Jump To

Top Caption Combined Opinion

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 16, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

People v. Dunn

California Court of Appeal

• Citations: None known

• Docket Number: A172594

• Opinion

• Authorities (15)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (11.3K)

• PDF

Combined Opinion

Filed 3/16/26
CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION *

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, A172594
v.
(Humboldt County
MORGAN JAMES DUNN, Super. Ct. Nos. CR2300341,
CR1505239).
Defendant and Appellant.

A jury convicted Morgan James Dunn of four counts of unlawful
firearm possession and five counts of unlawful ammunition possession under
Penal Code sections 29800, subdivision (a)(1), and 30305, subdivision (a)(1).
On appeal, Dunn argues the trial court made two instructional errors. First,
he contends the court should have instructed the jury, sua sponte, on how to
evaluate circumstantial evidence because, in his view, his guilt depended
almost entirely on circumstantial evidence that he lived in the cabin where
the guns and ammunition were found. Second, he contends the court erred
by giving the jury a unanimity instruction regarding the firearm counts even
though no single count alleged that Dunn possessed more than one firearm.
Dunn argues that the first alleged error warrants reversal of his convictions
on all nine counts and that the second alleged error warrants reversal of his
convictions on three of the four firearm counts. Alternatively, he argues that

• Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this

opinion is certified for publication with the exception of parts II and III.
the combined effect of the two alleged errors resulted in prejudice requiring
reversal of all nine counts. Finding no instance of prejudicial error, and no
cumulative prejudice warranting reversal, we affirm. 1
BACKGROUND
In 2022, Dunn lived in Hideaway Hills, a 40-acre property with
multiple cabins located at the single street address 284 Pine Drive. Each
cabin had a specific number, but not all of them were marked. Dunn served
as a caretaker of the property. He had a felony conviction that prevented him
from legally possessing firearms or ammunition.
Another Hideaway Hills resident, Sheila Castillo, testified that she
believed Dunn lived in a particular cabin on the property for about two years
after having replaced the prior caretaker. Although she did not know the
number of the cabin, she identified it on a map and described its appearance
and location. She testified that she had seen him come and go from the
cabin, she saw him inside it “[a]lmost every day” when she was passing by in
her car, and she had seen him bring his dogs inside. She said that the dogs
lived in the cabin and that Dunn parked a truck in front of it. She believed
that he slept in the cabin because she saw the bedroom light on at night.
Castillo also testified that she once saw Dunn carrying a black or blackish
rifle.
In July 2022, Deputy Sheriff Nathan Cumbow responded to a call from
Hideaway Hills. When he arrived, he saw Dunn waiting for him in a truck
parked in front of the same cabin identified by Castillo. Dunn got out of the
truck, and he and Cumbow spoke in front of the cabin.

1 We grant Dunn’s unopposed motion to amend his notice of appeal to

include case number CR1505239, a probation violation case related to case
number CR2300341.
2
In August, Deputy Sheriff Seth Crosswhite attempted to serve process
on Dunn. The service papers indicated that Dunn lived in Hideaway Hills at
cabin number 4. When Crosswhite arrived at Hideaway Hills, one of the first
cabins he came to was the one presumed by Castillo to be Dunn’s residence.
As he approached, a woman came out of the cabin. Crosswhite testified that
when he asked if Dunn lived there, she said no and directed him to a
different group of residences on the property. He did not learn her name, and
she did not testify at trial. Crosswhite did not find Dunn at another cabin or
group of cabins.
In September, Castillo enlisted the help of another neighbor, Valerie, 2
to serve Dunn with a restraining order. Castillo testified that she watched
Valerie go to the cabin to give Dunn the papers. Dunn was there but he
would not take them, so she left them on the porch. Castillo heard Dunn tell
Valerie to leave.
Around the same time, likely after Castillo and Valerie’s attempted
service, three sheriff’s deputies, including Deputy Cumbow (but not including
Deputy Crosswhite), came to Hideaway Hills looking for Dunn regarding
outstanding warrants. They spoke to Castillo, who identified the cabin as
Dunn’s residence. Based on that conversation, and because that is where
Cumbow had met Dunn, they believed that Dunn lived in the cabin. One of
the deputies testified that he did not recall a visible number associated with
the cabin. They knocked on the doors and announced their presence, but
nobody answered. The deputies entered the cabin through an unlocked
sliding glass door.
In some ways, the inside of the cabin appeared unfinished or bare. The
living room walls had no personal effects. Above a shop-vac, one wall had a

