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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Pavia CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B338024

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (6)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (30.2K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Pavia CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B338024
(Super. Ct. No. LA093470)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County)

v.

DANIEL A. RODRIGUEZ
PAVIA,

Defendant and Appellant.

Daniel A. Rodriguez Pavia appeals from the judgment after
a jury convicted him of rape. (Pen. Code,1 § 261, subd. (a)(2).) He
was sentenced to three years in state prison. He contends his
conviction should be reversed because he was prejudiced by a
four-year pre-charging delay. We affirm.

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Prosecution evidence
In February 2016, Carlos Campos organized a birthday
party for his girlfriend, J.J. He hired a party bus and invited
friends, including Pavia, who was Campos’s friend. The party
bus picked up Pavia at a 7-Eleven where he parked his car. This
was the first time J.J. met Pavia. After a night of partying at a
club, the group returned to J.J.’s house.
J.J. wanted to continue partying. Campos, J.J., and Pavia
walked down the street to Campos’s house and got into his car.
J.J. was the driver. She hit a curb and blew out a tire. J.J. and
Campos argued, and Campos walked back to his home.
J.J. testified that she called an Uber or taxi.2 When the car
arrived, Pavia got into the car with J.J. The car drove for a “few
seconds” before Pavia asked the driver to “stop here.” Pavia
grabbed J.J.’s wrist, and they got out of the car. He held onto her
wrist and led her down a street. J.J. was intoxicated. She fell
and hurt her knee. Pavia got on top of her and began lifting her
dress. He tried to move her underwear around and ripped it. J.J.
told him to stop and tried to cover her underwear. Pavia inserted
his penis inside J.J.’s vagina and ejaculated onto her leg. When
he got off of J.J., she got up and ran away. On her way home, J.J.
called Campos and left a voicemail. Campos fell asleep after
walking back home and woke up to find missed calls and a
voicemail from J.J. In J.J.’s voicemail, she was crying; she said
she had been raped. Campos went to J.J.’s home, and she told
him Pavia raped her.

2 It is unclear if J.J. hired a taxi or an Uber driver, but for

ease of discussion and because both appellant and respondent’s
brief refer to the driver as an Uber driver, we will do the same.

2
Campos messaged Pavia, accusing him of raping J.J. Pavia
denied what happened and replied, “Don’t try to blame me cuz
she got picked up by someone else dawg. I [don’t know] who
picked her up after.”
J.J. filed a police report. An officer took J.J.’s statement
and took as evidence the clothing and underwear she was
wearing the night of the incident. J.J. had a sexual assault
examination. She had abrasions and bruises on her knees. DNA
swabs were taken from the oral, vaginal, and cervical areas. A
laboratory analysis of the external genital and vaginal swabs
revealed sperm cells and developed a male DNA profile.
About four years later, in 2020, law enforcement obtained a
sample of Pavia’s DNA, which matched the male DNA profile
from the external genital and vaginal swabs.
Defense Evidence
Pavia testified in his own defense. He said that after J.J.
drove Campos’s car into a curb, she complained her leg hurt.
Campos left after arguing with J.J. and she walked off in the
opposite direction. Pavia followed her and sat with her as she
cried and talked about her fight with Campos. She called an
Uber and offered Pavia a ride. When the Uber arrived, they both
got into the car. The car stopped at 7-Eleven, where his car was
parked. He was resting in his car to sober up when J.J. knocked
on his passenger door. She continued to cry about Campos and
then started to kiss and touch him. Pavia said J.J. gave him oral
sex. They moved to the back seat where J.J. gave Pavia a “lap
dance.” He testified that his penis entered her vagina and he
emitted “pre-cum.” Pavia claimed that J.J. never told him to
stop. At some point, J.J. and Pavia began to have second

