4th 1229, 1245 (11th Cir. 2025).
Garcia’s main argument is that she received a substantially
higher sentence relative to Ruiz for the same conduct. But the evi-
dence suggested that, far from being equally culpable, Garcia was
the mastermind behind the scheme. She founded MJ Capital and
its related entities, all of which were named after her. The website
listed her as the CEO and ultimate decisionmaker, sitting atop a
large hierarchy that included Ruiz. Although Ruiz had substantial
authority as Garcia’s business partner, Garcia retained ultimate
control over how money was spent and disbursed. Ultimately, Gar-
cia was responsible for significantly greater losses than Ruiz ($86
million versus $43 million). The district court did not abuse its dis-
cretion in holding that Garcia’s involvement was “substantially dif-
ferent.” D.E. 86 at 58. Because a well-founded claim of disparity
under section 3553(a)(6) “assumes that apples are being compared
to apples,” Garcia’s objection fails. United States v. Sotis, 89 F.4th
862, 880 (11th Cir. 2023).
Other sentencing factors weigh in favor of reasonableness.
The district court reasonably concluded that a lengthy prison sen-
tence was necessary “to reflect the seriousness of the offense,”
“provide just punishment,” and “afford adequate deterrence.” 18
U.S.C. § 3553 (a)(2)(A)-(B). Garcia’s criminal conduct caused enor-
mous levels of suffering. As the government’s exhibits showed, her
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10 Opinion of the Court 24-14110

scheme wiped out many of her victims’ retirement savings ac-
counts. After the FBI and SEC shuttered MJ Capital, Garcia began
operating a new Ponzi scheme that was responsible for an addi-
tional $3 million in losses. Even after she had been arrested, Garcia
continued to engage in wrongdoing by directing her co-conspira-
tors to pressure witnesses and access frozen assets. Considering the
need for deterrence, the district court did not abuse its discretion
in concluding that this factor was particularly weighty. See United
States v. Clay, 483 F.3d 739, 743 (11th Cir. 2007) (the weight to be
accorded any given sentencing factor is a matter committed to the
sound discretion of the district court).
Finding neither procedural nor substantive errors, we hold
that the district court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing Gar-
cia to 240 months. Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
IV.

AFFIRMED.