2 The record does not contain Valerie’s last name.

3
hole with exposed electrical wires. The walls were incompletely painted, with
some exposed drywall. There was a light switch without a cover plate, there
appeared to be an exposed electrical panel, and a ceiling light fixture had
been removed. One of the deputies testified that the state of the cabin was
not extreme and that most of the hundreds of residences he had searched
were in more disarray.
The cabin showed signs of use. It had working electrical power. In the
kitchen, the deputies found food, a plugged-in hot plate, plates, soda cans,
trash in a trash bag, and salt and pepper shakers. In the living room, the
deputies found dog bowls with dog food in them, water bowls with water in
them, two dog cages, bags of dog food, and a tug-of-war dog toy. One bedroom
had a bed with sheets, blankets, pillows, and sleeping bags. It also had
folded clothes, shoes, and slippers that appeared to be larger than size 13. In
addition, the backside of the cabin had bins with cans and other recyclables
in them.
On the kitchen counter, the deputies found mail and papers with
Dunn’s name on them. These included a fictitious business statement signed
by Dunn, two vehicle-registration cards, a vehicle pink slip, a letter from
PG&E, a transmission-work receipt, and insurance paperwork. Some of the
papers showed the Hideaway Hills street address of 284 Pine Drive, and
others showed different addresses. The letter from PG&E showed the
284 Pine Drive address and specifically designated “No. 14.”
On the nightstand of the bedroom with the furnished bed, the deputies
found a wallet. It contained Dunn’s driver’s license, an identification card in
his name, and multiple credit cards in his name.
In the closet of the same bedroom, the deputies found four firearms and
ammunition. The firearms consisted of the following: an AR-15 rifle; a black

4
12-gauge, pump-action shotgun; a camouflage 12-gauge, pump-action
shotgun; and a shotgun with a sawed-off barrel. All of them were loaded.
The deputies could see the shotguns and the butt of the AR-15 rifle when
they walked into the room. Along with the firearms, the deputies found two
cannisters or canteens with five types of ammunition compatible with the
firearms.
Next to the ammunition in the closet, the deputies found clear plastic
containers. The containers held DMV records with Dunn’s name on them, his
birth certificate, and a bible with his name written inside the front cover.
Following the deputies’ search, the district attorney filed an
information charging Dunn with four counts of unlawful possession of a
firearm. Each count related to one of the four firearms found in the cabin.
The information also charged Dunn with five counts of unlawful possession of
ammunition.
At Dunn’s trial, the parties stipulated that Dunn had been previously
convicted of a felony, that the deputies’ search of the cabin was lawful, and
that there were no fingerprints on the firearms.
The court instructed the jury about direct and circumstantial evidence,
using CALCRIM No. 223, which defines those types of evidence and explains
that either or both can be used to prove a fact. It did not use CALCRIM
No. 224, which discusses the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence to prove a
defendant’s guilt.
For the firearm counts, using CALCRIM No. 2511, the court instructed
the jury that the People needed to prove that Dunn (1) possessed a firearm,
(2) knew he possessed the firearm, and (3) had been convicted of a felony.
The court explained that “[a] person does not have to actually hold or touch
something to possess it. It is enough if the person has control over it or the

5
right to control it, either personally or through another person.” The court
told the jury that the parties had stipulated that Dunn previously had been
convicted of a felony.
Continuing to use CALCRIM No. 2511, the court instructed, “[t]he
People allege that the defendant possessed the following firearms: One, a
black shotgun; two, a camo shotgun; three, an AR-15 rifle; four, a break-
action shotgun.” It further instructed, “[y]ou may not find the defendant
guilty unless all of you agree that the People have proved that the defendant
possessed at least one of the firearms, and you all agree on which firearm he
possessed.”
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all nine counts.
DISCUSSION
I.
Dunn contends the court erred by failing to use CALCRIM No. 224, sua
sponte, to instruct the jury how to evaluate the circumstantial evidence in the
case. We agree, but we find that the error was harmless.
A.
A trial court must instruct the jury “on the general principles of law
relevant to the issues raised by the evidence” even in the absence of a
request. (People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 154 .) We examine
without deference a trial court’s decision whether to give a particular jury
instruction. (People v. Waidla (2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 733.)
CALCRIM No. 224 provides: “Before you may rely on circumstantial
evidence to conclude that a fact necessary to find the defendant guilty has
been proved, you must be convinced that the People have proved each fact
essential to that conclusion beyond a reasonable doubt.” It continues: “Also,
before you may rely on circumstantial evidence to find the defendant guilty,

