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March 20, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Jackson CA2/1

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: B340655

• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Opinion

• Authorities (7)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (35.7K)

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Combined Opinion

Filed 3/20/26 P. v. Jackson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340655

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA514100)
v.

JAYLIN TYREESE JACKSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, David V. Herriford, Judge. Affirmed.
Stanley Dale Radtke, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Seth P. McCutcheon and Zachary John
Crvarich, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.

---

Defendant Jaylin Tyreese Jackson appeals from a
restitution order following his conviction by plea of assault with a
deadly weapon. Defendant argues there was insufficient
evidence to support restitution for lost wages because the victim’s
testimony was equivocal and the prosecution provided no
documentary evidence. Defendant further argues the victim has
“unclean hands” because her wages were unreported and
untaxed, and therefore is not entitled to restitution for loss of
those wages.
We hold the victim’s testimony provided sufficient basis to
award restitution for lost wages. Further, it is defendant, not his
victim, who has unclean hands, and he therefore may not raise
his victim’s tax circumstances as a defense to paying restitution
for the assault he committed. The record, moreover, does not
establish the victim’s wages were unreported and untaxed.
Accordingly, we affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On the morning of April 15, 2023, wife F.R. and husband
L.M. arrived at the parking lot of their workplace. L.M. got out of
the car and opened the gate to the parking lot. As F.R. drove the
car through the gate, defendant walked towards them from the
street. L.M. saw defendant put brass knuckles on his hand and
strike the car’s window, which did not break.
Defendant returned to the street and retrieved a hammer.
L.M. picked up a pipe to defend himself. Defendant struck the
driver’s side window of the car with the hammer, breaking it.
Defendant then struck F.R. on the arm with the hammer and on
the temple with his fist.

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L.M. moved forward to protect F.R. Defendant ran. L.M.
chased defendant and tackled him. Defendant bit L.M. on the
arm. L.M. held defendant until police arrived.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
An information charged defendant with two counts of
assault with a deadly weapon. Pursuant to an agreement with
the People, defendant pleaded no contest to the assault on F.R.
and admitted a prior strike conviction. The trial court convicted
defendant of that count and dismissed the count for assault of
L.M. The court sentenced defendant to four years in prison.
Several months later the trial court held a restitution
hearing, with defendant’s appearance waived. In advance of the
hearing, F.R. and L.M. submitted victim restitution request
forms. F.R. sought restitution for wage loss. Her request form
stated a wage of $600 per week, and requested total lost wages of
$15,000. F.R. and L.M. also sought reimbursement for medical
expenses, a broken car window, and security cameras they
installed in their home following the assault.
F.R. testified at the restitution hearing through an
interpreter. She explained that before the attack, she worked
four days a week and was paid $80 per day. The prosecutor
asked, “So each week you receive[d] $320 per week?” F.R. said,
“Yes.” The prosecutor asked why F.R. had listed a weekly wage
of $600 on the restitution request form. F.R. responded that $600
was what she received every week from a woman, E.P. The
prosecutor asked if that $600 included the $80 per day plus other
charges, and F.R. answered she was paid an additional “small
amount” for purchasing meat and vegetables for E.P.
F.R. explained she was unable to work following the attack
because she was afraid to return to the area where the crime had

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taken place. The prosecutor asked how much work F.R. missed
because of the attack, and she said approximately six weeks.
The prosecutor asked F.R. what she was requesting in lost
wages. F.R. said, “I’m not asking for anything. I don’t want to be
here. I don’t want to be here. I don’t want him to be released.
And what if he does something to me because I’m accusing — ”
The prosecutor asked why F.R. was changing her request. F.R.
said, “Because, honestly, I don’t want to cause anybody more
trouble because all of these . . . . It is not a large amount that I’m
going to request. All I want is that what happened to me won’t
happen to anybody else.” The prosecutor asked if F.R. was still
requesting the $15,000 listed on her restitution request form.
F.R. said, “$15,000? No. All I said is what I spent.”
On cross-examination, F.R. repeated she received $80 per
day as salary, and would receive an additional $20 or $30 dollars
twice a week for shopping for E.P. Defense counsel asked how
much of the $320 weekly salary F.R. took home after taxes, and
F.R. said, “I don’t do taxes. My husband does.” Defense counsel
asked if F.R. “pa[id] taxes on the $320 that you received as
salary,” and F.R. said, “No.”
On redirect examination, the prosecutor again asked about
the $600 weekly wages listed on F.R.’s restitution request form.
F.R. responded, “Because it’s two of us: my husband and myself.”
The prosecutor asked, “So is that for the two of you or is that for
just you?” F.R. answered, “No. That’s for the two of us, because
he works.” The prosecutor asked if F.R.’s husband was still
working after F.R. stopped working “or did that work completely
stop?” F.R. answered, “It stopped.” The prosecutor said, “So then
even though you said you were getting yourself $80 a day, in
reality the work that you were doing between the two of you was

