Jump To

Top Caption [Lead Opinion

                  by Ford Elliott](https://www.courtlistener.com/opinion/10811166/com-v-misseri-a/#o1)

Support FLP

CourtListener is a project of Free
Law Project, a federally-recognized 501(c)(3) non-profit. Members help support our work and get special access to features.

Please become a member today.

Join Free.law Now

March 19, 2026 Get Citation Alerts Download PDF Add Note

Com. v. Misseri, A.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

• Citations: None known
• Docket Number: 497 EDA 2025
• Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

• Judges: Ford Elliott

• Opinion

• Authorities (11)

• Cited By (0)

• Summaries (0)

• Similar Cases (14.5K)

• PDF

Lead Opinion

                        by [Kate Ford Elliott](https://www.courtlistener.com/person/8229/kate-ford-elliott/)

J-S05033-26

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ANTONYIO MISSERI :
:
Appellant : No. 497 EDA 2025

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered January 17, 2025
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002407-2023

BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J.E., KING, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E. 

MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED MARCH 19, 2026

Antonyio Misseri appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed

following a non-jury trial in which he was found guilty of possessing a firearm

as a prohibited person, carrying a firearm without a license, publicly carrying

a firearm on public streets or public property in Philadelphia, criminal mischief,

fleeing or attempting to elude a police officer, and recklessly endangering

another person.1 For these offenses, Misseri received an aggregate term of six

to twelve years of incarceration to be followed by one year of probation.

Misseri raises two issues, first arguing that the court erroneously denied his

suppression motion and, second, asserting that his sentence, as it pertains to

---

 Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6108; 18

Pa.C.S. § 3304(a)(5); 75 Pa.C.S. § 3733(a); and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705,
respectively.
J-S05033-26

his conviction for publicly carrying a firearm in Philadelphia, should be vacated

in accordance with this Court’s holding in Commonwealth v. Sumpter, 340

A.3d 977 (Pa. Super. 2025) (reargument denied; allocatur petition pending at

377 EAL 2025). We affirm.

The court summarized the facts underpinning this case, as follows:

At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth presented the
testimony of Officer Dave Dohan, who participated in [Misseri’s]
arrest in the City of Philadelphia’s 14 th District. Officer Dohan had
been a police officer for 15 years and was assigned to the 14 th
District for around 12 years. He testified that the 14 th District,
particularly near Collum Street where [Misseri] was arrested, is “a
high crime area” with “drug sales and gun violence.”

On March 14, 2023, around 1:18 p.m., Officer Dohan received a
call from Officer Jonathan Alvarez, who advised there was a “Jeep
Track Hawk” on Collum Street that resembled the same vehicle
which fled from Officer Dohan and other officers a few days earlier.
During the earlier encounter, Officer Dohan “ran the tag” for the
Jeep[,] and “it came back stolen.” Now, Officer Alvarez, who was
patrolling near Collum Street, advised that the Jeep was parked[,]
and he had seen an individual exit the car and walk away.

Upon arriving on Collum Street with his partner (Officer [Robert]
Snyder), Officer Dohan observed the Jeep was the same vehicle
that fled from him a few days earlier. It had the “[s]ame make,
same color, same tint on the windows, [and] same model of year.”
The Jeep also had a temporary New Jersey registration tag that
had already expired. When Officer Dohan checked the expired tag
through the police database, he learned it was assigned to a
different vehicle – i.e., a Ford Econoline Van. A few moments later,
[Misseri] entered the Jeep’s driver’s side[,] and the officers
converged in their patrol cars to stop the vehicle. Officer Dohan
testified that he intended to stop the Jeep because it violated
[Pennsylvania’s] Motor Vehicle Code due to its improper
registration tag[] and because he sought “to determine if it was a
stolen car.”

Officers Dohan and Snyder pulled their patrol car in front of the

-2-
J-S05033-26

Jeep while Officer Alvarez pulled his patrol car beside the vehicle.
Officer Dohan exited his unit in full uniform and wearing his body-
worn camera, which captured much of the encounter and was
admitted into evidence. As Officer Dohan approached the Jeep on
foot, he saw [Misseri] “reach down and put the car in reverse.”
Once [Misseri] began reversing the vehicle, Officer Dohan drew
his firearm and commanded [Misseri] to put the vehicle in park.
Officer Dohan’s body-worn camera record[ed] officers stating
there was a gun in the Jeep, and Officer Dohan saw [Misseri] reach
toward the area of the gun.