6
you must be convinced that the only reasonable conclusion supported by the
circumstantial evidence is that the defendant is guilty. If you can draw two
or more reasonable conclusions from the circumstantial evidence, and one of
those reasonable conclusions points to innocence and another to guilt, you
must accept the one that points to innocence. However, when considering
circumstantial evidence, you must accept only reasonable conclusions and
reject any that are unreasonable.”
In People v. Yrigoyen (1955) 45 Cal.2d 46 (Yrigoyen), the California
Supreme Court stated that a trial court must sua sponte give an instruction
on the principles in CALCRIM No. 224 when “circumstantial evidence is
substantially relied upon for proof of guilt . . . .” (Yrigoyen at p. 49, citing
People v. Bender (1945) 27 Cal.2d 164, 175, overruled on other grounds in
People v. Lasko (2000) 23 Cal.4th 101, 110; see People v. Rogers (2006)
39 Cal.4th 826, 885–886 (Rogers).) Citing People v. Wiley (1976) 18 Cal.3d
162, the Attorney General argues that even if the prosecution substantially
relies on circumstantial evidence, a trial court does not err by failing to give
the instruction when the circumstantial evidence is “not equally consistent
with a rational conclusion” of innocence. (Id. at p. 175.) While the Supreme
Court has not expressly repudiated that language, in more recent decisions it
has instead hewed to the approach first set forth in Yrigoyen. In Rogers, the
court considered only whether the prosecution had substantially relied on
circumstantial evidence, and, answering that question in the affirmative,
concluded the trial court erred by failing to give the instruction. (Rogers, at
p. 885.) It reached this conclusion even though it found the error harmless
because the circumstantial evidence was “strong” and, indeed, not even
susceptible to a reasonable interpretation pointing to the defendant’s
innocence. (Id. at p. 886.) Rogers’s finding of error thus calls into question

7
the continuing viability of any view that the instruction need not be given if
the circumstantial evidence is not equally consistent with a rational
conclusion of innocence. Similarly, in a case addressing the CALJIC
instructions for circumstantial evidence in the context of special
circumstances, the high court’s conclusion that the prosecution substantially
relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the lying-in-wait special
circumstance was sufficient to compel the conclusion that the trial court
erred by failing sua sponte to give the instructions. (People v. Sandoval
(2015) 62 Cal.4th 394, 417–421 (Sandoval).)
Here, the prosecution’s case rested on multiple items of circumstantial
evidence. No one saw Dunn in possession or control of the firearms or
ammunition. Even Castillo’s testimony that she saw Dunn with a black rifle
is not direct evidence that Dunn possessed one of the specific firearms at
issue. Therefore, the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 224.
B.
We next consider whether there is a reasonable probability the outcome
would have been more favorable to Dunn if the instruction had been given.
(Rogers, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 886 [citing People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d
818, 836, for standard of prejudice]; Sandoval, supra, 62 Cal.4th at pp. 421–
422 [same].) We conclude the answer is no.
As described above, Castillo’s testimony established Dunn’s regular
presence in the cabin, and the deputies’ testimony furnished evidence that
the cabin was inhabited and contained Dunn’s personal papers and items,
including in the same closet where the firearms and ammunition were found.
The shotguns, and the butt of the AR-15 rifle, were in plain view from the
bedroom where Dunn’s wallet lay on the nightstand.