3
thoughts. She “panicked” about cheating on Campos, got out of
the car, and left.
Pavia admitted to being dishonest with Campos when he
messaged him, and with the detectives in 2016 and 2019 when
they interviewed him.
Investigation
In April 2016, Detective Martin Pinner interviewed Pavia.
Pavia said “he did not think he had sex with” J.J. After the
initial interview, Pinner attempted to locate Pavia at his work
address for a DNA swab, but the owner advised that it was
Pavia’s day off. Pinner returned on a date Pavia was scheduled
to work, but he was advised that Pavia called in the morning to
say he would not be returning to work there. One of the other
employees suggested that Pavia was “on the run.”
By December 2016, Detective Pinner was transferred and
no longer assigned to the case. Another detective contacted
Pavia’s number and left a message but never received a call back.
In February 2017, another detective unsuccessfully attempted to
locate Pavia. In November 2018, police officers received a “CAL-
DNA Bank Hit” notification reporting that Pavia was a match
with the DNA profile developed in J.J’s rape case. Pavia was
arrested in another incident by the San Fernando Police
Department. Around January 2019, a detective retrieved an
address for Pavia from the San Fernando Police Department.
In October 2019, a detective attempted to locate Pavia and
discovered his place of employment. The detectives found Pavia
at work and interviewed him. During this interview, Pavia said
that J.J. started hugging and kissing him and that she was on
top of him “grinding him.”

4
In July 2020, police officers obtained a warrant for Pavia’s
DNA. The next month, the laboratory report showed that Pavia’s
DNA profile matched the profile developed from the vaginal and
external genital swabs in 2016.
Motion to Dismiss
After the jury found him guilty of forcible rape, Pavia
moved to dismiss the verdict on the ground that the four-year
pre-charging delay violated his state and federal due process
rights. He argued that he was prejudiced by the loss of the Uber
driver’s testimony. The prosecution argued that Pavia was not
prejudiced and the justification for the delay was for
investigation.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss. The court found the four-year delay to not be “an undue
length of time.” The court reasoned that “investigations on this
type of case do take time, and at least some of the cause for the
delay was the defendant’s lying about not having sex with the
victim . . . .” The court found that Pavia did not establish that
the delay was prejudicial. The court observed that the “only
thing in dispute is then the fact that somewhere on that street
the defendant started to pursue the victim sexually, and she said
no, and he continued and forcibly raped her, and he says, no. It
was consensual . . . .” Because the disputed events occurred
outside the car, the court reasoned that the “Uber driver would
have no bearing on [whether J.J.’s version of events or Pavia’s
version of events] is correct in terms of what happened when they
were on the street and the sexual advances began, and that’s the
only point in time where things become in dispute.” Lastly, the
court found that “there is substantial justification for any delay.

5
DISCUSSION
Pavia contends that the trial court erred when it failed to
dismiss the case because the pre-charging delay violated his state
and federal constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process.
He asserts that the delay was prejudicial because it denied him
the opportunity to procure the Uber driver’s testimony. We
disagree.
“ ‘[T]he right of due process protects a criminal defendant’s
interest in fair adjudication by preventing unjustified delays that
weaken the defense through the dimming of memories, the death
or disappearance of witnesses, and the loss or destruction of
material physical evidence.’ [Citation.] Accordingly, ‘[d]elay in
prosecution that occurs before the accused is arrested or the
complaint is filed may constitute a denial of the right to a fair
trial and to due process of law under the state and federal
Constitutions. A defendant seeking to dismiss a charge on this
ground must demonstrate prejudice arising from the delay. The
prosecution may offer justification for the delay, and the court
considering a motion to dismiss balances the harm to the
defendant against the justification for the delay.’ [Citation.]”
(People v. Nelson (2008) 43 Cal.4th 1242, 1250 (Nelson).)
“ ‘ “In the balancing process, the defendant has the initial
burden of showing some prejudice before the prosecution is
required to offer any reason for the delay [citations]. The
showing of prejudice requires some evidence and cannot be
presumed. [Citations.]” ’ [Citation.]” (People v. Alexander (2010)
49 Cal.4th 846, 874 (Alexander).) If a defendant fails to show
prejudice, the court need not inquire into the justification for the
delay as, under such circumstances, there is nothing to “ ‘weigh.’ ”
(Craft v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1533, 1541.)