[Misseri] defied the officers’ commands to stop and “attempted to
flee the area by reversing down Collum Street.” In the process,
[Misseri] struck Officer Alvarez’s patrol car, struck several other
parked cars, almost struck Officer Alvarez, and ultimately crashed
and “disabled” the Jeep. After crashing the Jeep, [Misseri] fled on
foot. While other officers pursued and apprehended [Misseri],
Officer Dohan put the Jeep in park and recovered the gun from
the Jeep’s cup holder next to the driver’s seat. Later that day,
Officer Dohan confirmed that the Jeep had, in fact, been reported
stolen.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 2-3 (record citations omitted; some brackets

in original).

Following his arrest, but prior to trial, at the suppression hearing, Misseri

claimed that the pretextual nature and illegality of the vehicle stop warranted

suppression of the firearm because:

[Misseri] claimed the officers stopped the Jeep[,] not because it
violated [Pennsylvania’s] Motor Vehicle Code for containing an
expired registration tag for a different vehicle[] and not because
Officer Dohan suspected the vehicle was stolen based on the
illegal tag and his earlier encounter with a matching vehicle that
had been reported stolen, but because the officers sought to
investigate [Misseri] for his suspected gang activity. According to
[Misseri], the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable
suspicion to stop him for his suspected gang activity, which
[Misseri] claims was their true purpose for executing the stop.
[The court ultimately found that the officers possessed reasonable
suspicion and denied suppression.]

-3-
J-S05033-26

Id. at 3-4 (record citations omitted).

At the non-jury trial, Officers Dohan and Alvarez testified consistent with

Officer Dohan’s prior testimony elicited during the suppression hearing. In

particular,

Officer Dohan again testified that he received a call from Officer
Alvarez regarding the Jeep they believed was in “stolen status.”
Officer Alvarez advised that the Jeep was parked on East Collum
Street and requested Officer Dohan to “drive by and take a look.”

As requested, Officer Dohan drove by and saw the Jeep had a New
Jersey temporary registration tag. He checked the tag with the
police database and learned it had expired and belonged not to
the Jeep, but to a Ford van. When [Misseri] entered the vehicle,
Officers Dohan, Snyder, and Alvarez attempted to stop the Jeep
because it had a fake and expired registration tag[] and because
they believed the vehicle had been stolen. However, [Misseri]
immediately reversed up the street[] and[,] only after striking
multiple cars[,] did the Jeep come to a stop.

At that point, Officer Alvarez “was able to open a rear window by
force with his . . . exp[a]ndable baton,” and he “made the callout
that there was a firearm inside the vehicle.” Officer Dohan likewise
observed the “firearm with an extended magazine in the cup
holder right next to the shifter where [Misseri] was going from
drive to reverse.” After [Misseri] exited the crashed Jeep and fled
on foot, [Officer] Dohan placed the vehicle in park and recovered
the firearm.

Officer Alvarez similarly testified that he observed a dark gray
Jeep on East Collum Street. The vehicle had “a New Jersey
temp[orary] tag on the back.” Officer Alvarez “did a query of that
tag, and it came back as an expired license plate for a Ford van.”
Based on his experience, Officer Alvarez “believed [the] vehicle
was possibly stolen with a fictitious tag on the back.”

Officer Alvarez testified that he initially saw [Misseri] walking away
from the passenger side of the Jeep. When [Misseri] returned and
entered the vehicle’s driver’s seat, Officers Alvarez, Dohan, and
Snyder attempted to stop the vehicle[,] but [Misseri] fled by

-4-
J-S05033-26

reversing up the street. [Misseri] drove the Jeep “up almost the
whole length of the block” and struck multiple vehicles, including
Officer Alvarez’s patrol car, before the Jeep’s front tires “popped”
and the vehicle “came to a standstill.”

When the officers re-approached the Jeep, [Misseri] “attempted
to drive off again” but “it got stuck up [under] another vehicle that
was parked there on the street as well.” With his baton, Officer
Alvarez broke the Jeep’s darkly[-]tinted rear-passenger window to
gain a “visual inside the car.” He observed a firearm inside the
vehicle, sitting in the center console area “next to the gear
shifter.” Officer Alvarez ordered [Misseri] “multiple times to stop
reaching for the gun, not to touch the gun, to stop the vehicle.”
He ultimately used his taser to try subduing [Misseri], who “fled
on foot[,]” but he was apprehended by other responding officers.