8
This evidence strongly supports the jury’s guilty verdicts. Dunn offers
four alternative possibilities that he says could be supported by the evidence,
but they are neither reasonable inferences from the evidence nor would they
point toward his innocence. Before addressing each alternative in turn, we
note that the jury did not need to conclude that Dunn lived in the cabin, or
that no one else lived in the cabin, to find Dunn guilty. It needed to conclude
only that Dunn had control over the firearms and ammunition in the closet.
First, Dunn argues that the evidence supports a conclusion that no one
lived in the cabin, in particular evidence that parts of the cabin’s interior
were bare, unfinished, or being worked on. But one deputy testified that it
looked as though someone lived there, and another testified that, of the
hundreds of residences he had searched, most were in more disarray than the
cabin. Moreover, to accept Dunn’s proposed explanation, the jury would need
to disregard piece after piece of evidence showing that someone ate, slept,
and kept dogs in the cabin; Dunn spent significant time in the cabin; and
Dunn kept important paperwork and personal items there, including in the
closet where the firearms and ammunition were found. Even if the jury were
to conclude that Dunn formally resided elsewhere—perhaps based on some of
the paperwork on the kitchen counter showing different addresses—it still
would not be reasonable for the jury to conclude that Dunn did not have
access to the cabin, that he did not spend significant time there, that he did
not store important personal items in the bedroom closet, and that he thus
did not have control over the firearms and ammunition found inside.
Second, Dunn proposes that evidence supports a conclusion that
someone else lived in the cabin. He points out that there was conflicting
evidence about what number cabin Dunn lived in and no evidence was
introduced about the size or gender characteristics of the clothes found in the

9
cabin. Dunn also relies on Deputy Crosswhite’s testimony that an
unidentified woman came out of the cabin and told him that Dunn lived in a
different group of cabins on the property (although the deputy did not find
Dunn living in another cabin). But it would not have been reasonable for the
jury, based on the evidence Dunn cites, to disregard Castillo’s testimony
about Dunn’s presence at the cabin, as corroborated by his personal effects
found inside. Moreover, as noted, the possibility that someone else also lived
in the cabin is not inconsistent with an inference that Dunn lived in the
cabin, or at a minimum had access to and control over the items in the closet.
Third, Dunn argues that one could conclude from the circumstantial
evidence that the firearms and ammunition were not in the cabin at the same
time he was. In support, he recites the following: There was no evidence
when the firearms and ammunition arrived; there were no dust rings around
the documents, ammunition, or weapons; the unidentified woman made her
statement to Deputy Crosswhite in August; Castillo could not remember the
date that she and Valerie attempted to serve Dunn at the cabin; and there
were no fingerprints on the firearms. But for the jury to reach this
conclusion it would need to disregard the undisputed evidence that Dunn’s
wallet was on the bedroom nightstand at the same time the firearms and
ammunition were in the bedroom closet. The jury would also need to
disregard Castillo’s testimony that she saw Dunn carrying a black or blackish
rifle. It is theoretically possible that some unidentified person brought the
firearms and ammunition to the closet and placed them next to Dunn’s
personal records for some unknown reason without telling Dunn and without
Dunn’s knowledge—and that Dunn then entered the room and left his wallet
on the nightstand without noticing the arrival. But it is not a reasonable
conclusion based on the evidence.

10
Fourth, Dunn proposes that the firearms and ammunition belonged to
a prior tenant of the cabin. He does not develop this argument beyond noting
that the cabin previously had a tenant who had been the caretaker of the
property before Dunn. This bare fact, however, does not undermine the
evidence or conclusions discussed above pointing to his control over the
weapons and ammunition.
We are also unpersuaded by Dunn’s argument that the court’s omission
of CALCRIM No. 224 negatively impacted the jury’s perception of defense
counsel or of Dunn’s primary defense such that reversal is warranted. As
Dunn recounts, in his closing argument defense counsel referred to a jury
instruction covering the requirements of CALCRIM No. 224 and told the jury
it would need to comply with those requirements. The court, of course, did
not proceed to give the instruction. But we find speculative Dunn’s
contention that the omission caused the jury to doubt defense counsel
generally. The prosecutor did not draw attention to the reference in her
rebuttal closing argument or otherwise suggest that defense counsel was
untrustworthy because of it. We find unlikely that the jury noticed or
remembered the discrepancy between the defense counsel’s statement and
the many pages of jury instructions given by the court. Further, absent the
alleged error, and thus absent any potential negative perception of counsel,
we do not think the jury reasonably could have reached a different conclusion
on any of the nine counts given the strength of the evidence presented.
II.
Dunn also contends his convictions on three of the four firearm counts
should be reversed because the court erred by giving the jury a unanimity