4
$600 a week; is that correct?” F.R. answered, “[S]he would give
us $600 a week for everything we did . . . . Because she used to
pay me $80. I only worked four days. But because I did the
shopping for the things for the lady that was $600. She sort of —
she would give me extra.”
The trial court stated it was inclined to award F.R. $220 for
the broken window, $3,600 for lost wages ($600 per week for
six weeks), and $5,670 in medical expenses. Defense counsel
objected, arguing F.R.’s lost wages should be calculated at $320
per week plus the additional $50 she earned from shopping, for a
total of $2,220 in lost wages. Defense counsel stated the defense
would not object to restitution in that amount. The court
responded, “[S]he’s testifying that she and her husband combined
get [$600 per week] and as a result of the incident they’re both
not working, so I think it’s appropriate to award her the $600 a
week times six[ ]weeks.”
The trial court awarded $9,490.00 in victim restitution,
which included the $3,600 for lost wages. Defendant timely
appealed from the restitution order.

DISCUSSION
Defendant on appeal challenges the $3,600 awarded for lost
wages. He does not otherwise challenge the restitution order.
“[I]n every case in which a victim has suffered economic
loss as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require
that the defendant make restitution to the victim or victims in an
amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss
claimed by the victim or victims or any other showing to the

5
court.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).)1 “The court shall order
full restitution.” (Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subd. (f).)
The standard of proof for restitution is preponderance of
the evidence. (People v. Shelly (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 181, 198
(Shelly).) “ ‘Once the victim makes a prima facie showing of
economic losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s criminal
acts, the burden shifts to the defendant to disprove the amount of
the losses claimed by the victim.’ [Citations.]” (Id. at p. 199.)
“We review a restitution order for abuse of discretion, and
we must uphold the amount of restitution if there is a factual and
rational basis for it.” (People v. Anderson (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
1256, 1260. “Courts broadly construe the right to restitution.”
(Ibid.)
F.R.’s testimony provided a factual and rational basis for
the award of lost wages. Although she testified her weekly wage
was $320 plus approximately $50, on redirect examination she
explained the $600 weekly wage listed on her restitution request
included her husband’s wages as well. F.R. also testified she and
her husband were out of work for six weeks following the attack.
This testimony supported the $3,600 award.
Defendant argues there was no factual basis for awarding
lost wages as restitution because “there was a lack of any
documentation presented in support.” This argument fails
because case law holds that a victim’s testimony may be prima
facie evidence of a loss. (Shelly, supra, 81 Cal.App.5th at p. 199;
see People v. Millard (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 7, 30 [testimony of

1 There are exceptions to this rule, but none is relevant
here. (See Pen. Code, § 1202.4, subds. (f), (p), (q).)

6
victim and victim’s attorney sufficient prima facie showing of lost
wages.)
Defendant cites People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th
641 in support of his argument that lack of documentation is
fatal to a restitution claim. In Harvest, the trial court awarded
the families of two murder victims, Vigil and Gialouris,
restitution for funeral expenses. (Id. at p. 645.) The Court of
Appeal reversed the award to Gialouris’s family, explaining, “The
Vigil family could support their claim with documentation and
stood ready to testify, but the Gialouris claim had neither of
these supports.” (Id. at p. 653.) Harvest stands for the
proposition that the absence of both documentary evidence and
testimony can doom a restitution request, but does not hold or
suggest that testimony alone cannot support a restitution
request.
People v. Vournazos (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 948
(Vournazos), also cited by defendant, similarly does not support
his argument. The trial court in Vournazos awarded a car theft
victim restitution for damage to the recovered car and the loss of
personal property taken with the car but never recovered. (Id. at
pp. 952–953.) The only evidence offered at the restitution
hearing was the testimony of the defendant’s probation officer,
who determined an amount of restitution based on the victim’s
written statement of loss and the probation officer’s discussions
with the victim. (Ibid.) The probation officer requested
documentation from the victim’s bookkeeper to support the
amounts claimed, but the bookkeeper did not provide it. (Id. at
p. 953.)
The Court of Appeal held the evidence did not support the
amount of restitution awarded. (Vournazos, supra,