In Officer Alvarez’s presence, Officer Dohan recovered the firearm
from the Jeep’s console. The gun was “loaded with 25 rounds and
1 round in the chamber.” The officers conducted a “query” that
“revealed [Misseri] did not have a permit to possess a firearm.”

The Commonwealth lastly presented the testimony of Officer
Kevin Dwyer, who works in the Police Department’s Firearms
Identification Unit. Officer Dwyer testified that he test[-]fired the
firearm recovered from the Jeep and found it was operable.

Id. at 4-6 (record citations and footnote omitted, some brackets in original).

Following the court’s adjudication of guilt and the subsequent

sentencing thereon, Misseri filed a timely post-sentence motion, which was

correspondingly denied. After that denial, Misseri filed a timely notice of

appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.

Misseri presents two issues for review:

1. Did the trial court err in denying Misseri’s suppression motion,
   which allowed the erroneous admission of evidence at trial,
   given that the police had no legal basis to pursue the vehicle?

2. Should Misseri’s judgment of sentence be vacated and the
   matter remanded to the trial court consistent with this Court’s

-5-
J-S05033-26

Sumpter decision, which was decided during the pendency of
his appeal?

Appellant’s Brief at 4 (questions rephrased). No relief is due.

We address Misseri’s suppression claim first. Our review of “a challenge

to the denial of a suppression motion is limited to determining whether the

suppression court’s factual findings are supported by the record and whether

the legal conclusions drawn from those facts are correct.” Commonwealth

v. Jones, 988 A.2d 649, 654 (Pa. 2010). Our Court is limited to reviewing

“[o]nly the evidence presented at the suppression hearing when examining a

ruling on a pre-trial motion to suppress.” Commonwealth v. Harlan, 208

A.3d 497, 499 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “It is within the

suppression court’s sole province as fact[-]finder to pass on the credibility of

witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony. The suppression court

is free to believe all, some[,] or none of the evidence presented at the

suppression hearing.” Commonwealth v. Duke, 208 A.3d 465, 470 (Pa.

Super. 2019) (citation omitted). “This Court is bound by the suppression

court’s factual findings that are supported by the record, but we are not bound

by its legal conclusions, which we review de novo.” Commonwealth v.

Camacho, 325 A.3d 685, 689 (Pa. Super. 2024).

Here, Misseri argues that “the police were lying in wait for someone . .

. when the vehicle had been legally parked[,] and the police had already seen

an individual exit the vehicle and walk away without approaching the individual

or obtaining a warrant to . . . search the parked vehicle.” Appellant’s Brief at

-6-
J-S05033-26

1. Nevertheless, “the police waited for someone to return to the vehicle,

purportedly already knowing that the tag on the vehicle was registered to

another vehicle, but . . . failing to confront the individual who entered it.” Id.

at 10-11. Instead, as Misseri asserts, the police waited until the vehicle began

moving, resulting in the police pursuing the car “on the pretextual basis of a

[vehicular] violation and to investigate whether the vehicle had been stolen.”

Id. at 11. In essence, with the officers waiting until the vehicle was in motion,

Misseri believes that their stop was a fishing expedition, allowing the officers

to tether their preexisting suspicion of his unproven gang activity to possible

evidence of the same. See id. Distilled down, Misseri contends that officers

never had reasonable suspicion that could allow them to stop the vehicle. See

id. (stating that reasonable suspicion “could have never . . . existed since the

vehicle was parked and the police intentionally waited for it to move”)

(emphasis in original).

Misseri’s argument fails for two reasons: (1) Misseri has failed to

demonstrate any expectation of privacy in the vehicle he had been driving,

which, after the vehicle’s movement had been arrested, led to Officer Dolan’s

plain-view observation of the firearm; and (2) notwithstanding Misseri’s

assertion that their actions were pretextual, the officers had independent,

reasonable suspicion to stop the car, based on prior knowledge and their

observation of at least one discrete vehicular violation, rendering any

allegation as to the pretextual nature of their actions meritless.

-7-
J-S05033-26

We start by emphasizing that “[a] defendant moving to suppress

evidence has the preliminary burden of establishing standing and a legitimate

expectation of privacy.” Commonwealth v. Lyn, 316 A.3d 1055, 1058 (Pa.

Super. 2024) (citation omitted). As this Court noted in Commonwealth v.

Burton, “Pennsylvania law makes clear there is no legally cognizable

expectation of privacy in a stolen vehicle.” 973 A.2d 428, 435 (Pa. Super.

2009) (en banc) (citation omitted). We emphasize that Misseri has failed to

provide any evidence that the Jeep was not, in fact, stolen or that the tags

were correctly used.