11
instruction. 3 Such an instruction is warranted when conviction on a single
count may be based on more than one act and the jurors may disagree about
which particular act the defendant committed. (People v. Beardslee (1991)
53 Cal.3d 68, 92–93.) It explains to the jurors that they must unanimously
agree on the specific criminal act. (People v. Gordon (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d
839, 853.)
The Attorney General concedes that the court erred, and we agree. 4 A
trial court should “ ‘refrain from instructing on principles of law which not
only are irrelevant to the issues raised by the evidence but also have the
effect of confusing the jury. . . .’ ” (People v. Saddler (1979) 24 Cal.3d 671,
681.) Here, a unanimity instruction would have been appropriate had Dunn
been charged with possessing multiple firearms under a single count. Then
the jurors would have needed to agree unanimously on which firearm Dunn
had possessed. Instead, the information charged Dunn with four separate
counts, each relating specifically to one of the four firearms found in the
bedroom closet. There was no need to instruct the jury, as the court did, that
“[y]ou may not find the defendant guilty unless all of you agree that the
People have proved that the defendant possessed at least one of the firearms,
and you all agree on which firearm he possessed.”

3 Dunn requests reversal for counts 1, 2, and 4, which relate to the

black shotgun, the camo shotgun, and the sawed-off—or “break action”—
shotgun.
4 The Attorney General argues that the claim of error is forfeited

because Dunn did not object in the trial court, whereas Dunn maintains his
claim is nonetheless cognizable because the error affected his substantial
rights. (People v. Campbell (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 463, 499.) We need not
address this issue because we conclude below that the error was harmless in
any event.
12
Dunn contends that the error prejudiced his case as to three of the four
firearm counts because the prosecutor pointed to separate evidence that
Dunn possessed the AR-15 rifle in particular—namely Castillo’s testimony
that she had seen him with a black rifle. According to Dunn, the unanimity
instruction would have allowed a juror to find him guilty on all four counts by
crediting only this testimony regarding the AR-15 rifle.
We find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
(Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 23–24.) The separate counts for
each firearm, while making the unanimity instruction inappropriate, also
mitigated any confusion stemming from the error. The jury received a
separate sheet of paper for each firearm count, each requiring the jury to
decide guilty or not guilty as to the particular listed firearm. For example,
the verdict form for Count One stated, “[w]e the jury . . . find the defendant,
Morgan James Dunn [Guilty/Not Guilty] of the offense charged in Count One
of the Information, to wit, possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, to
wit, a black shotgun, and in violation of Penal Code section 29800(a)(1), a
felony.” The court instructed the jury that it “must consider each count
separately and return a separate verdict for each one.” And, in fact, the jury
returned a separate verdict for each count.
The context of the jury instructions as a whole also mitigated the error.
(See People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009, 1016 [“ ‘[t]he correctness of
jury instructions is to be determined from the entire charge of the court, not
from a consideration of parts of an instruction or from a particular
instruction’ ”].) The court instructed that “[e]ach of the counts charged in this
case is a separate crime” and that the jury “must consider each count
separately and return a separate verdict for each one.” It also instructed that
“[p]roof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you with an abiding

13
conviction that the charge is true” and that “you must decide whether a fact
in issue has been proved based on all the evidence.” These instructions would
have left the jury with the impression that facts supporting each count had to
be proved.
Reviewing the whole record—including the separate verdict forms, the
mitigating instructions, and the strong evidence supporting the jury’s
verdicts discussed above—we conclude that the court’s error in providing the
unanimity instruction was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
III.
Relying on Chambers v. Mississippi (1973) 410 U.S. 284, 302–303,
Dunn argues that even if the two instructional errors were harmless, “their
combined effect results in prejudice because they cumulatively resulted in a
fundamentally unfair trial.” We disagree. This is not a case in which the
defendant was unable to present critical evidence or cross-examine an
important witness. (See Chambers v. Mississippi, at pp. 291–295, 298–303.)
For the reasons we have already discussed, we conclude that the combined
effect of the errors did not rise to the level of depriving Dunn of a
fundamentally fair trial.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
GOLDMAN, J.

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
MOORMAN, J. *

*Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
14
Trial Court: Humboldt County Superior Court

Trial Judge: Honorable John T. Feeney

Counsel for Defendant and Patrick J. Hoynoski, under appointment
Appellant: by the Court of Appeal

Counsel for Plaintiff and Rob Bonta
Respondent: Attorney General of California
Charles C. Ragland
Chief Assistant Attorney General
Jeffrey M. Laurence
Senior Assistant Attorney General
Eric D. Share
Supervising Deputy Attorney General
Molly A. Smolen
Stephanie F. Richardson
Deputy Attorneys General

15