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March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Mitchell CA2/6

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B344127

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (5)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (0)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26 P. v. Mitchell CA2/6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE, 2d Crim. No. B344127
(Super. Ct. No. SM105565)
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Santa Barbara County)

v.

GREGORY DEAN MITCHELL,

Defendant and Appellant.

Gregory Dean Mitchell appeals from the trial court’s order
denying his motion for a youth offender parole hearing. (Pen.
Code, §§ 1203.01, 3051.)1 He contends the denial of his motion
was error because he has an equal protection right under the
federal and California Constitutions to have a youth offender
parole hearing, and thus a Franklin2 hearing or proceeding. We
affirm.

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 People v. Franklin (2016) 63 Cal.4th 261.
Factual and Procedural Background
In 1997, appellant and three other men robbed the
Vandenburg Federal Credit Union in Lompoc. All four men were
armed. Moments after the robbery began, appellant shot security
guard Octavio Gallardo in the leg. Christine Orciuch was
walking toward the front door of the credit union when appellant
shot Gallardo. Orciuch turned and ran toward her parked car
where her 11-year old son was waiting. As she ran, appellant
shot her in the back, killing her.
In 1999, a jury convicted appellant of first degree murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)), robbery (§ 211), burglary (§ 459), and assault
with a firearm (§ 245, subd. (a)). The jury also found true the
special circumstance allegations that the murder was committed
during a robbery and a burglary. (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17).)
Appellant was sentenced to a determinate term of 38 years
followed by life without the possibility of parole (LWOP).
In 2001, we affirmed the judgment. (People v. Mitchell
(Feb. 21, 2001, B136280) [nonpub. opn.].)3
In 2023, appellant filed a motion in propria persona
requesting a hearing to preserve evidence for a possible youth
offender parole hearing pursuant to section 3051. The trial court
denied the motion because appellant was 18 years old at the time
of the controlling offense, was sentenced to LWOP, and was
therefore statutorily ineligible for a youth offender parole
hearing. (Id., subds. (b)(4), (h).)
In 2024, we affirmed the trial court’s order based on People
v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (Hardin), which held that section
3051’s exclusion of youthful offenders sentenced to LWOP

3 We granted appellant’s motion to take judicial notice of

our prior opinions in case numbers B136280 and B329199.

2
withstands rational basis scrutiny and does not violate
constitutional guarantees of equal protection (id., at pp. 838-839,
866). (People v. Mitchell (June 17, 2024, B329199) nonpub. opn..)
In January 2025, appellant filed in propria persona “Motion
under Penal Codes 1203.01 and 3051 for Youth Offender Parole
Hearing.” The motion stated: “[Appellant] acknowledges that
because he was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole
(“LWOP”) for special circumstances felony mu[r]der that occurred
when he was 18 years old, he is statutorily ineligible for youth
offender parole [citation.] However, [appellant] respectfully asks
this Court to find that he is now eligible and entitled to a youth
offender parole hearing pursuant to People v. Briscoe (2024) 105
Cal.App.5th 479 and under the equal protection guarantees of the
state and federal Constitutions. (See Cal. Const., art. I, [§] 7,
subd. (a); U.S. Const., 14th Amend.)”
The trial court denied the motion stating, “Since the jury
convicted [appellant] as the actual killer, the Briscoe decision
does not apply to his situation. The Hardin case controls.
[Citation.]”
Discussion
Appellant acknowledges that the doctrine of law of the
case forecloses raising the sub-issues of equal protection and
cruel or unusual punishment previously raised and rejected in
Mitchell I, supra, B329199. (Citing People v. Stanley (1995) 10
Cal.4th 764, 786-787.)
However, appellant contends he is not precluded from
arguing that there is no rational basis to distinguish between
young adult offenders sentenced to LWOP and juvenile offenders
sentenced to LWOP because the Court in Hardin did not consider

3
that issue and Mitchell I, supra, B329199, did not discuss it. (See
Hardin, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 846.)
This contention is forfeited for failure to raise it below.
(People v. Smith (2001) 24 Cal.4th 849, 852.)
But even absent forfeiture, appellant’s contention is
meritless. California appellate courts have concluded that the
Legislature had a rational basis to distinguish between offenders
with the same sentence based on their age. (See People v. Sands
(2021) 70 Cal.App.5th 193, 204; In re Murray (2021) 68
Cal.App.5th 456, 463-464; People v. Morales (2021) 67 Cal.App.
5th 326, 347; People v. Jackson (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 189, 196-
197; People v. Acosta (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 769, 779-780; accord,
Miller v. Alabama (2012) 567 U.S. 460, 471 [“children are
constitutionally different from adults for purposes of
sentencing”]; Roper v. Simmons (2005) 543 U.S. 551, 574 [“[t]he
age of 18 is the point where society draws the line for many
purposes between childhood and adulthood”].) We reach the
same conclusion here.
Accordingly, appellant’s prejudice argument fails.
Disposition
The trial court’s order denying appellant’s motion for a
youth offender parole hearing is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

YEGAN, Acting P. J.
We concur:

BALTODANO, J.

CODY, J.

4
Stephen Foley, Judge
Superior Court County of Santa Barbara

William L. Heyman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.