7
198 Cal.App.3d at p. 958.) The court noted restitution for
damaged or stolen property “ ‘shall be the replacement cost of like
property, or the actual cost of repairing the
property . . . .’ [Citations.” (Ibid.) Yet “[n]either the [written
restitution request] nor the testimony of the probation officer
established that the sum claimed by [the victim] for loss of
property was based on the replacement cost of the property.
Further, there was no evidence that the sum of $300 claimed for
repair of damage to the Mercedes represented the actual cost of
the repair.” (Ibid.)
The flaw with the evidence in Vournazos was not that it
was testimony as opposed to documents, but rather, that it
did not explain how the victim calculated the amount of
restitution claimed. That is, the evidence did not establish that
the victim was seeking repair and replacement costs as opposed
to some other amount. Vournazos does not hold that testimony
alone cannot support an award of restitution, just that the
specific testimony in that case was inadequate.
Defendant suggests the award was improper because F.R.
“retracted her demand for lost wages during her testimony.” In
support, he refers to F.R.’s statement, when asked what she was
seeking for lost wages, “I’m not asking for anything.” F.R.
immediately followed this statement, however, with, “I don’t
want to be here. I don’t want to be here. I don’t want him to be
released. And what if he does something to me because I’m
accusing — ” The trial court reasonably could conclude F.R. was
not withdrawing her request, but rather expressing her fear of
defendant and her desire to no longer be part of the proceedings.
Defendant argues F.R.’s wages were “under the table,”
meaning “not reported or taxed,” and therefore pursuant to the

8
doctrine of unclean hands, she is not entitled to recover them in
restitution. Assuming arguendo a defendant may assert an
unclean hands defense for the first time on appeal,2 the
argument fails on the merits.
“The doctrine of unclean hands prevents a party from
obtaining either legal or equitable relief when that party has
acted inequitably or with bad faith relative to the matter for
which relief is sought.” (People v. Wickham (2013)
222 Cal.App.4th 232, 238 (Wickham).
Wickham is an illustration of the doctrine of unclean hands
applied in the context of victim restitution. In Wickham, the
defendant was convicted of theft by false pretenses after he failed
to repay money he had persuaded an elderly man to lend him.
(Supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at pp. 234–236.) The trial court ordered
the defendant to pay restitution with statutory interest accruing
as of the date of the restitution award. (Id. at p. 236.) On appeal,
the defendant argued he should not have to pay interest on the
restitution amount because the interest rates the elderly man
had imposed on the loans to the defendant violated usury laws.
(Id. at p. 237.) The Court of Appeal held the defendant’s
conviction for “obtaining by false pretenses the money that was
the subject of” the purportedly usurious loans was “a textbook
case of [the] defendant acting ‘with bad faith relative to the
matter for which relief is sought.’ ” (Id. at p. 238.) Thus, the
doctrine of unclean hands prevented defendant from “seek[ing]

2 As noted in the Procedural Background, ante, defense
counsel below did not argue that F.R. was not entitled to her lost
wages, only that F.R.’s testimony supported an award of $2,220
rather than $3,600.

9
the protection of usury laws to counteract the restitution statute.”
(Ibid.)
Just as in Wickham, it is defendant, and not his victim,
F.R., who has unclean hands. In Wickham, the defendant’s
unclean hands — in that case his theft of money — barred him
from raising a usury argument to avoid restitution of that money.
Here, similarly, defendant effectively deprived F.R. of wages by
assaulting and traumatizing her. Thus, his unclean hands bar
him from raising the contention F.R. is not entitled to restitution
because she purportedly did not pay taxes on her wages.
Further, the record does not establish F.R.’s wages were
unreported and untaxed. The trial court made no such findings,
nor did defense counsel request such findings. Defense counsel
asked F.R. about her net wage after taxes, and F.R. indicated her
husband was in charge of the family’s taxes. Defense counsel
then asked if F.R. “pa[id] taxes on the $320 that you received as
salary,” and F.R. said, “No.” Given F.R. had just said her
husband handled the family’s taxes, however, it is not clear F.R.
was stating definitively no tax was paid on her wages, or simply
that she personally did not pay the taxes. We also cannot
conclude from the absence of documentary evidence of F.R.’s
wages, which defense counsel did not request, that the wages
were unreported and untaxed. Thus, even if defendant’s own
unclean hands did not bar him from raising his tax argument, the
record does not support that argument.
In his reply brief, defendant argues F.R.’s testimony that
she was unable to work due to fear was insufficient justification
to entitle her restitution for lost wages. This argument is doubly
forfeited for failure to raise it in the trial court or in defendant’s
opening brief. (GoTek Energy, Inc. v. SoCal IP Law Group, LLP

10
(2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1248; Hurley v. Department of Parks
& Recreation (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 634, 648, fn. 10.) Nor does
defendant cite any authority that missing work due to fear of
additional attacks is an insufficient basis to award victim
restitution. (People v. Dougherty (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 278, 282–
283 [argument forfeited for lack of legal authority].)

DISPOSITION
The restitution order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

We concur:

WEINGART, J.

M. KIM, J.

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