6
If a defendant shows prejudice, the court must balance the
prejudice against the justification for the delay. (Nelson, supra,
43 Cal.4th at p. 1251.) “Even a minimal showing of prejudice
may require dismissal if the proffered justification for delay is
insubstantial. By the same token, the more reasonable the delay,
the more prejudice the defense would have to show to require
dismissal. Therein lies the delicate task of balancing competing
interests.” (People v. Dunn-Gonzalez (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 899,
915.) “[W]hether the delay was negligent or purposeful is
relevant to the balancing process. Purposeful delay to gain an
advantage is totally unjustified, and a relatively weak showing of
prejudice would suffice to tip the scales towards finding a due
process violation. If the delay was merely negligent, a greater
showing of prejudice would be required to establish a due process
violation.” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256.) “The
justification for the delay is strong when there is ‘investigative
delay, [and] nothing else.’ ” (People v. Cowan (2010) 50 Cal.4th
401, 431 (Cowan).)
We review the trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss for
a pre-charging delay for an abuse of discretion. We review any
factual findings for substantial evidence. (Cowan, supra, 50
Cal.4th at p. 431.) Whether a delay is prejudicial is a factual
question that we review for substantial evidence. (Alexander,
supra, 49 Cal.4th at p. 874.)
Here, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying
the motion to dismiss because substantial evidence supports that
Pavia did not establish prejudice. Pavia contends the delay
resulted in the loss of the Uber driver as a witness, who could
have corroborated that he did not pull J.J. out of the car and that
J.J. followed him to his car. He also asserts that the Uber

7
driver’s testimony was material to his and J.J.’s credibility. But,
the evidence reflects that the driver was not a witness to the
actual crime. The driver, at best, could testify as to where the
ride ended and the conduct inside the car. However, there was no
dispute that J.J. and Pavia had exited the car next to or near the
7-Eleven, there was no evidence of a struggle inside or when they
exited the car, and the sexual conduct in dispute occurred
entirely outside of the car. The driver could not testify as to
whether the sexual conduct was consensual, and “was not a
material witness in terms of the disputed facts in question.”
Moreover, Pavia does not suggest that the Uber driver
would have testified favorably for the defense. (See People v.
Catlin (2001) 26 Cal.4th 81, 109 [claim of prejudice is “weak”
where there was no evidence suggesting that witnesses would
have testified favorably for the defense].) Pavia merely asserts
that the Uber driver’s testimony “impacted the credibility of both
[J.J.] and [Pavia], by either supporting or undermining the
conflicting testimony of each witness.” Under these
circumstances, Pavia’s claim of prejudice is speculative. “The
showing of actual prejudice must be made on competent evidence
and ‘must be supported by particular facts and not . . . by bare
conclusionary statements.’ [Citation.] Speculative arguments
are inadequate to establish actual prejudice.” (People v. Manzo
(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 538, 541.)
Here, there was no prejudice. The delay was justified and
there was no evidence to suggest that there was a purposeful
delay for the prosecution to gain an advantage. Rather, the
police investigation reports, which provide a detailed history of
the investigation, reflect the delay was in part due to the
difficulty in locating Pavia and serving him a warrant for his

8
DNA. The justification for an investigative delay required a
“greater showing of prejudice . . . [is] required to establish a due
process violation.” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1256; see also,
Cowan, supra, 50 Cal.4th at p. 431.)
To the extent Pavia argues the delay was due to “police
inaction or negligence,” we disagree. “A court may not find
negligence by second-guessing how the state allocates its
resources or how law enforcement agencies could have
investigated a given case. . . . It is not enough for a defendant to
argue that if the prosecutorial agencies had made his or her case
a higher priority or had done things a bit differently they would
have solved the case sooner.” (Nelson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp.
1256-1257.)
As prejudice, if any, was minimal and outweighed by the
justification for delay, there was no abuse of discretion in denying
the motion to dismiss.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order) is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

DEROIAN, J.*

We concur:

YEGAN, Acting P. J. CODY, J.

• Judge of the Santa Barbara Superior Court assigned by

the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.

9
Alan K. Schneider, Judge

Superior Court County of Los Angeles

---

Lori A. Nakaoka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Seth P. McCutheon and Charles
Chung, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.