As summarized by this Court in Lyn,

In Burton, the driver was stopped for a routine traffic violation.
When the police asked for identification, they discovered that none
of the car’s occupants were the named lessee and none could
establish their connection to the car or the named lessee. Our
Court held that because the defendant offered no evidence to
explain his connection to the vehicle or his connection to the
registered owner of the vehicle, he failed to demonstrate that he
had a reasonably cognizable expectation of privacy in a vehicle
that he did not own, that was not registered to him, and for which
he has not shown authority to operate.

316 A.3d at 1058 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

As the trial court, here, found, Misseri

failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy in the Jeep
he occupied. [Misseri] did not own the vehicle, it was not
registered to him, and he provided no evidence that he had any
authority to operate or occupy the vehicle. Indeed, the Jeep
contained a false registration tag and police officers confirmed
after the stop that the vehicle was, in fact, reported stolen[,] as
they suspected.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 8. Accordingly, because Misseri had no privacy

-8-
J-S05033-26

expectation vis-à-vis his unauthorized use of the vehicle, Misseri’s suppression

claim necessarily fails. See Lyn, 316 A.3d at 1058.

However, even if Misseri did have a reasonable expectation of privacy

in the vehicle upon entering it on its driver’s side, the police officers still

possessed indicia of at least one Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code violation,

thereby supporting a valid vehicular stop.

Whenever a police officer . . . has reasonable suspicion that a
violation of [Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Code] is occurring or
has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for
the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of
financial responsibility, vehicle identification number . . . or the
driver’s license, or to secure such other information as the officer
may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce the provision
of [Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Code].

75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b). However, “Pennsylvania law makes clear that a police

officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observes a

traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense.” Commonwealth v.

Harris, 176 A.3d 1009, 1019 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted). In either

case, if a violation is observed, an officer’s “subjective motive for stopping” a

vehicle is irrelevant. Id. at 1020. Nevertheless, as has been clarified by this

Court,

[a] police officer has the authority to stop a vehicle when he or
she has reasonable suspicion that a violation of the vehicle code
has taken place, for the purpose of obtaining necessary
information to enforce the provisions of the [Pennsylvania Motor
Vehicle Code]. However, if the violation is such that it requires no
additional investigation, the officer must have probable cause to
initiate the stop.

Commonwealth v. Spence, 290 A.3d 301, 312 (Pa. Super. 2023) (citations

-9-
J-S05033-26

and emphasis omitted).

Misseri has not expounded upon the distinctions between reasonable

suspicion and probable cause as applied to the facts of his case. However, and

regardless of Misseri’s assumption as to the officers’ subjective mindsets when

initiating the stop, there was clearly enough prior information ascertained

about the vehicle for the officers to operate in the manner that they did.

At a minimum, the officers possessed reasonable suspicion, allowing for

further investigation, that there had been a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor

Vehicle Code, namely in the form of the information they had already acquired

regarding the vehicle’s out-of-state, mismatched, and expired registration

tag. See 75 Pa.C.S. § 1301(a) (establishing that “[n]o person shall drive or

move and no owner or motor carrier shall knowingly permit to be driven or

move upon any highway any vehicle which is not registered in this

Commonwealth unless the vehicle is exempt from registration[]”); 75 Pa.C.S.

§ 1303(a) (exempting nonresident owners of foreign vehicles from registering

in this Commonwealth “provided the vehicle at all times when operated in this

Commonwealth is duly registered and in full compliance with the registration

requirements of the place of residence of the owner”).2

---

2 Although we find that the police officers performed a valid stop based on the

vehicle’s deficient registration status, Misseri’s own actions foreclose on any
“second step” analysis here, i.e. an inquiry into the officers’ actions vis-à-vis
the suspected Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code violation, because he, prior to
(Footnote Continued Next Page)

• 10 - J-S05033-26

As the court stated:

Here, the officers observed [Misseri] enter the same vehicle they
believed had fled from them a few days earlier. During the earlier
encounter, the officers checked the vehicle’s information through
the police database and learned the vehicle was reported stolen.
During the subsequent encounter, the officers observed the
vehicle had a fake and expired registration tag. Under these
circumstances, when [Misseri] entered the vehicle, the officers
had probable cause to believe the vehicle’s condition violated
[Pennsylvania’s] Motor Vehicle Code for its fake registration tag[]
and at least a reasonable suspicion to believe [Misseri] was
engaged in criminal behavior by possessing a vehicle that they
reasonably believed was stolen.

Trial Court Opinion, 3/21/25, at 10.

Officer Dohan originally observed an identical car, a gray Jeep

Trackhawk, with an expired New Jersey temporary tag that “came back [as]

stolen.” N.T. Suppression Hearing, 9/27/23, at 8-9. One week later, on the

date of Misseri’s arrest, an identical vehicle of the “[s]ame make, same color,

same tint on the windows, same model of year[,]” id. at 10, was observed

about half a mile away from Officer Dohan’s initial observation. Officer Dohan

ran the registration on this vehicle, “and it came back to a Ford Econoline,

which that car is obviously not.” Id. at 11. The registration on the vehicle was

suspended. See id. After Misseri got into the vehicle, the officers activated

their lights, with Officer Dohan exiting his marked vehicle in full uniform,

approaching the Jeep. See id. at 13. Then, Misseri reached down, put the Jeep

---

any substantive interaction with the officers, immediately fled, first in the
vehicle and then on foot.

• 11 - J-S05033-26

in reverse, and proceeded to ram into, inter alia, parked vehicles and a police

vehicle, leading to his attempted flight both in the Jeep and on foot and to the

ultimate discovery of the at-issue firearm. See id.

As Officer Dohan’s current and prior observations matched regarding

the status of the Jeep, there was clearly enough of a basis for him to initiate

the traffic stop to investigate, inter alia, its then-suspected stolen status.

Moreover, Officer Dohan testified, with enough of an articulable basis, that

there was a discordancy between the car’s make and model, as registered (or

not registered, as was the case), and reality, which allowed him to investigate

evidence of non-compliance with the vehicle code as well as potential

criminality further. Accordingly, the court’s factual findings were supported by

the record, and its legal conclusions drawn therefrom were correct: Officer

Dohan conducted a valid stop. Misseri is, therefore, due no relief on his first

issue.

In his second claim, Misseri argues that our Court’s decision in Sumpter

“is currently good law and [Misseri] respect[fully] requests that[,] if this

judgment of sentence is not reversed on his suppression argument[,] that the

[C]ourt reverse the judgment of sentence as to the Section 6108 conviction

and remand this matter to the trial court for additional proceedings relating to

that charge.” Appellant’s Brief at 14.

In Sumpter, a panel of this Court held Section 6108 of the Crimes Code

violated, on an as applied basis, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth

• 12 - J-S05033-26

Amendment to the United States Constitution. See Sumpter, 340 A.3d at

980-81.

Here, the trial court found Misseri guilty of violating Section 6108 and

imposed a concurrent term of imprisonment. To the extent that Sumpter

announced a new rule of law with respect to Section 6108, it would only apply

to Misseri’s case on direct review so long as the issue was previously

“preserved at all stages of adjudication.” See Commonwealth v. Hays, 218

A.3d 1260, 1266 (Pa. 2019) (stating, where “an appellate decision overrules

prior law and announces a new principle, unless the decision specifically

declares the ruling to be prospective only, the new rule is to be applied

retroactively where the issue in question is properly preserved at all stages of

adjudication up to and including any direct appeal”). However, Misseri did not

raise an Equal Protection claim, either as a facial challenge or as applied,

before the trial court. Thus, he failed to preserve any such claim for direct

appeal.

“It is a settled principle of appellate review, of course, that courts should

not reach claims that were not raised below.” Commonwealth v. Colavita,

993 A.2d 874, 891 (Pa. 2010) (citing Pa.R.A.P. 302(a)), overruled in part

on other grounds, Commonwealth v. Bradley, 261 A.2d 381, 397 (Pa.

2021). “A corollary of this salutary restriction is that courts generally should

not act sua sponte to raise claims or theories that the parties either did not

raise below or failed to raise in their appellate pleadings.” Id. “The rule is no

• 13 - J-S05033-26

different in the constitutional context.” Id.; see also Commonwealth v.

Cline, 177 A.3d 922, 927 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“The law is clear that issues,

even those of constitutional dimension, are waived if not raised in the trial

court.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Commonwealth v.

Strunk, 953 A.2d 577, 579 (Pa. Super. 2008) (“Even issues of constitutional

dimension cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).

With Misseri failing to present this claim to the trial court, he has waived

review of such a contention and is due no relief.

As neither of Misseri’s two arguments warrant reversal and/or remand,

we affirm his judgment of sentence.

Judgment of sentence affirmed.

Date: 3/19/2026

• 14 -